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Abstract
This thesis examines issues associated with the interaction of government and
financial institutions in the operation of a company through the board of directors in
Japan and Taiwan. Specially, it highlights the relationships between a company, the
main bank system, and the system of amakudari (appointing retired bureaucrats to
the board of public companies). The focus is on why government and financial
institutions intervene in the operation of a company, and whether the intervention of
government and financial institutions is related to the subsequent operation of a
company through the board of directors. The empirical results suggest that
governments and financial institutions tend to appoint representatives to the board in
order to help troubled companies. On the other hand, a negative relationship is
established between the presence of retired bureaucrats (amakudari) and subsequent
firm performance and the degree of internationalisation. Thus, while the system of
amakudari may use its power in an attempt to save troubled companies, the argument
that monitoring ability of the board may be jeopardised to the detriment of firm
performance and the degree of internationalisation is supported. The empirical results
also demonstrate that intervention of governments and financial institutions is an
integral part of the operation a company in Japan and Taiwan.
Furthermore, with the latest reform of corporate governance in Taiwan, the thesis
also introduces the institutional background of incentive payments and
sub-committees and examines whether the level and the structure of top executives'
compensation and incentive payments are related to firm performance and the
corporate governance mechanism. The empirical results indicate that the alignment
between executives' and shareholders' interests is not less efficient in
government-linked companies (GLCs) compared to non-government-linked
companies (non-GLCs). Additionally, although the Taiwanese authorities have
started to reform corporate governance in Taiwan, the grants of incentive payments
to top executives are not necessarily related to performance or the corporate





Informal relationships are often mentioned as one characteristic of Asian economies
that is used in the formulation and implementation of government policy. Many
studies conclude that the so-called "economic miracles", and especially that of Japan
during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, mainly happened due to the peculiar
characteristics of these countries' economic systems and the intervention of
government (e.g. Aoki et al., 1996; Porter et al., 2000). Against the background of
these claims, the concept of 'relational capitalism' has been presented as a viable
alternative to the stock market capitalism of Western countries (Raghuram and
Zingales, 1998; Kang, 2002). Examples of such informal relationships can be found
in Japan (keiretsu, amakudari), Korea (chaebol), China, and Taiwan (family
companies). It is also pointed out, however, that the existence of this close
relationship between government sectors and companies has often bordered on
corruption.
In more recent years, after the major economic crises that struck many Asian
countries in the late 1990s, analysis focused on the perceived weaknesses of
relational capitalism (e.g. Haggard, 2000; Claessens et al., 1999; Van Rixtel and
Hassink, 2002; Colignon and Usui, 2003), manifested in a lack of disclosure and
transparency, the absence of an independent corporate governance mechanism and
outright corruption (Monks and Minow, 2004). For example, due to the lack of
disclosure and transparency, the Long-term Credit Bank (LTCB) in Japan collapsed
in 1998 because of nonperforming loans (NPLs). It is clear that although
governments in Asian countries recorded some remarkable economic achievements
in the past, certain characteristics of political intervention have been regarded as
inefficient. Based on the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1998), the government plays
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the role as a grabbing hand. In the grabbing hand model, politicians will divert the
objective from profit maximisation to pursue their own political goals, such as
maximizing domestic votes. Therefore, informal relationships which arise through
political and financial intervention may result in weak corporate governance in Asia.
Many scandals, such as Livedoor in 2006 in Japan, Procomp in 20041 in Taiwan,
and Pacific Electric Wire and Cable in 2005 in Taiwan, highlight the problems of
political intervention and the weakness of corporate governance in Asia. Based on
the grabbing hand model, the basis of hypotheses in this thesis is the argument that
the intervention of governments and financial institutions is the source of
inefficiency.
Japan and Taiwan have been characterised by the close relationship between
government and business, especially in the 1980s in Japan and the late of 1970s in
Taiwan. Until now, government in Japan and Taiwan still intervenes in the operation
of public companies. Given the scandals and problems resulting from political
intervention and weak corporate governance, many studies now conclude that some
reassessment is called for (e.g., Lee and Yeh, 2004). Meanwhile, recent financial
scandals in Taiwan mentioned above have also exposed the weakness there of
corporate governance when subject to political intervention. Therefore, given the
similarity in political intervention and the financial system (e.g., the main bank
system) between Japan and Taiwan, this thesis sets out to compare the difference in
the relationships between governments, financial institutions, and companies in the
two countries.
There is a large volume of literature on corporate governance that establishes
unequivocally that corporate governance mechanisms affect the operation of
companies. Most of this literature supports the adoption of specific governance
mechanisms (e.g., outside directors or sub-committees on the board) as currently
employed in developed western countries, such as the US and the UK (Mueller,
1 Taiwan's market regulator has compared the bankruptcy scandal at Procomp Informatics in 2004 to
the collapse of the giant US energy company Enron in 2001. Procomp Informatics is a major
Taiwanese computer hardware maker. It has been the subject of a Financial Supervisory Commission
investigation into claims that its executives colluded with overseas sales agents to falsely boost sales
revenue, illegally leveraged assets frozen due to past improprieties, and manipulated share price.
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2006). However, there is reason to question whether these findings are equally
applicable to countries in East Asia, where political intervention is widely regarded
as a critical factor in company operations, due to the informal relationships that exist
between the public and private sectors (Van Rixtel, 2002; Dunning and Narula, 1996;
Kang, 2002; Aoki et al., 1996). Even omitting this political factor, corporate
governance mechanisms originating from western countries may not necessarily be
applicable in East Asian economics.
Meanwhile, although government in Japan and Taiwan acts similarly, the differences
on corporate governance may cause dissimilar outcomes. Except for insider-oriented
boards and the two-tire system and which include a board of directors and a board of
auditors concurrently, board composition and ownership structure in Japan and
Taiwan are different. First, Japanese boards are typically comprised mostly of former
employees and representatives from affiliated companies while Taiwanese boards are
mostly composed of family members. According to agency theory, this difference
implies that boards in Japan and Taiwan may have different incentives and behaviour.
These family members who sit on the boards may have stronger incentive to monitor
executives while representatives from affiliated companies are sent to solidify good
relationships.
Therefore, recognising the similarities and differences, this thesis investigates the
intervention of governments and financial institutions in the operation of a company
through its board of directors. From the viewpoint of firm performance, the first
question we examine is that why government and financial institutions intervene in
the operation of a company. Given the importance of corporate governance and the
informal relationships between directors and government bureaucrats in Japan and
Taiwan, we hypothesise that firm performance may be correlated with subsequent
intervention of government and financial institutions. Accordingly, the second
question is whether the intervention of governments and financial institutions is
correlated wit subsequent firm performance.
In addition to firm performance, this thesis also focuses on the degree of
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internationalisation (DOI) in the second topic. While firm performance is commonly
the focus when evaluating the operation of a company, it is also common for
governments and financial institutions in Asia to support or regulate the international
activities of companies and thereby influence the strategy of internationalisation of a
company (Sim and Pandian, 2003). Based on the grabbing hand model (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1998), the intervention of governments and financial institutions is likely to
be negatively related to DOI. In order to understand the intervention of governments
and financial institutions more comprehensively, it is necessary to also examine DOI.
To do this, we first examine whether the argument that DOI influences the
intervention of government and financial institutions through the board of directors is
supported by our data. Accordingly, we investigate whether such intervention is
associated with subsequent DOI.
By laying bare the interplay between government, financial institutions, the board of
directors, and the operation of companies, we can try to understand the possible
reasons for the intervention of governments and financial institutions in Japan and
Taiwan. With the benefit of such understanding, governments and financial
institutions in Japan and Taiwan could appreciate the weakness or strengths of
intervention and adjust their policies accordingly. As an example of such policy
initiatives, the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) was established in 1998 in Japan.
The FSA is responsible for supervising the management of banks and other financial
institutions. It has established a more disciplined relationship with individual banks
to mitigate the problems caused by informal relationships.
In addition to the two topics of firm performance and DOI, a third topic is
investigated here, namely top executives' compensation and incentive payments in
Taiwan. Due to several severe financial scandals, the authorities in Taiwan have
started to reform corporate governance. Related regulations and guidelines have been
established within the last five years. These new laws or requirements have
significantly improved the disclosure of top executives' compensation and incentive
payments, thereby allowing us to investigate the granting of share-based
compensation. In this thesis, we first discuss this recent legal reform of corporate
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governance in Taiwan and then try to examine the relationship between top
executives' compensation and incentive payments and the corporate governance
mechanism.
There are three main research questions regarding this topic. First, is there a
relationship between top executives' compensation and incentive payments and other
governance variables? Second, whether corporate governance mechanisms provide
an alternative to the use of incentive payments? Furthermore, based on the grabbing
hand model (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) which demonstrates that politicians may
pursue their own profits at the expense of the companies' interests, the third question
we ask is, do non-government-licked companies (non-GLCs) better align the
interests of top executives with the interests of shareholders? We seek to discover
what determines the level and structure of top executives' compensation and
incentive payments. By understanding this relationship, we hope to better understand
the efficiency of share-based compensation in Taiwan.
1.2 Thesis Overview
In this thesis, we first discuss, from the viewpoint of firm performance, why
government and financial institutions intervene in the operation of a company
through the board of directors. We then investigate the relationship between the
intervention of government and financial institutions and firm performance through
the board of directors. Following this topic, we also investigate the similar
relationships from the viewpoint of DOI. Furthermore, given the more transparent
disclosure of share-based compensation and the lack of literature regarding top
executives' compensation in Taiwan, this thesis also introduces the institutional
background of top executives' compensation and incentive payments in Taiwan and
investigates the relationships between the share-based compensation to top
executives' and the corporate governance mechanism in that country.
The context of political involvement and the institutional background of corporate
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governance in Japan and Taiwan are provided in Chapter 2, which addresses
business-government relations and the specific characteristics of corporate
governance in Japan and Taiwan. It is shown that, in general, governments in Japan
and Taiwan have the power to control the operation of specific companies by
appointing ex-bureaucrats to the board of directors, thus influencing company
operations and supporting projects favoured by the government. In addition to the
existence of political involvement, Japan and Taiwan also share similarities in board
structure and institutional framework. Consequently, the various characteristics of
Japanese and Taiwanese corporate governance are discussed, such as the board of
auditors and the main bank system in Japan and the passive institutional investors in
Taiwan. A comparison between NYSE standards and Japanese and Taiwanese
corporate practice is also included in Appendices.
Chapter 3 addresses internationalisation in Asia, beginning with an outline of the
theories on internationalisation. In addition to firm performance, the intervention of
government and financial institutions is also related to international strategies
(Dunning and Narula, 1996). However, most internationalisation theories are largely
based on models of western multinational corporations (MNCs) (Sim and Pandian,
2003). Since Asian companies generally exhibit specific characteristics (e.g., political
involvement) and different internationalisation paths, this chapter contextually
examines the role that home governments in Asia play in internationalisation.
Hypotheses for the relationship between the intervention of governments and
financial institutions and firm performance, as well as the relationship between the
intervention of government and financial institutions and DOI are established in
Chapter 4, drawing on the existing literature. We first hypothesise that government
and financial institutions will intervene in a company when firm performance is poor.
Furthermore, drawing on the observed intervention of governments in the
internationalisation of companies in East Asia, we also build hypotheses to examine
whether DOI itself is associated with the intervention of governments and financial
institutions. The thesis then goes on to develop hypotheses that examine whether
such intervention is negatively related to subsequent firm performance and DOI. The
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possibility of the inefficiency of government intervention leads us to hypothesise that
subsequent firm performance and DOI will be negatively related to the intervention
of governments and financial institutions.
Chapter 5 introduces structural equation modelling (SEM), which is the main
empirical methodology used in this thesis. SEM combines confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) and path analysis, and utilises the concept of latent variables to
examine relationships using variables which cannot be observed directly (e.g.,
internal governance). Furthermore, unlike traditional regressions, the structural part
of SEM links latent variables with each other by using simultaneous equation
modelling. In addition to direct relationships between latent variables, we can also
estimate the indirect relationships between latent variables. Moreover, this chapter
also introduces the sampling frame, the data, and the derived variables used in this
thesis.
The SEM empirical estimates of the relationship between the intervention of
government and financial institutions and firm performance through the board of
directors are reported in Chapter 6. These results support the argument that poor firm
performance will result in the intervention of governments and financial institutions
in Japan and Taiwan. For example, the governments and financial institutions will
appoint representatives to the board to help troubled companies. Specially, the
government and financial institutions in Taiwan will intervene in the operation of a
company through the board of directors, whereas the boards in Japan do not possess
this intermediate role. However, such intervention of governments and financial
institutions is not positively associated with subsequent firm performance and the
subsequent monitoring ability of boards. Even when these troubled companies
employ many such retired bureaucrats to build an informal network, the relationship
between such intervention and subsequent firm performance in Japanese and
Taiwanese companies is not positive.
Chapter 7 presents the empirical results of SEM for the relationship between the
intervention of government and financial institutions and DOI. The results indicate
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that DOI in Japan is negatively related to the intervention of government but
positively related to the intervention from financial institutions. However, DOI in
Taiwan is negatively related to the intervention from both the government and
financial institutions. Unfortunately, intervention of the government and financial
institutions in Japan and Taiwan is not accompanied by higher subsequent firm
performance and DOI.
Chapter 8 launches a distinct discussion concerning top executives' compensation in
Taiwan. A great deal of work has been done on CEO compensation in both the US
and the UK. However, the Anglo-American approach to the alignment between top
executives' and shareholders' interests may not be applicable in Asia because Asia
has only been conscious of the importance of corporate governance after the Asian
financial crisis (Chen, 2002). Since 2000, the Taiwanese authorities have initiated a
series of reforms in the regulations and guidelines of corporate governance that have
significantly improved the transparency of reporting of top executives' compensation.
Unfortunately, top executives' compensation in Japan remains as topics for which it
is difficult to obtain precise data. Most data are vague or confidential (Kubo and
Kato, 2006). Therefore, this thesis does not include any empirical analysis of top
executives' compensation and incentive payments in Japan. Before engaging in
empirical analysis, Chapter 8 discusses the composition and institutional framework
of top executives' compensation and the adoption of board sub-committees in
Taiwan.
Chapter 9 develops the hypotheses and provides details of the empirical data on this
topic. Based on the prior literature, we include past firm performance, cash
constraints, board composition, ownership structure, investment opportunities, and
firm size as determinants and try to find out what factors affect the level and
structure of top executives' compensation. The sample, data, derived variables, and
estimation methodologies are also introduced in this chapter.
Chapter 10 presents the empirical results concerning top executives' compensation.
These results indicate that, although the Taiwanese authorities have started to reform
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corporate governance, grants of incentive payments to top executives are not always
related to performance or to corporate governance, such as the ratio of outside
directors. Moreover, given the argument that companies will choose across corporate
governance mechanisms (Coles et al., 2000), the results in this thesis imply that
non-GLCs in Taiwan may distribute share-based compensation to executives
excessively because the distribution of share-based compensation to executives is not
always negatively related to other corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, the
corporate governance influence in GLCs in Taiwan is not seen to be less efficient
than in non-GLCs. The results also point to the need to reform the disclosure of top
executives' share-based compensation and to provide a uniform calculation method
for quantifying share-based compensation .
Finally, Chapter 11 summarises the arguments of all the preceding chapters,
identifies applications and policy contributions of this thesis and points out possible
directions for future research.
In brief, this thesis examines the relationships between the intervention of
government and financial institutions and firm performance and DOI. Furthermore,
the current institutional background and recent reforms of corporate governance in
Japan and Taiwan are also discussed. The thesis breaks new ground by utilising SEM
to examine political and financial intervention from the viewpoint of corporate
governance in Japan and Taiwan. Furthermore, it also examines the relationship
between top executives' compensation and the corporate governance mechanism in
Taiwan, a theme that has been seldom investigated before. It is only due to the very
recent improvement in the level of disclosure of corporate governance data in Japan
and Taiwan that this analysis has been possible. Based on the findings presented
above, the reform of corporate governance in Japan and Taiwan has further ground to
cover.
2 The Taiwanese government now intends to refer to Statement 123(R) in the US, which regulates that
the cost of all employee share options and equity-based compensation should be reflected in the
financial statements based on the estimated fair value of the awards.
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Chapter Two
Political Involvement and Corporate
Governance
2.1 Introduction
The operation of a successful company always involves many external and internal
factors. In some countries, political involvement is the most obvious external factor.
In relational capitalism (Raghuram and Zingales, 1998), most of the economy is
operated subject to a grabbing hand which is controlled by the ruling political party
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). The ruling party may afford better treatment to those
companies that have the same political ideology as the ruling party and who are
engaged in economic activities that are favoured by the government. In this kind of
capitalism, it is of critical importance for managers and directors to develop a
harmonious relationship with the government in order to get the subsidised resources.
In addition, the government can also have the power to control the operation of some
specific companies through the pattern of government ownership and government
appointed directors and thereby can attempt to make a profit or to extract rents for
the ruling party. This is especially true for government-linked financial institutions.
The grabbing hand model in the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1998) indicates that
that the government will pursue its own interests at the expense of the taxpayers and
shareholders, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the monitoring system of a
company.
In relational capitalism, the rules established by the government, such as entry
barriers, regulations, subsidies, and taxes, also strongly affect company strategies and
firm performance. So a company will attempt variously to lobby and appoint retired
bureaucrats to the board in order to build deeper relations with the government, for
example, the system of amakudari in Japan (Van Rixtel and Hassink, 2002), In this
way, the company may be able to enjoy some specific advantages in trade and bank
borrowing as a payback from the government. Examples of such arrangements are
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the business groups that dominate the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese economies
(keiretsu, chaebol, and family enterprise respectively). Nevertheless, overlooking the
contribution that governments have made to the economic achievement of many
Asian countries would be a mistake (Raghuram and Zingales, 1998).
Empirical analysis is used in this thesis to examine two dimensions - firm
performance and the degree of internationalisation (DOI). First, we examine the
relationship between firm performance and political involvement. We try to find the
reason why governments and other financial institutions intervene in the operation of
some companies. We also examine whether this kind of intervention jeopardises the
monitoring ability of a board and subsequent firm performance. Second, we
investigate the relationship between DOI and political involvement. Since the
governments in many Asian countries support the international expansion of local
companies, a significant relationship should exist between political involvement and
the prior/subsequent DOI. In this thesis, we try to fill the gap left by quantitative
empirical studies on this topic.
Although few papers study the relationship between political involvement and firm
performance and DOI, there are many papers paying attention to political issues in
macroeconomics, political economics and public finance. Scholars have discussed
the topics of the unemployment rate, economic growth rate, congressional voting,
and monetary policy. Poole and Rosenthal (1996) and Kalt and Zapan (1990) argue
that political ideology significantly affects the legislator's voting behaviour; that is, a
legislator may vote for a specific policy that conforms to the policy of his party. They
conclude that a legislator's political ideology will affect his voting behaviour and
thereby affect whether the government adopts a new policy. Lopez and Ramirez
(2000) conclude that a worsening of economic conditions (e.g. higher inflation rate
or higher unemployment rate) causes the convergence of the political views of
different parties. However, when the economic growth rate increases, the political
views of different parties become highly distinct. They infer that political ideology is
an endogenous factor. However, compared with macroeconomics and public finance
studies, studies concerning the relationship among political involvement, the
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corporate governance mechanism and firm performance are still rare.
Among these few studies concerning the relationship between political involvement
and firm performance, Raghuram and Zingales (1998) argue that stock market
capitalism, although not necessarily better than relational capitalism, has a much
lower chance of causing systematic financial crisis in the short term. Agrawal and
Knoeber (2001) is the pioneering study, which takes political involvement into
consideration in corporate governance mechanism studies. They examine the
political roles of outside directors and find that when politics is more important for a
company, there is a greater number of directors with political and legal experience in
that company. In addition, they also conclude that politically experienced directors
are more important when the government acts as an ally because cooperating with
the government is more important. Conversely, legally experienced directors are
more important when the government acts as an adversary because, in this situation,
negotiating or standing up to the government is more important. In addition to
corporate governance and firm performance, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) also
claim that political ideology will influence the value-weighted excess return in the
stock market in the US. There are also several studies that have examined the
relationship between Japanese bank performance and the system of amakudari, for
example, Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002) and Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001). Most
studies conclude that the system of amakudari enables banks to expand risk-taking
activities and thereby sabotages the monitoring system. According to these papers, it
seems that political involvement greatly affects the corporate governance mechanism
and firm performance.
In order to strengthen the effectiveness ofpolicy implementation and to pave the way
for winning the next election, government representatives who sit on boards would
have to be replaced if the ruling party changes, thus ensuring that these companies
follow the policies favoured by the new ruling party . In addition to the system of
amakudari in Japan, Ma and Yu (2003) examine the power-shift in Taiwan and find
that there is a significant relationship between the policy control consideration and
the turnover rate of directors. That is, the percentage change of board members after
13
the power-shift is significantly higher for policy-sensitive companies that are highly
regulated or instrumental to policy implementation, such as the banking, energy,
transportation, and telecommunications industries.
According to the literature, there is reason to believe that political involvement
affects corporate governance and firm performance. However, the existing literature
is limited to the system of amakudari in the Japanese banking industry. We attempt to
investigate the relationship among political involvement, corporate governance, and
firm performance and the relationship among political involvement, corporate
governance, and DOI in Japan and Taiwan. Before discussing the sample and the
models used in this thesis, we will introduce the background of political involvement
and corporate governance in Japan and Taiwan. Section 2.2 will discuss political
involvement and corporate governance in Japan and Section 2.3 will discuss political
involvement and corporate governance in Taiwan. The conclusion is presented in
Section 2.4.
2.2 Political Involvement and Corporate Governance in Japan
2.2.1 Informal Networks in Japan: Amakudari and Gakubatsu
The most notable feature of the Japanese corporate governance mechanism is serious
political involvement, which is dominated by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF)
and Bank of Japan (BoJ). The MoF, BoJ, and other subsidiary organisations not only
supervise financial activities in Japan but also maintain strong regulatory control of
all Japanese companies (Van Rixtel, 2002; Monks and Minow, 2004). The most well
known informal network in Japan is 'amakudarf, which is discussed by numerous
studies (Johnson, 1974; Inoki, 1993; Van Rixtel, 2002; Van Rixtel and Hassink, 2002;
Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001; Carpenter, 2003; Schaede, 1994, 1995; Yamori, 1998;
Colignon and Usui, 2003).
Before discussing amakudari in Japan, it is necessary to first introduce the concept of
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'gakubatsiC. This is a school-based clique, which is a personal network based on
academic background (Ursacki, 1994; Schaede, 1995; Van Rixtel, 2002). In Japan,
bureaucrats have long been recognised to hold a common orientation based on
education and training; they have attended the same universities and share similar
work experience. Top-level bureaucrats have a similarity of experience and education
that produces a very exclusive environment and a special elite culture, which is very
hard for other people who do not share the same experience to enter. Gakubatsu
"...is based on a strong feeling of group consciousness, resulting from sharing the
experience, and status of the same university. This strong consciousness of one's
academic background establishes a mutual support system both within and between
Japanese organisations" (Van Rixtel, 2002, p.65). The most famous gakubatsu come
from the five most prestigious universities (the so-called 'Big Five'). The best of
which is the University of Tokyo (Todai). The other four include two public
universities, the Waseda University and the Keio University, and two private, the
University ofKyoto and the Hitotsubashi University.
Japanese education is extremely competitive. If you pass the university entrance
examination and enter one of the 'Big Five', you will be guaranteed a successful
career. Colignon and Usui (2003, p.32) claim that the process of entering top
universities and then going into government is to "...contribute to the public's
perception of them as a legitimate elite based on merit." Todai is the most prestigious
university (especially the Law School) and provides the main pathway to access the
elite posts as top bureaucrats, diplomats, and ministers. Because of the centrally
controlled education in Japan, the recruitment into the government is strongly biased
toward Todai, even though Article 15 of the 1946 constitution requires public service
to be open to all. For example, in 2003, among the 18 directors of the Bank of Japan
(BoJ), 15 directors had graduated from Todai and one from the Flitotsubashi
University.
In addition to supplying elites to the public sector, the 'Big Five' also build a
public-private bridge between the government and private sector. Some of the
graduates from the 'Big Five' may enter famous large 'blue-chip' companies. These
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graduates will eventually gain the highest positions and will then facilitate
communication with the government and establish an informal relationship with
other 'Big Five' graduates in the public sector for the exchange of information,
consultation and the co-ordination of policies. The significance of networks for
university graduates in Japan is obvious. For example, in 2003, 42% of CEOs and
27% of directors graduated from the 'Big Five' . Rebick (2000) also shows that
almost 60% of employment in the private sector can be attributed to a number of
specific faculties at certain universities. According to Ichiro (1994), all 37
administrative vice ministers of MoF between 1945 and 1995 graduated from the
University of Tokyo. Out of the 26 administrative vice ministers of the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), only one did not graduate from the 'Big
Five'.
Because of similar academic backgrounds, this connection between the public and
private sectors may result in a "homogenisation of views" (Johnson, 1982, p.60-62).
These graduates who share a similar educational background and work experience
also share a similar orientation to government politics and policies (Colignon and
Usui, 2003). Under this kind of homogeneity and the close relationship with
education, it is very common to appoint a director or an employee with the political
background of a certain public sector because they come from the same environment.
It is very easy for managers who work in the private sector to say "...we need one
officer from the government or come to work with us" (Colignon and Usui, 2003,
p.34). Thus, there is always political involvement.
Because of the gakubatsu, the phenomenon of amakudari occurs. The system of
amakudari is the post-retirement employment of government bureaucrats in public
listed companies. The literal translation of amakudari is 'descent from heaven' and
refers to the re-employment of top-level bureaucrats in high-level positions in private
or public listed companies, for example, as presidents, directors, CEOs, and CFOs.
These retired bureaucrats receive full compensation from their new companies in
addition to their civil service pensions. This kind of re-employment will generate
3 Source: Yakuin Shikihou (Employee Report), published by Tokyo Keizai Shinposha.
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pervasive personal networks and alliances between many different elements of
Japanese society, business, politics, and bureaucracy. When these former bureaucrats
move to their new positions, they will bring with them their personal networks and
invaluable knowledge concerning administrative procedures and the ministry's
policies gained during their careers (Colignon and Usui, 2003; Van Rixtel, 2002).
The system of amakudari provides a channel of sharing information and resources
across legislative, bureaucratic and business institutions. With amakudari, a great
deal of information transfers to those private and public listed companies that employ
former bureaucrats. The system of amakudari can help these companies to maintain
smooth relationships with the related ministries and public institutions that regulate,
license, and subsidise their industry. Table 2-1 exhibits the scale of amakudari in
Japan from 1979 to 2000.
Table 2-1 Amakudari on the boards of directors of the 100 largest public listed
companies, Japan, 1979-2000
Year Total number Number of Firms Number of The ratio of
of directors (a) with amakudari amakudari (b) amakudari (b/a) (%)
1979 2,715 35 35 1.29
1981 2,727 40 41 1.50
1983 2,965 39 50 1.69
1985 3,122 50 71 2.27
1987 3,217 62 68 2.11
1989 3,423 65 69 2.02
1991 3,605 67 85 2.36
1997 3,434 63 102 2.97
2000 2,852 58 94 3.30
Source: Colignon and Usui (2003, p.62, Table 3.3)
Amakudari has numerous different definitions. The most obvious difference is in the
type of companies that try to employ retired bureaucrats. Some studies limit their
definition to public listed companies and some to amakudari sources, such as the
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) (Van Rixtel, 2002). In this
thesis, the following definition is used.
'Amakudari involves the movement of retired bureaucrats from the public sector to
the boards ofpublic listed companies. "
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In addition, the term 'shukko' is a variation of amakudari (Carpenter, 2003). Shukko
means "on loan to another company" (Carpenter, 2003, p.93). It is a temporary
exchange of employees between the public and private sector (Miyamoto, 1995; Van
Rixtel, 2002). The on-loan employees are assigned as regular staff of the receiving
organisations or companies for one to three years (Van Rixtel, 2002; Carpenter,
2003). The shukko mechanism can happen between the government and the private
sector, between companies, or between governmental institutions (Van Rixtel, 2002).
In this thesis, we focus on the assignment from the government to public listed
companies. These on-loan bureaucrats still have connection with their ministries but,
at the same time, they are identified as officers of the public listed companies where
they are assigned (Carpenter, 2003). According to Keehn's (1990, p. 1032) discussion
of the deployment of Japanese ministry directors in shukko positions, about 80% of
all Japanese directors in ministries had previously held shukko positions in other
organisations during their career. The benefits of shukko include better access to
political information, improved understanding of administrative and bureaucratic
rules and the establishment of informal networks with the government. Therefore, the
shukko mechanism is a very important medium, which allows the government to
intervene in the operation of a company. Based on the definition of amakudari above,
we also consider the shukko mechanism to be a form of political involvement in this
thesis.
In a broad sense, political involvement in Japan includes three other different forms.
The first form is 'yokosuberf (sideslip), which means the movement of retired
bureaucrats from the bureaucracy to public organisations, non-profit organisations,
and special legal corporations, such as the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Japan Airline, and
the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Johnson, 1974; Schaede, 1995; Colignon and
Usui, 2003). These public organisations provide an intermediate linkage between the
government and public listed companies. Many public listed companies rely on the
resources supplied by special legal corporations. These resources include contracts,
subsidies, consultancy contracts, and loans. These public organisations, non-profit
organisations, and special legal corporations also receive retired bureaucrats from the
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government through the form of yokosuberi, which is less regulated and less visible
than amakudari. Therefore, it is very common to have ex-bureaucrats in public
organisations. For example, a government report published in the Japan Times on
22nd December, 2000 claimed that 538 top-level bureaucrats retired between August
1999 and August 2000. After three months, 90% (485 ex-bureaucrats) were
employed and 53.4% (259 ex-bureaucrats) of these moved to government affiliates or
related foundations as directors, auditors, or into high management positions.
Another government report made by the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications also indicates that in Japan, 33% of
state-backed public organisations have directors, who were previously employed as
civil servants (Financial Times, 30th July, 2004).
However, high-level retired bureaucrats that move out of ministries may look
forward to two, three, or even more high-level positions in public organisations or
public listed companies. Bureaucrats who have several positions in public and
private sectors are called 'wataridorf (the literal translation is migratory birds). The
system of wataridori establishes a linkage between yokosuberi and the system of
amakudari. Wataridori represents not only the direct relationship between
bureaucracy and the first re-employment positions, but also the indirect relationship
between bureaucracy and subsequent re-employment positions. Therefore, counting
amakudari placements in the private sector and yokosuberi placements in the public
sector alone may overlook the influence ofpolitical involvement from ex-bureaucrats
who are employed by both public listed companies and special legal organisations.
The literature on wataridori, however, is very sparse, partly because of the limited
availability of data and partly because of the nature of wataridori (Johnson, 1978;
Inoki, 1995; Colignon and Usui, 2003).
The last form of political involvement in Japan is lSeikai TensirC (movement to
political office), which represents the bureaucrats' movement into the political world,
for example, by becoming candidates for election to the Diet or members of the
Lower House. According to Colignon and Usui (2003, p. 11), this path "...is usually
open only to bureaucrats who served in choice national or regional posts suitable for
19
building general political support." The previous three forms refer to the movement
of retired bureaucrats to public or private sector posts. In the larger political economy,
Diet members enact legislation that facilitates or impedes the resource and personnel
distribution in the economy. In other words, Seikai Tensin builds a complete network
among bureaucratic, political and business elites and thereby produces an iron
triangle (Colignon and Usui, 2003). For this reason, the broadest political
involvement should consider Seikai Tensin. Figure 2-1 illustrates these different
kinds of political involvement. Due to the difficulty of data collection, this thesis
only regards amakudari and shukko as political involvement.
Wataridori
>_
Source: Revised from Colignon and Usui (2003, p.12)
Figure 2-1 Political Involvement in Japan
There are a few studies that examine the relationship between Japanese bank
performance and the system of amakudari. Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002) suppose
that the system of amakudari could be helpful in exercising ex-ante and ex-post
monitoring. In ex-ante monitoring, the system of amakudari could operate as a
watchdog who takes precautions before a financial crisis happens. In ex-post
monitoring, the system of amakudari is viewed as a 'trouble shooter' who can restore
confidence among depositors and solve an acute financial crisis. Troubled banks may
attempt to employ more retired bureaucrats from MoF (Ministry of Finance) and BoJ
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(the Bank of Japan) because they can persuade the relevant regulators to allow them
to take more loans and more investment risks in order to try to improve firm
performance. According to their empirical results, there is a negative relationship
between firm performance and the inflow of retired MoF and BoJ staff members. In
this way, they argue that the system of amakudari is used as a trouble-shooter.
Furthermore, there is a positive relationship between the amount of risky loans and
the inflow of retired MoF and BoJ bureaucrats. That is, risky loans increase after
these ex-bureaucrats are recruited, which implies that the purpose of amakudari is to
buy influence from the government.
Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) classify 125 regional banks into four categories which
reflect different levels of utilisation of retired bureaucrats on the board. The
empirical analysis of Japanese regional banks shows that those banks that accept
ex-bureaucrats from MoF reduce the capital adequacy levels and increase the bad
loan ratio. Their finding is similar to that of Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002). They
conclude that the system of amakudari enables banks to expand risk-taking activities,
and thereby sabotages the monitoring system. According to these papers, we can say
that political involvement greatly affects the corporate governance mechanism and
firm performance in Japan. Owing to the significant influence of political
involvement concluded by prior literature, it is necessary to examine the relationship
between political involvement, firm performance, corporate governance, and the
strategy of a company in an empirical way.
2.2.2 External Governance: The Main Bank System and
Cross-shareholding
As Japan rebuilt its economy after World War Two, it developed a unique corporate
governance mechanism (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Monks and Minow, 2004). In
addition to the notable political involvement, which is discussed in Section 2.2.1, the
Japanese system is also famous for the form of 'relationship investing', known as
keiretsu (Monks and Minow, 2004), and the main bank system (Monks and Minow,
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2004; Aoki and Patrick, 1994). We first concentrate the pattern of cross-shareholding
by affiliated companies (i.e. keiretsu) and the main bank system in this section.
Board structure in Japan will be discussed in Section 2.2.3.
Different corporate governance mechanisms exist in different countries (Prowse,
1994; La Porta et al., 1996, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997)4. In the US and the UK,
incentive payments to executives (Murphy, 1999; Core et. al., 2003), outside
directors on the board, and the threat of external takeovers all provide incentives for
executives to maximise the interests of shareholders (Kang and Shivadasani, 1995).
In Japan, these mechanisms, which are widely adopted by countries in stock market
capitalism, exist to a lesser extent (i.e. Prowse, 1992, 1994; Kang and Shivadasani,
1995; Shleifer ad Vishny, 1997; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; Ferris et al., 2001). For
example, some shareholders in Japan, called stable shareholders, almost never sell
the shares they hold and always support the management (Morck and Nakamura,
1999; Morck et al., 2000). A group of companies "linked by stable intercorporate
shareholdings is called a keiretsu" (Morck and Nakamura, 1999, p.320). According
to Kang and Shivdasani (1995), 49% of observations in their sample belong to a
keiretsu. These stable shareholders form a barrier to takeovers. In fact, intercorporate
ownership in Japan is developed to be a takeover barrier (Sheard, 1989, 1991, 1992).
The concept of keiretsu can be defined as "a group consisting of a bank (with its
affiliated financial institutions of other kinds, such as an insurance company and a
trust bank) and the companies for which it acts as the main bank (main supplier of
funds)" (Odagiri, 1992, p.167)5. Keiretsu are famous for cross-shareholding and
4 Please refer to La Porta et al. (1996, 1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a discussion of
international differences in corporate governance.
5 The history of keiretsu can be traced back to World War Two. After 1945, the post-war occupation
by the US forced the dissolution of the family-controlled corporate groups, called zaibatsu, which
were the dominant conglomerates in Japanese business before the war (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001;
Morck and Nakamura, 1999). Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda were the four biggest
zaibatsu that dominated the Japanese economy during the pre-war and wartime periods (Hoshi and
Kashyap, 2001). Some other smaller groups, which formed at the end of the 1870s, such as Furukawa,
Asano, Fujita, and Kawasaki, were also regarded as zaibatsu (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). Since
Japanese companies were widely held by investors outside the zaibatsu after the reform, companies
formerly in zaibatsu groups started to face the threat of takeovers (Morck and Nakamura, 1999). In
order to protect companies, managers of former zaibatsu companies "set up cross-holding with the
explicit aim of blocking potential hostile raids" (Morck and Nakamura, 1999, p.320). This
coalescence of groups in English is now commonly identified by the Japanese word keiretsu.
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intense information sharing among member companies (Van Rixtel, 2002). Member
companies monitor each other (Van Rixtel, 2002; Morck and Nakamura, 1999) and
managers are monitored by companies in the same group. These member companies
and the main bank, which will be discussed later, construct a network of external
governance in Japan.
The term keiretsu covers two kinds of network. One is the vertical keiretsu, which is
a supply-chain with one dominant company, such as Toyota, Nissan, Hitachi, or
Matsushita. The other is the horizontal keiretsu, which is composed of a group of
peers. In the horizontal keiretsu, there is neither family control nor a dominant
company that governs other companies. Since the prohibition of intercorporate
ownership was withdrawn in 1949, Japanese companies started to buy each others'
shares as "part of the recapitalisation process" (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 11) and
as a barrier to hostile takeovers (Morck and Nakamura, 1999). This phenomenon is
so-called cross-shareholding and thereby creates the horizontal keiretsu, which is
different from a parent company holding shares in a subsidiary.
Cross-shareholding among keiretsu members is a device to entrench executives
(Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Morck and Nakamura, 1999). Managers are monitored
by other companies in the same group. Although this kind of external monitoring
arises in Japanese keiretsu, studies on American conglomerates make this argument
suspect (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Therefore, the main question concerning keiretsu is
whether it distorts the strategies and jeopardises firm performance (Hoshi and
Kashyap, 2001). Although this kind of alliance may provide external monitoring and
generate extra profits, some researchers argue that these profits may be used to allow
the members to undertake other activities that may not be profitable, while others
suggest that the behaviour of keiretsu companies is no different from the behaviour
of other companies (Lawrence, 1991; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Kang and
Shivdasani, 1995; Prowse, 1992; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; Hoshi and Kashyap,
2001). For example, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) report that keiretsu membership
has no effect on the sensitivity of top executive turnover to either earning or share
price performance. Based on the origin of keiretsu, we consider the
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cross-shareholding among companies as one alternative corporate governance
mechanism in this thesis.
In addition to keiretsu, the main bank system is another notable characteristic of
Japanese governance mechanisms. Keiretsu are characterised by a complicated web
of cross-shareholding among members centred around a main bank6. Kang and
Shivdasani (1995) report that 18% of the companies in their sample are tied to a main
bank. Aoki et al. (1994) define the term main bank system as follows.
"a system of corporate financing and governance involving an informal set of
practices, institutional arrangements and behaviours among industrial and
commercial firms, banks of various types, other financial institutions, and the
regulatory authorities. At the core is the relationship between the main bank and the
firm. " (Aoki et al., 1994, p.3)
The influence lfom the main banks on companies includes the supply of resources
and funds, the dispatch of directors, stable shareholding, the provision of financial
services, and the underwriting of bond issues (Aoki et al., 1994). In other words,
main banks in Japan play the role of shareholder and creditor simultaneously (Morck,
Nakamura, Shivdasani, 2000). A bank holds a substantial shareholding in the
companies to which it acts as the main bank. Before 1977, Japanese banks could not
hold more than 10% of the outstanding shares of a company. Due to the excessive
control of the banks, the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act in 1977 made the restriction
that banks cannot hold more than 5% of a company's outstanding equity and
insurance companies cannot hold more than 10%. The Act provided a 10-year period
(until April, 1987) for institutions to achieve this requirement7. The bank, therefore,
is usually one of the top five shareholders of the company and the top shareholder
among other banks (Aoki et al., 1994). Sheard (1989, p.402) reports that the main
6
In Japan, the major depository institutions are the commercial banks and ordinary banks, whose
activities are regulated under the Banking Law of 1927 (a new edition was promulgated in 1981 and
implemented in 1982). The commercial banks are composed of city banks, regional banks, and mutual
banks (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001; van Rixtel, 2002). The city banks are the largest of all commercial
banks. Most city banks are the main bank of a keiretsu (van Rixtel, 2002).
7 Before 1987, the limit ofbank ownership of an individual company was 10%.
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bank was one of the top five shareholders in 72% of observations for companies
listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in 1980, and there was
only 11% of observations whose main banks were not within the top 20 shareholders.
The concentrated shareholdings provide Japanese banks with the incentives to
monitor firm performance and future direction, and the right to intervene in the board
of directors (Aoki, 1990; Aoki et al., 1994; Sheard, 1989; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995;
Hoshi et al., 1990; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; Abe et al.,
2005). Prowse (1990) concludes that large ownership of Japanese financial
institutions affects companies' investment decisions and reduces agency costs.
Many prior studies suggest that main banks in Japan perform a role as monitor and
also as financial supporter. For example, Aoki et al. (1990), Kaplan and Minton
(1994), Kaplan (1994a), and Morck and Shivdasani (1999) find that banks are more
likely to intervene in the operation of companies and appoint directors to companies
with financial problems. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) document that companies with
ties to a main bank are more likely to replace top executives for poor performance
than companies without such ties. In case of financial distress, the main banks will
play the role of "a guarantor for other creditors, reducing the cost related to the
restructuring of the client firm" (Hiraki et al., 2003, p.241). All these studies support
the argument that the main banks are likely to enhance firm value for companies that
have ties with the main banks.
However, due to the Japanese banks' dual role as creditor and shareholder (Prowse,
1990, 1992; Sheard, 1994; Morck and Nakamura, 1999), some prior studies claim
that large ownership of the main banks may give them considerable power to
influence corporate governance without "significantly aligning their interests with
those of shareholders" (Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani, 2000, p.539) and may
constrain their incentives to maximise shareholders' interests. Although some studies,
which are discussed in the previous paragraph (i.e. Kaplan and Minton, 1994),
conclude that bank-appointed directors follow poor performance and result in a
higher executive turnover rate, Morck and Nakamura (1999) doubt the interpretation
which regards banks as ex-post monitors. Morck and Nakamura (1999) claim that
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Japanese banks have used their lobbying power to advance their own interests. The
replacement of some executives when liquidity problems occur does not indicate an
effective monitoring role for the banks. Hiraki et al. (2003) also agree with this view
that the main banks extract surplus from client companies. Meanwhile, Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998) indicate that main bank clients did not exhibit high profitability or
grow faster than their industry peers even though they have superior access to capital
resources. Furthermore, Hoshi et al. (1990) also find that poor financial performance
of client companies will result in bailouts from banks. Meanwhile, banks will also
accept disproportionate responsibility for bad debts. Therefore, these arguments
illustrate that main banks in Japan may play an insurance role, which may not
maximise firm value, rather than a monitoring role (Morck and Nakamura, 1999).
Based on the importance of bank-appointed directors and the intervention of banks,
we include variables to measure the level of bank intervention in this thesis.
From the introduction above, we can conclude that the corporate governance
mechanism in Japan is widely considered to be bank-oriented. Much less is known
regarding alternative corporate governance mechanisms in Japan (Kang and
Shivdasani, 1999). Nevertheless, such alternative mechanisms still provide the
monitoring function. Kang and Shivdasani (1999) find that companies which do not
affiliate with banks display significantly higher levels of managerial ownership,
higher levels of bank ownership by bank blockholders, smaller boards, and better
firm performance. Hiraki et al. (2003) also report that one-way intercorporate
shareholdings8 are positively related to firm value, but cross-shareholdings tend to
be negatively related to firm value. These results suggest alternative governance
mechanisms may substitute for bank-based monitoring in Japan. Therefore, in
addition to bank-oriented variables, we also include variables to measure other
alternative governance mechanisms in Japan, such as blockholder ownership and
cross-shareholding ownership.
8 Hiraki et al. (2003) suggest that there are two types of intercorporate shareholdings. The first type is
cross-shareholdings in which participating companies hold each other's share. The second type is
one-way shareholdings in which company A holds the shares of company B, but company B does not
hold any shares of company A.
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2.2.3 Internal Governance: Board Structure
Based on the introduction in Section 2.2.2, we can conclude that concentrated
ownership in Japanese companies is very high. Financial institutions are the most
important large shareholders of a company (Prowse, 1992). The unique
mechanisms - keiretsu and the main bank - also influence board structure in Japan,
where corporate priorities focus on promoting the interests of the company and its
employees rather than on the shareholders (Monks and Minow, 2004). In this section,
we will focus on the characteristics of the board of directors in Japan.
First, however, we will introduce the relevant laws and codes concerning Japanese
corporate governance. In May 1998, the Japan Corporate Governance Forum (JCGF)
issued one code, which recommended that Japanese companies should have more
outside directors and independent committees. In October 2001, the Japan Corporate
Governance Forum (JCGF) revised this code. This new code covers similar concepts
but outlines its principles in more detail. It raises the issue concerning transparent
disclosure and brings much greater clarity to board committees. Afterwards, in 2001,
the Japanese government amended its Corporation Law and Commercial Code to
strengthen the independence of statutory auditors, who are traditionally appointed by
shareholders and are responsible for supervising directors. In 2002, Japan amended
its Corporation Law and Commercial Code again to introduce the 'committee
system'. Companies can choose to use the traditional statutory auditor system, which
will be discussed below, or to adopt the committee system, which includes
independent directors, three board committees (audit, remuneration and nomination
committees), and chief executive officers. The new rules were implemented on April
1st, 2003.
From the code and the revision, we can observe that board structure in Japan is
different from board structure in most western countries, such as the US and the UK
The corporate governance in Japan, however, is similar to that in Germany (Mallin,
2004) in that banks and supervisory boards play an important role in both countries9.
9
Compared to the German system, there is no "automatic provision for employees to sit on the
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In Japan, the directors are elected at shareholder meetings, which are held annually.
At an annual general meeting (AGM), which is called by the directors of a
company10, shareholders have the right to vote for directors and statutory auditors, to
decide dividend payments and to act on other matters, such as management proposals.
The AGM is called within three months from the end of the fiscal accounting year of
the listed companies. An extraordinary general meeting (EGM) may be convened
whenever necessary11. However, only shareholders having 3% or more of the total
voting rights of all shareholders continuously for at least the preceding six months
can demand the convocation of an EGM by submitting to the directors a paper
12document describing the proposed agenda .
The top management team members in Japanese companies may include a chairman
(sometimes a deputy chairman), a president, executive directors, managing directors,
directors, advisory directors, and statutory auditors (Van Rixtel, 2002). A company
requires a minimum of three directors with at least one of them being nominated to
1 o
the position of representative director . A director is appointed by the shareholders at
the AGM for a maximum of two years14. The chairman's main tasks are to advise the
president, to manage public relations, and to take care of the selection of top
executives (Schaede, 1992, p.28). The chairman is usually regarded as powerless and
does not have significant influence (Van Rixtel, 2002). The most important director
is usually the president. The president in Japanese companies is similar to the CEO in
western companies (Kaplan and Minton, 1994). Nevertheless, Kaplan and Minton
(1994) argue that, in some cases, the chairman may have greater power. Van Rixtel
(2002, p.259) also points out that the chairman is "well informed about the strategic
decisions". Hence, in this thesis, we still consider the chairman as a board member.
Meanwhile, the president, the deputy-president, the executive directors, and the
managing directors constitute the so-called jomukai (executive committee), which is
responsible for the most important decisions (Wiersema and Bird, 1993; Van Rixtel,
supervisory boards" in the Japanese system (Mallin, 2004, p. 175).
10 Commercial Code, Article 231.
11 Commercial Code, Article 235.
12 Commercial Code, Article 237(1).
13 Commercial Code, Article 255 and Article 256
14 Commercial Code, Article 254
28
2002). In Wiersema and Bird's (1993) study, most jomukai comprise an average of
5.6 members.
In addition to directors, there are several statutory auditors on Japanese boards. Most
Japanese companies adopt the statutory auditor system. According to the Commercial
Code in Japan, Japanese companies are required to have statutory auditors (called
kansayaku) and a board of statutory auditors (Cooke and Sawa, 1998). In 2002, the
Diet made an amendment to the Commercial Code whereby a committee system was
introduced as an alternative to the traditional statutory auditor system of corporate
governance. Figure 2-2 is the comparison between the committee system and the
traditional statutory auditor system.
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Figure 2-2 The old and new corporate governance systems in Japan
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The principal duty of auditors and the board of auditors are as follows:
Principal Powers of Statutory Auditors:
1. Duty to attend and state opinions at board of directors' meetings (Commercial
Code, Article 260-3 (1))
2. Authority to request the convening of or to convene a board of directors'
meeting (Commercial Code, Article 260-3 (3,4))
3. Authority to request business reports and authority to examine business and
financial conditions (Commercial Code Article, 274 (2))
4. Authority to examine subsidiaries (Commercial Code Article 274-3)
5. Authority to request the suspension of illegal activities (Commercial Code,
Article 275-2)
6. Right to represent the company in lawsuits between directors and the company
(Commercial Code, Article 275-4)
Principal Powers of the Board of Statutory Auditors:
1. Right to consent to or to propose the election of an auditor (Law on Exceptions
to the Commercial Code, Article 18 (3))
2. Authority to elect or dismiss an external financial auditor (Law on Exceptions to
the Commercial Code, Article 3 (2,3), Article5-2 (3), Article6 (3), and Article
6-2 (1))
Source: Japan Corporate Auditors Association (JCAA)15.
Previously, the relevant Act had stated that a person could be appointed as an outside
statutory auditor even if he/she had previously been a director, an executive officer or
an employee of the same corporation or one of its subsidiaries, provided that five
years had elapsed since that period of employment. Therefore, the independence of
statutory auditors is doubtful (Cooke and Sawa, 1998). In 2001, an amendment was
made to the Japanese Commercial Code and statutory auditors were given a more
15
For more discussion regarding the powers of auditors, please refer to
http://www.kansa.or.ip/english/frarneset-about01.html.
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independent and important role within their companies. After 2001, the statutory
auditor system became more strict in large companies. A large company is defined in
the statute as a joint-stock company, whose legal capital exceeds ¥500 million or
whose total balance-sheet liabilities exceed ¥20 billion16'17. The new Commercial
Code stated that a person who had previously been a director, an executive officer or
an employee of the same corporation or one of its subsidiaries, may never become an
outside director. From 1st May, 2005, there must be at least three auditors and at least
1 8
half of the auditors must be outside auditors . A board of statutory auditors should
also be formed. The board of statutory auditors of a Japanese company is
functionally similar to the audit committee on an American board. However, the
board of auditors must be a separate body from the board of directors. The auditors
cannot serve as a director or an employee of the company or its subsidiaries
concurrently19'20.
In addition to statutory auditors, another characteristic of Japanese boards of
directors is that the board is mainly composed of insiders (Aoki, Patrick, Sheard,
1994). According to Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994), incumbent managers include
two kinds of employees. The first kind is insiders, so-called life-time employees who
have risen to top management positions through internal promotion. The second kind
is outsiders who are ex-bureaucrats or ex-employees of other organisations, such as
banks and affiliated companies. Although directors and auditors are responsible for
monitoring executives in Japan, they lack independence because the president
normally selects his successor and has the final authority to decide the appointment
of directors and statutory auditors owing to the culture of life-time employment
(Cooke and Sawa, 1998; Kaplan and Minton, 1994). Therefore, unlike most
16 "Law Related to Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc. of Joint
Stock Corporations", Article 1-2
17 The amendment of the Commercial Code made in May 2002 (the "May 2002 amendment")
introduced the concept of "deemed large company". A company is a deemed large company under the
Code if it has issued share capital ofmore the ¥100 million.
18 "Law Related to Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc. of Joint
Stock Corporations", Article 18
19 "Law Related to Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc. of Joint
Stock Corporations", Article 18 (4)
20 If a person had previously been a director or an employee of the company or its subsidiaries, he/she
can still serve as a statutory auditor in the company after retirement. However, he/she would not be
regarded as an outside statutory auditor.
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companies in the US and the UK, before the amendment was made to the
Commercial Code in 2001, most Japanese boards were dominated by inside directors
(Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). In Kaplan (1994a), 58.8% of the sample companies
had no outside director. In Kang and Shivdasani (1995), a Japanese board usually had,
on average, less than one outside director (0.72). Furthermore, according to a survey
published by the Japan Corporate Auditors Association (JCAA) in 1996, over 50% of
companies with representation in JCAA had outside auditors coming from parent
companies, other affiliated companies, and their main banks.
According to the Commercial Code in Japan, Japanese companies are required to
have statutory auditors and a board of statutory auditors (Cooke and Sawa, 1998).
Albeit that the independence of statutory auditors is low in Japan, we still include
auditors as members of the board of directors. Furthermore, although the observed
frequency of outside directors is low in Japan (Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan and Minton,
1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995), the influence of outside directors is not
insignificant. For example, Kaplan and Minton (1994) find that poor firm
performance is negatively related to the subsequent appointments of outside directors.
Morck and Nakamura (1999) also find that poor share performance will raise the
possibility of an outside bank representative being appointed to the board. This
finding infers that outside directors are still regarded as a source of external
monitoring in Japan. Therefore, in this thesis, we also include the ratio of outside
directors in Japanese models.
Since Japan and Taiwan share differences and similarities on political involvement
and corporate governance, the following section will introduce political involvement
and corporate governance in Taiwan.
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2.3 Political Involvement and Corporate Governance in Taiwan
2.3.1 Business-Government Relations in Taiwan
Political involvement in Taiwan is significant but implicit. The origin of the
business-government relations can be traced back to the political interests of the
ruling party, the Kuo-Min-Tang (KMT) (Haggard, 2000). The KMT was the ruling
party for fifty years in Taiwan. Following the establishment of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) in 1949, the KMT has remained active in Taiwan up to the present
time. In 1950, the KMT declared martial law in Taiwan and halted some democratic
processes, including Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Until the 1970s, the
KMT successfully developed the economy and created the admirable 'Taiwan
economic miracle' (Tien, 1992). However, the KMT controlled the government under
a one-party authoritarian state until the reforms in the late 1970s through to the 1990s.
In the 1970s, the KMT began to allow for supplemental elections in Taiwan to fill the
seats of the aging representatives in the parliament. Although opposition parties were
not permitted, representatives who did not belong to the KMT were tolerated. In the
1980s, the KMT focused on transforming the government from a single-party system
to a multi-party democracy. With the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) in 1986, the KMT started competing against the DPP in Parliamentary
elections. In 1991, martial law was lifted. All parties were allowed to compete in all
levels of elections, including the Presidential election (Roy, 2003)21.
As the ruling party in Taiwan for fifty years, the KMT amassed a vast business
empire and operated state-owned companies in almost every industry, including the
banking and insurance industry, the steel industry, the cement industry, the
petrochemical industry, the ceramic industry, and television and radio stations. The
characteristics of these state-owned companies are similar to the special corporations
(tokushu hojin) in Japan22, which are supported by public funding from the
21 The history of the KMT is based on its official website: http://www.kmt.org.tw/
22 The establishment of special corporations (tokushu hojin) in Japan was based on a special law, the
Law Establishment Act, Article 4-11 subject to the Ministry of General Affairs (renamed as the
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunication, MPHPT , in 2001 and
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state-owned banks and annual government budget (Carpenter, 2003). During that
period, these state-owned enterprises were more like party-owned enterprises, which
made the KMT the richest political party in East Asia23. The KMT's long-term
holding of political power, however, also brought corruption, vote buying, and
plutocracy (Kang, 2002).
With the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 and the lifting
of martial law in 1991, the ruling party had strong incentives to utilise business
groups for political and financial support (Chu, 1994). This tendency was reinforced
by the elections (Haggard, 2000; Haggard and McCubbins, 2000). Elections in
Taiwan created strong incentives for politicians (i.e. candidates) to pursue personal
votes which could be gained by campaign contributions and business supports. This
phenomenon in Taiwan is similar to the phenomenon in Japan. In both countries, the
single non-transferable vote system24 enables parties to use public construction
projects to assist individual candidates in solidifying his/her personal support base
(Haggard, 2000; Haggard and McCubbins, 2000). In this kind of environment,
business groups may utilise the opportunity of giving support to a party to cement
their informal relationship with the government and to guarantee their interests in the
future.
In this situation, people regard political involvement as natural. Compared to western
countries, the percentage of government ownership in listed companies is very high
in Taiwan. According to our calculation, by 31st December, 2004, the average ratio of
government ownership to total outstanding listed shares was 2.21%, and the
market-value-weighted government ownership amounted to 12.34% . Through
shares and corporate bonds, the KMT regime economically allied itself with
enterprises and the mass investors for decades (Lee, 2004; Hsu, 2002). For example,
the National Financial Stabilization Fund (NFSF) was established in 2000. According
renamed again as Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, MIC, in 2004.) (Carpenter, 2003).
23 "Taiwan's Kuomintang On the brink", Economist, 6th December, 2001.
24 The single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) means that many legislators are elected from the
same district but each voter can only cast one ballot. Moreover, the votes of one candidate cannot be
transferred to another candidate of the same party.
25 The market-value-weighted ratio for each industry = t/ze capitalisation of the industry
the total capitalisation of the market
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to the 'Statute for the Establishment and Administration of the National Financial
Stabilization Fund', which was announced on 9th February, 2000, the NFSF was
specially established to preserve stability in capital markets and other financial
markets and guarantee national stability26'27. Since most investors in Taiwan are
individuals , the KMT used the NFSF to boost the market temporarily during the
election period (Lin and Roberts, 2001). The central bank in Taiwan, CBC29, also
extended its regulatory authority over the banking system (Cheng, 1993; Haggard,
2000). Loans from the state-owned banks "tended to flow primarily to state-owned
firms and a handful of larger private enterprises with collateral in land" (Haggard,
2000, p. 135). The government can utilise these banks to subsidise favourable
companies and public construction projects, which can generate domestic votes.
The era of the KMT ended in March, 2000 when the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) won the presidential election and ended the KMT's position as the ruling party
in Taiwan for the first time. Although the ruling party changed, the
business-government relationship still exists (Ma and Yu, 2003). In order to cement
the government's power, a new network emerged. It is not unusual to observe a
reshuffle of administrative positions in any country after a transition in the
government. However, it is not so common to observe board restructuring in the
26 "Statute for the Establishment and Administration of the National Financial Stabilization Fund",
Article 1: The National Financial Stabilization Fund (the "Fund") is specially established and this
Statute is adopted for purposes of responding to significant occurrences at home or abroad so as to
preserve stability in capital markets and other financial markets and guarantee national stability.
27 "Statute for the Establishment and Administration of the National Financial Stabilization Fund",
Article 4: The total amount of the Fund's utilizable funds shall be NTD500 billion, which shall come
from the following sources:
1. Borrowings from financial institutions, collateralized by stock held by the National Treasury in
public and private enterprises; the ceiling on such borrowings shall be NTD200 billion;
2. Borrowings from the Postal Deposit system, Postal Life Insurance Fund, Labour Insurance
Fund, Labour Pension Fund, and Civil Servant Pension Fund of funds that are available for investment
in securities but have not yet been invested; the ceiling on such borrowings shall be NT$300 billion.
3. Other funding sources approved by the competent authority.
The types and quantities of stocks that may be furnished as collateral as provided in subparagraph 1 of
the preceding article shall be proposed by the Ministry of Finance for approval by the competent
authorities. The collateralization of such stocks shall not be subject to the restrictions in Article 7,
paragraph 1, and Article 28 of the National Property Law.
Borrowings made by the fund pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not be subject to the restrictions in the
Public Debts Law.
28 For the discussion concerning ownership structure in Taiwanese companies, please refer to Section
2.3.2.
29 The full name of the central bank in Taiwan is "Central Bank ofChina (CBC)".
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private sector after a power-shift. According to Ma and Yu (2003), after the
power-shift, about one third of the board members of 73 listed GLCs were re-elected
within the first year after the presidential inauguration and, of these, 40% changed
their chairman and 33% changed their CEOs. New CEOs or chairmen were often
DPP members or people who had a good relationship with the new ruling party.
Based on the history of the business-government relationship in Taiwan and board
restructuring in the private sector after the power-shift, political involvement in
Taiwan may be rent-extracting rather than profit-maximising.
Ma and Yu (2003) examine the power-shift in Taiwan. They build two main
hypotheses - the control-driven hypothesis and the performance-driven hypothesis.
The control-driven hypothesis suggests that the motivation of political involvement
is to control companies for domestic votes and policy implementation. Conversely,
the performance-driven hypothesis suggests that the motivation of political
involvement is to improve firm performance. Ma and Yu (2002) find that there is a
significant relationship between policy control considerations and the turnover rate
of directors. That is, the percentage change in board members after the power-shift is
significantly higher for policy-sensitive firms, which are highly regulated or
instrumental to policy implementation, such as banking, energy, transportation and
telecommunication industries. The subsequent firm performance, however, is not
related to the turnover rate of directors. This finding rejects the performance-driven
hypothesis. It indicates that the motivation behind this kind of board restructuring is
control-driven rather than performance-driven.
From the company's viewpoint, in order to strengthen the business-government
relationship and thereby obtain some advantages, companies in Taiwan also employ
directors who have political backgrounds, such as former CBC bureaucrats and
former executives of state-owned enterprises. This has similarities to the amakudari
and shukko systems in Japan30. Because of the different ideologies between the two
political parties, KMT and DPP, Taiwanese companies cannot avoid political
involvement in order to guarantee profit in such a political environment. This
30 For discussion concerning the amakudari system and the shukko system in Japan, please refer to
2.2.1.
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provides us with a good opportunity to evaluate the effect of political involvement on
corporate governance, firm performance and DOI in Taiwan, which has seldom been
examined before (Hoesel, 1999; Smith, 2000). Why and how political involvement
affects corporate governance, firm performance and DOI of Taiwanese companies
are questions that need to be given more attention.
2.3.2 External Governance: Passive Institutional Investors
Unlike in Japan, where companies utilise financial institutions as a strong external
governance mechanism, in other Asian countries, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong,
family control is quite strong (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Recent literature shows
that corporate governance in emerging Asian countries has been noticed by
researchers (Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Joh, 2003; Yeh et al.,
2001; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Among companies in these emerging Asian
countries, Taiwanese companies have been criticised for the lack of transparency in
financial reports, weak institutional investors, and family control (Yeh et al., 2001,
2002; Solomon, 2003). In this section, we focus on the phenomenon of passive
institutional investors in Taiwan. We will discuss board structure in Section 2.3.3.
Appendix 1 summarises the institutional framework.
Small-sized and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the major company styles in
Taiwan (Chen, 1999). The directors in SMEs tend to be family-related, which means
companies in Taiwan do not have significant numbers of outside directors who are
not members of the founding family or affiliated companies (Yeh et al., 2001).
Family control is a dominant characteristic in Taiwanese companies (Yeh et al., 2001;
Solomon et al., 2003), which will be discussed in Section 2.3.3. The phenomenon of
family control results in low institutional ownership in Taiwan (Yeh et al., 2001,
2002). In the US and the UK, independent directors, incentive payments and the
threat of takeovers all provide incentives for managers to maximise the interests of
shareholders, while companies in Japan and Germany utilise the relationship between
banks and companies as strong external governance (Kaplan, 1994b). The role of
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institutional investors in Taiwan is quite different from that in other countries. In
Taiwan, individual investors are the major participants of the Taiwanese stock market.
Conversely, institutional investors own only a minor portion. According to Table 2-3
below, in 2004, foreign institutional ownership was 10.9%; domestic institutional
ownership was 11.6 percent, whereas domestic individual ownership was 75.9
percent. In the 1990s, the Taiwanese government started to set policies to increase
institutional ownership (Yeh, et al., 2001). In 2000, the Ministry of Finance in
Taiwan removed the limitation that foreign institutional ownership could not exceed
50% equity of a company. However, as shown in Table 2-3, institutional ownership
remained limited. A large portion of individual investors will result in many noise
traders31, a sentimental market, and a high turnover rate in the market (De Long et al.,
1990). Moreover, individual shareholders often waive their right to have a voice in
shareholder meetings due to either their overly small shareholding or to less
cohesiveness among individual shareholders.
Table 2-2 The type of investors and trading value ratio in Taiwan
Domestic Institutional Foreign Institutional Domestic Individual
Year Investors Investors Investors
1992 3.6 0.3 96.1
1993 5.4 0.5 94.1
1994 5.8 0.7 93.5
1995 6.7 1.4 91.9
1996 8.6 2.1 89.3
1997 7.6 1.7 90.7
1998 8.6 1.6 89.7
1999 9.4 2.4 88.2
2000 10.3 3.6 86.1
2001 9.7 5.9 84.4
2002 10.1 6.7 82.3
2003 11.5 9.4 77.8
2004 11.6 10.9 75.9
2005 /01 12.9 16.4 67.8
* Source: Corporate governance in Taiwan, Securities and Future Institute, April, 2005, p. 8.
Owing to low institutional ownership, the empirical evidence on the roles of
31 A noise trader is a share trader that does not have any specific information of the security. They
don't trade on fundamentals, then they consistently buy high and sell low (De Long et al., 1990).
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• ... 32 •institutional investors in Asia is sparse (Claessens and Fan, 2002) . Qi et al. (2000)
use a sample of Chinese listed companies and find that performance is positively
associated with ownership by legal persons (institutional or corporate investors) but
negatively associated with state ownership. The argument that legal persons are
better monitors than the state is supported by Sun and Tong (2002), who also use a
sample of Chinese listed companies. Furthermore, significant political involvement
also reduces the demand of external governance from institutional investors because
"professionalism may reveal information that can jeopardize the firms' rent-seeking
activities" (Claessens and Fan, 2002, p.82). Chen et al. (2003) report that 50% of the
directors are appointed by state controlling shareholders after studying 621 Chinese
companies that went public from 1993 to 2000. They present a negative relationship
between the presence of bureaucrats and professionalism. The presence of
bureaucrats results in fewer directors possessing experience in law, finance, or
accounting. Given this finding, in countries with significant political involvement,
such as Taiwan and China, the monitoring ability from institutional investors may be
reduced.
In a similar way to that in Japan, the phenomenon of cross-shareholding also occurs
in Taiwan. The Company Law in Taiwan, however, allows institutional or
government shareholders to appoint representatives to the board as directors and
supervisors concurrently to serve the same company33'34. This enables the controlling
family to establish nominal investment companies as a vehicle of shareholding (Lee
32 Some studies examine institutional ownership in India, such as Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) and
Chhibber and Majumdar (1999). Since the culture and institutional framework in India are different
from those in Pacific-Asian countries, this research does not discuss the issues concerning corporate
governance in India.
j3
Supervisors in Taiwan are similar to statutory auditors in Japan. Section 2.3.3 will discuss the
supervisor system in Taiwan.
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Company Law, Article 27: Where a government agency or a juristic person acts as a shareholder of
a company, it may be elected as a director or supervisor of the company provided that it shall
designate a natural person as its proxy to exercise, on its behalf, the duties of a shareholder.
Where a government agency or a juristic person acts as a shareholder of a company, its authorized
representative may also be elected as a director or supervisor of the company; and if there is a plural
number of such authorized representatives, each of them may be so elected.
Any of the authorized representatives of a company referred to in Paragraphs I and II of this Article
may, owing to the change of his/her functional duties, be replaced by a person to be authorized by the
company so as to fulfil the unexposed term of office of the predecessor.
Any restriction placed upon the power or authority of the authorized representatives set forth in
Paragraph I and Paragraph II of this Article shall not be set up as a defence against any bona fide third
party.
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and Yeh, 2004). Some Taiwanese companies have established affiliated nominal
investment companies, which are related to the controlling shareholders (Yeh et al.,
2002). These nominal investment companies are used to create a cross-shareholding
mechanism, which is different from the keiretsu in Japan in that there is no strong
incentive for them to monitor the parent companies. Their controlling powers are
strengthened through appointing family members to the board of directors and
supervisors once the nominal investment companies or other legal entities are elected
to dispatch representatives on the board. The affiliation between supervisors and
control shareholders has weakened the function of supervisors. This law conflicts
with the rule that a supervisor should not concurrently be a director of a company
(Yeh, et al., 2002). Consequently, the external governance in most Taiwanese
companies that are controlled by families has been neglected. Figure 2-3 shows the
relationship between controlling family and nominal investment companies. The
Taiwanese government is aware of the weak governance system in Taiwan, and is
currently engaged in revising the relevant laws as discussed in Appendix 2.
In conclusion, compared to institutional investors in the US and the UK and the
banks in Japan and Germany, the external governance in Taiwan is weak. Therefore,
the monitoring function in Taiwan relies on boards of directors and the relevant
regulations and laws. Although institutional investors and other external governance
mechanisms are weak in Taiwan, they are far from ineffective. Gibson (2003)
examines CEO turnover in eight emerging countries, including five Asian countries -
India, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea - and finds CEOs are more
likely to be replaced when firm performance is poor35. The influence of institutional
investors is growing now due to the revision of relevant laws (Securities and Futures
Institute, 2005) and the high demand of capital in the Taiwanese electronics
35 Gibson (2003) does not examine the relationship between the CEO turnover rate and firm
performance for each country. This paper uses all the companies from eight emerging countries in the
same regression.
36 For example, due to the risk of cross-shareholding among affiliated companies, a subordinate
company cannot redeem or buy back any share of the controlling company, nor accept any share under
amended Company Law in 2001 (Company Law, Article 167). Moreover, in order to enhance the
monitoring ability of the parent company to affiliated companies, the "Regulations for the
Establishment of Internal Control Systems by Public listed companies" are amended twice in 2003
and 2004.
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industry. Therefore, we include institutional ownership, bank representatives, and
other variables concerning external governance in the Taiwanese models.
(1) appoint family members to the board direct control
(2) appoint institutional representatives to the board indirect control
(3) cross-shareholding
Source: Adapted from Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 in Yeh (2002, p. 91-92).
Figure 2-3 The relationship between the controlling family and nominal
investment companies
2.3.3 Internal Governance: Family Control and Supervisors
Similar to that in Japan, internal governance in Taiwan is usually criticised as
'insider-oriented'. In Japan, these insiders are life-time employees who have risen to
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top management positions through internal promotion . In Taiwan, these insiders
originate from a structure based on family control and concentrated ownership
(Franks and Myers, 1995; Solomon et al., 2003). In Asia, many companies are family
owned and family controlled. Although these companies are listed on the stock
market, they are directly or indirectly run by founding family members. Family
control has hitherto received much attention in Asian corporate governance studies
(Claessens et al., 2000a, 2000b; Bongini et al., 2001; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Yeh
37 Please refer to Section 2.2.3 for the introduction of life-time employees.
42
et al., 2001, 2002)38'39. La Porta et al. (1999) examine the control structure of the
largest 20 companies in 27 wealthy countries (including four Asian countries)40 and
find that the control of a company is usually held predominantly by a small number
of owners in East Asia. La Porta et al. (1999, p.476) define a controlling shareholder
(ultimate owner) as when "this shareholder's direct and indirect voting rights in the
firm exceeds 20%." They also find that companies are more likely to be controlled
by some controlling shareholders in countries with poor shareholder protection.
Successive studies usually continue to use the concept of controlling shareholders,
which is defined in La Porta et al. (1999), to observe the phenomenon of
concentrated ownership in Asia. Subsequently, Claessens et al. (2000a) use a sample
of 2980 publicly traded companies in nine East Asian countries41 and report that
57.1% of companies have a CEO, a chairman, or a vice-chairman from the
controlling family and 67.8% of companies have only one dominant controlling
shareholder.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the benefits from concentrated ownership are
larger in less developed counties. La Porta et al. (1999) substantiate this argument
empirically. Since civil law countries are associated with weaker shareholder
protection compared with common law countries (La Porta et al., 1997), Claessens
and Fan (2002) point out that the weak legal systems and state enforcement in Asia
explain why family-rim companies have been the dominant corporation forms. On
the other hand, Lins (2003, p. 159) investigates 1433 companies in 18 emerging
markets and reports that a "large non-management external shareholder can act as a
partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms". Based on these
studies, most Taiwanese companies are family owned and family controlled because
38 The discussions of family control in Asia usually exclude Japan in that its institutional features are
somewhat different from those in the rest of Asia. For discussions of Japanese governance systems,
please see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) for a historical description of the Japanese governance system
and Aoki and Patrick (1994) for the main bank system in Japan.
39 For studies concerning controlling shareholders and family control in Europe, please refer to Faccio
and Lang (2002).
40 The four Asian countries include Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. In addition to
the four Asian countries, La Porta et al. (1999) also examine 23 other countries around the world.
41 The nine counties include Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Indonesia.
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of significant political involvement and the civil law system in Taiwan42 (Solomon
et al., 2003). According to Claessens et al. (2000a), 79.8% of Taiwanese companies
have a CEO, a chairman, or a vice-chairman from the controlling family and 43.3%
of companies have only one dominant controlling shareholder. By using 251
Taiwanese companies from 1997 to 1998, Yeh et al. (2002) focus on the family
control in Taiwan and report that the controlling shareholder in Taiwan owns on
average 30.3% of the equity. Moreover, the controlling shareholder concurrently
holds the position ofCEO or chairman in 47.8% ofTaiwanese companies.
Claessens et al. (2000a) link concentration control with relational capitalism in East
Asia. Concentration control in the hands of a few families creates incentives for these
families to lobby government agencies and bureaucrats for preferential treatment,
such as a better interest rate when borrowing money from state-owned banks and
first choice of public contracts (Claessens et al., 2000a). In order to lobby
government agencies, these families will try to build relationships with the
government, for example, by employing retired bureaucrats. Finally, Claessens et al.
(2000a) infer that the participation of bureaucrats in the control of the corporate
sector certainly raises the likelihood of relational capitalism. Thus, the concentration
control has suppressed the evolution of the legal system and institutional
development43. For example, links between family shareholders and politicians have
been spotlighted as a serious weakness in Taiwanese corporate governance and have
hindered the reform (Solomon, et al. 2003).
Although family control is significant in East Asian countries, such as Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Hong Kong, it is now gradually decreasing in Taiwan. In order to
compete with foreign companies and raise money from the capital market (i.e.
enhance the inflow of outside funds), some Taiwanese companies, especially
companies in the electronics industry, have started to reform the phenomenon of
family control by employing professional managers and outside directors (Solomon,
42 The most famous families in Taiwan are Tainanbang group and the Formosa group. Please refer to
Numazaki (1993) and Taniura (1989) for more discussion.
43 These findings in Claessens et al. (2000) do not show the direction of causality. They imply that
"the ability to lobby government could lead to further concentration of corporate control, thus creating
a vicious circle of increased dependence of politicians and tycoons" (Claessens et al., 2000, p. 109).
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et al. 2003). In order to attract foreign institutional investors, it is necessary for
Taiwanese companies that are controlled by families to share powers with outside
shareholders. Hsu (1997) finds that family control through family members serving
as executives and directors on the board has been gradually decreasing in Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the incidence of professional managers serving as directors and
executives is increasing. The recent reform of Company Law and relevant
regulations and the establishment of the corporate governance code of practice in
2002 have also reduced family control. Therefore, in this thesis, we emphasise
political involvement, which may be brought by family members because of
relational capitalism (Claessens et al., 2000), and other external monitors, such as
banks and other institutional investors.
According to La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000), family control in
Japan is less significant than other Asian countries. Except for family control, the
corporate governance mechanisms in Taiwanese and Japanese companies are similar
to that in German companies in the sense that all countries include supervisors
(called statutory auditors in Japan) in boards of directors. Both Japanese and
Taiwanese companies operate under a "two-tier board structure" (Filatotchev et al.,
2005), with a board of directors and a supervisory board (called a board of statutory
auditors in Japan), which is composed of some supervisors (called statutory auditors
in Japan). In Taiwan, before 2002, a minimum of three directors was required44. After
February 2002, according to the 'Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Regulations
Governing Review of Securities Listings', a new company applying for listing on the
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) requires a minimum of five directors.
Moreover, the company should have at least two independent directors and one
independent supervisor on the board45. In addition, at least one each of the elected
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Company Law, Article 192: The board of directors of a company shall have at least three directors
who shall be elected by the shareholders' meeting from among the persons with disposing capacity.
45 Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Regulations Governing Review of Securities Listings, Article
9: Notwithstanding the fact that an issuing company applying for the listing of its stock meets the
listing criteria set forth in these Regulations, this Corporation may disagree to its listing if the issuing
company has any of the events listed below..... Article 9(10): Where the company applying for listing
has less than five members on its board of directors, or less than 2 independent directors; less than
three supervisors, or less than one independent supervisor; or where within the past year the board of
directors or supervisor(s) have been unable to independently exercise their functions. Additionally, the
elected independent directors and independent supervisors) shall be confined to persons other than
45
independent supervisors should be a professional in accounting or finance. Before
the amendment of Company Law in 2001, supervisors were elected from the
shareholders. This Act, however, is only applicable to companies that are listed on
the TSEC after 2002.
Supervisors (statutory auditors) are a unique characteristic of Taiwanese and
Japanese boards. However, both Taiwanese and Japanese boards are different from
boards that operate a truly two-tier model (Filatotchev et al., 2005). First, a German
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) has the right to select and remove members of a
management board (Vorstand) (Mallin, 2004; Filatotchev et al., 2005), whereas
supervisors (statutory auditors) in Taiwan and Japan do not have the power to
appoint or dismiss members of a board. Second, the two-tier model in Germany
requires a compulsory employee representation. Companies which have more than
500 or 2,000 employees in Germany are also represented on the supervisory board,
which is composed of one-third or one-half employee representatives respectively
(Mallin, 2004). Furthermore, although both the Taiwanese and the Japanese
supervisory system stems from the German supervisory system, the components of
Taiwanese and Japanese supervisors (statutory auditors) are still different (Solomon
et al., 2003). In Taiwan, owning to Article 27 in Company Law46, the supervisors are
sometimes "under the shadow of directors" (Solomon et al., 2003, p.239). The
directors and supervisors usually come from the same family or the same
institutional group, while the statutory auditors in Japan usually come from retired
employees of the company, banks and other companies (Yeh, et al., 2002)47.
The function of supervisors in Taiwan is similar to the function of audit committees
in the United States (Securities and Futures Institute, 2005). Supervisors in Taiwan
are designed to monitor the board of directors and solve conflicts among
juristic persons or representatives thereof set forth in Article 27 of the Company Act, and at least one
of each shall be a professional in accounting or finance.
46 The Company Law in Taiwan allows institutional or government shareholders to appoint their
representatives as directors and supervisors at the same time.
47 After 2005, the statutory auditor system is stricter in large companies. A large company is defined
in the statute as a joint-stock company whose legal capital exceeds ¥500 million or total balance-sheet
liabilities exceed ¥20 billion. For such large companies, there must be at least three auditors and at
least half of the auditors must be outside auditors. Please see Section 2.2.3 and Appendix 1 for more
discussion about statutory auditors in Japan.
46
shareholders, directors, and the company (Her, 1999; Solomon et al., 2003;
Filatotchev et al., 2005). Thus, supervisors fulfill their duties by providing an
independent and objective review concerning the financial reports, internal controls
and the audit function. Supervisors in Taiwan can exercise their duties individually
rather than passing through the board of supervisors , act on behalf of the
company49, and convene shareholder meetings30. The main individual duties
exercised by supervisors include: (1) Supervisors should make a thorough
investigation regarding the application of the company (§146 Company Law); (2)
Supervisors can investigate the business and financial condition of the company at
any time (§218 Company Law); (3) Supervisors should check and investigate all
statements and records (§219 Company Law); (4) Supervisors should immediately
notify the board to terminate improper business activities. (§218-2 Company Law);
(5) Supervisors should verify the property when the company issues new shares
(§274 Company Law51).
Since supervisors in Taiwan are responsible for monitoring directors and managers,
independence is an important determinant to allow them to monitor effectively.
Therefore, a supervisor cannot concurrently be a director or an employee of the
company (§222 Company Law). Moreover, supervisors in public listed companies
that are listed on the TSEC should include at least three members who do not have
significant family or business relationships with directors52. In order to align the
interests of directors and supervisors with the interests of shareholders, the Company
Law in Taiwan, which was amended in 2001, requires the directors and supervisors
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Company Law, Article 221: Supervisors may each exercise the supervision power individually.
49 The supervisor can act on behalf of the company, such as in case of a lawsuit between the company
and a director (§213, §214, §218, §219,and §418 Company Law).
50 When deemed necessary, a supervisor may convene a meeting of shareholders (§214 and §245
Company Law)
51
Company Law, Article 274: Where a company issues new shares other than to the public, under the
proviso to Article 272, it shall still be required to make the forms of subscription available as required
by Paragraph I of the preceding Article After accepting property other than cash payment, the
Board of Directors shall pass it on to the supervisor for inspection and comment, and shall report to
the authority for approval.
52
Relationships exist between (1) Spouse; (2) Lineal relations within the second degree of kinship; (3)
Collateral relations within the third degree of kinship; (4) Representatives of the same juristic person;
(5) Associated person (§9 (12), Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Criteria for Review of Securities
Listings and §17, Supplementary Provisions to the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Regulations
for Review of Securities Listings).
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of public listed companies to hold a certain amount of the company's shares and to
disclose ownership information, including the change of the directors' and
supervisors' shareholdings (§26 Securities and Exchange Act53). The mandatory
equity ownership in Taiwan is different from the conditions not only in the UK and
the US, but also in Japan (Filatotchev et al., 2005). Solomon et al. (2003) point out
that it was generally accepted that only if directors and supervisors hold shares in the
company will they protect the interests of shareholders.
Although Company Law in Taiwan prohibits the supervisors from concurrently being
a director or an employee of the company and requires the directors and supervisors
of public listed companies to hold the company's shares, the independence of
supervisors is still in question (Yeh et al., 2002; Solomon et al., 2003). Company
Law in Taiwan allows institutional or government shareholders to appoint their
representatives as directors and supervisors to serve in the same company (§27(2)
Company Law54). The affiliation between supervisors and major shareholders and
the relationship between directors and supervisors has weakened the supervisors'
monitoring functions because directors and supervisors are appointed by the same
institutional or government shareholders (Yeh et al., 2002; Solomon et al., 2003).
Article 27(2) in Company Law also strengthens family control and political
involvement in Taiwan because powerful families and the government can increase
their dominance within a company by establishing nominal investment companies to
hold shares and appoint directors and supervisors to the board afterwards (Yeh et al.,
2001, 2002). Figure 2-3 in page 42 depicts this situation.
53 Securities and Exchange Act, Article 26: The total shares of nominal stocks held by the entire body
of either directors or supervisors of an issuer shall not be less than a specified percentage of its total
issued shares. The rules regulating the minimum percentage to be held by the directors and
supervisors referred to in the preceding paragraph, and the examination of such holding shall be
prescribed by an order from the Competent Authority.
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Company Law, Article 27: Where a government agency or a juristic person acts as a shareholder of
a company, it may be elected as a director or supervisor of the company provided that it shall
designate a natural person as its proxy to exercise, in its behalf, the duties of a shareholder.
Where a government agency or a juristic person acts as a shareholder of a company, its authorized
representative may also be elected as a director or supervisor of the company; and if there is a plural
number of such authorized representatives, each of them may be so elected.
Any of the authorized representatives of a company referred to in Paragraphs I and II of this Article
may, owing to the change of his/her functional duties, be replaced by a person to be authorized by the
company so as to fulfil the unexposed term of office of the predecessor.
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Although the Taiwanese government has established many rules and laws to enhance
the independence of boards35, these rules are not implemented properly (Webb, 2006).
For example, two outside directors in the China Development Financial Holding
Corporation (SIC code: 2883) resigned their positions before the expiration of their
terms on the board in 2006 because they saw family control of that company being so
strong as to leave them powerless in terms of board decision-making56. Therefore,
increasing the independence of supervisors and strengthening the implementation
and enforcement of rules are the main tasks in the reform of Taiwanese corporate
governance. On 11th January, 2006, the Taiwanese government revised the Securities
and Exchange Act to reform corporate governance in Taiwan. This is the most
comprehensive revision for 20 years. The new Act removes Article 27(2) in the old
Securities and Exchange Act, which allows institutional or government shareholders
to appoint their representatives as directors and supervisors to serve the same
company concurrently. The new Securities and Exchange Act will be implemented
on 1st January, 200757.
Since the independence of supervisors is questioned in Taiwan (Yeh et al., 2002;
Solomon et al., 2003), the authorities have started to amend relevant laws to upgrade
the quality of supervisors. Since 2002, according to the 'Taiwan Stock Exchange
Corporation Criteria for Review of Securities Listings', every public company that
applies for listing should have at least two independent directors and one
independent supervisor. From March 22nd, 2002, the annual reports of listed
companies should disclose whether their independent directors and independent
supervisors have conformed to the independence guidelines in 'Taiwan Stock
Exchange Corporation Criteria for Review of Securities Listings'. Appendix 2
summarises the institutional framework of corporate governance in Taiwan.
55 Please refer to Appendix 2 for a summary of the institutional framework of corporate governance in
Taiwan.
56 The serial discussion can be obtained in China Times, Bl, B2, 18th May, 2006; China Times, B2,
19th May, 2006; China Times, B2, 23rd May, 2006.
57 Article 183, Securities and Exchange Act (amended on January 11th, 2006)
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has provided the necessary context for the studies conducted in this
thesis by introducing corporate governance in Japan and Taiwan. According to the
discussions above, political involvement, such as amakudari, is significant in Japan
and Taiwan. In Japan, the government appoints retired bureaucrats to the board to
exercise the monitoring function. In Taiwan, the government also appoints
representatives to the board. Due to the non-transferable vote system, which enables
parties to use public construction projects to assist individual candidates, companies
in both countries may utilise this opportunity to cement their informal relationship
with the government. Therefore, political involvement plays an important role in
corporate governance and company performance in Japan and Taiwan. Unfortunately,
owing to the shortage of data, literature concerning the relationships between
political involvement, corporate governance, firm performance, and DOI in Asia is
sparse.
In addition to political involvement in corporate governance in Japan, the main bank
in a keiretsu is also involved in the role ofmonitor and creditor. From the discussion
in Section 2.2.2, it can be seen that corporate governance mechanisms in Japan are
significantly linked with banks, as they are in Germany. The influence on companies
from main banks includes the supply of resources and funds, the dispatch of directors,
stable shareholding, the provision of financial services, and the underwriting of bond
issues (Aoki et al., 1994). However, some studies claim that large ownership of the
main banks may give them considerable power to influence corporate governance
without "significantly aligning their interests with those of shareholders" (Morck,
Nakamura and Shivdasani 2000, p.539) owing to the dual role of Japanese banks as
creditor and shareholder. This may constrain their incentives to maximise the
interests of shareholders.
Unlike Japan, internal governance in Taiwan is usually criticised as 'insider-oriented'
owing to a structure based on family control. Yeh et al. (2002) focuses on the family
control in Taiwan and reports that the controlling shareholder owns on average
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30.3% equity. Moreover, the controlling shareholder concurrently holds the position
of CEO or chairman in 47.8% of Taiwanese companies. Family control, however, is
now gradually decreasing. Some Taiwanese companies, especially companies in the
electronics industry, have started to reform the phenomenon of family control by
employing professional managers and outside directors (Solomon, et al. 2003). In
order to attract foreign institutional investors, it is necessary for Taiwanese
companies that are controlled by families to share powers with outside shareholders.
According to the Commercial Code in Japan and the Company Law in Taiwan,
Japanese and Taiwanese companies are required to have statutory auditors (called
supervisors in Taiwan) and a board of statutory auditors (called a board of
supervisors in Taiwan). The function of supervisors/auditors is similar to the function
of audit committees in the US. Supervisors/auditors are designed to monitor the
board of directors and resolve conflicts between shareholders, directors, and the
company. However, the independence of supervisors/auditors in Japan and Taiwan is
weak owning to defective laws. Therefore, the authorities in Japan and Taiwan have
started to amend the relevant laws to upgrade the quality of supervisors.
Claessens and Fan (2002) indicate that two issues are still unknown in corporate
governance. The first issue is "how alternative governance mechanisms improve
corporate governance, such as foreign institutional investors and incentive
payments." Although the Japanese corporate governance issues are widely discussed,
less is known about these and the phenomenon of relational capitalism in other Asian
countries. Therefore, based on the discussions in this chapter, we try in this thesis to
examine political involvement in Japan and Taiwan by considering the influence of
banks, institutional investors, blockholders, and the board of directors. The second
issue mentioned by Claessens and Fan (2002) is how ownership structure affects not
only firm performance and firm value but also other dimensions such as investment
patterns In this thesis, we try to fill the gap within literature by examining the
relationship between DOI, political involvement, the intervention of financial
institutions, and the board of directors in Japan and Taiwan. The main focus of the
next chapter is on the characteristics of internationalisation in Asian countries. It also
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Political Involvement and the Degree of
Internationalisation
3.1 Introduction
Recently, the focus of international business research has been on internal and
external constraints (Ahokangas, 1998). Internal constraints include the history of a
company and the way the company's resources are interlinked with each other.
External constraints include demand conditions, government policy, and competitor
behaviour (Conner, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Ahokangas, 1998). In this
thesis, we discuss the involvement from both external and internal dimensions on the
degree of internationalisation (DOI). We focus on the external dimension of political
involvement and the intervention of financial institutions, and the internal dimension
of the monitoring ability of the board of directors.
To date, the discussion of internationalisation theories have concentrated on the
question of why companies venture abroad. The root of internationalisation theories
can be traced back to the sixteenth century. Interestingly, in numerous economic
writings the first formulation of internationalisation theory was politically motivated
(Ball and McCulloch, 1999). Mercantilism58 was the dominant economic ideology
of Europe in the early modem period. In 1776, Adam Smith published 'An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations' in which he tried to destroy the
mercantilist philosophy. However, these intemationalisation theories are currently
largely based on models of Western multinational corporations (MNCs) (Sim and
Pandian, 2003). They are not complete explanations of MNCs, especially Asian
companies (Sim and Pandian, 2003). Asian companies exhibit specific characteristics
58 Mercantilism is the economic theory which claims that the prosperity of a nation depends upon its
supply of capital. Under this concept, the amount of capital that is represented by bullion (amount of
precious metal) held by the country should increase through a positive balance of international trade,
with large exports and low imports. Mercantilism suggests that the ruling government should achieve
these goals by playing a protectionist role in the economy, such as encouraging exports and
discouraging imports, especially through the use of tariffs.
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and different internationalisation paths, which are different from MNCs that originate
from Western countries (Sim and Pandian, 2003). Western international theories do
not usually discuss the role played by the home government because it seldom
intervenes in the operation of companies (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998; Lecraw, 1996;
Porter, 2000; Sim and Pandian, 2003). In the Asian context, however, home
governments play a critical role in the promotion of outward foreign direct
investment (FDI) and international expansion (Pang, 1995). Conversely, based on the
grabbing hand model in Shleifer and Vishny (1998), the government will pursue
rent-seeking and such intervention of government and financial institutions will be
inefficient. Therefore, the relationship between the intervention of government and
financial institutions and DOI should be examined empirically.
Werner (2002) analyses recent trends in the international business literature from
1996 to 2000. There are 271 articles located in 20 top management (and management
related) journals. According to the summarisation in Werner (2002), the topics that
are the most commonly discussed in the area of international business are: (1) the
global business environment; (2) internationalisation; (3) entry mode decisions; (4)
international joint ventures; (5) FDI; (6) international exchange; (7) transfer of
knowledge; (8) strategic alliances and networks; (9) multinational enterprises; (10)
subsidiary-headquarters relations; (11) subsidiary and multinational team
management; and (12) expatriate management (Werner, 2002, p.280). Among these
topics, political and regulatory environments are discussed in the context of the
global business environment, for example, Guillen (2000), Moon and Lado (2000),
Rugman and Verbeke (1998a, 1998b), and Schuler (1996). Unfortunately, these
papers usually focus on the relationship between host governments and the MNCs,
not on the relationship between home governments and companies. In the context of
the political environment, most papers examine the influence of political risks from
host governments on MNCs. Researchers seldom discuss the relationship between
political involvement from the home government and DOI of domestic companies
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1990).
Most studies that do examine the relationship between political involvement from the
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home government and DOI of domestic companies do so in a contextual way (i.e.
Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; Pangarkar, 1998; Sim and Pandian, 2003; Zutshi and
Gibbons, 1998; Pananond and Zeithaml, 1998). While there have been some
contextual studies, we are not able to find any empirical analysis concerning this
topic. If we view internationalisation as a network that is built among customers,
suppliers, host governments, home governments, and intermediaries (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977, 1990)59, it is quite important to understand the relationship between
home governments and DOI of domestic companies by examining different Asian
countries. Van Hoesel (1999, p.35) concludes that "What is seriously lacking at
present are new empirical findings that will enable us to make theoretical statements
and hypotheses more concrete." Therefore, this thesis will attempt to shed light on
the relationship between political involvement from the home government and DOI
of companies by using empirical analysis of samples from two countries, Japan and
Taiwan.
We will first introduce the theories regarding the process of internationalisation in
Section 3.2.1. Subsequently, in Section 3.2.2, we will discuss the characteristics of
Asian countries regarding internationalisation. The literature concerning the
relationship between DOI and political involvement will be discussed in Section
3.2.3. Finally, the conclusion of this chapter will be expounded in Section 3.3.
3.2 Theoretical Overview and Literature on Internationalisation
3.2.1 Theories on Internationalisation
Theories concerning internationalisation can be traced back to the sixteenth century.
Mercantilism is a sixteenth century economic philosophy based on the belief that a
nation's wealth depends on accumulated treasure, usually gold. Mercantilism
59 The Uppsala Model, which will be discussed in Section 3.2.1, views internationalisation as a
network that is built among customers, suppliers, host governments, home governments, and
intermediaries (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990).
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suggests that the ruling government should achieve these goals by playing a
protectionist role in the economy, such as encouraging exports and discouraging
imports, especially through the use of tariffs (Ball and McCulloch, 1999). Adam
Smith published 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations' in
1776 to destroy the mercantilist philosophy. He claimed that markets forces rather
than government controls should determine the direction, volume, and composition
of international trade. Each country should only produce those products that can be
the most efficiently produced. This is the theory of absolute advantage. However,
Ricardo demonstrated in 1817 that even though one nation held an absolute
advantage in the production of two goods, the two countries could still trade with
advantages for each as long as the less efficient nation was not equally less efficient
in the production of both goods. Currently, this concept of comparative advantage is
the basis for international trade and is the main foundation of academic research in
the area.
In 1933, Heckscher and Ohlin considered the difference of production costs and
developed the Theory of Factor Endowment. This theory states that international and
interregional differences in production costs occur because of differences in the
supply of production factors. Those goods that cost less can be sold for less in
international markets. Therefore, countries with relatively large amounts of labour
(e.g. China) should export labour-intensive goods, whereas countries with abundant
capital (e.g. the UK) should export capital-intensive goods. However,
Heckscher-Ohlin's Theory of Factor Endowment does not consider transportation
costs and the time lag between the introduction of a new technology and its
worldwide application. The theories of absolute advantage and factor endowment,
which focus on the existence of internationalisation rather than its process only,
served as an explanation of international trade before the 1960s (Ahokangas, 1998).
After the 1960s, theories on internationalisation were still based on the models of
Western countries but also started to recognise the process. For example, the Uppsala
Model (Johanson and Weidersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990),
the Eclectic Paradigm (OLI), and the Investment Development Path (IDP) (Dunning,
1977, 1981a, 1981b) all emphasise the process of internationalisation.
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Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm of international production appears to be the most
widely accepted theory (Dunning, 1977, 1981a, 1981b, 2001). This theory focuses on
how MNCs exploit ownership (O) and location (L) advantages by internationalising
(I) markets60. According to this model, MNCs will establish production where they
can best exploit competitive advantages (due to market imperfections). Although the
OLI-parameters explain why internationalisation occurs, they ignore its process.
Therefore, Dunning (1981b, 1986) developed the IDP, which provides the OLI with a
dynamic process by linking the net outward investment of a country with its
economic development. Initially, economic development is low and there is little
inward or outward investment (stage 1). When the economy develops, inward
investments increase, especially for import substitution goods. Meanwhile, some
outward investments occur into neighbouring countries whose economic
development is lower (stage 2). Afterwards, inward investments decrease while
outward investments increase with further economic development (stage 3).
Countries at stage 3 will invest in countries at lower IDP stages to achieve lower
labour costs. At stage 4, net outward investments become positive and production
becomes multi-nationalised. Finally, a convergence of outward and inward
investment flows occurs because "the shift from advantages based more on factor
endowment to those based on internalizing international markets" (Sim and Pandian,
2003, p.29). In other words, a country's net outward investment position fluctuates
around zero, which means that the inward and outward investments are nearly equal
at a very high level.
Compared to the OLI, the Uppsala model emphasises the dynamic process of
internationalisation. This theory is based on papers by Johanson and
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) and Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990). The model
60 There are three kinds of advantages in Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm (OLI) of international
production:
(1) Ownership-specific or firm-specific advantage (O) refers to technology and skills which can be
obtained by one company but not available to other companies.
(2) Internationalisation (I): It is in the company's best interest to use its ownership-specific advantage
(internalise) to invest overseas rather than license them to foreign companies (financialise).
(3) Location-specific advantage or Country-specific advantage (L): The company can benefit by
locating part of its production plants overseas.
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includes the idea that incremental steps to international business expansion are based
on a series of incremental decisions, which allows the model to adapt a perspective
of evolutionary learning and innovation adoption (Ahokangas, 1998; Sim and
Pandian, 2003). The Uppsala model has five successive stages, each representing a
higher degree of international involvement.
The first stage starts from no export activity, which is followed by a second stage
characterised by modest export sales. The third stage involves systematic export
through independent activities (agents). In the fourth stage, companies will establish
an overseas sales subsidiary leading to the final stage in which companies produce
products in foreign countries61. The Uppsala Model is supported by many empirical
studies and case studies (e.g., Davidson, 1980, 1983; Welch and Loustarinen, 1986;
Erramilli et al., 1999).
Based on the Uppsala Model, Johanson and Vahlne (1990) continue to examine the
process of internationalisation from the viewpoint of a network. They claim that
intemationalisation is the process of establishing networks of business relationships
(Johanson and Mattsson, 1988). In order to achieve the objectives of the company,
networks are established and maintained and an important portion of resources is
held and maintained by relevant sectors within such networks (Bartmess and Cerny,
1993). Given the important role of networks in internationalisation, relationships are
established with customers, suppliers, host government bureaucrats, home
government bureaucrats, and intermediaries. The network viewpoint emphasises that
these relationships will affect the process of internationalisation. Therefore, in order
to achieve the objectives of companies and obtain support from other sectors,
companies must build the relationships with a variety of sectors, including
governments and financial institutions. The network viewpoint is consistent with our
argument that relationships exist among companies, intermediaries, financial
institutions, and home governments. Therefore, in this thesis, we adopt the network
61 Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990) also claim that internationalisation of companies is associated
with the psychic distance61. In the beginning, companies will enter those foreign markets that are
closer in terms of the psychic distance, but will eventually enter those with greater psychic distances.
Similarly, the initial entry will be in a low commitment mode, such as a minority joint venture, and
will be followed by higher levels of commitment, such as a wholly-owned subsidiary.
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viewpoint and will use empirical analysis to examine these relationships.
Both the Uppsala model and Dunning's IDP explain the development of
internationalisation. Studies concerning MNCs in developing countries support the
IDP (Sim and Pandian, 2003). Most developing countries with some outward
fO
investment are at stage 2 in IDP, NICs/NIEs are at stage 3 (Sim and Pandian, 2003,
p.29), and developed countries, such as Japan and the UK, are at stage 4. The
Uppsala Model has also received some empirical support (e.g., Davidson, 1980, 1983;
Welch and Loustarinen, 1986; Erramilli et al., 1999). In addition, Taiwanese outward
investments into China also support the Uppsala Model. The Taiwanese outward
investments into China starts from exports and are quickly followed by minority joint
ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries because of a similar culture (i.e. shorter
psychic distance) (Van Hoesel, 1996, 1999).
To sum up, the Uppsala Model explains the internationalisation process of small
companies, whereas the OLI (Dunning, 1977, 1981a, 1981b, 2001) and the
resource-based perspective (Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1994; Tallman and Li,
1996) explain the activities of large MNCs. All these theories and perspectives
provide some explanation of the internationalisation of companies in Asian countries
(Sim and Pandian, 2003). These theories, however, do not completely consider the
characteristics of Asian MNCs. The intervention from home governments and
financial institutions is neglected. In the following section, we will discuss the
relationship between internationalisation, the intervention of home governments, and
the intervention of financial institutions in Asian countries.
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Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) or Newly Industrializing Economy (NIE) refer to four Asian
countries - Taiwan, Hong-Kong, South Korea, and Singapore.
59
3.2.2 The Relationship between Internationalisation and Home
Governments in Asia
Compared to the international expansion of Western and Japanese companies, the
rise of the international expansion in developing Asian countries is a more recent
trend which has attracted limited attention (Luo, 1999). Before the 1980s, the
international expansion of Asian companies was insignificant (except for Japanese
companies). Afterwards, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the international
expansion of East Asian companies caused increased intra-regional direct
investments (Sim and Pandian, 2003; Dobson and Chia, 1997). For example,
intra-regional direct investments from NICs/NIEs to China and the ASEAN 4 are
increasing significantly, particularly for IT-related goods (Isogai and Shibanuma,
2000). The expanded intra-regional direct investments from NICs/NIEs are closely
related to East Asian increasing market share in the global trade of IT-related goods
(Isogai and Shibanuma, 2000).
This phenomenon of rapid intemationalisation in Asia is described as the
'flying-geese model'64, which spreads from one level of economy to another, starting
from Japan, followed by the newly industrialised countries/economies (NICs/NIEs,
which includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore), and then by the rapidly
growing economies in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia
(Pangarkar, 1998; Sim and Pandian, 2003). Recent work has investigated MNCs in
developing countries, such as newly industrialised countries/economies (NICs/NIEs)
in Asia. Asian companies exhibit characteristics that are not observed in Western
companies (e.g. Dunning, 1986; Aggarwal and Agmon, 1999; Dunning and Narula,
63 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN 4) includes four countries in Southeast Asia:
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
64 The flying-geese model (FG) was originally created by Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s (Akamatsu,
1935, 1937). It describes the catching-up process of industrialisation in latecomer economies (Kojima,
2000). The FG pattern of industrial development is transmitted from a lead goose (Japan) to follower
geese (such as NICs/NIEs, China, Thailand, and Malaysia). This model can be applied to
internationalisation. Initial exports of new products by Japan and other developed countries would be
limited by high costs, but emerging developing countries would supply low-cost products. Therefore,
progress in developed countries will be repeated with time lags in other Asian developing countries.
The FG model can explain the shift of a given industry from developed countries (e.g. Japan) to less
developed countries (e.g. India). The shifting of comparative advantages reflects how factor
endowments, such as labours and skills, change with economic development.
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1996; Dunning, Van Hoesel and Narula, 1998; Van Hoesel, 1999; Sim and Pandian,
2003). One of these characteristics is the influence of political involvement on
domestic companies in East Asia. Home governments play an important and direct
role in the intemationalisation of East Asian companies (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998;
Lecraw, 1996). Government policies, regulations, and financial support are also
intervening factors in the promotion of outward foreign direct investment (Zutshi and
Gibbons, 1998). Although existing theories on internationalisation can elucidate the
internationalisation of Western companies, they are not appropriate for East Asian
companies in that the political involvement so common in East Asia.
Considering the influence of political involvement on internationalisation in Asia,
Zutshi and Gibbons (1998) observe Singaporean government-linked companies
(GLCs) and conclude that the government policy has been an important intervening
variable in the internationalisation of Singaporean MNCs. The basic concept of
internationalisation theories is comparative advantage - the internationalisation
strategy is driven by the company's need for resources or markets. In Singapore,
however, Zutshi and Gibbons (1998) find that "GLCs internationalize in response to
government policy and then strategise and reconfigure to acquire the necessary
competencies for competing in the global market" (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998, p.232).
Moreover, Sim and Pandian (2003) observe both Taiwanese and Singaporean
companies and indicate that, although some differences in degree between Taiwanese
and Singaporean cases are detected65, the intemationalisation strategies are "brought
together by an extensive web of ethnic networks and aided by government
encouragement and institutional framework" (Sim and Pandian, 2003, p.42). In
Taiwan, political involvement also has an important role in the intemationalisation
strategies of companies (Sim and Pandian, 2003; Van Hoesel, 1996, 1999). On one
hand, the Taiwanese government targets some specific industries, such as
semiconductor companies in the electronics industry, and supports them in their
international activities. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government imposed
constraints on the international activities of Taiwanese domestic companies for
political reasons. For example, constraints were imposed on Taiwanese FDI to
65 For instance, Taiwanese companies are more developed and elaborate in the network of production
and have greater ODM/OBM participation than Singaporean companies.
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China66 (Van Hoesel, 1996; Sim and Pandian, 2003) even though China was the
• ... (\~l
biggest trading partner with Taiwan in 2005 . The Taiwanese government even
initiated a 'go south' policy in 1993 to encourage Taiwanese companies to increase
investments in Southeast Asia instead of China. Under these circumstances, many
Taiwanese companies invest in China via third countries, such as Hong Kong (Van
Hoesel, 1996,1999).
The Japanese government is also famous for its intervention in the
internationalisation of Japanese companies. The Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are the principal agents for
playing the intervening role. The Japanese government is similar to the Taiwanese
government in that it also targets priority industries to subsidise, such as steel in
1960s, semiconductors in 1970s, and computers in the 1980s (Porter et al., 2000).
Moreover, in order to 'stabilise' the economy and reduce excess competition, the
Japanese government encouraged merger and cooperation of companies in some raw
material industries, such as steel, petroleum, synthetic textiles, and paper (Tsuruta,
1984; Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997). In addition to these raw materials
industries, the automobile industry is another interesting case. Due to the large
number of automobile competitors, MITI tried to establish three car groups in the
1960s69, each group specialised in different products. However, this plan finally
failed. Ironically, political involvement is seldom found in internationally
competitive industries, for example, audio equipment in the 1970s and automobiles
in the 1980s. Honda, one of the most competitive automobile companies in the world,
66 All investment to China must register with the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) and cannot
exceed a certain amount.
67 The total trading amount between Taiwan and China is NTD 65,972,683,337 in 2005. The ratio of
Chinese export to total export is 21.55% and the ratio of Chinese import to total import is 11.06% in
2005. The data is provided by Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA).
"In the 1990s, Taiwan promoted a 'go south' policy of investment in Southeast Asia. To enhance
economic ties and substantive mutual interests with the region, Taiwan has signed agreements on the
protection of mutual investment, avoidance of double taxation, customs cooperation, agricultural
cooperation, technical cooperation, tourism cooperation, and aviation rights with most of the nations
of Southeast Asia." (Source: the Republic of China Yearbook - Taiwan 2002, published by
Government Information Office in July 2002.) The Republic of China Yearbook - Taiwan 2002 can be
obtained in http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/vearbook/2002/index.htm.
69
MITI felt that Japan's automobile industry of ten manufacturers should be merged into two
international majors (namely Toyota and Nissan) and one minicar manufacturer.
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even ignored the original suggestion from MITI, which attempted to discourage it
from producing automobiles.
Based on these examples of political involvement in Asia, it can be seen that
although political involvement is common in many Asian countries, the types and
patterns are distinct between countries. According to Pangarkar (1998, p. 110), "some
economies are characterized by a large government-linked sector (e.g. Malaysia,
India) whereas others are characterized by a less salient government-linked sector but
indirect support from the government (e.g. South Korea), and yet others by limited
government involvement (e.g. Hong Kong)." Moreover, the stages of economic
development are also different (Pangarkar, 1998). Japan is the most economically
developed country in the region and has a high DOI, whereas most Southeast Asian
countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, are less developed and have a lower DOI.
In addition, there are significant differences in the institutional framework among
East Asian countries, such as the patterns of cross-shareholding, the strength and
support of the banking sector, and the probity of the legal system. Therefore, it is
critical to examine the relationship between internationalisation and political
involvement under different environments and systems.
Unfortunately, literature concerning the relationship between internationalisation and
political involvement under different environments and systems is sparse. From a
contextual viewpoint, Aggarwal and Agmon (1990) examine three stages of the
government-business relationship in the process of internationalisation of companies
under different stages of economic development in developing countries, especially
NICs/NIEs. They argue that the role of government is important in directing initial
international trade, but it will change as the country develops. The first stage is the
import substitution stage when the government leads the corporate sector. The
government attempts to determine the long-term comparative advantages and the
paths to effect them. Pricing is also decided by negotiations between the government
and the corporate sector, not by the market.
As time proceeds, the accumulation of knowledge and skills leads companies to the
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second stage, the export promotion stage. Although the domestic market is usually
protected at the second stage, foreign markets are competitive. Therefore, companies
must adapt themselves to a competitive market and may still need to negotiate with
their governments for support and subsidies (Becker, 1982). This stage is a period of
transition when the control from the government starts to decrease. Success in the
second stage will lead to the third stage - the FDI stage. Companies become the
'driving force' at this stage (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990, p. 175) and the government
becomes a partner. The primary goals of companies at the third stage are to maintain
and expand the export market and reduce the risks associated with the changes of
policies in target countries. Compared to the second stage, which is a transitional
stage, the third stage is a stabilisation stage. Knowledge and advanced technology
gradually shift companies away from the government.
This three-stage model is consistent with the development experiences in India,
South Korea, and Singapore (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990). According to this
classification, Singapore is mainly at the second stage with some successful
companies at the third stage. South Korea is moving out of the second stage and
heading towards the third stage (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990). Aggarwal and Agmon
(1990) imply that the influence of political involvement on internationalisation will
gradually diminish as the country develops. It is important to examine whether this
argument is empirically supported. Taiwan is quite similar to Japan in its legal
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systems, banking systems, and board structure (Filatotchev et al., 2005) . However,
these two countries may not be positioned at the same stage of economic
development (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; Sim and Pandian, 2003). Therefore, by
comparing the empirical results from the two countries light can be shed on the
relationship between internationalisation and political involvement.
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Japanese and Taiwanese companies operate under a two-tier board structure, with a board of
directors and a number of supervisors. The Company Law in Taiwan (Articles 216-227) specifies that
companies should have supervisors (statutory auditors in Japan). However, this two tier structure is
not similar to formal two-tier systems because there is a lack of any formal representation from labour
in Taiwan and Japan. Pleas refer to Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.3.3 for the discussion.
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3.2.3 Literature on Political Involvement by Home Governments
The literature that discusses the relationship between political involvement and DOI
can be divided into two categories. The first category discusses how the political
environments in host countries affect the investment strategies of companies and how
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companies handle political uncertainty in host countries . Political uncertainty is
defined as the probability of a policy change by government and the likelihood that
any change will be adverse due to the lobbying behaviour of their competitors in the
host country (Delios and Henisz, 2003). According to the level of policy uncertainty,
companies set their multinational entry strategies - distribution entry, joint venture
manufacturing plant entry, or wholly-owned manufacturing plant entry - to extend
their DOI (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Delios and Henisz, 2003a, 2003b). Prior
studies conclude that as long as political environments are extremely uncertain,
multinational enterprises will seek local partners to provide them with additional
information about local markets. Unfortunately, most research that examines political
involvement focuses on political uncertainty in host countries rather than the
relationship between international expansion and political involvement from the
home governments.
Since political involvement from the home governments is very rare in stock market
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capitalism, most research concentrates on countries with relational capitalism , such
as Asian countries. The second category of literature discusses the relationship
between political involvement from the home governments and the characteristics of
a company, such as the DOI and firm performance. (Mascarenhas, 1989; Kole and
Mulherin, 1997; Boardman and Vining, 1982, 1989; Feeney and Hillman, 2001).
There are two different views concerning political involvement from the home
governments. The first is an optimistic view (Gerschenkron, 1962), which argues that,
in terms of economic growth, the government can use its ownership in a company to
develop certain strategies through both direct ownership and control over finance.
For example, Gerschenkron (1962) suggests that the government, by becoming
71
Regarding the discussion of political risk of host countries, Henisz and Williamson (1999), Henisz
(2000), Delios and Henisz (2003a, 2003b) have detailed discussions.
72 For the introduction of relational capitalism, please refer to Section 2.1.
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involved in financial institutions, can encourage lending to those private sector
companies that operates politically motivated projects. Furthermore, the government
can intervene in the finance of a company in many ways. For example, it can provide
subsidies directly for the politically desirable projects or can encourage state-owned
banks to lend money to the company.
The second view, however, argues that government ownership is less efficient than
private ownership in a competitive market without financial ties (Boycko et al., 1996;
Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Mascarenhas, 1989) and that firm performance of
state-owned companies (SOEs) and government-linked companies (GLCs) is inferior
to publicly traded companies (Shleifer, 1998). This is mostly explained by the
argument that the government lacks competitiveness and pursues political welfare
instead of a profit-maximisation objective. According to this argument, the
government may acquire controlling power from companies in order to provide
employment, subsidies, and other benefits to supporters who will return the favour in
the form of votes and political contributions. For example, La Porta (2002) concludes
that greater government ownership of banks may lead to slower subsequent
development of the financial system and lower growth of per capita income and
productivity. In addition to the slower growth of per capita income, Mascarenhas
(1989) argues that SOEs focused on their domestic market with a narrow product line
and had a conservative customer base. He points out that SOEs are overseen by
politicians and government in order to maximise domestic votes. Boardman and
Vining (1989) also conclude that SOEs and mixed companies are less efficient and
less profitable than similar publicly traded companies. For example, according to
their empirical results, the return on equity (ROE), the return on assets (ROA), and
the return on sales (ROS) of SOEs are lower than publicly traded companies by
11.65%, 1.73%, and 2.23% respectively.
In addition to the empirical studies, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) build a theoretical
model using an economic model to describe a game among the managers, the public
and the politicians. Their model leads to the conclusion that when managers control
companies, politicians may use subsidies and bribes to convince them to pursue
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political benefits. However, when politicians control companies, managers will use
resources to convince them not to pursue political objectives. From this viewpoint,
we can observe that a manager's objective is different from that of a politician.
Although there are many studies that discuss the issues relating to government
ownership, most of them only discuss its relationship with firm performance (e.g.,
Sun et al., 2002) and the conclusion is that government ownership is inefficient in
terms of firm performance. Studies relevant to the relationship between
internationalisation and political involvement from the home governments are very
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rare. Most research uses a contextual view to examine this topic in Asian countries
rather than using empirical analysis (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998). Furthermore, apart
from government ownership, other variables that can measure political involvement
are seldom used.
Mascarenhas (1989) is one of the few researchers that use the empirical analysis. He
uses a sample of companies in the offshore drilling industry in the US to examine the
relationship between ownership structure and the domain of a company in the
international market. He classifies these companies into three groups - publicly
traded, state-owned, and privately held and uses seven dimensions to capture the
domain of a company in the international market74. The independent variables
• < • • • 75include firm size, the nationality of the company, and ownership structure .
73 These contextual studies are discussed in Section 3.2.2.
74 The seven dimensions are: (1) Growth: the average annual growth rate of a company. This variable
is measured by the change in number of rigs in a company's fleet between year t and year t+1 divided
by the number of rigs in the company's fleet in year t; (2) International scope: This variable is
measured by the number of countries in which a company operates; (3) Domestic market dominance:
the market share of a company in its home country. This variable is measured by the number of rigs a
company has in its domestic market divided by the total number of rigs in the company's domestic
market; (4) Product line scope: the breadth of a company's product line. This variable is measured by
the number of rig types in a company's fleet; (5) State-owned customers overseas: the propensity of a
company to have overseas state-owned customers. It is measured by the number of rigs overseas that
are contracted with state-owned customers divided by the number of rigs a company operates overseas;
(6) Customer-based stability: the propensity of a company to enter into long-term contracts with its
customers. It is measured by the company's mean of the proportion of years in a rig's life which is
contracted with the same customer (this variable is available when a customer has the contract for
more than one year); and (7) Advanced technology: the propensity of a firm to use high-cost, complex
technology. It is measured by a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the company has a drill ship rig or
semi-submersible rig in its fleet, and 0 otherwise.
75 Based ownership structure, firms are classified as stated-owned, publicly traded, and privately held.
67
Mascarenhas (1989) indicates that state-owned companies are mostly domestic and
have a limited foreign investment. This is possibly because political criticism
discourages foreign investment by state-owned companies. Moreover, state-owned
companies tend to focus on their domestic market with a narrow product line and
have a stable customer base, whereas privately held companies also operate
domestically with a narrow product line but have an unstable customer base.
Mascarenhas (1989) proves that ownership structure is significantly related to
international scope, product-line scope, state-owned customers overseas,
customer-based stability, and advanced technology. For example, the mean of
international scope76 in publicly traded companies is 2.91, which is greater than 1.21
in state-owned companies.
On the other hand, Mascarenhas (1989) infers that companies with a greater market
share in the domestic market are more visible and thereby more likely to be
controlled by the government. Government officials may focus their efforts on larger
and more visible companies in their domestic markets. In this way, it is easier to
control the companies and extract benefits. The government may try to control the
company through government ownership. Therefore, the characteristics of a
company may be also associated with ownership structure.
Van Hoesel (1999, p.35) concludes that "What is seriously lacking at present are new
empirical findings that will enable us to make theoretical statements and hypotheses
more concrete". In order to fill the lacuna, we use empirical analysis rather than the
contextual viewpoint to examine the relationships between political involvement, the
intervention of financial institutions, and DOI. The following section will discuss
how to measure DOI by citing prior literature.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the theories on internationalisation and its measurement.
76 The variable is measured by the number of countries in which a company operates.
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The focus of this chapter has been on the relationship between internationalisation
and home governments in Asia and therefore provides the necessary context for
research concerning this relationship.
The two most relevant theories concerning the internationalisation in Asia are the
IDP, which is a dynamic process linking the net outward investment of a country
with its economic development (Dunning, 1981, 1986), and the Uppsala model,
which emphasises the dynamic process of internationalisation (Johanson and
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). Both the Uppsala
model and Dunning's IDP explain the development of internationalisation. Studies
concerning MNCs in developing countries support the IDP. The Uppsala Model has
also received some empirical support (e.g. Davidson, 1980, 1983; Welch and
Loustarinen, 1986; Erramilli et al., 1999).
Although existing theories on internationalisation can elucidate the
internationalisation ofWestern companies, these theories may not be appropriate for
East Asian companies where political involvement is common. Since political
involvement by home governments is very rare in stock market capitalism, most
research concerning political involvement by home governments concentrates on
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countries with relational capitalism , such as Asian countries. Recent work has
begun to investigate MNCs in developing Asian countries because Asian companies
exhibit political involvement, which is not observable in Western companies. In Asia,
government policies, regulations, and support are important intervening factors in the
promotion of outward FDI. For example, in Taiwan, political involvement is
significantly related to the internationalisation strategies of companies (Sim and
Pandian, 2003; Van Hoesel, 1996, 1999). The Taiwanese government targets some
specific industries, such as semiconductor companies in the electronics industry, and
supports these industries in their international activities. Similarly, the Japanese
government also targets priority industries to subsidise (Porter, et al., 2000).
Although political involvement is common in Asia, the types and patterns are distinct
77 For the introduction of relational capitalism, please refer to Section 2.1.
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across countries. Moreover, the stages of economic development are also different.
From the viewpoint of economic development, Japan is the most developed country
in the region and has a great DOI, whereas most Southeast Asian countries are less
developed and have a lesser DOI. There are also significant differences in the
institutional framework among East Asian countries such as the patterns of cross
shareholding, the strength and support of the banking sector, and the probity of the
legal system. Therefore, it is critical to examine the relationship between
internationalisation and political involvement under different environments and
systems.
This chapter has also discussed the measurement of DOI. It is a critical but
unresolved issue in the field of international research. What measurements should be
included to measure DOI and how to combine these measurements are two important
considerations. It remains questionable whether these factors can be combined into
one index as by so doing the analysis could be distorted. Therefore, in this thesis, we
select measurements according to previous studies and combine them by adopting
SEM, which will be introduced in Chapter 6.
Since most studies concerning internationalisation in Asia are contextual, Van Hoesel
(1999, p.35) concludes that "What is seriously lacking at present are new empirical
findings that will enable us to make theoretical statements and hypotheses more
concrete". In order to fill the gap, we use empirical analysis to examine the
relationships between political involvement, the intervention of financial institutions,
and DOI. Based on the theories on internationalisation and the relevant literature on
internationalisation in Asia, we build hypotheses in the following chapter. In addition
to intemationalisation, the following chapter also examines hypotheses regarding the




Theory and Hypotheses on Political
Involvement, Performance, and the
Degree of Internationalisation
4.1 Introduction
According to the previous chapters, which discuss political involvement, the
intervention of financial institutions, and the board of directors in Japan and Taiwan,
it is evident that these dimensions are related to firm performance and the degree of
internationalisation (DOI). In the light of the relevant literature, this chapter
establishes hypotheses concerning the relationship between these different
dimensions. There are two main topics in this chapter. The first topic is the
examination of the relationship between the intervention of governments and
financial institutions and firm performance, and the second is the examination of the
relationship between the intervention of governments and financial institutions and
DOI.
Section 4.2 focuses on firm performance. Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, in
Section 4.2.1 we build hypotheses around the question of why there is intervention
from the government and financial institutions, such as banks and insurance
companies. We try to examine whether governments and financial institutions
intervene in the operation of companies with poor firm performance. Since
governments and financial institutions usually play a monitoring role when a
company has a financial crisis in East Asia (Van Rixtel, 2002), we also investigate
whether political involvement and the intervention of financial institutions are
positively associated with subsequent firm performance. Section 4.2.2 tries to answer
this second question of whether the intervention of governments and other financial
institutions is positively related to subsequent firm performance.
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Section 4.3 focuses on the relationship between the intervention of governments and
financial institutions and DOI. We also try to answer two questions about this aspect.
The first question, which is discussed in Section 4.3.1, is whether the DOI of a
company is related to the intervention of governments and financial institutions.
Since it is common in East Asia for the governments to play an activist and
supportive role in the intemationalisation of its companies, we also investigate
whether the intervention of governments and financial institutions is associated with
the subsequent DOI. In Section 4.3.2, we try to answer the second question, which is
whether the subsequent DOI is affected by the intervention of governments and
financial institutions. The hypotheses relating to the relationship between the board
of directors and firm performance/DOI are also discussed in this chapter. A summary
of this chapter is presented in Section 4.4.
4.2. The Relationship between Political Involvement and Firm
Performance
4.2.1 Why do the government and financial institutions intervene?
The first question we try to answer regarding the first topic is why governments and
financial institutions intervene in the operation of a company. In Japan, there is a
pattern of cross-shareholding by affiliated companies, often including customers and
suppliers. The dominant shareholder is often a main bank78 or a 'keiretsu' partner79.
After dissolving into several small individual companies and banks after World War
II, the former conglomerates (zaibatsu) started to play the role of fund suppliers (Van
Rixtel and Hassink, 2002). They supply efficient long-term funds to their related
companies or subsidiaries, which allows them to buy each other's shares. These
cross-shareholdings can prevent hostile takeovers and form stable ownership.
78 Please refer to Section 2.2.2 for the discussion of the main bank system.
79 There are several definitions of 'keiretsu'. Odagiri (1992, p. 167) defines 'keiretsu' as "a group
consisting of a bank (with its affiliated financial institutions of other kinds, such as an insurance
company or a trust bank) and the companies for which it acts as the main bank (main supplier of
funds)". The most obvious characteristics of 'keiretsu' are affiliation, long-term relationships,
information sharing, cross shareholding, and extended networks (Van Rixtel and Hassink, 2002).
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Corporate governance in Japan is related to the existence of these kinds of informally
organised business groups, the so-called 'keiretsu\ The main bank system, the
keiretsu alliance and the government all play the role of protector or supporter
(Monks and Minow, 2004). The system of amakudari is an important issue among
these protectors and supporters.
Some studies focus on the relationship between Japanese bank performance and the
system of amakudari, which means retired government officials who are appointed
to board positions in public companies. Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002) suppose that
the system of amakudari could be helpful in exercising ex-ante and ex-post
monitoring. In ex-ante monitoring, the system of amakudari could operate as a
watchdog to take precautions before a financial crisis happens. In ex-post monitoring,
the system of amakudari is viewed as a 'trouble-shooter' who can restore confidence
among depositors and solve an acute financial crisis. Those troubled banks may
attempt to employ more retired officials from MoF (the Ministry of Finance) and BoJ
(the Bank of Japan) because such retired officials can persuade the relevant
regulators to help them, for example by petitioning for a loan deadline to be extended
or by asking for additional funding from the government. Given the empirical results
in Van Rixtel and Hassink's (2002) study, which indicate that there is a negative
relationship between firm performance and the inflow of retired MoF and BoJ staff
members, they argue that the system of amakudari is used as a trouble-shooter.
Furthermore, there is a positive relationship between the value of risky loans granted
and the inflow of retired MoF and BoJ officials. That is, the value of risky loans
granted by banks increases after these retired bureaucrats are recruited, which
suggests that the purpose of employing MoF and BoJ officials is to buy influence
from the government and banks. Similar to Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002), Horiuchi
and Shimizu (2001) classify 125 regional banks into four categories, which reflect
different levels ofutilisation of retired officials on the board. Their empirical analysis
shows that those regional banks that accept ex-bureaucrats from MoF reduce capital
adequacy levels and increase the bad loan ratio. This finding is similar to that of Van
Rixtel and Hassink (2002). They conclude that the system of amakudari enables
banks to expand risk-taking activities and thereby sabotages the monitoring system.
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Unfortunately, similar studies in Taiwan are very rare, even though political
involvement is significant. Ma and Yu (2002) examine the first power-shift in Taiwan
from the viewpoint of the ruling party. Taiwan experienced its first power-shift in
March 2000, ending the KMT's position as the ruling party for over half a century.
During its first two years in power, the new ruling party (DPP) reappointed CEOs
and directors in many state-owned and government-linked companies . Ma and Yu
(2002) build two main hypotheses - the control-driven hypothesis and the
performance-driven hypothesis. The control-driven hypothesis suggests that the
motivation of political involvement is to control companies for domestic votes and
policy implementation. Conversely, the performance-driven hypothesis suggests that
the motivation ofpolitical involvement is to improve firm performance.
Ma and Yu (2002) find that there is a strong relationship between policy control
considerations and the turnover rate of directors. That is, the percentage change in
board members after the power-shift is significantly higher for policy-sensitive firms
which are highly regulated or instrumental to policy implementation, such as banking,
energy, transportation and telecommunication industries. Subsequent firm
performance, however, is not related to the turnover rate of directors. This finding
does not support the performance-driven hypothesis. It indicates that the motivation
behind this kind of board restructuring is control-driven rather than
performance-driven. By using the event study, Ma and Yu (2002) also obtain a
negative market reaction after the board restructuring, which supports the
control-driven hypothesis because most investors think the government will use
political power to implement policies rather than improve firm performance.
Based on prior studies, we believe that the system of amakudari is not solely used as
a reward system (Van Rixtel and Hassink, 2002). That is, these retired bureaucrats
from government institutions, such as MoF and BoJ, are sent to troubled companies
in case of a financial crisis or the threat of insolvency81. These retired bureaucrats
80 For the introduction of the KMT party and the DPP party in Taiwan, please refer to Section 2.3.1.
81 This kind of appointment is often reported by the media or is published in the government white
book.
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can exercise their monitoring function and use their political networks to help the
company, such as extending the deadline for loans or negotiating for more funding
from the government. Given this, we think that the governments in Japan and Taiwan
not only play the role of protector or supporter but also pay attention to the policy
implementation. Since it takes some time for the government to recognise poor firm
performance and thereby have effects, there is a time lag before they intervene. Thus,
we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between firm performance (t) and political
involvement (t+1) is negative.
Sheard (1994) claims that companies are more likely to have bank executives on
their boards when they rely heavily on bank loans. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and
Morck and Nakamura (1999) also report that poor share performance raises the
probability of a banker being appointed to the board. Furthermore, Hoshi et al. (1990)
find that main banks in Japan orchestrate bailouts and accept disproportionate
responsibility of bad debts when their client companies have financial problems.
Hypothesis 1 supports the argument that that in order to improve firm performance
and help the company solve financial crises, the government will appoint
representatives to intervene in the board. For the same reason, financial institutions82,
such as banks and other keiretsu partners, will also dispatch representatives to the
boards to exercise the ex-post monitoring functions (Sheard, 1994; Morck and
Nakamura, 1999; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). It also
takes some time for financial institutions to recognise poor firm performance and
thereby take action; there is a time lag before they intervene. Thus, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between firm performance (t) and the intervention of
financial institutions (t+1) is negative.
The relationship between firm performance and the board of directors is discussed by




many prior studies. Various variables are used, such as CEO duality , board
composition84, and ownership structure85. However, these studies are not always
consistent (Dalton et al., 1998). On the one hand, there is evidence that the
monitoring ability of the board has influence on firm performance (Coles et al.,
2001), but on the other hand, the empirical results also imply the existence of a
reverse causality. Poor firm performance may also have influence on the structure of
the board of directors (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; Denis and Sarin, 1999). In order
to improve firm performance, the board of directors may change its composition and
quality to have better monitoring ability, which means that firm performance will be
negatively related to the monitoring ability of a board in the future. For example,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Weisbach (1988) conclude that the ratio of
independent directors on a board increases when a company has performed poorly.
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also indicate that poor firm performance often result
in a change of board members. Therefore, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between firm performance (t) and the monitoring
ability of the board (t+1) is negative .
4.2.2 Is subsequent firm performance positively related to such
intervention?
The second question concerning the relationship between the intervention of
governments and financial institutions and firm performance is whether the
intervention of governments and financial institutions is positively related to the
subsequent firm performance. In relational capitalism, the government can control
the operation of a company through the patterns of government ownership and
government appointed directors (La Porta et al., 2002; Sun et al., 2002). This
83 For example, Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996), Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997), and Fosberg and
Nelson (1999) have studied the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.
84
For example, Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Yeh,
Chou, and Chang (1999), and Bhagat and Black (2001) have examined the relationship between
board composition and firm performance.
85
Bhagat and Black (2001) include most governance-related variables in their empirical analysis to
examine the relationship between board independence and firm performance.
86 Section 5.3.1 will introduce the variables that are used to measure the monitoring ability of a board.
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business-government relationship can help the company to gain more support from
the government and help top management team (TMT) members to develop better
strategies. For example, government appointed directors can supply their knowledge
of government bureaucratic procedures and their prediction of government actions
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Colignon and Usui, 2003). The government may also
utilise these appointed retired bureaucrats (amakudari) on the board to help the
company solve financial problems, especially in the banking sector. For example, the
government can extend the deadline of loans from state-owned banks or give the
troubled companies more financial support (Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Porter et al.,
2000). Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) point out that after the bubble economy at the
beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese government allocated 60 trillion yen of public
funds as ofMarch 1999 to manage the bank crisis.
Some recent papers support the viewpoint that the government will give more
support to companies with which it has a closer connection. Sapienza (2004) argues
that state-owned banks in Italy might be charging lower interest rates to certain
companies in accordance with political objectives. They find that in areas where the
political party that runs the state-owned banks is stronger, the companies in those
areas that borrow money from them would obtain a higher discount than in other
areas. Johnson and Mitton (2003) also demonstrate that capital controls in Malaysia
provide rents to politically connected companies. In a cross-country study, Faccio
(2006) finds that companies with political connections can access debt financing
more easily and enjoy lower taxation. Faccio et al. (2006) conclude that
politically-connected companies are significantly more likely to be bailed out than
similar non-connected companies. On the evidence from prior studies, companies
which have good connections with the government may obtain government support
and thereby undermine competitors, or can forestall government actions which might
be inimical to the company. Based on these reasons, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 4-1: The relationship between political involvement (t) and the
subsequent firm performance (t+1) should be positive.
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On the other hand, based on the grabbing hand model (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998),
political involvement has long been considered a major reason for inefficiency
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1998; Shleifer, 1998). Most studies focus on government
ownership of banks. Barth et al. (1999) provide empirical evidence that government
ownership of banks is associated with a low level of financial development. Beck
and Levine (2002) fail to find any positive effect of government ownership of banks
on growth. Caprio and Peria (2000) also find that government ownership of banks is
associated with a higher likelihood of banking crises.
In addition to studies regarding government ownership of banks, Mascarenhas (1989),
Vining and Boardman (1992), Boardman and Vining (1982, 1989), Dewenter and
Malatesta (2001), and Sun et al. (2002) analyse how government ownership affects
firm performance. Vining and Boardman (1992) and Boardman et al. (1989) point
out that government ownership is less efficient than private ownership. Mascarenhas
(1989, p.582) also concludes, "Publicly traded firms exhibited generalism by
operating in many geographic markets and offering a wide product line. In contrast,
state-owned enterprises focused on their domestic market with a narrow product line
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and had a stable customer base ." Sun et al. (2002) investigate whether the extent of
government ownership affects the performance of Chinese state-owned enterprises
• ... 88
(SOEs) in the privatisation process . They conclude that the relationship between
government ownership and firm performance is nonlinear. That is, a portion of
government ownership has positive effects on SOE performance but there is
entrenchment. The relationship between government ownership and firm
performance is an inverted U-shape. This conclusion shows that too much
government ownership may undermine firm performance.
87 Mascarenhas (1989, p.583) defines that publicly traded firms are firms that issue shares and are
traded in stock exchanges. State-owned enterprises are owned by governments.
88 The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China now have 'partial privatization' (Sun et al., 2002, p.4).
Sun et al. (2002, p.2) indicate that "The official term used in China is not 'privatization' but 'share
ownership scheme'. The Chinese government try very hard to separate the two terms, as
'privatization' implicitly assumes capitalistic private ownership. According to the 'share ownership
scheme', as long as the assets of an SOE do not fall into the hands of private investors, the SOE is still
not privatized and hence still conforms with communism's public ownership principle. Such a
distinction is more than just ideological, because for a large number of privatized enterprises, the
Chinese government still retains a substantial portion of ownership." Therefore, Sun et al. (2002)
examine how the changing mix of public and private ownership influences firm performance of the
SOEs.
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Moreover, troubled companies are more willing to employ the retired bureaucrats
with the highest reward because they want to buy influence from them (Van Rixtel
and Hassink, 2002). Generally speaking, troubled companies are inclined to invest in
risky projects, but the regulations set by the government may forbid them to do so
(Van Rixtel and Hassink, 2002, p.3). Therefore, they need more retired bureaucrats to
persuade the government to extend more loans and allow them to undertake more
risky investment projects. Hence, the amakudari system here is used to buy influence
from the government through the retired bureaucrats, instead of monitoring the
troubled companies to restore profitability. Based on the grabbing hand model argued
by Shleifer and Vishny (1998), we can have another opposite hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4-2: The relationship between political involvement (t) and the
subsequent firm performance (t+1) will be negative.
Financial institutions, especially banks, will also appoint representatives to the board
to help the company solve financial problems (Aoki and Patrick, 1994, p. 188). These
representatives are also used for a monitoring function. The most commonly utilised
methods in banks involve reducing interest and appointing representatives to the
board. For example, in 1992, Sumitomo Bank dispatched five managers, including
executive directors, as trouble-shooters to Itoman Corporation as vice presidents
(SIC code: 8009). It also implemented interest reductions and wrote off 300 billion
yen in losses in 1993 (Sheard, 1991, p.47-52). Additionally, in order to save Nihon
Housing Loan (SIC code:8581), Sanwa Bank also dispatched officers to assess its
financial position and arranged assistance packages including interest reductions
from 6.55% to 3.25% in 1993 (Aoki and Patrick, 1994, p.225). Morck and Nakamura
(1999), Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) examine
whether the subsequent firm performance is related to prior outside director
appointments in Japan. Kaplan and Minton (1994) find no deterioration in firm
performance following outside director appointments. Kang and Shivdasani (1995)
suggest that the turnover of presidents is positively associated with the subsequent
firm performance only when their removal is expected to rectify poor firm
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performance. Based on prior studies and examples, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 5-1: The relationship between the intervention of financial institutions (t)
and the subsequent firm performance (t+1) should be positive.
Similar to Hypothesis 4-2, another kind of relationship is also possible. Because of
the moral hazard, the companies that have serious financial problems are more
willing to employ bank representatives to the board. In this way, they can obtain
more funding and support to invest in high profit but high risk projects. For example,
Morck and Nakamura (1999) document that companies experience negative share
returns in the year following bank director appointments. If the reason for recruiting
professional representatives to the board is to obtain considerable financial support
and buy influence rather than exercise monitoring, the subsequent firm performance
may be jeopardised. Hence, the hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 5-2: The relationship between the intervention of financial institutions (t)
and the subsequent firm performance (t+1) will be negative.
We also examine the relationship between the board of directors and the subsequent
firm performance. According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), a
company with a board with better monitoring ability, such as one with more outside
directors, dual leadership structure, more performance contingent pay, and a high
ratio of board ownership will have better firm performance. For example, there is
evidence that companies with majority-independent boards perform more effectively
than other boards in particular tasks, such as replacing the CEO (Weisbach, 1988),
and thereby have better firm performance. However, some studies do not find a
significant relationship between the monitoring ability of the board and firm
performance. For example, some studies of Australian, Singaporean, and United
Kingdom companies find no correlation between board composition and firm
performance (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999; Mak and Li, 2001). A few studies even find
that companies with a high percentage of independent directors may perform worse.
Yermack (1996) reports a significant negative correlation between the ratio of
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independent directors and contemporaneous Tobin's Q but no significant correlation
for other performance variables (sales/assets; operating income/assets; operating
income/sales). Although much has been said about the corporate governance
mechanism, the results are not always consistent (Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2001).
But, based on the previous literature (Gompers, et al., 2003), a company with a board
with better monitoring ability, such as more outside directors and higher board
ownership, is expected to have better performance.
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between the monitoring ability of the board (t) and
the subsequent firm performance (t+1) is positive.
Moreover, since political involvement and the intervention of financial institutions in
Japan and Taiwan means that they can appoint representatives to the board, the
monitoring ability of a board will be influenced by them. This phenomenon allows
the board of directors to play an intermediate role between the government/financial
institutions and firm performance. This research takes the implicit relationship into
consideration by using structural equation modelling (SEM). To focus on this
implicit relationship, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 7: The board of directors may moderate the relationship between
performance and the intervention of government and financial
institutions.
4.3 The Relationship between Political Involvement and the
Degree of Internationalisation
4.3.1 Is the degree of internationalisation related to the subsequent
intervention of governments and financial institutions?
In addition to firm performance, this research also examines DOI and discusses
whether the intervention of government and other financial institutions is associated
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with firm strategy on this matter . Based on the discussion in Chapter 3, we find that
governments in Asian countries play a very critical role in the development of
internationalisation. Current internationalisation theories, however, do not consider
the special phenomena in Asia, such as the intervention of governments and financial
institutions. Therefore, in addition to the contextual viewpoint, it is important to
observe the relationship between the intervention from government and financial
institutions and DOI in Asia from an empirical viewpoint. The first question we ask
in this section is whether DOI is related to the subsequent intervention of
governments and financial institutions? In other words, are companies with higher
DOI more likely to be intervened by governments and financial institutions?
Companies may prefer less political involvement because the government is
commonly regarded as a major source of inefficiency. Government ownership is used
to pursue political goals, extract rents, and transfer resources to supporters instead of
maximising profits (Mascarenhas, 1989; Shieifer and Vishny, 1994, 1998; Shieifer,
1998; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Garrett and Lange, 1995). If politicians and
government officials are interested in maximising domestic votes, the objective of
maximising the interests of shareholders will be neglected. From the government's
viewpoint, it is less likely to intervene in the operation of a company with a high DOI
because they can generate more votes by intervening in the operation of domestic
companies where domestic officials can have greater control of firm activities
(Mazzolini, 1980a, 1980b, Mascarenhas, 1989). From the company's viewpoint,
international expansion implies greater mobility for capital (Keohane and Milner,
1996). Owners of capital will use the threat of exit as leverage to their political
influence (Hirschman, 1970, Keohane and Milner, 1996). Internationally mobile
capital will gain political power as internationalisation proceeds. Therefore, those
companies that gain political power may try to decrease political involvement
because the intervention of government is commonly regarded as inefficient (Shieifer
and Vishny, 1994; Shieifer, 1998). In addition, as discussed in Section 3.2.2, political
involvement and the role of a government will change with internationalisation and
the economic development process (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; Sim and Pandian,
89 The measurement of DOI is discussed in Section 3.3.
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2003). Therefore, different stages of internationalisation will have different
influences on political involvement. According to Aggarwal and Agmon (1990) and
Dunning (1981, 1986), a higher DOI (i.e. Stage 3 in Aggarwal and Agmon (1990) or
Stage 4, 5 in Dunning (1981, 1986)) will reduce the ability of the government to
control the company. Considering the argument that it takes some time for the
government to influence DOI of a company, there is a time lag between DOI and
political intervention. Thus, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 8-1: The degree of internationalisation (t) is negatively associated with
the subsequent intervention of governments (t+1).
Although the government is commonly regarded as the source of inefficiency,
companies with a lower DOI may prefer political involvement. From the company's
viewpoint, the home government can offer some support by acting on the company's
behalf (Poynter, 1985). Political involvement from the home government can
increase their bargaining power when they negotiate with host countries, especially
in countries with high political risk90. Moreover, political involvement of the home
government can also help domestic companies overcome or circumvent unfavourable
domestic international regulations. For example, the Singaporean government enjoys
good relations with the governments of host countries, so the Singaporean
government-linked companies (GLCs) can exploit these relationships to enter these
markets (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998; Pangarkar, 1998). Furthermore, according to
Aggarwal and Agmon (1990) and the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981, 1986)91, the
government acts as a supplier of information and technology in the early stages of
the internationalisation process (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). At this stage, when
DOI is not high enough, companies would prefer political involvement from the
home government because it "creates and protects profit opportunities for the
corporations" (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990, p. 174). Therefore, the relationship
between DOI and political involvement from the home government would be
90 Henisz and Williamson (1999), Henisz (2000), Delios and Henisz (2003a, 2003b) discuss in detail
the political risk of host countries.
91 Please refer to Section 3.2 for more discussion concerning Aggarwal and Agmon (1990)'s
contextual research and the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981, 1986).
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positive.
In addition, when DOI of domestic companies increases, the domestic economy it
will become more sensitive to world market price and economic shocks (Keohane
and Milner, 1996). Therefore, increasing internationalisation may undermine the
autonomy and efficacy of government policy (Razin and Rose, 1994; Milner and
Keohane, 1996a). In order not to accept the outcome passively, the government will
start to intervene in the international strategy of a company. For example, the
government in Taiwan does support companies in their international expansion but,
for political reasons, imposes constraints on Taiwanese FDI to China (Sim and
Pandian, 2003). Because of these restrictions, many Taiwanese firms invest in China
via third countries. Additionally, a higher DOI (i.e. higher outward FDI) also results
in higher capital mobility (Garrett, 1996). When it is easy to move capital offshore,
the government will have stronger incentives to intervene in a company with a high
DOI. By appointing directors to the board, the government can pursue policies that
will increase rates of return on domestic investments (Garrett, 1996). For example, in
order to guarantee that Taiwanese companies will bring profits back to Taiwan and
that the headquarters of Taiwanese companies will stay in Taiwan rather than move
to China, the Taiwanese government imposes constraints on the total amount of FDI
• • 09
in China . In this way, the relationship between DOI of a company and political
involvement will be positive. Based on these arguments, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 8-2: The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively related to the
subsequent intervention of governments (t+1).
The DOI is also associated with the intervention from financial institutions. Financial
investors usually manage broad portfolios of foreign securities and actively engage in
international equity markets (Norburn et al. 2000). These active institutional
investors, however, encounter barriers regarding capital flow, institutional regulations,
92
According to the Announcement No. 09304602280 made by the Ministry of Economic Affairs on
1st March, 2004 for small-medium enterprises (SMEs), the total amount invested in China cannot
exceed NTD 80,000,000. For companies whose capitalisations exceed NTD 80,000,000 but are under
NTD 5 billions, the total amount invested in China cannot exceed 40% of their capitalisation or NTD
80,000,000, whichever is greater.
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and information asymmetry (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Tihanyi et al., 2003).
Conversely, multinational companies (MNCs) do not have these restrictions and
thereby can gain profit, which cannot be obtained by institutional investors in
international markets (Doukas and Travlos, 1988). That is, investing companies with
a high DOI can provide low risk and low cost international investments to
institutional investors (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998;
Tihanyi et al. 2003). Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) also demonstrate that international
diversification by MNCs can be an attractive alternative for the clients of
professional investment funds.
Moreover, some studies claim that international expansion provides companies with
significant benefits, such as higher firm performance and higher sales (Ball and
McMulloch, 1999; Hitt et al., 1994; Kim et al., 1993; Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003).
Higher international expansion produces higher firm performance than domestic
product diversification (Hitt et al., 1994; Kim et al., 1993; Ruigrok and Wagner,
2003). MNCs may also have higher returns than domestic companies (Hughes et al.,
1975). Therefore, financial investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and
blockholders, are likely to be interested in investing in companies with a higher DOI
owing to the positive effects it has on shareholders' wealth (Tihanyi et al., 2003).
Given these arguments, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 9: The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively associated with the
subsequent intervention of financial institutions (t+1).
Sullivan (1994) claims that a company's DOI reflects its dependence on foreign
markets for customers, suppliers, and the geographical dispersion. The complexity of
operating a company increases with the DOI (Roth and O'Donnell, 1996). Given the
increased complexity, which results from a higher DOI, directors and executives are
tasked with greater information-processing requirements (Roth and O'Donnell, 1996;
Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Therefore, a classic agency problem appears because
it is more difficult for the board to monitor executives under a complex international
environment (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). According to
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agency theory, the monitoring problem can be resolved through governance
arrangements, such as more share-based compensation and a higher ratio of outside
directors. By studying 258 American companies in 1992, Sanders and Carpenter
(1998) also find that a higher DOI will result in higher CEO incentive compensation,
larger top management teams, and the separation of CEO and the chairman. They
conclude that a company's DOI will significantly influence its choice of corporate
governance arrangements. Based on these prior studies, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 10: The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively associated with the
subsequent monitoring ability of a board (t+1).
4.3.2 Is the subsequent degree of internationalisation positively
related to such intervention?
The question we ask in this section is whether the intervention of governments and
financial institutions is positively related to the subsequent DOI. The fact that
political involvement from the home country might push investment overseas has
been noted in some contextual survey studies but received little statistical attention
(Tallman, 1988). It is very common in East Asia for governments to play an active
and supportive role in the international expansion of their domestic companies
(Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998; Sim and Pandian, 2003; Van Hoesel, 1999; Dunning et
al., 1998). For example, the Singaporean government played a supportive role in the
promotion of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly from the early
1990s (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998; Pang, 1995; Tan, 1995). The Keppel Corporation93,
a Singaporean GLC, led a consortium of Singaporean companies to build the
Singapore-Suzhou industrial town in Suzhou, China. The Singaporean government
provided generous supports, such as tax incentives, finance schemes, and training, to
foster the rapid development of local entrepreneurship in the regionalisation efforts.
93 The Keppel Group is focused on three key businesses: Offshore and Marine, Property, and
Infrastructure. The Keppel Group was one of the first Singaporean companies to spearhead
investments abroad. The group's geographical presence extends as far as Germany, the US, the Middle
East, Brazil and Nicaragua. Keppel is the Singapore MNC with the core competencies for enduring
relationships, successful businesses and synergistic opportunities.
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Given the example of the Keppel Corporation, GLCs in this stage are usually used as
a tool to increase the DOI, which means that political involvement is positively
related to DOI. We thereby hypothesise as follows.
Hypothesis 11-1: The intervention of governments (t) is positively related to a higher
subsequent degree of internationalisation (t+1).
However, government support usually focuses on the macroeconomic dimension. It
is not clear whether political involvement is positively related to firm-level
internationalisation. Similar to the relationship between political involvement and
subsequent firm performance, the argument that inefficient government ownership
and intervention may jeopardise international expansion (i.e. result in a lower DOI)
may also be supported. According to the grabbing hand model (Shleifer and Vishny,
1998), the government can have the power to control the strategy of a company and
thereby make a profit or extract rents for the ruling party itself, instead of
maximising the interests of shareholders. There exists the danger that the government
will pursue its own interests at the expense of the shareholders. In order to maximise
domestic votes, the strategy of increasing the firm-level DOI is not the primary goal
because international expansion is more risky than operating a company domestically
(Mascarenhas, 1989). For the government, the main goal of intervening in a company
focuses on generating domestic votes, increasing jobs, and other political goals (Ball
and MuCulloch, 1999), not increasing the firm-level DOI. Therefore, we
hypothesise:
Hypothesis 11-2: The intervention of governments (t) is negatively related to
subsequent degree of internationalisation (t+1).
In addition to political involvement, the intervention from financial institutions also
plays an important role in DOI. Financial investors here include blockholders, banks,
insurance companies, professional investment funds, pension funds and so on.
Financial investors, who own a large ratio of a company's outstanding shares, may be
able to "exert significant influence on the strategy and structure of a firm" (Sanders
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and Carpenter, 1998, p. 167). Managers pursuing profits and growth opportunities
should consider the support from various financial investors because "the confidence
of these large investors may help managers to secure funds for costly overseas
projects and thereby can significantly affect the success of international strategies"
(Tihanyi et al., 2003, p. 196).
Because of different interests, different financial investors may have different
objectives (Bushee, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Tihanyi et al., 2003). Based
on the classification in Brickley et al. (1988), there are three kinds of institutional
investors - pressure-resistant, pressure-sensitive, and pressure-indeterminate.
Kochhar and David (1996) conclude that pressure-resistant investors (i.e. pension
funds, mutual funds, and foundations) have a stronger influence on firm innovation
than pressure-sensitive investors (i.e. insurance companies and banks). Prior studies
suggest that understanding pressure-resistant investors is particularly important from
the perspective of agency theory (Bushee, 1998, 2001). Therefore, prior studies
seldom examine the influence of pressure-sensitive investors on the strategy of a
company. In this thesis, however, we consider both pressure-resistant and
pressure-sensitive institutional investors by using SEM which will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
According to Tihanyi et al. (2003), institutional ownership, including professional
investment fund ownership and pension fund ownership, has a significant and
positive influence on DOI. By studying 197 companies drawn from the S&P 1500 in
1996, they found that one percentage point increase in pension fund ownership will
result in 14% increase in DOI. Moreover, because of current or potential business
transactions with a company, banks have an obligation to support the management's
strategy financially (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Although banks are regarded as passive
investors from this viewpoint (Davis and Thompson, 1994), they still supply
financial support for companies undergoing international expansion. The main bank
system in Japan is a very good example. In addition, the equity holdings of other
financial institutions, such as insurance companies, also provide a 'safety net' for
these companies (Tihanyi et al., 2003, p. 199). Based on the arguments above, we
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hypothesise:
Hypothesis 12: The intervention of financial institutions (t) is positively associated
with subsequent degree of internationalisation (t+1).
Sanders and Carpenter (1998) conclude that a company's DOI will significantly
influence its choice of corporate governance arrangements. At the same time,
however, an effective board can also protect the interests of shareholders by ensuring
that executives formulate good strategies (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Therefore, Sanders
and Carpenter (1998) also imply that "the opposite causal chain may occur" (Sanders
and Carpenter, 1998, p. 174). According to their empirical results and implications,
we can observe that a reinforcing spiral may occur between the monitoring ability of
a board and a company's DOI. That is, a board with better monitoring ability is more
appropriate for managing complexity and thereby tends to increase international
expansion (i.e. increases the company's DOI).
Prior studies have indicated that the board and the composition of the top
management team are involved in strategic changes (Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt,
1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Sherman et al., 1998; Westphal, 1998; Tihanyi et al.,
2000). Researchers have recently extended the examination of the influence of board
composition on firm strategy by considering the DOI (Ellstrand et al., 2002). For
example, outside directors are likely to support international diversification because
of the potential to increase profits through, for example, increased sales. Tihanyi et al.
(2003) examined 197 large American companies in 1996 and found that outside
directors significantly increase DOI. When the ratio of outside directors increases
one percentage point, DOI will increase by 12%. Sherman et al. (1998), however,
find that board characteristics or composition is not significantly related to DOI.
They also find that larger board executive committees94 with greater tenure are
94
According to Sherman et al. (1998, p.318), "The monitoring committees are primarily responsible
for providing an objective, independent review of corporate actions. They often are composed of
outside directors and include audit, compensation, and nominating committees. Management support
committees primarily advise the board on major operating or strategic decisions The executive
committee serves as a stand in for the full board during crises and also acts as a screening and review
vehicle on major proposals before they come to the full board.... The executive committee appears to
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associated with a higher DOI. Based on prior studies, we believe that the relationship
between the monitoring ability of a board and DOI exists. Therefore, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 13: The relationship between the monitoring ability of a board (t) and the
subsequent degree of internationalisation (t+1) is positive.
In addition, Tihanyi et al. (2003) argue that board composition will moderate the
relationship between DOI and institutional ownership. Institutional ownership in
Tihanyi et al. (2003) includes professional investment funds and pension funds.
Tihanyi et al. (2003) hypothesise that institutional ownership by professional
investment funds and pension funds are both positively related to a company's DOI.
They also find that the relationship between professional investment funds and DOI
will be stronger for companies with a higher ratio of outside directors on the board
(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), whereas the relationship between pension funds and
DOI will be stronger for companies with a higher ratio of inside directors on the
board (Ellstrand et al., 2002; Hoskisson et al., 2002). Their findings imply that the
board of directors can play an intermediate role in the relationship between financial
institutions and DOI. In this thesis, we take the implicit relationship into
consideration by using SEM. To focus on this implicit relationship, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 14: The board of directors may moderate the relationship between DOI
and the intervention of government and financial institutions.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter establishes hypotheses concerning the relationship between different
dimensions. There are two main topics in this chapter. The first topic is the
examinations of the relationship between political involvement, the intervention of
financial institutions, and firm performance. The second topic is the examinations of
the relationship between political involvement, the intervention of financial
be controlled by inside firm managers."
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institutions, and DOI. There are two questions that we try to answer relating to each
topic.
Section 4.2 focuses on firm performance and discusses the relationship between
political involvement, the intervention of financial institutions, and firm performance.
The first question we try to answer in this topic is why there is intervention from the
government and financial institutions. This question is discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Based on prior studies, we hypothesise that these retired bureaucrats from
government institutions and representatives from financial institutions are sent to the
troubled companies in case of a financial crisis in order to exercise a monitoring
function. Section 4.2.2 discusses the second question concerning the relationship
between political involvement and firm performance, which is, is the intervention of
governments and financial institutions positively related to the subsequent firm
performance? Since the informal relationship between companies and
governments/financial institutions can help companies to gain more support from
them, the subsequent firm performance may be positively related to their intervention.
Conversely, some researchers have considered this kind of intervention a major
reason for inefficiency. Political involvement and the intervention of financial
institutions may jeopardise the monitoring ability of the board of directors and
thereby reduce firm performance. Hence, we have two different hypotheses for the
relationship between the intervention of governments and financial institutions and
subsequent firm performance.
Section 4.3 discusses the relationship between political involvement, the intervention
of financial institutions, and DOI. The first question in Section 4.3.1 is whether DOI
is related to subsequent intervention of government and financial institutions? As
discussed in Section 3.2.2, political involvement and the role of a government will
change with internationalisation and the economic development process. Therefore,
the relationship between political involvement and DOI might be negative in
countries with higher economic development and positive in countries with lower
economic development (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990). Moreover, prior studies claim
that a higher DOI will produce higher firm performance. Therefore, financial
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investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are likely to invest in companies
with a higher DOI because of the positive effects of international expansion on
shareholders' wealth (Tihanyi et al., 2003). The intervention of financial institutions
may be positively associated with the subsequent DOI.
In Section 4.3.2, we try to answer the second question concerning DOI - are political
involvement and the intervention of financial institutions related to the subsequent
DOI? It is common for the governments in East Asia to play an activist and
supportive role in international expansion of their domestic companies, which means
that the intervention of governments may be positively associated with the
subsequent DOI. However, it is not clear whether the relationship between political
involvement and firm-level internationalisation is empirically positive. Similar to the
relationship between political involvement and subsequent firm performance,
inefficient government intervention may jeopardise international expansion (i.e.
result in a lower DOI). Therefore, the relationship between political involvement and
DOI may be positive or negative. Financial investors also play an important role in
DOI because investment by them may secure funds for international expansion.
Moreover, the equity holdings of financial institutions also provide a 'safety net' for
companies (Tihanyi et al., 2003, p. 199). Based on prior studies, the relationship
between institutional ownership and DOI should be significant and positive (Tihanyi
et al., 2003). Therefore, we hypothesise a positive relationship between the
intervention of financial institutions and DOI.
This chapter also focuses on the relationship between the board of directors and firm
performance/DOI. The board of directors may play an intermediate role in these
factors. A board with good monitoring ability may fend off the intervention of
government and financial institutions and thereby be positively related to subsequent
firm performance or DOI. The intervention of government and financial institutions,
however, may jeopardise the monitoring ability of a board and thereby supports the
argument that such intervention will result in poor firm performance and a lower
DOI. Given the importance of the board of directors, it is necessary to consider its
intermediate and implicit role. Therefore, in this thesis we include the board of
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directors as an intermediate factor in these relationships. Based on the hypotheses
discussed in this chapter, we build the models for Japan and Taiwan in the following





Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a commonly used methodology in
psychology, sociology, and other humanities studies. It represents a hybrid of two
statistical methods. The first method is factor analysis, which was developed for use
in the disciplines of psychology and psychometrics and which gained enormous
popularity in the 1950s and 1960s. Joreskog's (1967) and Joreskog and Lawley's
(1968) studies created a maximum likelihood based approach for factor analysis. The
maximum likelihood based approach allows researchers to test a hypothesis that a
specified number of factors were presented to specify the intercorrelations among the
variables. Based on the maximum likelihood approach, Anderson and Rubin (1956)
and Joreskog (1969) developed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In CFA,
researchers first specify a number of factors, decide which factors are correlated and
then statistically test the significance of a hypothesised model. Therefore,
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is regarded as a priori-specified theoretical
model.
The second method is simultaneous equation modelling, which is commonly used in
the area of econometrics. Based on simultaneous equation modelling, Sewell Wright
(1918, 1921, and 1934) developed the path analysis, which examines how the
correlations between variables can be related to the parameters of a model as
demonstrated by a path diagram. Generally, path analysis solves a set of
simultaneous regression equations, which establish the relationships between
variables based on hypotheses. Wright applied path analysis to problems of
estimating demand and supply equations. Unfortunately, path analysis was neglected
until econometricians reconsidered it in the 1950s "as a form of simultaneous
equation modelling" (Schumacker and Fornax, 2004, p.5).
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SEM, which combines confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and path analysis, was
based on the work by Joreskog (1973), Keesling (1972), and Wiley (1973). Basic
SEM consists of two parts: (1) the measurement part, which connects observed
variables (i.e. measurement variables) with latent variables by using confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA); (2) the structural part, which links latent variables with each
other by using simultaneous equation modelling (Kaplan, 2000). The original
approach was initially known as the JKW model and then as the linear structural
relation model (LISREL) due to the development of the software program LISREL in
1973. Currently, SEM is one of the most popular statistical methodologies used in
quantitative research, especially in psychology and is becoming increasingly popular
in business and management. One of the modern developments of SEM has focused
on the extension of new estimation methods to manage the non-normality problem.
The basic assumption of SEM is that measurement variables must follow
multivariate normal distribution. In many cases, the dichotomous, order-categorical,
and continuous variables do not follow the normal distribution. These non-normal
variables, which can be found in many management and financial studies, will result
in biased results. The non-normality problem will be discussed in Section 5.4.5.
Based on the backgrounds of political involvement, corporate governance, and DOI
in Japan and Taiwan introduced in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 builds hypotheses
upon these dimensions. In this chapter, we will introduce SEM, the sample, and the
variables used in this thesis. The sample and data sources are introduced in Section
5.2. In Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, we explain the calculation of the variables that are
used in this thesis. Section 5.4 explains the theory of SEM and the problems that it
may present. Section 5.5 provides a summary of this chapter.
5.2 Sample and Data
This thesis focuses on two countries that operate relational capitalism - Japan and
Taiwan. For Japan, the sample comprises 203 Japanese companies from the Nikkei
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225 index95. As there is no similar index in Taiwan that includes a comparable
number of companies, 200 from all listed Taiwanese companies were chosen
according to the highest capitalisation on 1st August, 2004 and data availability. For
both countries, the research period is three years from 2001 to 2003. Table 5-1
presents the the industry distribution of the observations in Japan and Taiwan.
Table 5-1 The industry distribution of the observations in Japan and Taiwan
(A) Japan
Industry Code Industry Classification Total %
13 Farming and Fishing 1 0.05
16 Mining 1 0.05
18-19 Construction 8 0.39
20-29 Foods 13 0.64
31-34 Textiles 10 0.49
38 Papers 4 0.20
40, 42, 44, 49 Chemicals 15 0.74
45 Pharmaceutical Industry 10 0.49
50 Oil 2 0.10
51 Rubber 2 0.10
52-53 Glass and Ceramics 6 0.30
54-56 Steels 4 0.20
57-58 Metals 10 0.49
61-64 Machinery 11 0.54
65-69 Electric appliance and Cable 24 1.18
70, 72 Heavy Industry 8 0.39
72 Automobiles 5 0.25
77 Instruments 5 0.25
80-81 Trading and Consumers' Goods Industry 8 0.39
82 Retail 6 0.30
83-85 Banks 8 0.39
86 Securities 4 0.20
87 Insurance 2 0.10
88 Real Estate 4 0.20
90-92 Transportation 12 0.59
93 Logistics 1 0.05
94, 97-99 Communication 8 0.39
95 Gas and Electricity 5 0.25
96, 97 Service Industry 3 0.15
79 Others 3 0.15
Total 203 100
Average firm size (total asset) (Unit: In million USD) 23.67
Average (Total capital)/(Total assets) (%) 52.27
95 21 companies were deleted from the sample because they did not have complete data or have been
merged into a new company. The rule for deleting companies in Taiwan is the same as in Japan.
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(B) Taiwan
Industry Code Industry Classification Total %
11 Cement 3 1.51
12 Foods 2 1.01
13 , Plastic 11 5.53
14 Textiles 5 2.51
15 Machinery 8 4.02
16 Electric appliance and Cable 1 0.50
17 Chemicals 8 4.02
18 Glass and Ceramics 1 0.50
19 Paper 4 2.01
20 Steel and Iron 7 3.52
21 Rubber 5 2.51
22 Automobiles 3 1.51
23-24 Electronics and Computers 94 47.24
25 Construction 6 3.02
26 Transportation 9 4.52
27 Tourism 1 0.50
28 Finance 17 8.54
29 Logistics 4 2.01
98-99 Others 11 5.53
Total 200 100
Average firm size (total asset) (Unit: In million USD) 20.28
Average (Total capital)/(Total assets) (%) 64.18
According to the classification of industry in Tokyo Stock Exchange and Taiwan
Stock Exchange, there are 32 industries in Japan and 20 industries in Taiwan. From
Table 5-1, we can observe that our Japanese sample includes 30 industries and the
Taiwanese sample includes 19 industries, which means that our samples widely
cover different industries in Japan and Taiwan.
In Taiwan, according to the regulations set by the Taiwan Stock Exchange
Corporation (TSEC), a listed company must disclose its ownership structure, the
ratio of outside directors and brief biographies of its directors in its annual report. By
using the database - the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and FINASIA, we obtained
financial data and data regarding political involvement, such as government
ownership. The Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) was founded in April 1990, Taipei,
Taiwan. It provides the data and information on financial market and company
information in Taiwan and China. TEJ also acts as the Asian data provider for
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DATASTREAM, Dialog, and QUICK (in Japan).
In Japan, however, most companies are not required to disclose a great deal of
information to the public. They only have to be responsible to their financial
supporters, i.e. the main banks and the government (Monks and Minow, 2004).
Given the low disclosure transparency in Japan, which is discussed in Appendix 1, it
is very difficult to obtain Japanese data by using annual reports alone. Fortunately,
some private and official publishers publish some booklets containing information
about the boards of directors in Japan. In addition to annual reports, we use three
main sources of data that are published in Japanese. No single source captures the
entire scope of Japanese boards but only a piece of the overall picture. Unfortunately,
some sources are difficult to obtain before 2000 and thereby constrain our research
period.
1. Yakuin Shikihou (Employee Report, fxJtEB^PfE) are published quarterly by
Toyo Keizai Shinposha These two sources include financial
data of listed companies. In addition to basic financial data, they also provide the
names of directors, their career history, the universities from which they
graduated, the year they entered the company, and the interlock conditions.
Therefore, variables concerning board composition and the quality of directors
are collected from this source.
2. Nippon Kinyu Meikan (Directory of Executives in the Japanese Finance Industry,
B published by Nippon Kinyu Tsushinsha (Japan Finance Press,
B /ft)- This three-volume book, published since the 1960s, contains
detailed information about the composition of the boards of directors of all
Japanese financial institutions including city banks, regional banks, second tier
regional banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, foreign banks and other
financial institutions. This publication offers three advantages. First, it shows the
careers of the board members since graduating from university. Thus, if the
member was previously employed by the government, this information will be
shown. Second, this book also lists every interlock relationship. All the positions
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occupied by a director will be listed. This three-volume book Therefore, we
collect directors' information of financial institutions through this three-volume
book which provides a detailed picture of the relationships between Japanese
banks and the government.
3. Yukashoken Hokokusho (Securities Report,^ fjSj |iE^ pf If) is published
annually by every Japanese company. It is the major source for this thesis. We
obtained Yukashoken Hokokusho from the Japanese official website, EDINET
(Electronic Disclosure for Investors' Network). Yukashoken Hokokusho is an
annual security report. Unlike annual reports, which only provide limited and
general information, Yukashoken Hokokusho provides detailed information
concerning the board of directors, ownership structure, and the operation of the
company. The variables regarding ownership structure and DOI are collected
from this source.
In addition to the data sources mentioned above, we also used DataStream to collect
financial data, such as ROE, ROA, and TSR. When there is a conflict between
information which is available in multiple data sources, this thesis will use the formal
reports published by companies.
5.3 Variables
SEM has a major advantage when dealing with concepts such as governance, board
monitoring or institutional intervention. While these concepts have a clear meaning
in the literature, they generally lack a unique or well-defined measure by which they
can be quantified or gauged. SEM allows a group of variables to be associated with
each underlying concept (e.g. 'internal governance'). While it is difficult to point to a
single measure for a concept such as 'internal governance', it is far easier to specify a
range ofmeasures that, by general agreement, capture the notion of board monitoring.
SEM also enables the relationships between these underlying but difficult-to-measure
concepts to be quantified. The measurement variables discussed below are grouped
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into five latent variables: internal governance (BOARD), financial institutions
(INST), political involvement (GOV), firm performance (PERF), and the degree of
internationalisation (DOI). Each of these main headings and their respective
constituent measured variables will be discussed in turn.
(BOARD) - Internal governance: BDOWN; OUTSIDE; MANOWN; BP Q.
In relational capitalism, retired government bureaucrats will simply be invited to
work with public listed companies (Colignon and Usui, 2003). If the directors have a
close relationship with the government and financial institutions, they will persuade
the government and professional investors to dispatch representatives to the board
and help the company solve financial problems. Therefore, the board of directors
plays an important intermediary role between a company and the intervention of
governments and financial institutions. Meanwhile, the board of directors also plays
the role ofmonitoring CEO behaviour and firm performance. In order to evaluate the
direct and indirect relationship between the board of directors and firm performance,
this thesis includes several variables to measure its monitoring ability. In terms of
internal governance, the percentage of board ownership (BDOWN) is included
(Coles et al., 2001). With regard to board composition, the ratio of non-executive
directors to the number of total directors (OUTSIDE) is also included. Also included
is the fractional equity ownership by the CEO and his immediate family
(MANOWN). The key consideration here is that as the ownership by the CEO and
his immediate family increases, any actions taken by him may be oriented
increasingly toward maximising the value of the company. That is, CEO ownership
can align his interests with those of shareholders. Owing to the unavailability of data,
the Japanese model does not include the MANOWN variable96.
Bhagat and Black (2001) argue that outside directors have less professional business
96 The Japanese corporate governance system is different from the Anglo-Saxon system. Japanese
companies seldom use the titles of CEO, CFO, and COO (only a few companies have adopted the
Anglo-Saxon system, such as SONY). All directors (torishimariyaku), including managing directors,
executive directors, and advisory directors, act like a CEO. The demarcation among them is very
ambiguous.
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knowledge and lack information concerning the company, so adding outside directors
may increase the board independence at the expense of sabotaging both the
decision-making process and firm performance. Therefore, in addition to the variable
OUTSIDE, the variable BD_Q is included to measure the quality of directors. The
National Association ofCorporate Directors guidelines (NACD, 1996) recommended
that senior corporate executives and CEOs should hold no more than three outside
directorships97. BD_Q captures the percentage of directors who occupy more than
three executive or director positions in other companies (Perry and Peyer, 2005).
(INST) - Financial institutions: FINOWN; BANKD; CROSS; BLOCK.
In addition to the government, the main bank and other keiretsu partners98 will also
appoint representatives to the board in order to help their troubled partner tackle
financial problems. Banks play an extremely important role in corporate governance
in Asia, especially in Japan. The notable feature of the Japanese corporate system is
keiretsu, a pattern of cross-shareholding by affiliated companies including customers
and suppliers. There is usually a dominant main bank in a keiretsu group. These main
banks usually appoint some representatives to the boards to exercise the monitoring
function. We analyse this dimension through four measurement variables. The first
variable used to capture this phenomenon is financial ownership (FINOWN), which
is measured by the ratio of shares held by financial institutions to total outstanding
shares. Additionally, to take account of the number of bank-appointed directors on
the board, these are expressed as a proportion of the total number of directors
(BANK D). Cross-shareholding ownership (CROSS) measures the ownership
owned by other companies, and is computed as the ratio of cross-shareholding shares
97 Some researchers believe that there is no prescriptive answer to the ideal number of directorships
that a person should hold. The number of directorships that a person accepts should be limited only by
that person's capacity to properly carry out the obligations required of each directorship on behalf of
the shareholders. Moreover, each individual directorship brings valuable experience and additional
business insights (Ferri et al., 2003).
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Japanese companies interlink each other through share purchases to form horizontally-integrated
alliances, so-called keiretsu. Companies in the same keiretsu also supply one another, making the
alliances vertically-integrated to some extent as well. The keiretsu is usually centred on one main bank,
which lends money to the member companies and holds equity of these companies. Each main bank
has control over the member companies in the keiretsu and acts as a monitoring entity as well as an
emergency bail-out entity.
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to total outstanding shares. These cross-shareholders include affiliated companies
and other companies that belong to the same keiretsu group. Finally, as in the study
by Kang and Shivdasani (1995), the percentage of ownership accounted for by the
top ten blockholders is captured in the variable BLOCK. By virtue of the magnitude
of their investments and the threat of selling large blocks of shares if the company
fails to provide an acceptable return, they may have influence on managerial
behaviour.
(GOV)- Political involvement: GOVOWN; GOV I; GOVAPP; GAKUBATSU.
The most important latent variable in this thesis is political involvement (GOV).
Powerful government intervention has maintained strong control of many Japanese
and Taiwanese companies. The main task of this thesis is to examine why there is
intervention of government and whether the existence of the close relationship
between the companies and government jeopardises firm performance and DOI in
Japan and Taiwan.
The subject of political involvement is always sensitive. The government can
intervene in the operation of companies in many different ways, such as the
placement of government appointed directors on the board and government
ownership. Furthermore, governments in different countries usually have different
methods of intervention in the operation of a company. For example, governments in
Asian countries usually use government ownership and appointed directors on boards
to control the operation of the company. According to our calculation, at the end of
2004, the government ownership of shares across all Taiwanese listed companies
amounted to 2.21% of the total number of listed shares, and the
weighted-market-value of government ownership amounted to 12.34%. The
following part will explain these different variables used by prior studies and
introduce the variables used in this thesis.
Most studies concerning the relationship between the government and the operation
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of a company use various variables for empirical analyses. Among these variables,
government ownership is the most commonly used. Many studies discuss how
government ownership affects other variables, such as firm performance (e.g.
Boardman and Vining, 1982, 1989; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Sun, Tong and
Jing Tong, 2002). In order to intervene in the operation of a company, the
government may assume a high level of ownership. In this way, the government can
occupy a fixed number of seats on the board and thereby be involved in the
decision-making process. Compared to other variables, government ownership is also
the most unbiased variable because there is no subjective judgement". Furthermore,
data regarding government ownership can be easily obtained from various databases
and the financial statements of companies.
In addition to government ownership, with regard to the government appointed
directors, the system of amakudari is the most famous example in Japan (Kuji, 1998).
The system of amakudari in Japan means that some retired officials from Japanese
monetary authorities, such as the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Bank of Japan
(BoJ), enter the boards of public listed companies. Troubled banks may attempt to
employ retired officials, so-called amakudari, from MoF (the Ministry of Finance)
and BoJ (the Bank of Japan) because they can persuade the relevant regulators to
allow them to take more loans and more investment risks (Van Rixtel and Hassink,
2002; Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001). The system can establish an informal network
between the supervisory authorities and the private sector. Moreover, the private
sector can buy influence from the government through employing retired bureaucrats.
Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002) and Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) examine the
relationship between firm performance and the number of appointed ex-bureaucrats.
Both of them conclude that the system of amakudari is not only used as a reward
system but also used to build an informal network between the public sector and the
private sector in Japan. Troubled banks may attempt to buy influence from the
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For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) analyse the backgrounds of directors of American
manufacturing firms and thereby determine whether they have political experience or legal experience.
The problem that arises is what the criteria are of determining a person having political experience or
legal experience. Does a director have political experience if he was previously a Member of
Parliament (MP)? Does a director have political experience if he majors in political science at
university? The criteria are quite ambiguous.
103
monetary authorities, i.e. the MoF and BoJ, to allow them to expand their risk-taking
activities. This kind of behaviour may jeopardise the monitoring ability of the
monetary authorities and thereby cause an unstable monetary system.
In addition to government ownership and government appointed directors, Van Rixtel
and Hassink (2002) also use the variable GAKUBATSU to represent the existence of
specific relationships between the MoF/BoJ and the banks in the private sector. The
variable GAKUBATSU displays the human-network between the MoF/BoJ and
public banks. GAKUBATSU is the ratio of the number of graduates from the 'Big
Five' to the total number of executives in the highest board positions100. If banks
have a large number of graduates from the five universities in their highest executive
positions, it might be easier to build relationships with the monetary authorities.
Following prior studies, this thesis includes four variables to measure political
involvement. Due to data limitations, we focus on the variables that can be collected
from databases and financial reports. The first variable included in this group is
government ownership (GOVOWN), which is measured by the ratio of government
shares to total outstanding shares. The second variable is the number of
shareholdings that represent government-linked agencies (GOV I). This study does
not use the ratio of shareholdings that represent government-linked agencies because
the number of total shareholders is very large. The ratio of government-linked
agencies to the number of total shareholders would be extremely small and almost
meaningless. Furthermore, most general shareholders do not participate in the
operation of the company actively. Some of them only appear in annual shareholder
meeting (AGM) for a short time. They do not have the critical power and intention to
influence the operation of a company. Although the number of government-linked
agencies is small, all of them represent the government and pay attention to the share
price and the operation of the company. Based on this argument, this thesis uses the
absolute value of government-linked agencies to measure one dimension of political
involvement.
100 Please refer to Section 2.2.1 for the discussion of the system ofgakubatsu.
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Another key variable is the number of government appointed directors (GOV_APP)
(Van Rixtel, 2002). This variable measures the phenomena of amakudari and
shukkom. Here, the two types of director are combined into the same measurement
variable. Whether a director is a retired bureaucrat (i.e. amakudari) or an incumbent
government official who is temporarily on loan to a company (i.e. shukko), he/she is
regarded as a director with a political background. GOV_APP is the ratio of the
number of directors who possess such political backgrounds to the total number of
directors on a board.
To measure the additional phenomenon Lgakubatsu\ which establish strong support
and group consciousness within and between large Japanese companies (Van Rixtel,
2002; Colignon and Usui, 2003), the variable GAKUBATSU is constructed as the
ratio of the number of graduates from the five most prestigious universities in Japan
(the so-called 'Big five') to the total number of directors in a board. Because of the
absence of a similar phenomenon in Taiwan, the Taiwanese model does not include
this variable.
(PERF) - Firm performance: TSR; ROE; ROA.
Three alternative variables are used to measure firm performance: total shareholder
return (TSR), return on equity (ROE), and return on assets (ROA). We use these
three as the proxy variables to measure firm performance from the accounting and
market dimension. TSR is the total return on shares assuming dividends are
reinvested. In this thesis, ROE is computed as the net income divided by the
shareholder's equity, and ROA is calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings
by its total assets.
(DOI) - The Degree ofInternationalisation: FOROWN; FSTS; FATA; FSE.
101 For detailed information concerning amakudari and shukko, please see Section 2.2.1 and Section
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In order to measure DOI in a clear and quantitative way, many prior studies try to
build an aggregate index that is composed of several variables. A review of the recent
literature reveals four main indices used in internationalisation research: (1) the
Index of Transnationality (TNi); (2) the Transnational Activity Spread Index (TASi);
(3) the Degree of Internationalisation Scale (DOI); and (4) the Two Dimensions of
Internationalisation (TDI). When developing an index, the key consideration is
whether the individual factors are complementary enough so that they do not conflict
with each other in combination. For example, it may not be appropriate to sum up the
ratio of foreign sales and the number of foreign listed exchanges. An explanation of
how each index is calculated will now follow.
The Index of Transnationality (TNi) was designed by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to rank the largest transnational companies
(TNCs). UNCTAD ranks the 100 biggest transnational companies (TNCs) around the
world and publishes the results annually in the World Investment Report. The Index
of Transnationality (TNi) is calculated as the average of three different ratios - the
ratio of foreign assets to total assets (FATA), the ratio of foreign employment to total
employment (FETE), and the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FSTS). Since the
index is the average percentage of three different ratios, the index ranges from 0 to
100%.
FATA + FSTS + FETB
The Index of Transnationality (TNi) designed by UNCTAD, however, assumes that
the three ratios can be grouped into the same index. The amount of foreign sales is an
accounting concept, which can measure whether the operation of a company is
mainly based on exports, but foreign employment and foreign assets are not included.
If we rank these TNCs on the basis of the three ratios separately instead of on the
index, we will find that the rank of 100 TNCs fluctuates considerably. For example,
in 1997, on the basis of the ratio of foreign assets (FATA), General Electric was in
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the top position (FATA=32.04%) and the Ford Motor Company was in the second
position (FATA=26.33%).
However, the ratios of foreign employment (FETE) for General Electric and the Ford
Motor Company are lower than other TNCs. Although General Electric and the Ford
Motor Company are ranked the first and the second respectively on the basis of the
ratio of foreign assets (FATA), the TNi of General Electric and the Ford Motor
Company are not so high. In 1997, the TNi of General Electric was 33.10%, ranking
the 84th' and the TNi of the Ford Motor Company was 35.14%, ranking the 80th. It
does not mean that General Electric and the Ford Motor Company are less
international than the Gillette Company (ranking the 28th in 1997) or the Thomson
Corporation (ranking the 3rd in 1997). The combination of different variables is
questionable. Although the individual variable in the Index of Transnationality (TNi)
can demonstrate some dimensions ofDOI of a company, it may not be appropriate to
add up these three variables directly into the same index. Therefore, the Index of
Transnationality (TNi) designed by UNCTAD does not seem to be complete enough
to measure DOI sufficiently.
There is another defect of the Index of Transnationality (TNi). According to Ietto-
Gillies (1998), it ignores the spread of foreign activities. That is, it distinguishes
between local and foreign activities but does not consider how widely the foreign
activities are spread. (Hassel et ah, 2003; Dorrenbacher, 2000). Based on this
argument, she designs a minor index - the Network-Spread Index (NSi) - which is
calculated by dividing the number of foreign countries where a company has
branches by the total number of countries worldwide in which there is inward stock
of foreign direct investment (FDI) minus 1 (in order to exclude the home country).
This Network-Spread Index (NSi) shows international diversification but it does not
take into account the amount of real foreign activities, such as foreign sales and
foreign assets. Therefore, she combines the Network-Spread Index (NSi) and the
Index of Transnationality (TNi) to capture a more complete picture ofDOI. This new
index 'Transnational Activity Spread Index' (TASi) is calculated by multiplying the
Network-Spread Index (NSi) by the Index ofTransnationality (TNi).
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TASi = TNixNSi
Multiplying the Network-Spread Index (NSi) by the Index of Transnationality (TNi)
can capture three more dimensions of DOI, but the index NSi is conceptually
different from the ratio of foreign sales, the ratio of foreign assets, and the ratio of
foreign employees. Therefore, Hassel et al. (2003) argues that it is even less
convincing to multiply this factor by the average of the other three other individual
factors instead of using NSi as a single factor in measuring DOI.
Sullivan (1994) develops the third index - the Degree of Internationalisation Scale
(DOI). He points out that there are three different dimensions to measure DOI -
performance, structure, and attitude. Unlike UNCTAD, which selected three
individual factors according to its assumptions that these factors can present DOI,
Sullivan (1994) chooses nine factors first and then uses factor analysis and item-total
analysis to test whether these factors can measure DOI sufficiently. According to the
empirical results, five good factors have been identified. The index is composed of
the following five indicators: (1) the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FSTS); (2)
the ratio of foreign assets to total assets (FATA); (3) the number of overseas
subsidiaries divided by the total number of subsidiaries (OSTS); (4) the international
experience of top managers (TMIE); and (5) the psychic dispersion of international
operations (PDIO). The fourth factor, TMIE, is measured as the cumulative duration
of top managers' international working time divided by the total years of their
working experience. The fifth factor, PDIO, is calculated by the dispersion of the
subsidiaries of a firm among the ten psychic zones of the world, which is defined by
Ronen and Shenkar (1985)102. The DOI is equal to the sum of the five ratios. The
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According to note 5 in Sullivan (1994, p.340), "Ronen and Shenkar's (1985) meta-analysis of
cross-cultural studies decomposed the world into ten psychological zones - Anglo, Germanic, Nordic,
Near Eastern, Arab, Far Eastern, Latin American, Latin European, Independent, and Other. We used
these categories as a template to access the psychic distribution of each firm's subsidiaries. For
instance, if a company Y reported the following distribution of units,
National Site of Subsidiary Psychic Zone
1. Austria 1. Germanic
2. Canada 2. Anglo
3. Belgium 3. Latin European
4. Chile 4. Latin American
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range of the value for a company is from 0.0 (no international involvement) to 5.0
(total international involvement). For example, CPC is top in the DOI at 3.13 and
IBM occupies the fourth position at 2.91. According to Ramaswamy et al. (1996),
since different variables may have different effects and attributes on the operation of
a company, combining these variables with different characteristics into the same
index might be theoretically suspect. Although the DOI has been criticised, it is still
the index that is most often used.
Based on the index developed by Sullivan (1994), Hassel et al. (2003) devise the
fourth index, which they call Two Dimensions of Internationalisation (TDI), on the
basis of 51 German companies. Due to the drawback of combining different factors
into the same index, they decide to separate the real dimension and the financial
dimension. The real dimension refers to the share of foreign activities of companies,
such as sales, assets, and employees. The financial dimension indicates the
orientation towards international capital markets. The real dimension includes three
individual factors - the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FSTS), the ratio of foreign
employment to total employment (FETE), and the degree of geographical spread of
activities (SPREAD). Since the numbers of foreign subsidiaries vary highly in annual
reports, they group the number of countries in which companies operate into three
groups: high (company operates in more than 16 countries), middle (company
operates in 7 to 16 countries), and low (company operates in less then seven
countries).
Hassel et al. (2003) is the first study that deals with the financial dimension in the
field of measuring DOI. In order to measure the extent of the participation of
international capital, they use three factors to measure this dimension - the ratio of
foreign ownership (FOTO), the number of listings in foreign stock exchanges (FSE),
and the accounting standard (AS). The accounting standard (AS) factor is on an
ordinal scale. It examines whether companies use German accounting rules
5. Hong Kong 5. Far Eastern
6. Greece 6. Near Eastern
7. Bermuda 7. Other
then it was credited with operating a subsidiary in the corresponding zone, and assigned a score of
70%."
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according to German commercial legislation or whether they use international
accounting standards, such as the US General Accepted Accounting Principles
(US-GAAP) or the International Accounting Standards (IAS).
Instead of combining the degree of real and financial internationalisation, they
decided to construct two indices by calculating the mean of the unweighted z-scores
because it is difficult to find a way to combine unstandardised values. Therefore, the
range of real internationalisation (REAL) and financial internationalisation
(FINANCE) is from 0 to 1.
ni^AT zFSTS + zFETE + zSPREADREAL =
FINANCE =
3
zFOTO + zAS + zFSE
They find that the correlation coefficient between REAL and FINANCE is 0.41,
which is low enough to assume that these two indices might indeed catch two distinct
dimensions of DOI of a company. The separation of the real and the financial
dimensions indeed points to a way to capture new dimensions of measuring DOI.
This index, however, might only work for German or continental European
companies because companies in the US or the UK have long used the US General
Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) or the International Accounting
Standards (IAS).
To sum up, due to the changing nature of international business, it is difficult to find
a uniform measurement of DOI. First, it remains questionable whether these factors
can be combined into one index. Combining various factors into one index might
distort the analysis (Hassel et al., 2003). Second, the choice of factors remains
controversial. Third, some factors are seriously sensitive to the size of a company,
but others are not (Hassel et ah, 2003). For example, big international companies
based in small countries may have a higher ratio of foreign assets and foreign sales
compared to companies based in big countries.
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Based on the argument in Hassel et al. (2003) and other studies concerning the
measurement of DOI, we also use multiple variables to measure the two dimensions
of DOI. Due to data availability, similar to Hassel et al. (2003), in the financial
dimension we include the percentage of foreign ownership (FOROWN) and the
number of listings in foreign stock exchanges (FSE) as variables. In the real
dimension, we include the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FSTS) and the ratio of
foreign assets to total assets (FATA). By using SEM, we do not need to combine or
1 flT
sum up these variables to create an index . Therefore, we can use these variables to
measure DOI without summing up variables with different scales.
The measurement variables discussed above are grouped into five latent variables:
internal governance (BOARD), financial institutions (INST), political involvement
(GOV), firm performance (PERF), and the degree of internationalisation (DOI).
Table 5-1 presents the composition of each latent variable.
Table 5-2 The composition of latent variables
Latent Variable Measurement Variables
Internal governance
(BOARD)
1. the ratio of directors' shares to total outstanding shares (BDOWN)
2. the ratio of outside directors (OUTSIDE)
3. the fractional equity ownership by the CEO and his immediate family
(MANOWN)
4. the percentage of directors who occupy more than three executive or
director positions in other companies (BD 0)
Financial institutions
(INST)
1. the ratio of financial institutions' shares to total outstanding shares
(FINOWN)
2. the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the number
of total directors (BANKD)
3. the ratio of cross-shareholding shares to total outstanding shares (CROSS)




1. the ratio ofgovernment shares to total outstanding shares (GOVOWN)
2. the number of shareholdings which represent government-linked agencies
(GOV_I)
3. the ratio of the number of directors who possess political backgrounds to
the total number of directors on a board (GOV APP)
4. the ratio of directors who graduate from the Big-Five to the total number
of directors on a board (GAKUBATSU)
Firm performance
(PERF)
1. total shareholder return (TSR)
2. return on equity (ROE)
3. return on asset (ROA)
103 For the discussion concerning the methodology, SEM, please refer to Section 5.4.
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The degree of 1. the ratio of foreign investors' shares to total outstanding shares
internationalisation (FOROWN)
(DOI) 2. the ratio of foreign sales to the total sales (FSTS)
3. the ratio of foreign assets to the total assets (FATA)
4. the number of listings in foreign stock exchanges (FSE)
5.4 Structural Equation Modelling
5.4.1 Model Specification
SEM is used to test the hypotheses and to calculate path coefficients. Structural
equation modelling has a major advantage when dealing with concepts such as
governance, board monitoring or institutional intervention. While these concepts
have a clear meaning in the literature, they generally lack a unique or well-defined
measure by which they can be quantified or gauged. SEM allows a group of
variables (so-called measurement variables, MVs) to be associated with each
underlying concept (e.g. 'internal governance'). While it is difficult to point to a
single measure of a concept such as 'internal governance', it is far easier to specify a
range ofmeasures that, by general agreement, capture the notion of board monitoring.
SEM also enables the relationships among these underlying but difficult-to-measure
concepts to be quantified. These difficult-to-measure concepts are called latent
variables (LVs) in SEM. By using LVs and MVs, which will be introduced in the
following, SEM can help researchers build more complete and complex models. This




(4) Model fit evaluation
In a general regression framework, there are dependent variables and independent
variables. In SEM, there are two kinds of variables: LVs and MVs. LVs are concepts
that cannot be directly observed and measured and hence are measured by a set of
MVs that we can directly observe from tests, surveys, and interview. For example,
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confidence is a latent variable that represents a psychological construct. We use MVs
to define or infer LVs. Therefore, when using SEM to analyse causality, instead of
categorising variables into dependent and independent variables, the set of variables
in a given model includes MVs and LVs. MVs serve as approximate measures, or
indicators of LVs. It is advantageous to use SEM in measuring DOI because the
concept of DOI is very vague. There are many different proxy variables that can
evaluate DOI. By using SEM in this thesis, we can include several possible proxy
variables to represent the DOI. SEM also categorises variables into two other
groups - endogenous variables and exogenous variables. Endogenous variables are
variables influenced by any other variables in the model. Exogenous variables are
variables that affect other variables but are not themselves affected by other variables.
Including the categories ofMVs and LVs, we can classify variables in SEM into four
different groups - endogenous MVs, exogenous MVs, endogenous LVs, and
exogenous LVs.
Given a set of MVs and LVs, SEM will constitute a pattern of linear relationships
between these variables. Within the model, there are two types of relationships:
direct and indirect. A direct relationship represents a linear direct relationship from
one LV to another LV, whereas an indirect relationship is the linear effect of a latent
variable that goes through one or more intervening, intermediate, or mediating latent
variables (Hoyle, 1995).
The initial model is formulated by researchers prior to estimation and is built on the
basis of the theory and hypotheses. No analysis can be done until the researcher has
specified a model of the relationships between the variables. That is, SEM is one
statistical skill used to test a prior theoretical model. SEM is a confirmatory
statistical skill rather than an explanatory statistical skill (Chiou, 2004). Model
specification involves "determining every relationship and parameter in the model
that is of interest to researchers" (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). This is the most
difficult part of SEM (Cooley, 1978).
A given model is properly specified when the true (population) variance-covariance
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matrix is deemed consistent with the estimated variance-covariance matrix that is
properly reproduced by the hypothesised theoretical model. The goal of researchers
is to determine the best possible model which generates the estimated
variance-covariance matrix. That is, the researchers' goal is to find a model which
most closely fits the true variance-covariance matrix. In other words, the researchers
must find a model that can minimise the difference between the estimated
variance-covariance matrix and the true variance-covariance matrix. If the true model
is not consistent with the hypothesised theoretical model, then the hypothesised
theoretical model is misspecified. The exclusion or inclusion of variables can result
in a misspecified hypothesised theoretical model. Therefore, hypotheses development
is very important in SEM. To sum up, a structural equation model is based on several
hypothesised linear relationships among a set of LVs, which are measured by several
MVs. After constructing the hypothesised model, an important but difficult issue in
SEM is model identification.
5.4.2 Model Identification
In SEM, the object is to minimise the difference between the estimated
variance-covariance matrix and the true variance-covariance matrix. It is important to
solve the identification problem prior to the estimation of parameters. In this step, we
ask the following question: Based on the sample data and the theoretical model, can
we find a unique set ofparameter estimates (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004)?
For each free parameter, it is necessary that at least one algebraic solution can be
found to express it as a function of estimated variances and covariances. There are
three levels of model identification. The classification of levels depends on the
amount of information supplied by the estimated variance-covariance matrix for
uniquely estimating the parameters in the model. If all parameters are uniquely
determined because there is just enough information in the estimated
variance-covariance matrix, the model is called 'just-identified'. If there are more
equations than unknown independent parameters, that is, more than one way to
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estimate a parameter, the model is called 'over-identified'. When there is not enough
information to have parameters determined uniquely, that is, one or more parameters
can not be uniquely determined, the model is called 'under-identified'. When a
model is under-identified, the parameter estimates are not reliable because the
degrees of freedom for the model are zero or negative. Such a model, however, can
be identified if additional constraints are added. We can obtain parameter estimates
for a just-identified or over-identified model.
Bollen (1989) uses the numbers of data point (DP) and the number of parameters to
determine the model identification, the so-called 't-Rule'. An identified model must
conform to the following equation:
t<^(p + q)(p + q + \) = DP
where t is the number of free parameters that are estimated in the model, p is the
number of endogenous MVs, q is the number of exogenous MVs, and (p+q) is the
total number ofmeasurement variables.
The criteria are as follows:
1. When t<DP, the model is over-identification.
2. When t=DP, the model is just-identification.
3. When t>DP, the model is under-identification.
We can find parameter estimates for a just-identification and an over-identification
model but not an under-identification model. Most of SEM computer programs
provide a check of identification during estimating parameters. In this thesis, we use
LISREL 8.7 as the analysis software. A just-identification model, the so-called
saturated model, can always find a set of perfectly fitted parameters, thereby making
it meaningless to assess model plausibility by evaluating goodness of fit. Models
with over-identified parameters cannot fit data perfectly, therefore the main task in
SEM is to find a model which fits the observed data as perfectly as possible. There
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are many possible parameters that can structure the model and obtain path
coefficients. We must choose the best one by comparing the goodness-of-fit indices.
In this way, finding a good fit would be meaningful in SEM (Hoyle, 1995).
Another important issue in SEM is scaling. In SEM, LVs are measured by several
MVs. As a LV is not really an observed variable, we must give it a specific scaling.
The first possible method is to set the variance of one LV equal to unity, which
means that the unit of the LV whose variance equals unity is the standard. Or, in the
case of several MVs that measure one LV, we can set the path coefficient of a given
MV equal to unity. Within each group the strongest connection is assigned the unit
value 1.0 (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). Hence, the unit of the estimated LV is the
same as the unit of the MV whose path coefficient is set to unity. Both of the two
methods can be used to scale LVs. When the LV is an endogenous LV that is
measured by other LVs, it is better to use the second method. In order to unify the
scaling method, we use the second method, which assigns the unit value 1.0 to the
strongest connection within each latent group because there is one endogenous LV in
this thesis.
5.4.3 The Methods ofEstimating Parameters
The core procedure in SEM is parameter estimation. The main task in SEM is to
determine a set of parameters that can minimise the difference between the estimated
variance-covariance matrix and the true (population) variance-covariance matrix
from which a sample has been drawn. The basic concept of how to obtain the








Figure 5-1 A SEM model with two latent variables
Figure 5-1 is a typical model constructed by two LVs (Fi and F2) and six MVs
(Vi-Ve). From Figure 5-1, we know that:
vx=\*fx+ex
v2=x2*fx+e2
Then, we can obtain,
Cov(Vx ,V2) = Cov(A, Fx+Ex, A2FX + E2)
= AxA2Cov(Fx ,Fx) + AxCov(Fx,E2) + A2Cov(Fx,Ex) + Cov(ExE2) (5.1)
= T1^2Cov(F1,F1)
= ^1-^2
There are three hypotheses that have to be satisfied before obtaining (5.1). First, the
covariance between any two residuals is zero. Second, the covariance between
residuals and LVs is zero. Finally, the variance of Fi is equal to unity. Based on the
three assumptions, we can subsequently obtain (5.2) and (5.3).
Cov(Vx ,V4) = Cov(\ Fx+Ex, A4F2 + E4)
= AxA4Cov(Fx,F2) + AxCov{Fx ,E4) + A4Cov(F2,Ex) + Cov(Ex,E4) ^ ^
= AxA4Cov(Fx, F2)
= \A4(j)2x
Var(Vx) = Cov(AxF] + Ex, AXFX + Ex)
= tfCov(Fx ,FX) + ACov(Fx ,EX) + ACov{Ex ,FX) + Cov(Ex, Ex) (53)
= ^Var(Fx) + Var(Ex)
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where (j)2x is the covariance ofFi and F2. 0, is the variance ofEi.
Based on Figure 5-1 and the calculation introduced above, we can obtain the
estimated matrix, 2(0) . When elements in matrix 2(0) (the estimated
variance-covariance matrix) minus the element in matrix S (the true
variance-covariance matrix) equal zero, the perfect model is produced.
The process of estimating parameters involves the use of a particular method to
minimise the difference between 2(0) and S. The three main methods used in
estimating the parameters are ULS (unweighted least squares), GLS (generalised
least squares) (Aitken, 1934; Joreskog and Goldberger, 1972), and ML (maximum
likelihood) (Koopmans, Rubin and Leipnik, 1950). The most common method in
parameter estimation is ML, which is suggested by Koopmans, Rubin, and Leipnik
(1950). Joreskog (1973) applies this method in SEM. In this thesis, we also use ML
to be the parameter estimation method. The equation for the ML method is as
follows:
p is the number of measurement variables (MVs), S is the true (population)
variance-covariance matrix and 2(0) is the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
This method provides a guideline to minimise the difference between the true
(population) variance-covariance matrix (S) derived from the sample and the
(5.4)
fml = log | 2(0) | - log | S | +fr(52(0)-1)- p (5.5)
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variance-covariance matrix (£(#)) derived from the hypothesised model.
There are several statistical properties of parameter estimates in the ML method
(Hoyle, 1995; Chiou, 2004).
1. The parameter estimates are asymptotically unbiased
When E [0] = 0 for all possible values of 0, such an estimator is unbiased. If
there is no unbiased estimator, we look at asymptotic properties. Asymptotically
unbiased is defined as Bias (0) —» 0 when n—» oo.
2. The parameter estimates are asymptotically efficient.
Efficiency relates to the variance of an estimator rather than its mean. The
smaller the variance, the more efficient the estimator is. We define the mean
square error (MSE) to be MSE((9) = E[(0 -0)2]. Assume that there are two
AAA A A
different estimators, 0j and02, then 0, is better than 02 if MSE( 0.) *
MSE(02) for all possible values of 0. Ifwe take all unbiased estimators of 0 and
find that 0 is the one with the smallest variance, then it is the minimum
variance unbiased estimator (MVUE) of 0. When 0 —» MVUE (0) as n—> oo,
then it is asymptotically efficient.
3. The parameter estimates are asymptotically consistent.
If 0 is asymptotically unbiased and its variance—>0 as n—» oo then 0 is
consistent as an estimator of 0. 0 is consistent <=> P (| 0 - 0| > e)—>0 as n—» oo,
for all s. We can write this in shorthand as plim( 0) = 0.
To satisfy these properties, the MVs must be continuous and have a multivariate
normal distribution. When the assumption is not met, there is no guarantee that the
statistical properties of parameter estimates in ML method would be hold. Therefore,
the robustness of parameter estimates that are obtained when the assumption is
violated is an important issue which needs to be addressed. Section 5.4.5 will discuss
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this issue in some depth.
5.4.4 Model Fit Evaluation
The major difference between SEM and other statistical methods lies in hypothesis
testing. In most statistical methods, the objective is to reject the null hypothesis and
accept the alternative hypothesis. Thus, the model can prove the argument proposed
by researchers. In SEM, however, the null hypothesis is that the estimated model can
fit the original data and the alternative hypothesis is that the estimated model cannot
fit the original data. Obviously, when we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we cannot
prove that there is a significant difference between the estimated model and the real
world.
Model fit describes the degree to which the theoretical model fits the sample data.
The two popular ways of evaluating whether the model fits the original data are the
Chi-square (/2) test and fit indices. We will introduce these in turn.
Chi-square (%2) Test
A significant x1 value relative to the degrees of freedom (df) indicates that the
observed and estimated matrices differ. A non-significant ^2 value indicates that the
two matrices are not significantly different, i.e. H0:S = X(<9)(Schumacker and Lomax,
2004) where S is the sample variance-covariance matrix and Z(<9) is the estimated
variance-covariance matrix. In SEM, researchers are interested in obtaining a
non-significant ^2 value. The equation of y2 test is as follows:
T = (N-\)Fmia (5.6)
The statistic T is often called the %2 test. N is the number of data observations. A
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discrepancy function F = F[S, 1(6)} can be viewed as a measure of the discrepancy
between S and £(<9) evaluated at an estimator and is minimised to yield Fmin (Hoyle,
1995, p.77). The test statistic, T = (N - l)Fmin, has an asymptotic x1 distribution. In
general, the H0: S = 1.(6) is rejected if the T statistic exceeds a Ta in the
X2 distribution at an a level of significance.
Unfortunately, although a large sample size can make the empirical results stable, it
also increases the valuex2 and causes the null hypothesis H0:S = 1(6)to be rejected.
Furthermore, T (T = (N - l)Fmin) may not be /2 distributed when the multivariate
normality assumption is violated. Therefore, the Chi-square (x2) test may not be a
good enough statistic to measure the goodness-of-fit of a model under a large sample
(Chiou, 2004). In this thesis, our sample is above 200 and variables are not normally
distributed104. Therefore, it is not appropriate to use the Chi-square (x2) test alone.
Thus, in addition to the Chi-square (x2 ) test, we also use three groups of indices in
this thesis.
The first group is the goodness-of-fit index of the model. In this group, two indices
are reported - GFI (goodness-of-fit index; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984) and AGFI
(adjusted goodness-of-fit index; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984). GFI is similar to R2
and AGFI is similar to adjusted- R2 in regressions (Chiou, 2004). Both GFI and
AGFI range from 0 to 1. When the index approaches 1, the model can explain the
original data more precisely. In general, a good model will have GFI and AGFI
greater than 0.9 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The formulae of the two indices are as
follows:
GFIMl= 1 -tr&iey'S-1)2 ltr(Y.(6)-xS)2} (5.7)
AGFI[viL = j; GFIml
^ the number of parameters
the number of observations
104 For the discussion of the non-normality problem, please see Section 5.4.5.
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where S is the sample variance-covariance matrix and I(6>) is the estimated
variance-covariance matrix.
The second group is the alternative index. In this group, one index will be
introduced - RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation; Browne and Cudeck,
1993). RMSEA measures the amount of discrepancy between the model and the data
taking the complexity of the model (i.e. the number of parameters being estimated)
into consideration. A rule of thumb is that a good model should have RMSEA lower
than 0.06 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). If the RMSEA is greater than 0.10, the model does
not fit the data very well (Browne and Cudeck, 1993). The formula of RMSEA is as
follows:
RMSEAml = -3- (5.9)
V ftest
2 7/
where F0 = —est ———, N is the number of observations; ^Lt *s the /2 value of
the hypothesised model and dftest is the degrees of freedom of the hypothesised
model.
The third group is the residual index. In this thesis, the selected measure for absolute
fit is SRMR (the standardised root mean square residual). SRMR is the standardised
RMR. SRMR statistic is a measure of the size of the residuals (i.e. the difference
between the estimated model and the observed data), with smaller values indicating
better fit. SRMR is the standardised difference between the observed covariance and
estimated covariance. A value of zero indicates perfect fit. SRMR tends to be smaller
as the sample size increases or as the number of parameters in the model increases.
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where sy - <ry is the difference between the sample variance-covariance matrix and
the estimated variance-covariance matrix and q is the number of estimated
parameters.
If these indices indicate acceptable overall fit of a model, then the focus moves to the
specific variables of fit. Individual variables of free parameters are evaluated by t test
to observe whether they are different from some specific null value, typically zero.
Tests and comparisons of parameter estimates involve unstandardised parameter
estimates, whereas the presentation of results usually involves standardised
parameter estimates (Hoyle, 1995; Kaplan, 2000; Chiou, 2004). Unstandardised
parameter estimates still retain the original scaling information and can only be
interpreted by the scales of these variables. Unstandardised estimates are based on
the variance-covariance matrix of raw data. When comparing across groups,
variables may have different variances. Unstandardised parameter estimates indicate
that per unit change in a specific independent variable will result in a fixed units
change in the dependent variable when all the other independent variables remaining
are at their mean (Hoyle, 1995).
However, when observed variables have different scales, it is necessary to
standardise parameter estimates to aid interpretation (Kaplan, 2000). Standardised
parameter estimates can be obtained by using standardised data. This is done in the
usual way by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the
respective variable. Standardised structural parameters emerge from analysis of this
transformed data. Since standardised parameter estimates remove the scaling
information, they are used to compare effects among latent variables. Standardised
parameter estimates measure the number of standard deviation changes in the
dependent variable when per standard deviation change in the independent variable,
while all remaining independent variables are at their mean in standard normal units,
which is zero. The interpretation is similar to OLS. If a standardised coefficient is 0.5,
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then the latent dependent variable will increase by 0.5 standard units for each unit
increase in the independent variable. To sum up, for unstandardised parameter
estimates, equal coefficients indicate equal absolute effects on the dependent variable,
whereas for standardised parameter estimates, equal coefficients mean equal effects
on the dependent variable relative to differences in means and variances.
In addition to standardised coefficients, 'completely standardised coefficients' are
obtained for the relationship between a measurement variable and a latent variable
and for the relationship between latent variables (Kaplan, 2000; Chiou, 2004). If we
only standardise the data of latent variables, these coefficients are called standardised
coefficients. 'Completely standardised coefficients' signifies that all of the raw data
and not just the estimated latent variables have been subjected to such
standardisation. In this thesis, we always report completely standardised coefficients
to aid interpretation.
5.4.5 SEM with Non-normal Variables
As we mentioned in Section 5.4.3, maximum likelihood (ML) and generalised least
squares (GLS) are the most commonly used approaches to estimate parameters in
SEM. These two approaches assume that the measurement variables are continuous
and have a multivariate normal distribution (Hoyle, 1995). The body of literature that
accumulated from the mid-1980s to the 1990s indicates that non-normality does not
affect parameter estimates (Kaplan, 2000). Non-normality will lead to the
overestimation of likelihood ratio chi-square statistics (Muthen and Kaplan, 1985,
1992; Kaplan, 2000) and the underestimation of fit indices, such as the NFI and CFI
(Hoyle, 1995). Moreover, it also causes a serious underestimation of standard errors
of parameter estimates (Kaplan, 2000). Unfortunately, many researchers often ignore
the fundamental assumption. Some studies even use dummy variables in structural
equation modelling. For example, some management papers include the dummy
variable to examine the CEO duality. Breckler (1990) examines 72 articles in social
psychology that use structural equation modelling and finds fewer than 10% of the
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studies examine whether the data follow normal distributions. Unfortunately, until
now, this kind ofmisuse still exists.
There are many approaches that try to solve this non-normality problem, such as item
parcelling, the transformation of variables, and the asymptotic distribution free
estimator (ADF). Item parcelling is a method to re-express variables. We can
construct item parcels by summing or taking the mean of several items that measure
the same concept (e.g., political involvement) (Hoyle, 1995). These parcels may
exhibit a distribution that approaches a normal distribution more closely than the
original items. Moreover, item parcelling can reduce the number of parameters that
need to be estimated in the model. Therefore, the parameter estimates will be more
stable in a small sample. Item parcelling, however, may result in the difficulty of
interpreting empirical results. In this thesis, every MV has its own importance in the
hypothesised relationship. It is not appropriate to sum up any two or three MVs.
The transformation of variables is another commonly used method to solve the
non-normality problem. For example, for right-skewed data we can use logarithms to
transform and for left-skewed data we can use roots to transform. Both these two
transformation methods need to use non-negative data. Unfortunately, the data in this
thesis are not suitable for this approach because we have some variables with
negative values, such as ROE and ROA.
In the mid-1980s, Browne (1982, 1984) and Muthen (1978, 1984) developed an
alternative estimation method to solve the non-normality problem for continuous
variables and categorical variables respectively. The asymptotic distribution free
estimator (ADF) is a distribution-free method. The key characteristic of ADF is the
use of an optimal weight matrix that consists of a combination of the second- and
fourth-order moments and thereby eliminates the influence of non-normality.
However, the ADF method has two limitations (Hoyle, 1995). First, the calculation
of ADF is very complicated and time-consuming as the computational demands are
very high. Second, the calculation of ADF requires a big sample. In a fifteen-MV
model, it is necessary to invert a 120 by 120 weight matrix including 14,400 unique
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elements (Hoyle, 1995). In general, the ADF requires a sample size in excess of 2500
observations to obtain stable empirical results (West, Finch, and Curran, 1995).
Unfortunately, we do not have such a large sample, which means we cannot use ADF
to solve the non-normality problem. Since item parcelling, the transformation of
variables, and the asymptotic distribution free estimator (ADF) are not suitable in
this thesis, we develop another approach - the averaging method - to solve the
non-normality problem and make a robust check.
According to the central limit theorem, a given distribution with a mean (ju) and
variance (a2 ), the sampling distribution of the mean approaches a normal
distribution with a mean (//) and variance a2 /N as N, the sample size, increases. In
this thesis, we use C# programming language to write a program to select 30
companies randomly from our original sample. There is no constraint on selection.
That is, we do not apply the constraint that every company can only be picked up for
specific times to guarantee that every company shares the same opportunity of being
selected. The whole selection process is very random. After selecting 30 companies
randomly, we calculate the mean of the 30 companies to be the new observation. We
do the same procedure at the same time to all variables to guarantee that the variables
are consistent with each other.
If we have 200 companies in our sample, we can create c200 = 200! new30
301x170!
observations by selecting 30 companies randomly from the sample. In order to
increase the possibility that every company in the sample is selected, we choose
1,000 rather than the original number of observations (i.e. 203 Japanese companies
and 200 Taiwanese companies). After applying the averaging method to the original
data, the distribution of every variable should approach a normal distribution due to
the central limit theorem. The empirical results will be thoroughly discussed in
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
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5.5 Conclusion
Over the last 30 years, SEM has become one of the most important multivariate
techniques in social science and has recently been adopted in many business studies.
As stated in the introduction, the focus of this chapter is to introduce the sample, the
variables, and the foundations of SEM. There are four main steps in handling SEM:
(1) Model specification; (2) Model identification; (3) Parameter estimation; and (4)
Model fit evaluation.
SEM begins with the specification of a model to be estimated. No analysis can be
done until the researcher has formulated a model of relationships between variables.
This model is specified on the basis of the theory and hypotheses. Therefore, SEM is
regarded as priori-specified theoretical model. The second step, model identification,
determines whether it is possible to find unique solutions for the parameters of the
specified model. We can find parameter estimates for a just-identification and an
over-identification model, but not for an under-identification model. Once a model is
specified, there are several estimation methods available. The selection of estimation
methods is often determined by the distribution of variables, which are included in
the model. Most estimation methods require variables to follow a normal distribution.
After the parameter estimates are obtained, several goodness-of-fit indices are used
to evaluate whether the model, which is developed empirically according to the
theory and hypotheses, fits the data. There are four main indices to measure the
model fit in this thesis. The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and the adjusted
goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) measure the level of the observed matrix, which is
predicted by the estimated matrix (Hu and Bentler, 1995, p.85). In general, GFI and
AGFI are greater than 0.90 in a good model (Hu and Bentler, 1995, 1999). The root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) measures the amount of discrepancy
between the model and the data, taking into consideration the complexity of the
model (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004, p.84). An acceptable model should have
RMSEA lower than 0.10 (Browne and Cudeck, 1993). The standardised root mean
square residual (SRMR) is a measure of the size of the residuals (Schumacker and
Lomax, 2004, p. 103). In a good model, the SRMR should be less than 0.08 (Hu and
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Bentler, 1999). The fit of a model can be improved through re-specification.
However, SEM has frequently been misused (Kline, 1998; Kaplan, 2000). One
obvious problem is that most estimation methods require variables to follow a
normal distribution. The assumption is particularly important for the maximum
likelihood method (ML) and general least squares (GLS) because the ML and GLS
assume that the measurement variables are continuous and have a multivariate
normal distribution. Although the non-normality problem does not influence
parameter estimates, it will result in the underestimation of standard errors (Kaplan,
2000). Regarding the goodness of fit, the non-normality problem will result in
substantial overestimation of chi-square statistics (Muthen and Kaplan, 1985, 1992;
Kaplan, 2000).
Currently, there are some alternative estimation methods to solve the non-normality
problem, such as the asymptotic distribution free (ADF), which is proposed by
Browne (1984). Unfortunately, ADF requires a large sample size (generally over
2500) to produce stable estimates. In this thesis, the Japanese and Taiwanese samples
are not that large in this thesis. Therefore, we try another approach - the averaging
method - to solve the non-normality problem and make a robust check. Based on the
central limit theorem, we select 30 companies randomly from our original sample
and calculate the mean of the 30 companies, which becomes the new observation. We
finally select 1,000 new observations randomly, which become the new sample. After
applying the averaging method to the original data, the distribution of every variable
approaches a normal distribution.
In addition to SEM, this chapter also introduces the sample, data, and variables that
are used in this thesis. We include 203 Japanese companies and 200 Taiwanese
companies. The empirical results will be presented and discussed in Chapter 6 and
Chapter 7. Chapter 6 discuss the results of the relationship between firm performance,
political involvement, the intervention of financial institutions, and the board of
directors. Chapter 7 discuss the results of the relationship between DOI, political






The review of the relevant literature in Chapter 2 highlighted the relationship
between firm performance and the intervention of governments and financial
institutions in Japan and Taiwan. Based on the discussions in Chapter 2, relevant
hypotheses were developed in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2. The question we ask
in Section 4.2.1 is why government and financial institutions intervene in the
operation of a company. According to the hypotheses, the government and financial
institutions may intervene in the operation of a company to exercise a monitoring
function when firm performance is poor. In Section 4.2.2, we ask whether the
intervention of governments and financial institutions is positively/negatively related
to subsequent firm performance. Since intervention of government and financial
institutions is usually regarded as inefficient, it may have a negative effect on
subsequent firm performance. In contrast, the directors appointed by government and
financial institutions may provide financial support or counsel to companies with
poor performance (Westphal, 1999). Thus, subsequent firm performance may be
positively related to political involvement and the intervention of financial
institutions.
In order to test the hypotheses, this thesis adopts the methodology of structural
equation modelling (SEM). Chapter 5 introduces the theory of SEM, which combines
several measurement variables to produce a latent variable that is difficult to observe
directly. By using latent variables and measurement variables, SEM can help
researchers build more complete and complex models. Chapter 5 also introduces the
sample, data, and variables that will be used in this thesis.
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This chapter discusses the empirical results obtained by using SEM. The primary
focus is on exploring the relationship between the intervention from the government
and financial institutions through the board of directors and firm performance. In
Section 6.2 we examine these relationships in Japan, and in Section 6.3 we
investigate these relationships in Taiwan. We examine two issues in each country.
Section 6.2.1 and 6.3.1 examine whether firm performance is related to the
intervention of government and financial institutions through the board of directors
in Japan and Taiwan, and Section 6.2.2 and 6.3.2 investigate whether this
intervention is positively related to subsequent firm performance in Japan and
Taiwan.
According to the empirical results, we find that the relationships between political
involvement, the intervention of financial institutions, the board of directors, and
firm performance are similar in Japan and Taiwan. Unlike OLS, which can only
examine the direct relationships between dependent variables and independent
variables, SEM can examine direct relationships and indirect relationships
simultaneously to obtain the total effects. Therefore, by using SEM, we discover that
the board of directors in Taiwan plays a significant intermediate role, whereas in
Japan it does not significantly mediate the relationship between firm performance
and government/financial institutions. Section 6.4 compares the differences between
Japan and Taiwan and draws a conclusion.
6.2 Japan
6.2.1 Japan: Why do the government and financial institutions
intervene?
The variables in the Japanese model can be classified into four groups - the
monitoring ability of the board (BOARD), the intervention of financial institutions
(INST), political involvement (GOV), and firm performance (PERF). Summary
statistics are presented in Table 6-1 and show that the structure of corporate
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governance mechanisms in Japanese companies is different from that of western
companies (Monks and Minow, 2004). First, the ownership of banks and other
financial institutions (FINOWN) is 45.01%, which suggests that they play an
important role in the operation of Japanese companies. The main banks in Japan
operate informally as monitors (Aoki and Patrick, 1994). Even companies that do not
belong to a specific keiretsu usually maintain an informal relationship with
commercial banks, such as the Bank of Yokohama and the Bank of Saitama. These
banks can appoint representatives to the board to participate in the decision-making
process and thereby influence firm performance. In Table 6-1, the ratio of bank
representatives to total directors on the board (BANK D) is 5.44%.
In addition to financial ownership, blockholder ownership is another characteristic of
the Japanese corporate governance structure105. In our Japanese sample, the average
ratio of blockholder ownership (BLOCK) is 38.82%. The principal concentrated
shareholders are financial institutions and companies within the same keiretsu group.
With large ownership there is clearly a strong incentive for blockholders to monitor
the operation of a company.
In the political involvement group (GOV), the average ratio of government appointed
directors to the number of total directors (GOV APP) is 3.08%, which is very high
compared with western companies operating under stock market capitalism where
this phenomenon is virtually non-existent. Furthermore, the average ratio of
gakubatsu (GAKUBATSU) is 53.37%, which is very high. Most directors in large
Japanese enterprises graduate from one of the 'Big Five' universities. This
phenomenon implies that a personal network, which is based on having similar
university backgrounds, may be critical in the informal relationship between the
private and public sector in Japan.
105 Financial ownership is measured by the ratio of shares held by financial institutions to total
outstanding shares. As in the study by Kang and Shivdasani (1995), the percentage of ownership
accounted for by the top ten blockholders is captured in the variable BLOCK. Please refer to Section
5.3 for the definition of financial ownership and blockholder ownership.
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Table 6-1 Summary Statistics, Japan, 2001-2003, 609 Observations _
Performance
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the
percentage of managerial ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in
other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the
ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_I: the number of government agencies.
GOV_APP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. GAKUBATSU:
the ratio of the number of graduates from the elite universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to
the total number of executives in the highest board positions. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends
are reinvested. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. ROA: calculated by
dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets.
Latent variable Measurement Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Max Min
BDOWN (%) 609 0.55 2.66 37.43 0.00
BOARD OUTSIDE (%) 609 17.22 9.38 53.33 0.00
MANOWN (%) 609 ... ... ... ...
BD_Q (%) 609 6.42 10.23 53.85 0.00
FINOWN (%) 609 45.01 11.58 68.83 3.91
INST BANK D (%) 609 5.44 7.72 60.00 0.00
CROSS (%) 609 13.41 12.46 86.00 0.70
BLOCK (%) 609 38.82 10.82 81.59 17.45
GOVOWN (%) 609 0.64 5.69 66.74 0.00
GOV GOVI 609 1.82 5.95 63.00 0.00
GOVAPP (%) 609 3.08 5.15 33.33 0.00
GAKUBATSU (%) 609 53.37 20.07 100.00 5.56
TSR (%) 609 7.28 51.23 425.10 -78.17
PERF ROE (%) 609 -2.4 80.48 80.35 -1771.8
ROA (%) 609 1.18 5.20 63.87 -63.82
* Negative values in ROA are resulted from negative values in profits rather than assets.
Since SEM assumes that measurement variables follow a normal distribution, we use
the averaging method, which is discussed in Section 5.4.5, to normalise them. We use
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in this thesis to examine whether these measurement
variables follow a normal distribution after adopting the averaging method. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can compare the observed cumulative distribution
function for these variables with normal distribution. Table 6-2 presents the results of
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to assess the normality of the variables. Unlike
other statistical tests, a significant result here means that the normal distribution is
not a good fit for the data. We can observe that before using the normalising
procedure, almost all variables are not normal distributions. After normalising, the
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non-normality problem is improved significantly. In this thesis, we present results
both with original and normalised data.
According to our hypotheses in Section 4.2.1, we can draw Path Diagram 6-1.
Instead of combining several regressions, this thesis uses SEM to calculate path
coefficients. In order to unify the scales ofmeasurement variables (MVs) and latent
variables, we present completely standardised coefficients106 throughout this thesis.
Table 6-3 presents the model statistics and the completely standardised coefficients,
which are estimated by using SEM. These results are shown in Path Diagram 6-1.
The model statistics presented in Table 6-3 indicate an acceptable model fit. GFI
(goodness-of-fit index) equals 0.90, and AGFI (adjusted goodness-of-fit index)
equals 0.85107. In addition to the goodness-of-fit indices, the main alternative index
of this model is also acceptable: RMSEA (root mean square error of approximate)
equals 0.10, which is the threshold of RMSEA. If RMSEA is lower than 0.06, this
SEM model is ideal. RMSEA of an ideal model should not exceed 0.10 (Browne and
Cudeck, 1993). Moreover, in the residual analysis, SRMR (standardised root mean
square residual) equals 0.09. SRMR of an ideal SEM model should be as small as
possible. In general, when SRMR is lower than 0.08, the unexplained variance of this
SEM model is very small (Hu and Bentler, 1999).
106 For the discussion of completely standardised coefficients, please refer to Section 5.3.4.
107 Please see Section 5.4.4 for more discussion regarding these goodness-of-fit indices. Hu and
Bentler (1999) claim that the GFI and AGFI of a good SEM model should exceed 0.90. GFI of this
model reaches the standard.
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* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Some other studies indicate that the ratio of WLS (Normal Theory Weighted Least
Squares Chi-Square) to the degrees of freedom can also represent the goodness-of-fit
of a SEM model108. However, when the sample or the number of parameters is large,
WLS will be very high and thereby increases the possibility of rejecting the null
hypothesis. The model in this section has 14 parameters and 406 companies.
Therefore, it is not seen as appropriate to use the ratio of WLS to the degrees of
freedom in this situation. Although the goodness-of-fit indices of this model are not
very good, they are still acceptable and present valuable results. Kline (1998) claims
that we should consider the rationality of a model but not only judge models by using
indices alone.
108 Please see Section 5.4.4 for the detailed discussion about the ratio of WLS (Normal Theory
Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square) to the degrees of freedom.
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Table 6-2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Japanese Data Performance
Please refer to Table 6-1 for the explanations of variables.
Original Data (N=406) Normalised Data (N=1000)
Variables Kolmogorov-Smimov Z Signifiance (2-tailed) Kolmogorov-Smimov Z Signifiance (2-tailed)
BDOWN 8.463 0.000 2.223 0.000
OUTSIDE 2.527 0.000 0.531 0.941
BD_Q 5.959 0.000 1.212 0.106
FINOWN 1.371 0.047 0.694 0.721
BANKJD 4.795 0.000 0.842 0.478
CROSS 4.087 0.000 0.848 0.469
BLOCK 2.698 0.000 0.866 0.442
GOVOWN 10.235 0.000 5.785 0.000
GOVJ 7.548 0.000 1.802 0.003
GOVAPP 7.032 0.000 0.650 0.792
GAKUBATSU 1.150 0.142 0.742 0.641
TSR 0.848 0.468 1.126 0.158
ROE 6.284 0.000 0.788 0.563
ROA 3.048 0.000 1.026 0.243
The empirical results based on normalised data are not different from the empirical
results which use original data. Since the measurement variables have different scales,
we have utilised completely standardised coefficients to assist interpretation (Kaplan,
2000)109. Table 6-3 and Path Diagram 6-1 provide the completely standardised path
coefficients, and Table A3-1 in Appendix 3 provides the structural parameters. In
each latent variable, the measurement variable which is assigned the unit value 1.0 is
placed at the top.
The completely standardised coefficients in Table 6-3 and Path Diagram 6-1 provide
strong support for Hypothesis l110. We can observe that the direct relationship
between firm performance (PERF) and political involvement (GOV) is -0.25, which
is significant at the 5% level. Compared to the western corporate governance
mechanism, which is based on the assumption that a company should maximise the
interests of shareholders, the system in Japan is set up to promote the interests of the
company, the employees and the whole society rather than the passive shareholders
(Monks and Minow, 2004). In this kind of system, the government sees itself as a
109 Please see Section 5.4.3 for the detailed discussion regarding completely standardised coefficients.
110
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between firm performance (t) and political involvement (t+1)
should be negative.
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protector of domestic industry (Analytica, 1992). The whole system works
co-operatively. Given this situation, when a company performs poorly or has a
financial crisis and thereby causes instability, the government will intervene in its
operation by appointing retired ex-bureaucrats to the board. From the company's
viewpoint, a company with poor performance is also willing to accept
government-appointed directors (amakudari) or employ directors who graduated
from the 'Big Five' in order to build a tighter relationship with the government and
encourage the government to help it solve financial problems.
From Path Diagram 6-1 and Table 6-3, we also observe that the direct relationship
between firm performance (PERF) and the intervention of financial institutions
(INST) is -0.19, which is significant and negative at the 10% level. The empirical
result is consistent with Hypothesis 2m. Financial institutions, such as banks,
securities companies and other blockholders, also appear to act in a similar way to
the Japanese government. When a partner company performs poorly, they will
appoint representatives to the board to exercise the monitoring function. They may
also increase their ownership to give support and capital. This finding is consistent
with the arguments in prior studies, such as Sheard (1994), Morck and Nakamura
(1999), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995). In addition to
INST and GOV, the direct relationship between firm performance (PERF) and board
(BOARD) is also significant and negative (-0.10) at the 1% level. This result
supports the argument that poor firm performance will make a company improve the
monitoring ability of its board by increasing the percentage of outside directors and
board ownership. The result is consistent with Hypothesis 3112 as well as many prior
studies, such as Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Coles et al. (2001). It is also
consistent with the supposition in Sanders and Carpenter (1998) that implies that
firm performance and DOI may influence the structure of the board of directors.
The minor paths - the relationship between board (BOARD) and political
involvement (GOV) as well as the relationship between board (BOARD) and the
111
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between firm performance (t) and the intervention of financial
institutions (t+1) is negative.
112
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between PERF (t) and the monitoring ability of the board (t+1) is
negative.
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intervention of financial institutions (INST) - are not significant. Therefore, the
indirect paths, PERF->BOARD->GOV and PERF->BOARD~> INST, are not
significant either (t= -0.26 and -0.19 respectively). Although the indirect paths are
insignificant, the total effects from PERF on GOV/INST are significant. These
empirical results, therefore, imply that political involvement in Japan is direct. The
government will not intervene in the operation of a company through the board of
directors (BOARD). In other words, although the Japanese government and financial
institutions appoint retired bureaucrats and representatives to the board to exercise
the monitoring function, the board of directors does not play an intermediate role
between the government/financial institutions and firm performance, which leads to
1 I o
the rejection of Hypothesis 7 . When firm performance is poor, the Japanese
government and financial institutions will intervene directly without going through
the board of directors in order to restore confidence among shareholders and thereby
stabilise society. Normalised data also presents similar results among latent variables
in Table 6-3.
Because of data limitations and the absence of a similar phenomenon (Suganuma,
1995), the Taiwanese model does not include the variable GAKUBATSU. In order to
examine the difference between Taiwan and Japan, we rerun the model without the
variable GAKUBATSU. Table 6-4, which is included to confirm the results in Table
6-3, shows the completely standardised coefficients of the model without the variable
GAKUBATSU, and Table A3-2 in Appendix 3 shows the structural parameters. The
results in the model without the variable GAKUBATSU are similar to the results in
the model with it. By using the original data in Table 6-4, it can be seen that the total
effect from firm performance (PERF) on political involvement (GOV) is also
significant and negative (-0.25, t = -1.71). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. GFI
and AGFI are higher in the model that includes the variable GAKUBATSU, as seen
in Table 6-3. This implies that in the Japanese model this variable plays a very
important role in the relationship between political involvement (GOV) and firm
performance (PERF) (Van Rixtel and Hoskisson, 2002; Van Rixtel, 2002; Colignon
and Usui, 2003). In Table 6-4, which uses the original data and excludes the variable
113
Hypothesis 7: The board of directors may mediate the relationship between performance and the
intervention of government and financial institutions.
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GAKUBATSU, it can be seen that the total effect from PERF on INST is also
significant and negative. Furthermore, the direct relationship between PERF and
BOARD is -0.21, which is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 3 are both supported in Table 6-4. Once again, the indirect paths,
PERFBOARDGOV and PERFBOARDINST, are not significant, which
indicates that the Japanese boards do not play an intermediate role between
companies and government/financial institutions. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is not
supported. The normalised data in Table 6-4 also report similar results among the
variables.
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Table 6-3 Path Coefficients: Firm Performance (t) and Governance (t+1), Japan
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in other companies. BANK_D: the ratio of the
number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. FINOWN: the ratio of financial
institutions shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares.
BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates from the
elite universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of directors in the board.
GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV I: the number of government
agencies. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. ROE:
computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares assuming
dividends are reinvested. ROA: calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient tsalue
OUTSIDE <-- BOARD 1.40 0.71
BDOWN <-BOARD 0.07 0.20 0.21 1.82*
BD_Q <- BOARD 0.59 1.69* -0.02 -0.24
BANK_D <— INST 0.14 0.12
FINOWM <- INST -0.46 -2.58*** -0.53 -3.24***
CROSS <~ INST 0.95 2.56** 0.87 3.22***
BLOCK <- INST 0.54 2.62*** 0.54 3.24***
GAKUBATSU<—GOV 0.48 0.52
GOVOWN <-GOV 0.47 3.58*** 0.40 2.83***
GOVI <- GOV 0.20 2.65*** 0.07 1 97**
GOVAPP <~ GOV 0.66 5.10*** 1.21 7.18***
ROE<- PERF 0.15 0.40
TSR <— PERF 1.22 2.15** 0.67 8.39***
ROA <~ PERF 0.37 3.93*** 0.61 8.54***
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 0.02 0.19 0.01 0.08
BOARD ~> GOV 0.10 0.20 0.15 1.62
PERF -> INST -0.19 -1.92* -0.25 -2.69***
PERF --> GOV -0.25 -2.45** -0.17 -3.69***
PERF-> BOARD -0.10 -2.63*** -0.23 -3.82***
Indirect Effect
PERF~>BOARD~>INST -0.002 -0.19 -0.002 -0.08
PERF~>BOARD—>GOV -0.01 -0.20 -0.03 -1.56
Total Effect
PERF-> INST -0.19 -1.94* -0.25 -2 73***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 6-4 Path Coefficients: Firm Performance (t) and Governance (t+1), Japan,
without GAKUBATSU
Please refer to Table 6-3 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t\alue
OUTSIDE<-BOARD 0.77 0.53
BDOWNc-- BOARD 0.18 0.97 0.34 3.71***
BD_Q<-BOARD -0.05 -0.61 -0.05 -0.91
BANKD <— INST 0.17 0.14
FINOWM <- INST -0.56 -2.83*** -0.49 -3.82***
CROSS <-INST 0.82 2.82*** 0.90 3 77** *
BLOCK <-INST 0.55 2.82*** 0.51 3.84***
GOVI <— GOV 0.11 0.07
GOVOWN <- GOV 0.39 1.91* 0.41 1.81*
GOVAPP <- GOV 0.91 1.49 0.93 3.03***
ROE <— PERF 0.34 0.40
TSR <~ PERF 0.76 4.76*** 0.70 8.81***
ROA <— PERF 0.58 5.14*** 0.63 8.98***
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 0.12 0.80 -0.11 -1.35
BOARD -> GOV 0.13 0.74 0.14 1.80*
PERF -> INST -0.26 -2.07** -0.31 -3.02***
PERF-> GOV -0.22 -1.71* -0.17 -2.97***
PERF-> BOARD -0.21 -2.48** -0.43 -5.23***
Indirect Effect
PERF->BOARD—>INST -0.03 -0.73 0.05 1.30
PERF->BOARD~>GOV -0.03 -0.78 -0.06 -1.80*
Total Effect
PERF-> INST -0.29 -2.21** -0.26 -3.13***






*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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6.2.2 Japan: Is subsequent firm performance positively related to
such intervention?
Having discussed why the government and financial institutions intervene in the
operation of a company, we would like to examine whether this intervention is
positively related to subsequent firm performance. If the government and financial
institutions play the role of a monitoring function, subsequent firm performance of
companies that experience intervention should show a positive association. This
section will discuss the empirical results concerning subsequent firm performance.
The hypotheses discussed in Section 4.2.2 produce Path Diagram 6-2. The
intervention of financial institutions (INST) and political involvement (GOV) will
affect firm performance (PERF) directly, and also affect firm performance (PERF)
through the intermediate variable BOARD. Path Diagram 6-2 and Table 6-5 include
the completely standardised coefficients for the hypothesised relationships and the
model statistics. Structural parameters are exhibited in Table A3-3 in Appendix 3. In
each latent variable, the measurement variable which is assigned the unit value 1.0 is
placed at the top. The main goodness-of-fit indices are acceptable: GFI
(goodness-of-fit index) equals 0.91, and AGFI (adjusted goodness-of-fit index)
equals 0.87. In the alternative index, RMSEA (root mean square error of approximate)
equals 0.08. In the residual analysis, SRMR (standardised root mean square residual)
equals 0.07.
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From Table 6-5, we can observe that the direct relationship between political
involvement (GOV) and subsequent firm performance (PERF) is significant but
negative (-0.26, t = -1.97). According to our Hypothesis 4-1114, the government will
appoint retired bureaucrats to the board to help these troubled companies and to
thereby restore confidence among investors (Van Rixtel, 2002; Van Rixtel and
Hoskisson, 2002). The amakudari is used for the monitoring purpose. By receiving
such help from the government, subsequent firm performance should be better after
the recruitment of retired bureaucrats. However, according to the empirical analysis
presented here, Hypothesis 4-1 is not supported because subsequent firm
performance (PERF) is not positively related to former political involvement (GOV).
The empirical analysis does, however, support Hypothesis 4-2115, which states that
the relationship between political involvement and subsequent firm performance is
negative. From a company's viewpoint, troubled companies are willing to employ
114
Hypothesis 4-1: The relationship between political involvement (t) and firm performance (t+1)
should be positive.
115
Hypothesis 4-2: A company suffering a financial crisis will be more willing to employ retired
bureaucrats and thereby buy influence from the government. The relationship between political
involvement (GOV) and firm performance (PERF) will be negative.
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retired bureaucrats because they can build an informal network with the government
through them. However, based on the argument that government intervention is
inefficient, subsequent firm performance should be negatively associated with such
intervention. Our empirical analysis is consistent with Hypothesis 4-2, which states
that government intervention, such as amakudari, is negatively related to subsequent
firm performance.
The direct relationship between INST and PERF is also negative and significant
(-0.19, t = -1.73), which is consistent with Hypothesis 5-2116. This agrees with the
findings of Morck and Nakamura (1999) who conclude that companies experience
negative share returns in the year following bank director appointments, but is
contrary to Hypothesis 5-1 and the findings of Kang and Shivdasani (1995). Kang
and Shivdasani (1995) document that companies with ties to a main bank are more
likely to replace top executives for poor performance than companies without such
ties. They also indicate that the improvement of firm performance is evident after the
replacement of top executives. Therefore, companies with the ties to a main bank
will have better firm performance.
With respect to the Japanese corporate governance mechanism, we can observe from
Table 6-5 that the influence of the internal monitoring system - the board - is not
significant in Japan. The direct relationship between board (BOARD) and the
subsequent performance (PERF) is not significant (-0.05, t = -0.41). That is, the
relationship between the monitoring ability of a board and subsequent firm
performance is not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 6117 is not supported. This
result implies that the monitoring function in Japan relies mainly on external
institutions, such as the government and financial institutions, not on the board.
Because of the main bank system (Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Monks and Minow, 2004)
and the phenomenon of concentrated shareholders, the Japanese corporate
governance mechanism is mainly based on government, banks, securities companies,
116
Hypothesis 5-2: The relationship between the intervention of financial institutions (t) and the
subsequent firm performance (t+1) will be negative.
117
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between the monitoring ability of the board (t) and the subsequent
firm performance (t+1) and is positive.
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and insurance companies. Our empirical results provide support for this argument.
Given the insignificant relationship between BOARD and PERF, which results in the
significance of indirect paths, Hypothesis 7 is not supported. The results using
normalised data are similar to the results using original data in Table 6-5.
In order to compare the difference between Japan and Taiwan, we rerun the model
without the variable GAKUBATSU. Table 6-6 presents the empirical results of the
model without this variable. The relationships in the model without the variable
GAKUBATSU are similar to the relationships in the model that includes it. The total
effect from INST on PERF in Table 6-6 is -0.17 (t - -2.35) and in Table 6-5 is -0.22
(t = -2.11). Similarly, the total effect from GOV on PERF in Table 6-6 is -0.23 (t =
-2.06) and in Table 6-5 is -0.27 (t = -1.97). Therefore, Hypothesis 4-2 and Hypothesis
5-2 are both supported. Similarly, the relationship between BOARD and PERF is still
insignificant, which results in insignificant indirect paths, GOV->BOARD-> PERF
and INST->BOARD ->PERF. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 7 are not
supported. The overall situation seems to be that the intermediate role of a board is
not supported in Japan.
Moreover, GFI and AGFI are also higher in the model with the variable
GAKUBATSU. This result suggests that this variable plays an important role in the
relationship between political involvement and firm performance in the Japanese
model (Van Rixtel and Hoskisson, 2002; Van Rixtel, 2002; Colignon and Usui, 2003).
Normalised data in Table 6-6 also exhibit the same relationships among latent
variables.
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Table 6-5 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1), Japan
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in other companies. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total
outstanding shares. BANKD: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of
directors. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total
outstanding shares. GOV_I: the number of government agencies. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of
political-related directors to the total number of directors. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates
from the elite universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of executives in the
highest board positions. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total
return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested. ROA: calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by
its total assets.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 0.36 0.43
BDOWN<- BOARD 0.48 3 49* * * 0.48 6.63***
BD_Q <~ BOARD 0.01 0.06 -0.07 -1.62
CROSS <-- INST 0.41 0.34
FINOWM <— INST -1.10 -4.26*** -1.39 -4.41***
BANKD <- INST 0.05 1.17 0.01 0.59
BLOCK <~ INST 0.28 7.32*** 0.22 11.30***
GOVOWN <- GOV 0.60 0.72
GOVI <~ GOV 0.22 3.21*** 0.21 5 09* * *
GOVAPP <- GOV 0.57 5.83*** 0.55 9 99* * *
GAKUBATSU <~ GOV 0.27 3.93*** 0.34 7.63***
ROE <— PERF 0.20 0.23
TSR <— PERF 1.02 2.51** 0.93 4 41* * *
ROA <- PERF 0.28 3.45*** 0.30 5.62***
Direct Effect
INST ~> BOARD 0.52 3.59*** 0.29 5.76***
GOV-> BOARD -0.10 -0.65 0.30 3.77***
INST -> PERF -0.19 -1.73* -0.21 -3.67***
GOV-> PERF -0.26 -1.97** -0.21 -2.93***
BOARD ~> PERF -0.05 -0.41 0.07 0.98
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD -> PERF -0.03 -0.41 0.02 0.99
GOV -> BOARD ~> PERF -0.01 0.34 0.02 0.94
Total Effect
INST ~> PERF -0.22 -2.11** -0.19 -3.76***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 6-6 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1), Japan,
without GAKUBATSU
Please refer to Table 6-5 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 0.51 0.54
BDOWN <~ BOARD 0.35 2.20** 0.38 4.82* * *
BD Q <-- BOARD -0.03 -0.40 -0.13 -2.63***
BLOCK <- INST 0.26 0.31
FINOWM <- INST -1.55 -1.34 -1.33 -3.2***
BANK D <- INST 0.04 1.47 0.06 3.06***
CROSS <- INST 1.32 1.34 1.11 3.18***
GOVOWN <— GOV 0.48 0.59
GOVI <~ GOV 0.18 2 79** * 0.19 4.35***
GOV_APP <-- GOV 0.75 3.67*** 0.68 7 01 * * *
ROE <— PERF 0.21 0.24
TSR <~ PERF 0.99 2.67*** 0.91 4 79* * *
ROA <- PERF 0.29 3.48*** 0.31 5.69***
Direct Effect
INST -> BOARD 0.17 3.00*** 0.17 4.35***
GOV->BOARD 0.09 0.79 0.36 4.69* * *
INST ~> PERF -0.15 -2.24** -0.24 -4.20***
GOV-> PERF -0.22 -2.02** -0.20 -2 92* * *
BOARD -> PERF -0.13 -1.14 0.06 0.88
Indirect Effect
INST ~> BOARD ~> PERF -0.02 -1.07 0.01 0.90
GOV -> BOARD --> PERF -0.01 -0.68 0.02 0.85
Total Effect
INST ~> PERF -0.17 -2.35** -0.23 _4_22* * *






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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6.3 Taiwan
6.3.1 Taiwan: Why do the government and financial institutions
intervene?
In addition to the Japanese models, we also investigate the intervention of
government and financial institutions in Taiwan. In this section, we examine whether
firm performance is associated with subsequent intervention of government and
financial institutions in Taiwan. The summary statistics of the Taiwanese sample are
shown in Table 6-7. Compared to the Japanese data in Table 6-1, we can observe that
financial ownership (FINOWN) is much smaller in Taiwan, whereas board
ownership (BDOWN), the ratio of outside directors (OUTSIDE), government
ownership (GOVOWN), and the ratio of government representatives (GOV APP)
are all higher. The ratio of outside directors (OUTSIDE) and the ratio of directors
who serves as a director in more than three companies (BD_Q) are both large in
Taiwan. Thus, it is common for an outside director to sit on the board of several
different companies concurrently, which casts doubt on their monitoring ability. For
example, one outside director in Acer (SIC code: 2353) served as an outside director
for 12 other companies in 2004, and another in ABIT (SIC code: 2407) served as an
outside director for 6 companies in the same year.
Although Company Law in Taiwan requires companies to have outside directors118
on the board, there is no other relevant law to protect these outside directors' right to
exercise monitoring. It is easy for directors who are appointed by the government
and financial institutions to control the board. For example, two outside directors in
the China Development Financial Holding Corporation (SIC code: 2883) resigned
their positions before the expiration of their terms on the board in 2006 because of
family control119. Although both Taiwanese and Japanese banks play an important
118
Starting 21st Feb, 2002, the 'Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Criteria for Review of Securities
Listings' forces listed companies to have at least two independent directors and at least one auditor on
the board but this rule only applies to those companies that are listed after 21st Feb, 2002.
119 The serial discussion can be obtained in China Times (in Chinese), Bl, B2, 18th May, 2006; China
Times, B2, 19th May, 2006; China Times, B2, 23rd May, 2006.
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role as a monitor, the summary statistics reveal that political involvement and the
corporate governance mechanism are different in these two countries in that
FINOWN is much higher in Japan whereas GOVOWN, GOV I, and GOVAPP are
all higher in Taiwan. Moreover, BDOWN and OUTSIDE are also much higher in
Taiwan.
Table 6-7 Summary Statistics, Taiwan, 2001-2003, 600 Observations
_Performance
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the
percentage ofmanagerial ownership. BDQ: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in
other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the
ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOV_OWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_I: the number of government agencies.
GOV_APP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. GAKUBATSU:
the ratio of the number of graduates from the elite universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to
the total number of executives in the highest board positions. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends
are reinvested. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. ROA: calculated by
dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets.
Latent variable Measurement Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Max Min
BDOWN (%) 600 10.28 11.66 70.61 0.00
BOARD OUTSIDE (%) 600 44.05 23.56 100.00 0.00
MANOWN (%) 600 2.84 5.99 53.58 0.00
BD Q (%) 600 28.26 24.43 100.00 0.00
FINOWN (%) 600 3.35 6.09 55.88 0.00
INST BANK D (%) 600 5.48 11.43 75.00 0.00
CROSS (%) 600 23.91 18.91 79.92 0.01
BLOCK (%) 600 37.45 16.34 95.32 5.03
GOVOWN (%) 600 3.73 10.24 97.13 0.00
GOV GOVI 600 3.48 5.02 38.00 0.00
GOV APP (%) 600 7.00 17.99 100.00 0.00
GAKUBATSU (%) 600 ... ... ... ...
TSR (%) 600 36.69 81.17 659.51 -76.37
PERF ROE (%) 600 8.24 14.36 67.78 -78.58
ROA (%) 600 6.17 8.31 50.64 -35.51
* Negative values in ROA are resulted from negative values in profits rather than assets.
Since SEM requires measurement variables to be a normal distribution, we use the
averaging method mentioned in Section 5.4.5 to normalise the variables. Table 6-8
presents the result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Before using the normalising
procedure, almost all variables do not follow a normal distribution. After adopting
the averaging method, the non-normality problem is improved significantly.
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Reflecting the hypotheses discussed in Section 4.2.1, Path Diagram 6-3 is drawn.
Table 6-9 presents the model statistics and the completely standardised coefficients.
Structural parameters, which are estimated under our hypotheses, are presented in
Table A4-1 in Appendix 4. The main goodness-of-fit indices of this model are: GFI
equals 0.89, AGFI equals 0.83. In the alternative index, RMSEA equals 0.10. In the
residual analysis, SRMR equals 0.09. The overall model is acceptable. Other
researchers (e.g. Lin, 2005) also present similar indices.
Table 6-8 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Taiwanese Data_Performance
Please refer to Table 6-7 for the explanations of variables.
Orgianal Data (N=400) Normalised Data (N= 1000)
Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Significance (2-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Significance (2-tailed)
BDOWN 3.767 0.000 0.746 0.633
OUTSIDE 1.133 0.154 0.637 0.811
MANOWN 6.274 0.000 1.950 0.001
BD Q 2.310 0.000 0.670 0.761
FINOWN 5.635 0.000 2.002 0.001
BANK_D 7.483 0.000 1.046 0.224
CROSS 2.500 0.000 0.546 0.926
BLOCK 1.258 0.084 0.706 0.702
GOVOWN 7.097 0.000 1.425 0.035
GOVJ 4.465 0.000 1.056 0.215
GOV_APP 8.892 0.000 1.084 0.191
TSR 3.243 0.000 1.052 0.219
ROE 2.560 0.000 0.743 0.639
ROA 1.899 0.001 0.776 0.583
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By using the original data, the completely standardised coefficients reported in Table
6-9 and the derived Path Diagram 6-3 allow the maintained hypotheses to be tested.
Original structural coefficients for Table 6-9 can be found in Table A4-2 in Appendix
4. The estimated Taiwanese model is very different from that found for the Japanese
model. Specifically, the direct paths of PERF -> GOV and PERT -> INST are not
significant. However, this does not mean that there is no significant relationship at
work. In contrast to the direct significant paths in Japan (see Table 6-3 and Path
Diagram 6-1), there is an indirect significant relationship between PERF and GOV
through the intermediate BOARD. From Path Diagram 6-3, it can be seen that the
indirect relationship of PERF on GOV is (-0.38)*(0.18), which equals -0.07 (t =
-2.90). The indirect path between PERF and GOV is significant at the 1% level.
Similarly, the significant indirect relationship of PERF on INST is (-0.38)*(0.31),
which equals -0.12 (t = -3.55). This indirect path between PERF and INST is
significant at the 1% level. The relationship between PERF and BOARD is also
negative (-0.38. t = -2.99) and significant at the 1% level. The empirical results are,
therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3. The
empirical results suggest that the government and financial institutions act as a
'trouble-shooter' when firm performance is poor.
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In contrast to the Japanese situation, the Taiwanese government does not seem to
intervene directly in the operation of a company. Instead, it affects firm performance
indirectly through the board of directors. This supports Hypothesis 7. Path Diagram
6-3 shows that the relationship between PERF and BOARD is negative. Based on the
significant and positive relationship between BOARD and INST (0.31, t = 2.93) and
the significant and positive relationship between BOARD and GOV (0.18, t = 2.46),
we find that the board of directors in Taiwan will increase the involvement of the
government and financial institutions. It can be argued that faltering performance
induces the board of directors to eagerly seek the help of government and the
financial institutions, and thereby build a positive relationship between BOARD and
GOV/INST. Additionally, BOARD also has a significant relationship with PERF.
Therefore, our empirical results suggest that boards in Taiwan play a significant
intermediate role in the relationship between the government and financial
institutions, whereas the boards in Japan are less effective. To sum up, unlike the
Japanese government, the intervention of Taiwanese government goes through the
board of directors. Our empirical results support this viewpoint.
The normalised data in Table 6-9 also exhibit the same empirical results. The results
in Table 6-9 are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. When firm
performance is poor, there will be more intervention of government and financial
institutions to help the company solve financial crises. In addition, the relationship
between PERF and BOARD is also significant and negative (-0.39, t = -5.05), which
is consistent with Hypothesis 3. That is, the argument that companies with poor
performance will try to improve the monitoring ability of the board of directors is
supported by the result.
Since the measurement variable MANOWN is excluded in the Japanese models
owing to data limitations, we rerun the model without it. The empirical results are
shown in Table 6-10 to confirm the results in Table 6-9. The relationship between
PERF and BOARD is significant and negative (-0.50, t = -4.33), which is consistent
with Hypothesis 3 that companies with poor performance will improve the
monitoring ability of boards. Although the direct relationship between PERF and
GOV is significant and positive, the total effect from PERF on GOV is still
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significant and negative (-0.16, t = -3.09) because of the significant and negative
indirect effect from PERF on GOV via BOARD (-0.47, t = -3.67). The similar
condition also applies to the relationship between PERF and INST. These findings
support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Normalised data also report similar results as
shown in Table 6-10. From Table 6-10, we can see the advantage of SEM. Unlike
multiple regressions, SEM does not only present the direct relationships but also
considers the indirect relationships. After combining the direct and indirect
relationships, the final results using SEM may be different from the results using
multiple regressions, which mainly consider direct relationships alone.
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Table 6-9 Path Coefficients: Firm Performance (t) and Governance (t+1),
Taiwan
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. MANOWN: the
percentage of managerial ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in
other companies. BANK_D: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of
directors. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOV_OWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOVI: the number of government agencies.
GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. ROE: computed
as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 0.18 0.18
BDOWN <-BOARD -0.98 -3.24*** -0.99 -5.50***
MANOWN <-BOARD -0.61 -3.36*** -0.65 -5.68***
BD_Q<~ BOARD 0.04 0.78 0.04 1.09
BANK_D <— INST 0.71 0.61 |
FINOWM <~ INST 0.39 6.26*** 0.36 9.35***
CROSS <-- INST 0.27 0.31 8.16***
BLOCK <~ INST 0.21 5 59*** 0.14 3.85***
GOVOWN <~ GOV 1.05 2.74
GOVI <~ GOV 0.38 6.28*** 0.62 5.75***
GOVAPP <-- GOV 0.66 q lg*** 0.25 0.52
ROE<- PERF 0.93 0.93
TSR <— PERF 0.21 4.23*** 0.21 6.58***
ROA <~ PERF 0.97 18.33*** 0.97 29.13***
Direct Effect
BOARD ~> INST 0.31 2.83*** 0.43 4.87***
BOARD-> GOV 0.18 2.46** 0.08 4.43***
PERF »> INST -0.08 -1.19 -0.03 -0.70
PERF -> GOV -0.03 -0.59 0.01 0.79
PERF --> BOARD -0.38 -2 99* * * -0.39 -5.05***
Indirect Effect
PERF~> BOARD -> INST -0.12 -3.55*** -0.17 -6.54***
PERF -> BOARD -> GOV -0.07 -2.90*** -0.03 -5.56***
Total Effect
PERF ~> INST -0.20 -3 19*** -0.20 -4.77* * *






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 6-10 Path Coefficients: Firm Performance (t) and Governance (t+1),
Taiwan, without MANOWN
Please refer to Table 6-9 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 0.33 0.35
BDOWN <~ BOARD -0.43 -5.23*** -0.38 -8.83***
BD_Q <- BOARD -0.02 -0.44 -0.07 -2.05**
BANKD <~ INST 0.77 0.73
FINOWM <- INST 0.39 5.52*** 0.37 7.93***
CROSS <~ INST 0.14 2.35** 0.14 3.59***
BLOCK <-INST 0.19 3.11*** 0.24 5.73***
GOVOWN <-- GOV 0.67 0.68
GOV_I <- GOV 0.22 4.90* * * 0.16 5 47* * *
GOV_APP <- GOV 1.08 11.46*** 1.06 18.09***
ROE <— PERF 0.98 1.01
TSR <— PERF 0.23 4.51*** 0.23 7 j 7* * *
ROA <- PERF 0.93 15.29*** 0.90 21.02***
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 0.81 5.38*** 0.72 g ] 9* * *
BOARD --> GOV 0.93 4.31*** 0.99 6.91***
PERF --> PRO 0.23 2.71*** 0.25 4.33***
PERF --> GOV 0.31 2.34** 0.35 4.52***
PERF ~> BOARD -0.50 -4.33*** -0.43 -6.26***
Indirect Effect
PERF->BOARD~>INST -0.41 -4.33*** -0.31 -5.95***
PERF~>BOARD~>GOV -0.47 -3.67*** -0.43 -5.12***
Total Effect
PERF -> INST -0.18 -2.71*** -0.06 -1.76*






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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6.3.2 Taiwan: Is subsequent firm performance positively related to
such intervention?
This section will examine whether intervention from the government and financial
institutions in Taiwan is accompanied by better subsequent firm performance. Path
Diagram 6-4 is derived from the hypotheses discussed in Section 4.2.2 and is based
on the results in Table 6-11. It demonstrates that INST and GOV will affect PERF
directly as well as indirectly through the intermediate variable BOARD.





















Table 6-11 includes the completely standardised coefficients for the hypothesised
relationships and the model statistics. Table A4-3 in Appendix 4 includes the
structural parameters. The main goodness-of-fit indices are acceptable: GFI equals
0.88 and AGFI equals 0.81. In the alternative index, RMSEA equals 0.11. In the
residual analysis, SRMR equals 0.09.
Table 6-11 reports the completely standardised coefficients for the hypothesised
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relationships and leads to Path Diagram 6-4. From Path Diagram 6-4, it can be seen
that the direct relationship between GOV and PERF is not significant. The direct
relationship between INST and PERF is also not significant. The indirect paths, once
again, are significant. Through the latent variable, BOARD, the relationship between
GOV and PERF is (-0.19)*(0.29), which equals -0.06 (t = -2.55) and is significant at
the 5% level. This allows Hypothesis 4-1 to be rejected but supports Hypothesis
4-2120. The relationship between INST and PERF is (-0.35)*(0.29), which equals
-0.10 (t = -2.90) and is significant at the 1% level. This allows Hypothesis 5-1 to be
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rejected but supports Hypothesis 5-2 .
According to the empirical results, even when these troubled companies employ
many retired bureaucrats to build an informal network, subsequent firm performance
in Taiwanese companies is not better. Because of the insignificant direct path
between GOV and PERF, the total effect from GOV on PERF is not significant, as
shown in Table 6-11, whereas the total effect from GOV on PERF in the Japanese
model (Table 6-5) is significant. Furthermore, Hypothesis 6 is also supported in that
the relationship between BOARD and PERF is significant and positive, which
supports the supposition that the board with better monitoring ability can improve
firm performance in Taiwan. Although some prior studies do not find a significant
and positive relationship between the monitoring ability of a board and subsequent
firm performance (Mak and Li, 2001; Yermack, 1996; Faccio and Lasfer, 1999;
Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2001), our result supports the argument that boards with
better monitoring ability will be positively related to subsequent firm performance in
Taiwan (Gompers et al., 2003).
Note that although the final conclusion of the Taiwanese model is similar to that of
the Japanese model, the processes are different. The direct relationships between
GOV/INST and PERF in the Japanese model are significant and negative. In the
Taiwanese model, however, GOV influences PERF via the latent variable, BOARD.
120
Hypothesis 4-2: The relationship between political involvement (t) and subsequent firm
performance (t+1) will be negative.
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Hypothesis 5-2: The relationship between the intervention of financial institutions (t) and
subsequent firm performance (t+1) will be negative.
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The negative relationship between GOV and BOARD in Taiwan supports the
supposition that more political involvement may damage the monitoring ability of
the board.
The negative relationship between INST and BOARD supports the supposition that
too much intervention from the financial institutions will damage the monitoring
ability of the board. Although Japan and Taiwan are similar in board structure,
Hypothesis 7 is supported by Taiwanese estimates but not in the Japanese estimates.
This may be because most directors in Japan are insiders who may not monitor
executives efficiently (Kaplan and Minton, 1994). The normalised data in Table 6-11
also show similar results.
Table 6-12 presents the empirical results without the measurement variable
MANOWN. Without this variable, the original data do not report a significant and
negative direct relationship between GOV/INST and subsequent firm performance
(PERF). Therefore, Hypotheses 4-1, 4-2, 5-1, and 5-2 are not supported. Furthermore,
Hypothesis 6, which states that a board with better monitoring ability is positively
related to the subsequent firm performance, is also not supported by using original
data in Table 6-12. The insignificant relationship between BOARD and PERF results
in the insignificant indirect relationship between GOV/INST and PERF and the
rejection of Hypothesis 7. The empirical results shown in Table 6-12 illustrate that
managerial ownership (MANOWN), which can align the interests of executives with
the interests of shareholders, is an important factor in internal monitoring. Without
including the variable MANOWN in the latent variable BOARD, the relationship
between BOARD and PERF becomes insignificant.
Although the final conclusion of the Taiwanese model is the same as for the Japanese
model, the processes are different. The direct relationships between PERF and
GOV/INST in the Japanese model are significant and negative, which suggests that
political involvement and the intervention from financial institutions are negatively
associated with subsequent firm performance directly. In the Taiwanese model,
however, GOV influences PERF via the intermediate latent variable, BOARD. The
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negative relationship between GOV and BOARD indicates that more political
involvement will damage the monitoring ability of the board. At the same time, the
unsound board of directors will be negatively associated with subsequent firm
performance because these government appointed directors may attempt to extract
rents for the ruling party or operate non-profit projects that can implement related
policies at the expense of firm performance. The indirect negative relationship
between INST and PERF also demonstrates a similar outcome. The negative
relationship between INST and BOARD supports the argument that too much
intervention on the part of the financial institutions may jeopardise the monitoring
ability of a board and thereby result in subsequent poor performance. Thus, the
intervention from the financial institutions (INST) may finally be negatively
associated with subsequent firm performance (PERF). The detailed comparison
between Japanese models and Taiwanese models is discussed in Section 6.4.
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Table 6-11 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1),
Taiwan
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the
percentage ofmanagerial ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in
other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the
ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_I: the number of government agencies.
GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. ROE: computed
as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are
reinvested. ROA: calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient tvalue
BDOWN <-BOARD 0.87 0.88
OUTSIDE<- BOARD -0.20 -3.34*** -0.14 -3.53***
MANOWN <~ BOARD 0.61 6.79*** 0.61 8.25***
BD_Q<-BOARD -0.11 q2** -0.03 -0.72
FINOWM <- INST 0.37 0.41
BANKD <— INST 0.79 6.18*** 0.77 10.09***
CROSS <-INST 0.26 3.33*** 0.15 3.90***
BLOCK <~ INST 0.20 3.13*** 0.19 4.76***
GOVOWN <-GOV 1.04 0.42
GOVI <~ GOV 0.46 7.43*** 0.08 4.83***
GOVAPP <— GOV 0.68 10.24*** 1.74 4.48* * *
ROE<- PERF 0.94 0.98
TSR <— PERF 0.20 4.01*** 0.22 6.97***
ROA <-- PERF 0.96 14.05*** 0.94 22.03***
Direct Effect
INST ~> BOARD -0.35 _421*** -0.29 -5.55***
GOV--> BOARD -0.19 -3.32*** -0.04 -1.98**
INST —> PERF -0.01 -0.16 -0.02 -0.36
GOV-> PERF -0.01 -0.25 -0.01 -0.26
BOARD-> PERF 0.29 3 83*** 0.21 4.73***
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD -> PERF -0.10 -2.90*** -0.06 -3.69***
GOV --> BOARD -> PERF -0.06 -2.55** -0.01 -1.83*
Total Effect
INST-> PERF -0.11 -1.79* -0.08 -1.80*






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.0i
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Table 6-12 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1),
Taiwan, without MANOWN
Please refer to Table 6-11 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN<~ BOARD 0.44 0.47
OUTSIDE <-BOARD -0.36 -5.17*** -0.47 -9.63***
BD_Q<-BOARD -0.08 -1.31 -0.04 -1.03
BLOCK <~ INST 0.15 0.18
FINOWM <- INST 0.39 2.55** 0.31 4.95***
BANK_D <- INST 0.82 2.65*** 0.56 5.45***
CROSS <- INST 0.11 1.84* 0.17 3.91***
GOVK-GOV 0.45 0.23 1.83*
GOVOWN <- GOV 1.04 7 ji*** 1.75
GOVAPP <- GOV 0.64 9.16*** 0.60 1.99**
ROA <~ PERF 0.89 0.93
TSR<— PERF 0.23 4.75*** 0.23 7.27***
ROE <--PERF 1.01 12.04*** 0.99 20.38***
Direct Effect
INST -> BOARD -0.61 -2.37** -0.46 -3.88***
GOV->BOARD -0.50 -4.67* * * -0.46 -1.88*
INST ~> PERF 0.55 0.67 0.32 1.73*
GOV ~> PERF 0.46 0.72 0.30 1.42
BOARD-> PERF 1.06 0.82 0.75 2.14**
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD ~> PERF -0.65 -0.77 -0.35 -1.85*
GOV -> BOARD -> PERF -0.53 -0.81 -0.35 -1.71*
Total Effect
INST -> PERF -0.10 -1.33 -0.03 -2.03**






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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6.4 Comparison and Discussion
From Section 6.2.1 and Section 6.3.1, we can observe that the overall final results in
the Japanese and Taiwanese models are identical, i.e. firm performance is negatively
related to the subsequent intervention of governments and financial institutions.
Compared to the western corporate governance mechanism, which is based on the
assumption that a company should maximise the interests of shareholders, the
Japanese system is set up to promote the interests of the company, the employees and
the whole society rather than just the shareholders (Monks and Minow, 2004). In this
kind of system the government sees itself as a protector of domestic industry
(Analytica, 1992). Given this phenomenon, when a company does not perform well
or has a financial crisis that causes instability, the government, banks, and other
cross-holding institutions will intervene in the operation of that company. Therefore,
in Japan the government and financial institutions are regarded as trouble-shooters.
This argument is supported by the empirical results from Japan and Taiwan. When
firm performance is poor, the government and financial institutions will appoint
retired bureaucrats and representatives to the board to exercise the monitoring
function. These empirical findings suggest that the system of amakudari is not used
only as a reward system for the government bureaucracy. If it is used as a reward
system alone, the relationship between performance and political involvement should
be insignificant. However, our results do not support this that the system of
amakudari is used as a reward system alone. Our results are consistent with those of
Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002) that the system of amakudari in Japan and Taiwan is
used as a trouble-shooter.
However, there are differences between the two countries. Although the total effects
from firm performance (PERF) on subsequent political involvement (GOV) and the
intervention of financial institutions (INST) are both significant and negative in
Japan and Taiwan, the paths are different. In Japan, we find that the indirect
relationships, PERF->BOARDSGOV and PERF->BOARD-> INST, are not
significant (Tables 6-3 and 6-4). These findings imply that the board of directors in
Japan does not play an intermediate role between a company and the
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government/financial institutions. From a company's viewpoint, a company with
poor performance is willing to accept government appointed directors (amakudari)
and representatives from financial institutions to build a harmonious relationship so it
can ask them to help solve its financial problems. However, the board of directors in
Japan cannot attract or refuse the intervention and support from the government and
financial institutions, as the relationships between BOARD and GOV/INST are not
significant.
In Taiwan, on the other hand, the influences from firm performance (PERF) to
political involvement (GOV) and to the intervention of financial institutions (INST)
are indirect, as shown in Table 6-9. The direct path from firm performance (PERF) to
the board (BOARD) is negative. Moreover, the direct path from the board (BOARD)
to political involvement (GOV) is significant and positive. This finding is consistent
with the supposition that a company with poor firm performance will improve the
monitoring ability of the board of directors who will subsequently negotiate for more
support from the government and financial institutions. The board of directors in
Taiwan plays an intermediate role on linking the company and the
government/financial institutions. In Japan, although the argument that the company
will improve the monitoring ability of the board when firm performance is poor is
supported, the board of directors does not play an intermediate role between the
company, the government, and other financial institutions. To sum up, governments
and financial institutions in Japan and Taiwan will intervene in companies with poor
performance. This argument is supported by the negative relationship between PERF
and GOV/INST.
From Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.2, due to the insignificant relationship between BOARD
and PERF, we can conclude that the improvement of the board in Japan is not
positively related to subsequent firm performance. If the government and financial
institutions play a monitoring role, the company that experiences intervention by the
government and financial institutions should have better firm performance. However,
intervention from the government and financial institutions is not positively
associated with subsequent firm performance. On the contrary, subsequent firm
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performance is negatively associated with such intervention by the government and
financial institutions. This result is similar to that found by Horiushi and Shimuzu
(2001) who conclude that political involvement will jeopardise capital adequacy, but
contradicts the results found by Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002) who demonstrate that
political involvement will improve profitability. The intervention of governments is
commonly regarded as inefficient (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998)
because there exists the danger that government will pursue its own interests at the
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expense of those of the shareholders . Our results provide indirect evidence for this
argument.
On the other hand, this thesis also examines whether subsequent firm performance is
associated with intervention of government and financial institutions. Unlike the
Japanese boards, which have no significant influence on subsequent firm
performance, in Taiwan the monitoring ability of a board is positively associated
with subsequent firm performance. Other empirical results from Taiwan are similar
to the results from Japan. From Table 6-11, we can also observe that the relationship
between political involvement (GOV) and subsequent firm performance (PERF) is
significant and negative, as is the relationship between the intervention of financial
institutions (INST) and subsequent firm performance (PERF). One point that
deserves to be mentioned is that the significant negative relationships between
GOV/INST and the subsequent firm performance (PERF) are direct in Japan (Table
6-5), whereas they are indirect in Taiwan (Table 6-11). In Taiwan, the negative
relationships between GOV/INST and subsequent firm performance (PERF) go
through the board of directors (BOARD)123. Again, this finding indicates that the
board of directors in Taiwan plays an intermediate role between government, the
financial institutions, and companies. Based on the differences between Japanese and
Taiwanese models, we find that the board of directors in Taiwan plays a more
122 Horiushi and Shimuzu (2001, p.573) indicate that "there exists the danger that the regulator will
collude with regulated banks to pursue their benefits at the expense of taxpayers, thereby reducing
effectiveness of financial supervision."
123 If we exclude MANOWN from the latent variable BOARD, the relationship BOARDA PERF
would be insignificant, and thereby results in the insignificant total effect from GOV/INST on
subsequent PERF. However, the exclusion of MANOWN does not influence the outcome that
government and financial institutions are more likely to intervene in the operation of troubled
companies.
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influential role in companies.
To sum up, both Japanese and Taiwanese models support the hypothesis that the
system of amakudari is not used as a reward system but for trouble-shooting (Van
Rixtel and Hassink, 2002). These retired bureaucrats from government institutions,
such as MoF and BoJ in Japan and MOEA in Taiwan, are sent to troubled companies
in case of a financial crisis. The representatives from financial institutions, such as
banks, are also dispatched to the boards to exercise the ex-post monitoring functions.
Both bureaucrats and bank representatives can exercise their monitoring function and
use their political networks to help the company. The direct intervention of
government and financial institutions in Japan includes extending the deadline of
loans, providing emergency financing, and reducing interest rate or loans. For
example, Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) provided Japan Line bridging loan for
scrapping of surplus tankers, implemented loan rollovers and interest rate reductions,
and wrote off 50 billion yen of 160 billion yen loans in 1989. Meanwhile, the
intervention in Taiwan is indirect. For example, in order to pave the road for the next
election, the ruling party will engage in the infrastructure which may not be
necessary. The government-appointed directors and bank representatives may lobby
and use their networks to bid on infrastructure projects favoured by the government
at a high price. The government may also give better treatments to companies which
have a good connection with it. The difference between Japan and Taiwan may origin
from the political environment. Unlike the one-party environment in Japan124, the
two-party system in Taiwan causes the need for companies to build relationships with
the possible succeeding ruling party.
Unfortunately, the intervention of government and financial institutions is negatively
related to subsequent firm performance. The result is consistent with the argument
that government is inefficient (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998; Vining
and Boardman, 1992; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Sun et al., 2002; Beck and
Levine, 2002). The negative relationship between the intervention of financial
institutions and subsequent firm performance is consistent with the study by Morck
124 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the biggest party in Japan. In Taiwan, the Kuo-Ming-Tang
(KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are the two biggest parties.
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and Nakamura (1999), who found that companies experience negative share returns
in the year following bank director appointments, but contrasts with the findings of
Kang and Shivdasani (1995). According to the findings in this thesis, we support the
supposition that the intervention of government and financial institutions may help
the companies solve crises in the beginning but subsequent firm performance is
negatively related to such intervention. Therefore, companies in Japan and Taiwan
should avoid seeking temporary relief from government and financial institutions
regardless of the consequences. Table 6-13 summarise the hypotheses and findings.
Table 6-13 The summary of hypotheses and findings_performanee
Hypothesis Argument Japan Taiwan
Hypothesis 1
The relationship between firm performance (t) and
political involvement (t+1) is negative Accept Accept
Hypothesis 2
The relationship between firm performance (t) and the
intervention of financial institutions (t+1) is negative. Accept Accept
Hypothesis 3
The relationship between firm performance (t) and the
monitoring ability of the board (t+1) is negative. Accept Accept
Hypothesis 4-1
The relationship between political involvement (t) and the
subsequent firm performance (t+1) should be positive. Reject Reject
Hypothesis 4-2
The relationship between political involvement (t) and the
subsequent firm performance (t+1) will be negative. Accept Accept
Hypothesis 5-1
The relationship between the intervention of financial
institutions (t) and the subsequent firm performance (t+1) Reject Reject
Hypothesis 5-2
The relationship between the intervention of financial
institutions (t) and the subsequent firm performance (t+1) Accept Accept
Hypothesis 6
The relationship between the monitoring ability of the
board (t) and the subsequent firm performance (t+1) is Reject Accept
Hypothesis 7
The board of directors may moderate the relationship
between performance and the intervention ofgovernment
and financial institutions.
Reject Accept
In addition to firm performance, this thesis also examines the relationships between
the intervention of government and financial institutions and DOI through the board
of directors. Based on the introduction in Chapter 3 and the hypotheses in Section 4.3,




Empirical Analysis of Political
Involvement and the Degree of
Internationalisation
7.1 Introduction
The review of the relevant literature in Chapter 3 and the hypotheses developed in
Chapter 4 highlighted the interaction between the degree of internationalisation (DOI)
and the intervention of governments and financial institutions through the board of
directors in Japan and Taiwan. Currently, the internationalisation theories are largely
based on western MNCs. These theories usually neglect the role played by the
government. In the Asian context, home governments, however, play a critical role in
the promotion of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and international
expansion. Furthermore, different stages of economic development also affect the
relationship between political involvement and DOI (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990).
Unfortunately, most studies concerning the relationship between internationalisation
and political involvement under different economic environments and legal systems
are contextual (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990). If the intervention of governments and
financial institutions has a significant influence on internationalisation, it is important
to use quantitative methods in addition to any contextual description to examine it.
Based on the review of literature in Chapter 3, relevant hypotheses were developed
in Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2. The question we ask in Section 4.3.1 is do
companies with a higher DOI seem to experience more or less intervention of
governments and financial institutions? We will examine whether DOI is related to
subsequent intervention of governments and financial institutions. Due to the dual
roles of the government and financial institutions as supporters and regulators, the
relationship between DOI and intervention of government and financial institutions
may be negative or positive. In Section 4.3.2, the main question is whether the
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intervention of governments and financial institutions is related to the subsequent
DOI. Since intervention of governments and financial institutions is usually regarded
as inefficient, the subsequent DOI may be negatively affected. In contrast, the
government and financial institutions also play the role as supporters. For example,
the Singaporean government provided generous support, such as tax incentives,
finance schemes, and training, to foster the development of internationalisation (Sim
and Pandian, 2003). Therefore, the subsequent DOI may be positively related to such
intervention of governments and financial institutions.
As in Chapter 6, this chapter adopts the methodology of structural equation
modelling (SEM). The primary focus of this chapter is in exploring the relationship
between intervention of governments and financial institutions, the monitoring
ability of the board of directors, and DOI. In Section 7.2, we examine these
relationships in Japan and in Section 7.3 we investigate these relationships in Taiwan.
For each country we examine two issues. Section 7.2.1 and 7.3.1 examine whether
DOI is related to subsequent intervention of governments and financial institutions
through the boards of directors in Japan and Taiwan respectively. In Section 7.2.2
and 7.3.2 we investigate whether intervention of governments and financial
institutions is associated with subsequent DOI through the boards of directors in
Japan and Taiwan respectively.
By using SEM, we can examine direct and indirect relationships simultaneously and
thus obtain the total effects. We find that the relationships between intervention of
governments and financial institutions, the board of directors, and DOI are different
in Japan and in Taiwan. The differences in the findings between Japan and Taiwan
will be discussed in Section 7.4 and a conclusion will be drawn.
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7.2 Japan
7.2.1 Japan: Is the degree of internationalisation related to the
subsequent intervention of governments and financial institutions?
In this section, we examine the relationship between DOI and subsequent
intervention of governments and financial institutions. The question in this section is
do companies with a higher DOI seem to have more or less intervention of
governments and financial institutions? Therefore, this section will discuss the
relationships between four latent variables: the monitoring ability of the board
(BOARD), the intervention of financial institutions (INST), political involvement
(GOV), and DOI. The composition of latent variables - BOARD, INST, and GOV -
is the same as in Section 6.2.1. The final latent variable, DOI, is composed of four
measurement variables: foreign ownership (FOROWN), the ratio of foreign sales to
total sales (FSTS), the ratio of foreign assets to total assets (FATA), and the number
of listings on foreign exchanges (FSE). Table 7-1 provides the descriptive statistics
for all measurement variables.
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Table 7-1 Summary Statistics, Japan, 2001-2003, 609 Observations DOI
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of
financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANK_D: the ratio of the number of bank representatives
on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares.
BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total
outstanding shares. GOV_I: the number of government agencies. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of
political-related directors to the total number of directors. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates
from the elite universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of executives in the
highest board positions. FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of
foreign sales to total sales. FATA: the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. FSE: the number of listings on foreign
exchanges.
Latent variable Measurement Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Max Min
BDOWN (%) 609 0.55 2.66 37.43 0.00
BOARD OUTSIDE (%) 609 17.22 9.38 53.33 0.00
MANOWN (%) 609 ... ... ... ...
BD_Q(%) 609 6.42 10.23 53.85 0.00
FINOWN (%) 609 45.01 11.58 68.83 3.91
INST BANK D (%) 609 5.44 7.72 60.00 0.00
CROSS (%) 609 13.41 12.46 86.00 0.70
BLOCK (%) 609 38.82 10.82 81.59 17.45
GOVOWN (%) 609 0.64 5.69 66.74 0.00
GOV GOV_I 609 1.82 5.95 63.00 0.00
GOV APP (%) 609 3.08 5.15 33.33 0.00
GAKUBATSU (%) 609 53.37 20.07 100.00 5.56
FOROWN (%) 609 18.09 12.30 68.46 0.63
DOI FSTS (%) 609 18.64 19.57 86.58 0.00
FATA (%) 609 13.21 15.46 78.24 0.00
FSE 609 0.52 1.27 11.00 0.00
Table 7-2 shows the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. From this table we can
observe that the non-normality problem of the original data is significantly improved
by the averaging method because most variables follow a normal distribution. If we
have more observations, the averaging method can make the data more normally
distributed.
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Table 7-2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Japanese Data_DOI
Please refer to Table 7-1 for the explanations of variables.
Orgianal Data (N=406) Normalised Data (N=1000)
Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Significance (2-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Significance (2-tailed)
BDOWN 8.463 0.000 2.245 0.000
OUTSIDE 2.527 0.000 0.602 0.861
BD Q 5.959 0.000 0.970 0.304
FINOWN 1.371 0.047 0.428 0.993
BANKD 4.795 0.000 0.997 0.273
CROSS 4.087 0.000 1.007 0.262
BLOCK 2.698 0.000 0.896 0.398
GOVOWN 10.235 0.000 1.709 0.006
GOVI 7.548 0.000 2.160 0.000
GOVAPP 7.032 0.000 1.082 0.192
GAKUBATSU 1.150 0.142 0.526 0.945
FOROWN 1.984 0.001 0.751 0.626
FSTS 3.435 0.000 0.735 0.652
FATA 4.070 0.000 0.749 0.628
FSE 8.614 0.000 1.366 0.048
Based on the hypotheses in Section 4.3.1 and the results in Table 7-3, we are able to
draw Path Diagram 7-1. Table 7-3 presents the model statistics and the completely
standardised coefficients. The results are also shown in Path Diagram 7-3. Structural
parameter estimates, which are estimated by SEM, are shown in Table A3-5 and
A3-6 in Appendix 3. The model statistics presented in Table 7-3 indicate a moderate
model fit. GFI (goodness-of-fit index) equals 0.86, and AGFI (adjusted
goodness-of-fit index) equals 0.80. In the alternative index, RMSEA (root mean
square error of approximate) equals 0.09. In the residual analysis, SRMR
(standardised root mean square residual) equals 0.11.
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From Path Diagram 7-1 and Table 7-3, we can observe that the direct relationship
between DOI and BOARD is significant and positive (0.26, t = 2.41). This finding is
consistent with Hypothesis 10, which states that in order to manage the increased
complexity resulting from a higher DOI, the monitoring ability of a board will be
improved. This finding is also consistent with the argument that companies will
adapt their governance mechanisms to address the information processing needs that
are created by a higher DOI (Chandler, 1962; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Sanders
and Carpenter (1998) find that DOI is positively related to the ratio of outside
directors and board size. They show that one percentage point increase on DOI will
result in a 5% increase in board size and a 15% increase in the ratio of outside
directors125. Similar to the results in Sanders and Carpenter (1998), the path
coefficient between DOI and the ratio of outside directors in our research is 0.12126,
which suggests that one percentage point increase on the standard deviation of DOI
will result in a 12% increase on the standard deviation of the ratio of outside
125 After including two interaction variables (DOI*board size and DOI*CEO long-tem pay mix), the
coefficient ofDOI is positive and significant; otherwise, the coefficient ofDOI is not significant.
126 The path coefficient of the relationship between the measurement variable OUTSIDE and the
latent variable BOARD is 0.45. Therefore, the path coefficient between DOI and the ratio of outside
directors (OUTSIDE) in our research is (0.26)*(0.45), which equals 0.12.
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directors.
From Table 7-3, we can also observe that the direct relationship between GOV and
DOI is significant and negative (-0.32, t = -2.05). After including the insignificant
indirect relationship between GOV and DOI, which adopts the latent variable
BOARD as an intermediate, the total effect from DOI on GOV is still negative and
significant at the 5% level (-0.23, t = -2.05). This finding does not support
Hypothesis 8-2, which states that the relationship between GOV and DOI is positive
because a higher DOI will supply stronger incentives for the government to regulate
and intervene. However, this result does support Hypothesis 8-1, which states that
the relationship between GOV and DOI is negative. Based on the discussion in
Section 3.2.2 and the hypotheses in Section 4.3.1, different stages of
internationalisation will have different influences on political involvement (Aggarwal
and Agmon, 1990; Sim and Pandian, 2003). In the latter stages when DOI is higher,
political involvement from the home country decreases (Aggarwal and Agmon,
1990). The significant and negative relationship between DOI and GOV implies that
the internationalisation process in Japan is in the latter stages, where the government
is "a reluctant partner" (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990, p. 175). Furthermore, since the
government is commonly regarded as inefficient, companies that gain political power
from a high DOI may refuse intervention from the government. The automobile
industry, the most competitive industry in Japan, is a good example (Porter et al.,
2000)127.
Conversely, the data in Table 7-3 presents a significant and positive direct
relationship between DOI and INST (0.35, t=2.15), which means that a higher DOI is
associated with more involvement from financial institutions. This finding is
consistent with Hypothesis 9 and Tihanyi et al. (2003), who conclude that financial
institutions are more willing to invest in companies with higher DOI. In addition to
127 The word "competitive" in Porter et al. (2000) can be defined as "a higher ratio of foreign sales".
In order not to create competition for Toyota, Nissan, and other Japanese automobile companies, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) tried to prevent Honda from producing cars in the
early 1960s (Tsuruta, 1984; Porter et al., 2000). Honda, however, ignored this suggestion because it is
based on government policy, instead of profit maximising. Please refer to Section 3.2.2 for more
information.
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the direct path, the indirect path from DOI to INST via BOARD is also positive and
significant at the 10% level (0.24, t = 1.86). After considering the indirect effect,
which goes through the latent variable BOARD, the total effect from DOI on INST
(0.59, t = 3.45) is positive and significant at the 1% level. Compared to the results
based on original data, those based on normalised data in Table 7-3 exhibit similar
results.
Since the Taiwanese model excludes the measurement variable GAKUBATSU due to
data unavailability, Table 7-4 reports the empirical results without it. After deleting
this variable, there is still a direct negative relationship between DOI and GOV
(-0.36, t = -2.63). The direct relationship between DOI and BOARD is also positive
and significant at the 5% level (0.47, t = 2.37). After considering the indirect path
from DOI to GOV via BOARD, the total effect from DOI on GOV is significant and
negative (-0.08, t = -2.74). Therefore, Hypothesis 8-1 and Hypothesis 10 are still
supported, even after excluding the variable GAKUBATSU. By using normalised
data to confirm the results, we still obtain a significant and negative direct
relationship between DOI and GOV. The total effect from DOI on GOV is negative
and significant at the 1% level (-0.08, t = -2.74). This finding is consistent with
Hypothesis 8-1.
According to Hypothesis 14, the board of directors may mediate the relationship
between DOI and intervention of government and financial institutions. Given the
results in Table 7-3 using original data, we can conclude that the board of directors in
Japan plays an intermediate role between the companies and financial institutions
because the indirect relationship between DOI and INST via BOARD is significant.
However, the indirect relationship between DOI and GOV via BOARD is
insignificant in Table 7-3, which makes the intermediate role of the board in Japan
less robust. Nevertheless, compared to the results in Section 6.2.1, the positive and
significant BOARDINST and BOARD->GOV in Table 7-3 reveal that the boards
in Japan are eager to require support from government and financial institutions in
terms ofDOI rather than firm performance.
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Table 7-3 Path Coefficients: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Japan
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in other companies. BLOCK: the percentage of
blockholder ownership. BANK_D: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total
number of directors. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the
ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_I: the number of government investors. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV APP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates from the elite
universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of directors in the board.
FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <-BOARD 0.37 0.29
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 0.45 3 49* * * 0.22 5.00***
BDQ<-BOARD -0.04 -0.57 -0.05 -1.38
BLOCK <-INST 0.09 0.52
FINOWM <- INST -0.08 -6.18*** -0.52 _9 9g** *
BANKD <~ INST 0.02 2.51** 0.07 3.34***
CROSS <- INST -0.31 -3 25* * * -1.82 -5.04***
GOVK-GOV 0.16 0.08 2.39**
GOVOWN <-GOV 0.50 2.42** 0.92 10.15***
GOV_APP<-GOV 0.72 2.36** 0.46
GAKUBATSU <-GOV 0.16 2.34** 0.26 7 j |***
FOROWN <~ DOI 0.52 0.51
FSTS <-DOI 0.94 10.35*** 0.95 15.38***
FATA <- DOI 0.79 10.43*** 0.77 16.09***
FSE <— DOI 0.35 6.09*** 0.32 9 24* * *
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 0.93 2.46** 0.28 4 j7***
BOARD -> GOV 0.36 1.72* 0.67 6.09***
DOI-> INST 0.35 2.15** 0.05 1.93*
DOI -> GOV -0.32 -2.05** -0.21 -3 05***
DOI-> BOARD 0.26 2.41** 0.17 1.77*
Indirect Effect
DOI->BOARD—>INST 0.24 1.86* 0.05 1.68*
DOI—>BOARD—>GOV 0.09 1.46 0.11 1.72*
Total Effect
DOI-> INST 0.59 3.45*** 0.10 3 j2***






: p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 7-4 Path Coefficients: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Japan without
GAKUBATSU
Please refer to Table 7-3 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN<~ BOARD 0.23 0.16
OUTSIDE <~ BOARD 0.17 2.86*** 0.83 2.80***
BD_Q <~ BOARD -0.02 -0.48 -0.06 -1.59
FINOWM <- INST 0.09 0.56
BANKD <— INST -0.21 -0.53 -0.13 -3.63***
CROSS <- INST 1.89 0.53 -0.91 -12.00***
BLOCK <~ INST -1.45 -0.53 -0.54 -13 39***
GOVOWN <— GOV 0.95 0.47
GOVI <- GOV 0.08 1.43 0.11 3.01***
GOVAPP <— GOV 0.37 4.37*** 0.90 5.34***
FOROWN <— DOI 0.52 0.48
FSTS <- DOI 0.94 10.35*** 0.99 14.07***
FATA <- DOI 0.79 10.44*** 0.74 15.36***
FSE<- DOI 0.35 6.10*** 0.34 9 53* * *
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST -0.34 -0.53 -0.26 -3.41***
BOARD ~> GOV 0.59 4 (7*** 0.34 3.13***
DOI -> INST 0.06 0.41 0.21 4.72***
DOI-> GOV -0.36 -2.63** -0.26 _4 Q4* * *
DOI ~> BOARD 0.47 2.37** 0.23 2.49* *
Indirect Effect
DOI—>BOARD~>INST -0.16 -0.52 -0.06 -2.46**
DOI—>BOARD—>GOV 0.28 2.17** 0.08 2.33**
Total Effect
DOI -> INST -0.10 -0.54 0.15 4 j ] * * *






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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7.2.2 Japan: Is the subsequent degree of internationalisation
positively related to such intervention?
The second question we ask regarding DOI is whether political involvement (GOV)
and the intervention of financial institutions (INST) affect the subsequent DOI.
Based on the hypotheses in Section 4.3.2, we can obtain Path Diagram 7-2, which
shows that three latent variables - BOARD, INST, and GOV - are related to DOI.
Table 7-5 shows the completely standardised coefficients. Original structural
parameter estimates, which are estimated by SEM, are shown in Table A3-7 and
A3-8 in Appendix 3. From Table 7-5, we can obtain that GFI is equal to 0.88, AGFI
equals 0.82, SRMR equals 0.09, and RMSEA equals 0.10. The goodness-of-fit of this
model is acceptable.
Path Diagram 7-2: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Japan
As seen In Table 7-5, the direct relationship between GOV and the subsequent DOI is
negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.31, t = -3.16). After including the indirect
path from GOV to DOI via BOARD, the total effect from GOV on the subsequent
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DOI is still negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.32, t = -3.26). This finding
supports Hypothesis 11-2 rather than Hypothesis 11-1. The intervention from the
Japanese government, such as government ownership and government appointed
directors, is not positively related to the subsequent DOI. Instead, this kind of
intervention is associated with the subsequent DOI.
The total effect from INST on the subsequent DOI is also negative and significant at
the 10% level (-0.13, t = -1.74). This finding is not consistent with Hypothesis 12 or
Tihanyi et al. (2003) who find that institutional ownership has a significant and
positive effect on DOI in the US. Similar to the relationship between the intervention
of financial institutions (INST) and the subsequent firm performance (PERF), the
negative relationship between INST and the subsequent DOI in Japan indicates that
the intervention of financial institutions is not accompanied with a higher DOI.
It is clearly that the finding in Table 7-5 does not support Hypothesis 13, which states
that the relationship between the monitoring ability of a board (t) and the subsequent
DOI (t+1) is positive. The direct relationship between BOARD and the subsequent
DOI is not significant, which means the monitoring ability of Japanese boards does
not have a significant influence on increasing the subsequent DOI. This insignificant
relationship between BOARD and DOI also results in the rejection of Hypothesis 14
because the indirect relationships, INST->BOARD->DOI and
GOV->BOARD->DOI, are not significant.
In order to confirm the results using original data, the results using normalised data
are also included in Table 7-5. The empirical results, which use normalised data, are
similar to the results using the original data in Table 7-5. The significant and negative
direct relationship between GOV and the subsequent DOI is also found by using
normalised data. After including the indirect path - the path from DOI to GOV via
BOARD - the total effect from GOV on DOI is still negative and significant at the
1% level (-0.23, t = -4.51). By using normalised data, the relationship between
BOARD and the subsequent DOI is positive and significant at the 10% level (0.11, t
= 1.75). Hypothesis 13, which states that the relationship between the monitoring
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ability of a board and subsequent DOI is positive, is supported by normalised data.
However, the relationship between BOARD and the subsequent DOI is insignificant
when we use the original data in Table 7-5. Although normalised data follow the
assumption that measurement variables should be normally distributed in SEM, they
are not real but manufactured by researchers. Hence, the results obtained by using
normalised data should be carefully interpreted and used for reference only.
Table 7-6 shows the results that exclude the measurement variable GAKUBATSU
from the model. The results without this variable are similar to those with it. The
direct relationship between GOV and DOI is still negative and significant at the 5%
level (-0.24, t = -2.31), which is consistent with Hypothesis 11-2 rather than
Hypothesis 11-1. Hypothesis 12128 is not supported in Table 7-6 using either the
non-normalised original data or the normalised data. The relationship between the
intervention from financial institutions (INST) and the subsequent DOI is not
significant. Hypothesis 13, which states that the relationship between the monitoring
ability of a board and the subsequent DOI is positive, is supported by using
normalised data rather than by using original data. Since we manufacture 1,000
observations, the results obtained by using normalised data should be carefully
interpreted and used for reference only.
From the information in Table 7-5 and Table 7-6, we can conclude that higher
political involvement (GOV) and higher intervention from financial institutions are
negatively associated with the subsequent DOI in Japan. These findings are
consistent with the argument that government inefficiency will jeopardise the
internationalisation of a company (Porter et al., 2000) but contradict Tihanyi et al.
(2003) who conclude that institutional ownership leads to higher subsequent DOI.
Moreover, similar to firm performance, which is discussed in Section 6.6.2, the
boards of directors in Japan do not play a significant intermediate role between the
Japanese government/financial institutions and Japanese companies.
128
Hypothesis 12: The intervention of financial institutions (t) will result in higher degree of
internationalisation (t+1)
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Table 7-5 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Japan
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of
financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANK_D: the ratio of the number of bank representatives
on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares.
BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares.
GOV_I: the number of government investors. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates from the elite
universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of directors in the board.
FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient tsalue
BDOWN <~ BOARD 0.44 0.26
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 0.42 3.38*** 0.68 3.08***
BD_Q <~ BOARD -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.85
FINOWM <~ INST 0.96 0.7
BANK_D <- INST -0.09 -1.68* -0.08 -2.11**
CROSS <~ INST -0.47 -5.87*** -0.72 -13.65***
BLOCK <-INST -0.33 _4 * * -0.54 -12.67***
GOVAPP <- GOV 0.62 0.65
GOVOWN <~ GOV 0.56 5.76*** 0.67 10.01***
GOVI <- GOV 0.23 3 29* * * 0.15 3.76***
GAKUBATSU <-GOV 0.25 3.62*** 0.34 7.82***
FOROWN <- DOI 0.45 0.41
FSTS <~ DOI 0.97 8.46*** 1.00 11.65***
FATA <- DOI 0.76 9.08*** 0.72 13.12***
FSE <— DOI 0.33 5.61*** 0.30 g j9***
Direct Effect
INST-> BOARD -0.55 -3.35*** -0.34 -3.00***
GOV->BOARD -0.09 -0.65 0.20 2.35**
INST-> DOI -0.07 -0.66 0.02 0.49
GOV-> DOI -0.31 -3.16*** -0.25 -4.62***
BOARD -> DOI 0.11 0.84 0.11 1.75*
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD ~> DOI -0.06 -0.85 -0.04 -1.53
GOV-> BOARD ~> DOI -0.01 -0.57 0.02 1.36
Total Effect
INST -> DOI -0.13 -1.74* -0.02 -0.28






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 7-6 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Japan, without
GAKUBATSU
Please refer to Table 7-5 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <- BOARD 0.25 0.19
OUTSIDE<-BOARD 0.75 1.24 0.92 1.63
BD_Q <-- BOARD -0.07 -1.06 -0.05 -1.44
FINOWM <~ INST 0.61 0.64 |
BANK D <-- INST -0.09 -1.54 -0.09 -2.32**
CROSS <-- INST -0.74 -7.83*** -0.79 -13.41***
BLOCK <--INST -0.58 -7 96* * * -0.54 -13.03***
GOVI <-- GOV 0.19 0.15
GOVOWN <— GOV 0.44 2.85*** 0.54 4.04* * *
GOVAPP <-- GOV 0.85 2.14** 0.84 3.70***
FOROWN <~ DOI 0.46 0.42
FSTS <~ DOI 0.96 8.61*** 0.98 11 97* * *
FATA <-- DOI 0.77 9 jg*** 0.73 13.28***
FSE <— DOI 0.33 5.61*** 0.30 8.17***
Direct Effect
INST ~> BOARD -0.25 -1.20 -0.25 -1.58
GOV->BOARD 0.03 0.30 0.09 1.26
INST ~> DOI 0.17 1.64 0.07 1.58
GOV-> DOI -0.24 -2.31** -0.20 -3.11***
BOARD -> DOI 0.13 1.63 0.07 1.87*
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD -> DOI -0.03 -0.99 -0.02 -1.21
GOV --> BOARD --> DOI 0.004 0.29 0.01 1.03
Total Effect
INST ~> DOI 0.14 1.43 0.05 1.25






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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7.3 Taiwan
7.3.1 Taiwan: Is the degree of internationalisation related to the
subsequent intervention of governments and financial institutions?
In addition to the Japanese sample, we also examine the relationship between DOI
and the intervention of governments and financial institutions through the board of
directors in Taiwan. Since some Taiwanese companies do not have data available for
the measurement variables of DOI, we drop three Taiwanese companies in the
empirical analysis129. The number of total observations in this topic is 197. Table 7-7
provides the descriptive statistics of all measurement variables. Compared to the
descriptive statistics of the Japanese model in Table 7-1, we find that the ratio of
foreign sales to total sales (FSTS) is 47.80% in Taiwan, which is larger than 18.64%
• 130 • •
in Japan , but foreign ownership (FOROWN) and the number of listings on foreign
exchanges (FSE) in Taiwan are smaller than in Japan. Therefore, given the diverse
conditions in Japan and Taiwan, it is important to consider the real side and the
financial side (Hassel, 2003) to obtain a complete picture of DOI131.
129 The three companies deleted in this section are Evergreen Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd. (SIC
code: 2603), Wan Hai Lines Ltd. (SIC code: 2615), and China Airline (SIC code: 2610). All three
companies belong to the international transportation industry. These three companies do not have data
for foreign sales and foreign assets.
130 We choose 200 Taiwanese companies according to capitalisation. Among the 200 big companies,
many companies are categorised as the electronics industry. In Taiwan, electronic products are the
main export commodities. Therefore, most companies in our sample have very high ratios of foreign
sales to total sales.
131 For the discussion concerning the real dimension and the financial dimension of DOI, please refer
to Section 3.4.
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Table 7-7 Summary Statistics, Taiwan, 2001-2003, 591 Observations_DOI
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the
percentage of managerial ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in
other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the
ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_I: the number of government agencies.
GOV_APP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. FOROWN: the
ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. FATA: the ratio of
Latent variable Measurement Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Max Min
BDOWN (%) 591 10.31 11.71 70.61 0.00
BOARD OUTSIDE (%) 591 44.17 23.43 100.00 0.00
MANOWN (%) 591 2.89 6.03 53.58 0.00
BD Q(%) 591 28.37 24.49 100.00 0.00
FINOWN (%) 591 3.39 6.12 55.88 0.00
INST BANK_D (%) 591 5.55 11.50 75.00 0.00
CROSS (%) 591 24.13 18.96 79.92 0.01
BLOCK (%) 591 37.20 16.26 95.32 5.03
GOVOWN (%) 591 3.77 10.31 97.13 0.00
GOV GOV_I 591 3.50 5.05 38.00 0.00
GOVAPP (%) 591 7.05 18.11 100.00 0.00
FOROWN (%) 591 9.76 12.19 85.39 0.00
DOI FSTS (%) 591 47.80 37.34 99.99 * 0.00
FATA (%) 591 12.73 21.15 108.44 ** 0.00
FSE 591 0.22 0.51 4.00 0.00
* Quanta Computer Inc. (SIC code: 2382) is the biggest laptop components producer in Taiwan and supply
components to many foreign laptop producers.
** The major production line of Chicony Electronics Corporation Ltd. (SIC code: 2385) is in China and
Southeast Asia.
Since SEM requires measurement variables to follow a normal distribution, we use
the averaging method, which is mentioned in Section 5.4.5, to normalise these
measurement variables. Table 7-8 presents the result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. Before using the normalising procedure, almost all variables are not normally
distributed. After using the averaging method, the non-normality problem is
improved significantly.
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Table 7-8 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Taiwanese Data_DOI
Please refer to Table 7-7 for the explanations of variables.
Orgianal Data (N=394) Normalised Data (N= 1000)
Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Significance (2-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Significance (2-tailed)
BDOWN 3.747 0.000 0.820 0.512
OUTSIDE 1.090 0.186 0.654 0.786
MANOWN 6.198 0.000 0.981 0.291
BD Q 2.279 0.000 0.835 0.489
FINOWN 5.582 0.000 1.646 0.009
BANKD 7.428 0.000 1.199 0.113
CROSS 2.429 0.000 0.863 0.445
BLOCK 1.268 0.080 0.551 0.921
GOVOWN 7.038 0.000 1.253 0.086
GOVI 4.428 0.000 0.892 0.404
GOVAPP 8.864 0.000 0.764 0.604
FOROWN 4.196 0.000 1.037 0.233
FSTS 2.779 0.000 0.582 0.887
FATA 6.344 0.000 0.856 0.456
FSE 9.538 0.000 1.930 0.001
Table 7-9 and Path Diagram 7-3 include the completely standardised coefficients for
the hypothesised relationships and the model statistics. Table A4-5 in Appendix 4
includes structural parameters. Compared to the Taiwanese models regarding
performance in Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 and the Japanese models in Section 6.2.1 and
6.2.2, the main goodness-of-fit indices presented in Table 7-9 are not so high but still
acceptable: GFI equals 0.87, AGFI equals 0.81. In the alternative index, RMSEA
equals 0.11. In the residual analysis, SRMR equals 0.10. From Path Diagram 7-3 and
Table 7-9, by using original data we can observe that the direct relationship between
DOI and BOARD is positive and significant at the 5% level (0.97, t = 2.00). Similar
to the Japanese Model in Table 7-3 and Table 7-4, this finding is consistent with
• 1 ^9
Hypothesis 10 . This finding is also consistent with Sanders and Carpenter (1998)
who conclude that companies will adapt their governance mechanisms to address the
information processing needs that arise from a higher DOI (Chandler, 1962;
Burgelman, 1991; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). In other words, in order to manage
the increased complexity that results from a higher DOI, the monitoring ability of a
board will be improved.
132
Hypothesis 10: The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively associated with the monitoring
ability of a board (t+1).
183
Path Diagram 7-3: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Taiwan
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Although the general conclusion regarding the relationship between DOI and the
monitoring ability of a board (BOARD) is similar to the conclusion in Sanders and
Carpenter (1998) for the US, the sign of the coefficient in the Taiwanese model is
different from those in the Japanese model and in Sanders and Carpenter (1998).
Sanders and Carpenter (1998) find that DOI is positively related to the ratio of
outside directors and board size. They state that one percentage point increase in DOI
will result in 5% increase in board size and 15% increase in the ratio of outside
1 TT
directors . In Japan, the path coefficient between DOI and the ratio of outside
directors (OUTSIDE) is 0.12134 compared with -0.34135 in the Taiwanese model.
That is, a higher DOI will result in fewer outside directors on the board in Taiwan,
whereas it will result in more outside directors on the board in Japan and the US
133 After including two interaction variables (DOI* board size and DOI* CEO long-tem pay mix), the
coefficient ofDOI is positive and significant, otherwise, the coefficient of DOI is not significant.
134 In Japan (Table 7-3), the path coefficient of the relationship between the measurement variable
OUTSIDE and the latent variable BOARD is 0.45. Therefore, the path coefficient between DOI and
the ratio of outside directors (OUTSIDE) is (0.45)*(0.26), which equals 0.12.
135 In Taiwan, the path coefficient of the relationship between the measurement variable OUTSIDE
and the latent variable BOARD is -0.37. Therefore, the path coefficient between DOI and the ratio of
outside directors (OUTSIDE) is (0.97)*(-0.35), which equals -0.34.
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(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998).
Table 7-9 also presents a direct significant and positive relationship between DOI
and INST (1.33, t = 1.70), which means that a higher DOI will attract more
intervention from financial institutions. However, the indirect path between DOI and
INST through the intermediate BOARD is significant and negative (-1.91, t = -2.32),
which implies that in Taiwan, a board with better monitoring ability and
independence will fend off intervention from other financial institutions. Owing to
the negative indirect path, the total effect from DOI on INST is negative and
significant at the 1% level (-0.58, t = -4. 60) in Taiwan, so the final results in the
Japanese and the Taiwanese model are different. This finding is not consistent with
Hypothesis 9 and the findings of Tihanyi et al. (2003) who conclude that financial
institutions are more willing to invest in companies with higher DOI.
By using the original data in Table 7-9, the direct relationship between GOV and
DOI is not significant (2.29, t = 0.87), which means that Hypotheses 8-1136 and
Hypothesis 8-2 137 are not supported. However, after including the path
DOI->BOARD->GOV, the total effect from DOI on GOV is negative (-0.28) and
significant at the 1% level. The negative total effect in Taiwan is consistent with
Hypothesis 8-1, which states that companies with a higher DOI will fend off
intervention of governments.
The normalised data in Table 7-9 present similar empirical results. By using
normalised data, the total effects from DOI to GOV/INST are both negative and
significant, which means that Hypothesis 8-1 is supported and Hypothesis 9 is
rejected. Moreover, due to the positive and significant relationship between BOARD
and DOI, Hypothesis 10 is also supported. In addition, since the Japanese models
exclude the variable MANOWN, we rerun the Taiwanese model without the variable
and report the results in Table 7-10. Structural parameters are presented in Table
136
Hypothesis 8-1: The degree of internationalisation (t) is negatively associated with the subsequent
intervention of governments (t+1).
137
Hypothesis 8-2: The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively related to the subsequent
intervention of governments (t+1).
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A4-6 in Appendix 4. The results in Table 7-10 are similar to those in Table 7-9.
In brief, unlike the Japanese model, which presents a significant and positive total
effect from DOI to INST in Table 7-3, the total effect from DOI to INST is negative
and significant in Tables 7-9 and 7-10. However, the total effects from DOI and GOV
are both negative and positive in Japan and Taiwan, which means that a higher DOI
will be accompanied with lower intervention of government. Based on the discussion
in Section 3.2.2 and Section 4.3.1, different stages of intemationalisation will have
different influences on political involvement (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; Sim and
Pandian, 2003). According to Aggarwal and Agmon (1990) and the eclectic paradigm
i o o
t
(Dunning, 1981, 1986) , the government acts as a supplier of information and
technology in the early stages of the intemationalisation process (Mahmood and
Rufin, 2005) but acts as a 'reluctant partner' in the late stages of the
intemationalisation process and 'try to slow down this phase in the process of
intemationalisation' (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990, p. 175). The negative relationship
between DOI and GOV in Japan and Taiwan provide the evidence that the stage of
intemationalisation in Japan and Taiwan are in the late stages.
Based on the empirical results, the board of directors in Taiwan plays a critical
intermediate role in the relationship between DOI and INST, which means that the
board of directors in Taiwan may have the power to fend off intervention from
financial institutions. However, according to the insignificant relationship between
GOV and BOARD, such an intermediate role is not held by the board between the
Taiwanese government and intemationalisation of Taiwanese companies. Therefore,
Hypothesis 14 is only supported in the relationship between DOI and INST. Section
7.4 will discuss more deeply the difference between the Japanese and Taiwanese
models.
138
For the introduction concerning the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981, 1986), please refer to
Section 3.2.1.
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Table 7-9 Path Coefficients: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Taiwan
BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in other companies. BDOWN: the
percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the percentage of
managerial ownership. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD:
the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio
of institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. GOV_I: the number of government investors. FATA: the ratio of foreign
assets to total assets. FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <- BOARD 0.44 0.40
OUTSIDE <-BOARD -0.38 -5.43*** -0.37 -8.20***
MANOWN <-BOARD 0.30 6.62*** 0.11 8.72***
BD_Q <- BOARD 0.10 1.66* 0.26 2.92***
FINOWN <-INST 0.38 0.40
BANKD <~ INST 0.73 6.12*** 0.72 10.11***
CROSS <-INST 0.24 3.11*** 0.29 5.56***
BLOCK <-INST 0.26 3.85*** 0.29 6.60***
GOVOWN <~ GOV 0.50 0.44
GOVI <~ GOV 0.40 2.56** 1.62 3.22***
GOV APP <~ GOV 1.47 4.61*** 0.40 5.17***
FATA <-- DOI 0.50 0.50
FOROWN <-DOI 0.21 3.27*** 0.23 5.64***
FSTS <- DOI 0.74 6.55*** 0.75 10.57***
FSE<- DOI 0.09 1.28 0.04 1.11
Direct Effect
BOARD ~> INST -2.00 -2.51** -1.97 -3.58***
BOARD ~> GOV -2.39 -0.98 -2.17 -1.31
DOI -> INST 1.36 1.66* 1.33 2.34**
DOI ~> GOV 2.06 0.84 1.89 0.32
DOI -> BOARD 0.97 5.72*** 0.97 8.76***
Indirect Effect
DOI—>BOARD—>INST -1.94 -2.24** -1.97 -3.25***
DOI—>BOARD—>GOV -2.32 -0.94 -2.10 -1.26
Total Effect
DOI ~> INST -0.58 _4 44* * * -0.64 -7.39***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 7-10 Path Coefficients: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Taiwan, without
MANOWN
Please refer to Table 7-9 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BD_Q <- BOARD 0.13 0.07
OUTSIDE<-BOARD -0.37 -2.22** -0.33 -1.85*
BDOWN<- BOARD 0.39 2.23** 0.45 1.86*
FINOWM <— INST 0.37 0.42
BANKJD <- INST 0.72 6.03*** 0.72 10.80***
CROSS <- INST 0.26 3 22* * * 0.28 5.62***
BLOCK <-INST 0.27 3.88*** 0.23 5.78***
GOVOWN <— GOV 0.49 0.53
GOVAPP <- GOV 1.48 439*** 1.44 7.73***
GOVI <- GOV 0.19 6.35*** 0.46 4.34***
FATA <- DOI 0.49 0.48
FOROWN <— DOI 0.33 3.41*** 0.29 5.76***
FSTS <- DOI 0.77 6.05*** 0.79 10.12***
FSE <— DOI 0.16 1.82* 0.04 1.03
Direct Effect
BOARD-> INST -1.75 -1.82* -1.51 -1.75*
BOARD-> GOV -1.74 -1.12 -1.02 -1.59
DOI-> INST 1.09 1.70* 0.75 2.31**
DOI-> GOV 1.41 1.04 0.66 2.05**
DOI-> BOARD 0.95 2.23** 0.92 1.86*
Indirect Effect
DOI—>BOARD~>INST -1.66 -2.42** -1.39 -3 99* * *
DOI—>BOARD—>GOV -1.65 -1.20 -0.94 -2 72* * *
Total Effect
DOI-> INST -0.57 -4.46*** -0.64 -8.11***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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7.3.2 Taiwan: Is the subsequent degree of internationalisation
positively related to such intervention?
In addition to the discussion about whether DOI is related to the intervention of
government (GOV) and financial institutions (INST), we also examine whether the
intervention of government (GOV) and financial institutions (INST) is associated
with the subsequent DOI. Based on the hypotheses discussed in Section 4.3.2, we can
draw Path Diagram 7-4. Table 7-11 reports the completely standardised coefficients
by using original and normalised data. Structural parameters, which are estimated by
SEM, are shown in Table A4-7 in Appendix 4. The goodness-of-fit indices in this
model are not so high but acceptable: GFI is equal to 0.86, AGFI equals 0.79, SRMR
equals 0.10, and RMSEA equals 0.11. This indicates that the data are not adequately
explained by the model in Path Diagram 7-4. The DOI in Taiwan may be influenced
by other determinants which are difficult to measure, such as the




















* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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In Table 7-11, it can be seen that both the direct relationships between INST and DOI
are significant using original data and normalised data. After including the indirect
effect from INST to DOI via BOARD, the total effect from INST on DOI is
significant and negative using original data (-0.53, t = -2.82) and normalised data
(-0.62, t = -4.79). This result is not consistent with Hypothesis 12, which states that
the relationship between the intervention of financial institutions and the subsequent
DOI is positive. Moreover, the negative and significant relationship between INST
and BOARD (-0.32, t = -3.53) indicates that the intervention of financial institutions
will jeopardise the monitoring ability of the board. The total effect from GOV on
DOI is not significant in Table 7-11. Both Hypothesis 11-1 and Hypothesis 11-2 are
not supported. Although political involvement does exist in Taiwan and has
significant relationship with firm performance, the government does not have
significant influence on the subsequent DOI.
Sanders and Carpenter (1998) infer that the monitoring ability of a board may
significantly influence the company's DOI. By using original data, the direct
relationship between BOARD and DOI presented in Table 7-11 is positive and
significant, which suggests that the argument that the monitoring ability of a board
have positive influence on the subsequent DOI. Hypothesis 13, which claims that the
relationship between the monitoring ability of a board (t) and DOI (t+1) is positive,
is supported by original data. Given the indirect significant relationship,
INST->BOARD->DOI, we can conclude that the board of directors may play an
intermediate role between companies and financial institutions. Therefore,
Hypothesis 14 is supported in the relationship between INST and DOI. However, the
intermediate role of a board is not held between GOV and DOI.
Table 7-12 presents the results excluding the variable MANOWN. Structural
parameters are shown in Table A4-8. By using the original non-normalised data, the
total effect from INST on DOI is -0.55, which is significant at the 1% level. This
finding rejects Hypothesis 12, which claims that the relationship between the
intervention of financial institutions and the subsequent DOI is positive. Similarly,
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the total effect from GOV on DOI is not significant in Table 7-12, which means that
Hypothesis 11-1 and 11-2 are not supported. Hypothesis 13 and Hypothesis 14 are
not supported by the results using the original non-normalised data in Table 7-12.
Section 7.4 will expand the discussion on the similarities and differences between the
Japanese and the Taiwanese models.
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Table 7-11 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Taiwan
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the
percentage of managerial ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in
other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANK_D: the
ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV I: the number of government investors.
GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. FOROWN: the
ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. FATA: the ratio of
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient t value
BDOWN <-BOARD 0.83 0.83
OUTSIDE <-BOARD -0.21 -3.41*** -0.21 -5 43***
MANOWN <~ BOARD 0.64 717* * * 0.63 10.98***
BD_Q<-BOARD -0.06 -0.90 -0.01 0.02
FINOWM <~ INST 0.35 0.34
BANKD <- INST 0.82 5.64*** 0.75 9 22* * *
CROSS<-INST 0.19 3.06*** 0.15 3.83***
BLOCK <-INST 0.22 3 24** * 0.28 5 94* * *
GOVOWN <-GOV 0.48 0.42
GOVI <- GOV 0.37 2.74*** 0.55 4.51***
GOVAPP <— GOV 1.52 4 17*** 1.39 6.17***
FOROWN <~ DOI 0.21 0.25
FSTS <-DOI 0.80 3 39*** 0.78 6.14***
FATA <-- DOI 0.47 3.36*** 0.42 5 92* * *
FSE <— DOI 0.12 1.75* 0.11 2.70***
Direct Effect
INST-> BOARD -0.32 -3.53*** -0.29 -4.64***
GOV->BOARD -0.05 -1.38 -0.04 -1.47
INST ~> DOI -0.41 -2.64*** -0.51 _4 55***
GOV-> DOI -0.02 -0.43 0.05 1.59
BOARD -> DOI 0.39 2.83*** 0.38 4.83***
Indirect Effect
INST-> BOARD-> DOI -0.12 -2.34** -0.11 -3.68***
GOV-> BOARD-> DOI -0.02 -1.20 -0.02 -1.36
Total Effect
INST -> DOI -0.53 -2.82*** -0.62 _4 79***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 7-12 Path Coefficients: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Taiwan, without
MANOWN
Please refer to Table 7-11 for the explanations of variables.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient t value
BDOWN <- BOARD 0.40 0.41
OUTSIDE <-BOARD -0.37 -5.43*** -1.41 -8.78***
BD_Q<~ BOARD 0.04 0.75 0.01 0.34
FINOWM <- INST 0.35 0.33
BANK_D <- INST 0.82 5.64*** 0.73 8.31***
CROSS <- INST 0.19 3.00*** 0.28 5.07***
BLOCK<- INST 0.23 3.34*** 0.26 5 63***
GOVOWN <— GOV 0.51 0.61
GOVI <- GOV 0.27 2.37** 0.12 2.47**
GOV_APP <- GOV 1.43 5 03*** 1.21 5.01***
FOROWN <— DOI 0.25 0.23
FSTS <— DOI 0.77 3.87*** 0.80 5.83***
FATA <~ DOI 0.47 3.77*** 0.46 5.75***
FSE <— DOI 0.13 j 97** 0.11 2 94***
Direct Effect
INST-> BOARD -0.63 -3.65*** -0.68 -5.46***
GOV->BOARD -0.17 -2.33** -0.21 -3 32* * *
INST -> DOI 0.24 0.45 0.11 0.29
GOV-> DOI 0.18 1.20 0.18 1.50
BOARD-> DOI 1.25 1.49 1.04 1.91*
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD -> DOI -0.79 -1.36 -0.71 -1.77*
GOV-> BOARD-> DOI -0.21 -1.37 -0.22 -1.78*
Total Effect
INST -> DOI -0.55 -3.05*** -0.60 -4.50***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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7.4 Comparison and Discussion
In addition to firm performance, this thesis also uses DOI to determine whether there
is relationship between the intervention of governments and financial institutions and
the strategy of a company (i.e. international expansion, which is measured by DOI in
this thesis). We first investigate whether DOI is positively/negatively associated with
the subsequent intervention of governments and financial institutions through the
board of directors. From Table 7-3 and Table 7-9, we can observe a significant and
positive relationship between DOI and the subsequent monitoring ability of a board
(BOARD) both in Japan and Taiwan, which implies that a higher DOI requires a
board with better monitoring ability to manage the complexity that results from
international expansion. These results are consistent with the study by Sanders and
Carpenter (1998) who conclude that DOI is positively associated with the subsequent
monitoring ability of a board due to the complexity resulting from international
expansion.
Additionally, there is a direct positive relationship between DOI and the subsequent
intervention of financial institutions (INST) in Japan (Table7-3) and Taiwan (Table
7-9). This result supports the argument that institutional investors, such as banks,
insurance companies, and blockholders, are likely to be interested in investing in
companies with a higher DOI because of the positive effects on shareholder wealth
(Tihanyi et al., 2003). However, the indirect effects from DOI to INST via BOARD
differ between Japan and Taiwan. In Taiwan, based on the negative relationship
between BOARD and INST, we conclude that the board of directors will fend off
intervention from financial institutions. Conversely, as seen in Table 7-3, the board of
directors (BOARD) in Japan is positively related to intervention from the financial
institutions (INST), which means that Japanese boards welcome more involvement
from financial institutions. Because of the different attitudes of the boards, the total
effect from DOI to INST via BOARD is negative in Taiwan but positive in Japan.
According to Tihanyi et al. (2003), different interests of institutional investors will
affect their influences on firm strategies. The ownership of pressure-resistant
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institutional investors13 , such as professional investment funds and pension funds,
are positively related to DOI (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2000; Tihanyi et al., 2003).
Hence, according to prior results and the findings in this thesis, we support the
argument that most institutional investors in Japan are pressure-resistant. The present
findings highlight the need for further research on the components of financial
institutional investors in Japan and Taiwan.
The total effects from DOI on subsequent political involvement (GOV) are negative
and significant in Japan and Taiwan. In Japan, the direct relationship between DOI
and GOV is significant and negative (Table 7-3 and Table 7-4), which is consistent
with Hypothesis 8-1, which states that companies with a higher DOI will reduce the
intervention of the government. Combining the indirect path from DOI to GOV via
BOARD, the total effect from DOI on GOV is still negative and significant in Japan.
In Table 7-9 we can see that in Taiwan, the direct relationship between DOI and
GOV is insignificant. However, the total effect from DOI on GOV is negative and
significant, which results in the acceptance ofHypothesis 8-1.
According to the contextual research in the study by Aggarwal and Agmon (1990),
varied stages of internationalisation will have different influences on political
involvement. They argue that the role of government is important in directing initial
international trade, but it will change as the country develops. That is, political
involvement and the role of a government will change with internationalisation and
the development process (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; Sim and Pandian, 2003).
Therefore, when the country is in the early stages of internationalisation, companies
will require more support from the government. As the country develops and has a
higher DOI, the influence and intervention of government will gradually diminish.
Since the government is commonly regarded as a major source of inefficiency in
prior research, companies with a higher DOI may reduce political involvement. The
results in the Japanese and Taiwanese models support the supposition that both
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Brickley and colleagues (1988) classified institutional investors into "pressure-resistant",
"pressure-sensitive," and "pressure-indeterminate" institutions. Pressure-resistant institutions include
pension funds, mutual funds, endowments, and foundations. Pressure-sensitive institutions include
insurance companies and banks.
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countries are at a later stage of internationalisation.
This thesis also investigates whether the intervention of government and financial
institutions affects the subsequent DOI. The total effect from the intervention of
financial institutions (INST) on the subsequent DOI is negative and significant in
Japan (Table 7-5) by using original non-normalised data, which means that the
intervention of financial institutions in Japan cannot promote the subsequent DOI.
Hypothesis 12 is rejected. Similar to the Japanese model, the intervention of financial
institutions in Taiwan has a negative total effect on the subsequent DOI because it
will jeopardise the monitoring ability of the board and thereby reduce the subsequent
DOI. This argument is supported by the significant and negative indirect path from
INST on DOI via BOARD, as seen in Table 7-10.
Moreover, the relationship between political involvement (GOV) and the subsequent
DOI in Japan is also negative and significant. As can be seen in Table 7-5 and Table
7-6, the direct path from GOV on the subsequent DOI is significant and negative.
Consequently, the total effect from GOV on the subsequent DOI is also significant
and negative. This result indicates that the intervention of the government, such as
government appointed directors and government ownership, is negatively related to
the subsequent DOI. However, in Taiwan both the direct and indirect effects from
GOV on the subsequent DOI are insignificant (Table 7-11). Unlike the analysis
concerning firm performance in Table 6-11, the government in Taiwan does not have
a significant influence on the subsequent DOI. In brief, the intervention of
government in Taiwan plays an important role on affecting subsequent firm
performance rather than the subsequent DOI.
Additionally, in Section 7.2.2 and Section 7.3.2, we also examine whether the
monitoring ability of a board is associated with the subsequent DOI. From Table 7-11,
we observe a positive relationship between BOARD and the subsequent DOI by
using original data in Taiwan. This finding supports Hypothesis 13, which argues that
a board with better monitoring ability can manage the complexity of international
markets and thereby enhance DOI. However, such positive relationship is not
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observed in the Japanese model (Table 7-5). Based the findings in Section 6.2.2 and
Section 7.2.2, we can conclude that Japanese boards are not significantly related to
subsequent firm performance and DOI. This finding adds value to scholars'
knowledge and demonstrates the need of improving the insignificant role of Japanese
boards. Table 7-13 summarises the hypotheses and findings.
Table 7-13 The summary of hypotheses and findings_DOI
Hypothesis Argument Japan Taiwan
Hypothesis 8-1
The degree of internationalisation (t) is negatively
associated with the subsequent intervention from Accept Accept
Hypothesis 8-2
The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively
related to the subsequent intervention from Reject Reject
Hypothesis 9
The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively
associated with the subsequent intervention of Accept Reject
Hypothesis 10
The degree of internationalisation (t) is positively
associated with the subsequent monitoring ability of a Accept Accept
Hypothesis 11-1
The intervention from governments (t) is positively
related to a higher subsequent degree of Reject
Not significant
Hypothesis 11-2
The intervention from governments (t) will result in a
lower subsequent degree of internationalisation (t+1). Accept
Not significant
Hypothesis 12
The intervention of financial institutions (t) will result
in a higher subsequent degree of internationalisation Reject Reject
Hypothesis 13
The relationship between the monitoring ability of a
board (t) and the subsequent degree of
internationalisation (t+1) is positive.
Not significan Accept
Hypothesis 14
The board of directors can moderate the relationship
between the degree of intemationalisation (DOI) and
the intervention of government and financial
Not significan Accept *
* Hypothesis 14 is only supported in the relationship between DOI and the intervention of financial institutions.
To sum up, although the incentives of intervention may be different, the intervention
of government and financial institutions is not accompanied by better firm
performance and a higher DOI in Japan and Taiwan. We can conclude that having
intervention of government and financial institutions is harmful to firm performance
and DOI. In the beginning, receiving representatives from government and financial
institutions can solve financial crises, however, the intervention will finally be
negatively related to subsequent firm performance and DOI Given the findings in
this thesis, government and financial institutions should not intervene in the
operation of a companies and companies should refuse the intervention of
government and financial institutions.
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Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 use SEM to examine the relationships among several latent
variables. The primary focus of these two chapters is examining whether political
involvement and the intervention of financial institutions are related to performance
and DOI. We use firm performance and DOI as dependent variables. Unlike OLS,
structural equation modelling can observe direct and indirect relationships. Therefore,
regarding firm performance, we can observe that the board of directors plays an
intermediate role in Taiwan but not in Japan. Based on previous discussions, we find
that the relationship between political involvement and subsequent firm performance
and subsequent, which supports the argument that government is not efficient
(Shleifer, 1998). This inefficiency may influence not only performance and
intemationalisation, but also the alignment between the interests of executives and
the interests of shareholders.
Based on the results in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and the work of Shleifer and Vishny
(1998), the following chapters examine whether government-linked companies
(GLCs) are less efficient in aligning the interests of executives and the interests of
shareholders, such as having fewer incentive payments and a less sensitive
pay-performance relationship. In this thesis we focus on the top executives' incentive
payments in Taiwan. Chapter 8 introduces the background of top executives'
compensation and remuneration committees in Taiwan. Chapter 9 develops
hypotheses concerning the relationship between the level of incentive payments and
performance/governance. Chapter 10 presents the empirical results for this topic.
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Chapter Eight
Top executives' Compensation in
Taiwan
8.1 Introduction
Academic research on the topic of CEO compensation has a long history. It has been
the subject of extensive studies and there are excellent literature reviews concerning
it (e.g. Murphy, 1999; Core et. al., 2003; Main, 2004). Beginning with Jensen and
Meckling (1976), principal-agent theory necessitates the alignment of the interests of
the CEO with the interests of shareholders. Efficient corporate governance
considerations should result in directors using the pay process as a way of achieving
this (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Daily et al. 1998).
In addition to CEO compensation, researchers also pay attention to non-executive
employees' incentive payments (Core and Guay, 2001). The corporate use of
restricted shares and share options for non-executive employees is widespread and
growing. For example, in a sample of 756 firms with option plans during the years
1994-1997, Core and Guay (2001) report that the number of options outstanding to
all non-executive employees exceeds 6.9% of the number of shares outstanding.
Non-executive employees hold 67% of these options. On a per-employee basis, the
mean (median) of non-executive employees hold option portfolios valued at over
$17,000 ($3,000). In Taiwan, in addition to base salary, top management team (TMT)
members will receive bonuses in the form of several months' base salary, restricted
shares, and share options140. Other, lower-level non-executive employees will be
granted bonuses in the form of several months' base salary and restricted shares.
Lower-level non-executive employees seldom receive share options. Restricted
shares rather than share options are used most commonly as incentive payments.
Unlike in most western countries, in Taiwan it is increasingly common to grant
140 Taiwanese companies grant warrants instead of share options to CEOs. The detailed information
will be discussed in Section 8.2.1.
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non-executive employees restricted shares.
Prior studies that investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and board
composition and ownership structure generally focus on the UK and the US
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999; and Core et al., 2003).
Systematic research outside of the US and the UK on CEO compensation is still in its
infancy, mostly due to data limitations (Kato and Long, 2004). In Asia, data on CEO
compensation are typically not disclosed publicly. Most researchers use average top
executives' compensation141, for instance, Kaplan (1994a), Xu (1997), Ang and
Constrand (1997), Joh (1999), and Kubo (2003, 2005) in Japan; Kato, Kim and Lee
(2004) in Korea; Fung et al. (2002) and Buck et al. (2006) in China. The rare
exception is Kato and Kubo (2006) who use precise data on Japanese CEO
compensation. However, their data comes from a "major compensation consulting
firm" that is not available to other researchers. Therefore, this thesis does not include
the empirical analysis of CEO compensation in Japan because the CEO
compensation in Japan is still a topic which is difficult to obtain precise data. Most
data are vague or confidential (Kubo and Kato, 2006).
A sample of Taiwanese companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation
(TSEC) from 2001 to 2004 is examined. The sample differs from previous studies in
two aspects. First, because of the reform of corporate governance practices, the
current Taiwanese regulations and laws on corporate governance require more
disclosure of compensation information, which enables us to obtain data concerning
top executives' and non-executive employees' incentive payments, such as restricted
shares. Taiwanese companies did not disclose detailed compensation information
before 30th January, 2001. Some Taiwanese companies started to disclose detailed
and individual compensation information in the annual reports after 2004. Therefore,
this thesis takes a step towards filling this gap. We will use the latest data to
investigate the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and top
executives' compensation in Taiwan. In Asia, Taiwan is one of these few countries
141 Because of data limitations, prior research only considers cash compensation. Average top
executives' cash compensation in prior literature is calculated as dividing the sum of all top
executives' cash compensation by the number of top executives.
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that disclose detailed top executives' compensation data, such as cash, restricted
shares, and options. This gives us an opportunity to observe the application of
Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms in Asian countries.
Second, although on the surface the governance system of listed companies in
Taiwan and the West appear similar, for example, the fact that CEOs and CFOs exist
in both Taiwanese and American companies, ownership structure and board
composition are very different. The main feature is the existence of government
ownership and the dominance of government appointed directors in Taiwan. The
existence of political involvement is very common in Asia. For example, in a typical
Chinese listed company, 59.30% of shares are held by the government (Kato and
Long, 2004) and the government has more than 20% ownership in over 10% of listed
Singaporean companies (Mak and Li, 2001). Political constraints influence executive
compensation by applying political pressure through the regulatory process (Joskow
et al., 1993, 1996). Based on the grabbing hand model argued by Shleifer and Vishny
(1998), politicians may pursue their own profits at the expense of the companies'
interests, the question we ask is, do non-government-licked companies (non-GLCs)
better align the interests of top executives with the interests of shareholders?
Therefore, we divide the whole sample into two groups — government-linked
companies (GLCs) and non-government-linked companies (non-GLCs) and examine
whether these two groups possess the same characteristics concerning top executives'
compensation. A company is classified as a GLC if there is at least one
government-appointed director on the board in 2001 or if government ownership
exceeds 5% in 2001.
In this chapter we pay attention to the grants of incentive payments, including
restricted shares and share options as well as discussing the institutional background
in Taiwan concerning top executives' compensation and non-executive employees'
incentive payments. Our focus is consistent with previous research that has
investigated compensation and the efficiency of the governance mechanism. We
would note, however, the differences of corporate governance between Taiwan, the
US, and the UK. We first describe the composition of top executives' compensation
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and incentive payments in Section 8.2.1. The institutional background of top
executives' compensation and non-executive employees' incentive payments in
Taiwan is introduced in Section 8.2.2. In Section 8.3 we will focus on the
remuneration committee and discuss the situations in Taiwan. Finally, we draw our
conclusions in Section 8.4.
8.2 Top Executives' Compensation and Non-executive Employees'
Incentive Payment
8.2.1 The Composition of Top Executives' Compensation and
Non-executive Employees' Incentive Payments in Taiwan
Prior studies usually investigate the compensation packages of three groups:
directors, top executives (i.e. CEO and CFO), and other non-executive employees
(e.g. Core et al., 2003; Core and Guay, 2001, 2002). In Taiwan, however, the
structure and disclosure of directors' compensation is very different from that of top
executives' compensation. First, unlike in western countries, in Taiwan, CEO
compensation is not disclosed together with directors' compensation, but with that of
other senior executives. Most Taiwanese companies only disclose two kinds of
compensation before 2004: (1) the sum of top executives' compensation; (2) the sum
of all directors' compensation. That is, we could not obtain any information of CEO
compensation from the directors' compensation. Second, Taiwanese companies
seldom grant shares and share options to directors. In Taiwan, directors'
compensation is mainly composed of base salary and cash bonuses, which are
distributed when firm performance is good. Given this situation, if we examine the
structure of CEO compensation, the directors' compensation may not reveal related
information. Therefore, in this thesis we focus on top executives' average
compensation because this group receives the most incentive payments.
In order to align executives' and shareholders' interests, most executives' pay
packages in the US and the UK contain four basic components: (1) a base salary; (2)
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an annual bonus tied to accounting performance (short-term incentive); (3) share
options; (4) long-term incentive plans (including restricted share plans and
multi-year accounting-based performance plans) (Murphy, 1999). However, the
structure of top executives' compensation in Taiwanese companies is different. There
are four main components in top executives' compensation in Taiwan: (1) a base
salary; (2) the year-end bonus; (3) the employees' bonus; (4) share options.
Employees' bonuses are not only distributed to top executives but also to
non-executive employees. Although on the surface, the structure of top executives'
compensation and non-executive employees' compensation in Taiwan is not different
from that in the US, there are distinct differences in the detail. These differences
mainly occur in the year-end bonuses and the employees' bonuses. If we use the
classification used by Murphy (1999), we can roughly view the year-end bonus as an
annual bonus tied to accounting performance (short-term incentive) and the
share-based bonus as a long-term incentive plan (LTIP).
In Taiwan, most year-end bonuses are composed of cash, whereas most of
employees' bonuses are composed of cash and shares. Table 8-1 presents the
components of the year-end bonuses and employees' bonuses. Regarding the
year-end bonus, some companies might distribute cash to employees (including
senior executives and CEOs) in the form of several months' base salary at the end of
each year when profits are 'good', but "typically there is no direct link between the
amount of year-end bonuses or extra salary and accounting profit" (Chen, 2002,
p.22). This is the main difference between a year-end bonus and an annual bonus tied
to accounting performance (short-term incentive) as defined by Murphy (1999).
Table 8-1 explains the difference between the year-end bonus and the employees'
bonus.
Table 8-1 The difference between the year-end bonus and the employees' bonus
cash shares
year-end bonus V
employees' bonus V V
Murphy (1998) classification short-term incentive ong-term incentive
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For most Taiwanese companies, the year-end bonus is essentially another form of
base salary because they have a policy or 'tradition' of setting it at a fixed number of
months of base salary. According to the tradition, as long as the earnings are not bad,
the company must distribute the year-end bonus to employees, including the top
executives, such as the CEO and CFO. The pay-performance sensitivity of the
year-end bonus is very low (Chen, 2002). To sum up, the year-end bonus can be
defined as a portion of the base salary. Table 8-2 shows the recent conditions of the
year-end bonus system in different industries in Taiwan. We can observe that it
ranges from no bonus to a twelve-month base salary payment.
Table 8-2 Summary of the extent of year-end bonuses in Taiwan by industry,
2000




Textiles less than 1 -2 months
Paper 1-2 months
Housing 0-2 months




Internet Service Provider 2-4.5 months
Construction 1 -4 months
Finance 2-4.5 months
Securities Up to 12 months
Miscellaneous 1.5-3 months
Source: Adapted from Cin et al. (2003, p.923)
Most Taiwanese companies distribute year-end bonuses of two months' worth of
salary on average to their employees each year (Cin et al., 2003). Flowever, the range
is very flexible. In some Taiwanese companies, the year-end bonuses vary according
to firm performance. Some companies will pay more year-end bonuses when the
companies yield high returns on their investments. Although it is not necessary to
have a direct link between the amount of year-end bonus and accounting profit (Chen,
2002), the year-end bonus sometimes changes with firm performance, which means
that the nature of the year-end bonus is "profit-sharing" (Cin et al., 2003).
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Unfortunately, there are no systematic and reliable data or statistics available
concerning the year-end bonus in Taiwan. As long as the disclosure is more
transparent in Taiwan, the year-end bonuses would be a valuable area for future
research.
Based on the concept of "profit-sharing" (Cin et al., 2003), Taiwanese companies
also distribute employees' bonuses to employees and top executives when the
company is profitable. There are two differences between the year-end bonuses and
employees' bonuses. First, companies can grant employees' bonuses in cash or in
shares, but only grant year-end bonuses in cash. Second, it is a 'tradition' for
companies to grant year-end bonuses but not employees' bonuses. The board of
directors can decide whether to grant, what to grant, and how many bonuses to grant
to top executives and employees. If a company grants employees' bonuses in cash,
we can view it as an annual bonus tied to accounting performance (a short-term
incentive). If a company grants the employees' bonus in restricted shares, we can
roughly view it as a long-term incentive plan.
However, the grant of restricted shares in employees' bonuses in Taiwan is very
different from LTIPs in the US and the UK. LTIPs are here defined as grants of cash
and shares (usually shares) with performance limitations (Buck et al., 2003), which
means that executives cannot obtain a portion of restricted shares according to the
contract until they reach a certain level of performance in the future. Although
Taiwanese companies also grant restricted shares to employees (including CEOs and
senior executives), the amount of grants depends on past performance rather than
future performance. If firm performance in this year is good, employees will be
granted an amount of restricted shares at the end of this fiscal year. Based on the
difference between general LTIPs and the grants of restricted shares in Taiwan, we
can anticipate different empirical results between LTIPs and restricted shares.
Another difference between LTIPs and Taiwanese employees' bonuses is whether the
company restricts the time within which employees can sell their shares. LTIPs are
long-term incentives. By contrast, employees' bonuses are relatively short-term
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because many Taiwanese companies do not restrict the time within which their
employees can sell their shares (Han, 2003; Cin et al., 2003). Although Company
Law in Taiwan does approve the time limitation142, most companies in Taiwan do not
have such a restriction. To sum up, LTIPs tend to encourage employees to direct their
efforts towards future performance whereas employees' bonuses in Taiwan are based
on the profitability of the year prior to the shares being allocated. Based on the data
we collected, Figure 8-1 presents an average top executives' compensation package
and the situation of the non-executive employees' incentive payments in Taiwan.
Figure 8-1 (A) presents the distribution of average top executives' compensation in
2004, Figure 8-1 (B) presents the structure of non-executive employees'
compensation, and Figure 8-1 (C) presents the ratio of share-based employees'
bonuses to total employees' bonuses.
142
Company Law, Article 267 VI: ...A company may restrain the shares subscribed by its employees
under Paragraph One or Paragraph Two of the article from being transferred or assigned to others
within a specific period of time which shall in no case be longer than two years...
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A. The structure of average top executives' compensation, 2004 *
82%
15%




B. The structure ofnon-executive employees' compensation, 2001-2004
92%
□ cash (including the year-
end bonus)
B employees' bonus
C. The ratio of share-based employees' bonuses to total employees' bonuses, 2001-2004
63%
37%
□ cash (includingthe year-end
bonus)
H employees' bonus
* Because of data limitations, we can only obtain the data of employees' bonuses for top executives in
2004. Figure (A) only displays the structure of top executives' compensation in 2004.
Note: The value of employees' bonuses is calculated by par value of a share, which is NTD 10.
Figure 8-1 The components of top executives' compensation and non-executive
employees' bonuses in Taiwan
In Figure 8-1, we can see that the employees' bonuses occupy a smaller portion in
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non-executive employees' compensation (8%) than in top executives' compensation
(15%). This indicates that the interests of top executives in Taiwan are more aligned
with the interests of shareholders than the interests of non-executive employees. The
ratio of share-based employees' bonuses on total employees' bonuses in Figure 8-1
(C) is 37%, which is similar to the findings of Chen (2002) who observes that the
ratio of share-based employees' bonuses to total employees' bonus is 35.03% from
1997 to 1998. From Figure 8-1, we conclude that the incentive payments occupy a
small portion in non-executive employees' compensation. Therefore, in this thesis we
only examine the relationship between top executives' compensation and the
corporate governance mechanisms.
8.2.2. The Institutional Background of Top Executives'
Compensation and Employees' Incentive Payments in Taiwan
Both year-end bonuses and employees' bonuses are based on the concept
'profit-sharing'. The administration of profit sharing is regulated under three
Taiwanese laws. Under Provision 40 of Factory Law, manufacturing plants should
reward employees with bonuses if the plants are profitable. Factory Law was
succeeded by the Fair Labour Standards Act, which was established on 30th July,
1984. Similar to the Factory Law, Provision 29 of the Fair Labour Standards Act also
regulates that employers should reward qualified employees with bonuses or profits
at the end of each year. In addition, Company Law requires companies to pay some
percentage of their distributable net income each year as employees' bonuses.
Companies are required by Company Law to retain 10% of reported net income each
year as legal reserves before they distribute dividends and employees' bonuses, until
the balance of legal reserves equals total authorised capital. There are four major
Articles in Company Law that regulate the distribution of employees' bonuses in
Taiwan:
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1. Article 232.1143: A company shall not pay dividends or bonuses, unless its losses
shall have been covered and a legal reserve shall have been set aside in
accordance with the provisions of this Law.
2. Article 232.11: A company shall not pay dividends or bonuses, if there is no
surplus earnings provided, however, that the aggregate of its legal reserve144
exceeds fifty per cent (50%) of its paid-in capital.
3. Article 235. II145: The percentage of surplus profit distributable as employees'
bonus shall be definitely specified in the articles of incorporation, unless
otherwise approved specifically by the central authority in charge of the
end-enterprise concerned.
4. Article 235. IV: Qualification requirements of employees, including the
employees of subsidiaries of the company meeting certain specific requirements,
entitled to receive dividend bonus may be specified in the articles of
incorporation.
5. Article 240. I: A company may, by a resolution adopted by a majority of the
shareholders present who represent two-thirds or more of the total number of its
outstanding shares of the company, have the whole or a part of the surplus profit
distributable as dividends and bonuses distributed in the form of new shares to
be issued by the company for such purpose. In case the amount of balance of
such distributable surplus profit is less than the par value (or a fraction) of one
share, it shall be paid in cash.
6. Article 267 VI: ...A company may restrain the shares subscribed by its
employees under Paragraph One or Paragraph Two of the article from being
transferred or assigned to others within a specific period of time which shall in
no case be longer than two years...
The employees' bonus rate must be specified in the Articles of Incorporation
(Company Law, Article 235. IV). It can be either a fixed percentage (e.g., 5% or 10%)
143 Article 232 was established on 7th December, 1983, and revised on 25th June, 1997 and 12th
November, 2001.
144 A certain level of capital has to be maintained to avoid automatic liquidation. Company Law or
related regulations will regulate the appropriation of retained earnings.
145 Article 235 was established on 9th May, 1980 and revised on 7th December, 1983 and 12th
November, 2001.
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or a range (e.g. no less than 5%). The board of directors determine the total amount
of employees' bonuses according to the bonus rate specified in the Articles of
Incorporation. If a range of possible bonus rates is specified, the board of directors
have to decide the actual bonus rate and the total amount of bonus. After deciding the
total amount of bonuses, the directors can determine the relative weight between
shares and cash. The decided bonus rate, however, can be changed after the approval
of shareholders in the annual shareholders' meeting (AGM). In this thesis, the
research data are the employees' bonuses, which are approved by the shareholders in
the shareholders' meeting.
The bonuses are only distributed to the employees (including top executives and
lower-level employees) who are still in the company at the time of distribution,
typically five to eight months after the year-end. The company must report and
announce the distribution of dividends and employees' bonuses to the TSEC.
Generally, according to the ranking, higher-level employees, such as CEO, would get
a larger portion of the total bonuses. BenQ Corporation, for example, had 19 top
management team (TMT) members in 2004. According to the ranking, the first ten
members were awarded 71.44% of the bonuses that were distributed to the top
management team members, and 11.24% of the total employees' bonuses.
Another important difference in the system of awarding employees' bonuses between
the US and Taiwan is that Business Accounting Law (§64) in Taiwan regulates that
distribution of employees' bonuses shall not be recorded as expenses or losses146.
Therefore, Taiwanese companies record the employees' bonuses as the distribution of
net income, which suggests that their value would not influence profits because it is
not regarded as an expense and deducted from profits. Consequently, the profits of
companies are overestimated. In May, 2006, the Taiwan Financial Supervisory
Commission (SFC) passed the draft of new Business Accounting Law which deletes
Article 64. The new Business Accounting Law may be implemented no later than
January, 2008. However, although the new edition deletes Article 64, it does not
require companies to record employees' bonuses as expenses. Relevant sets of laws
146 Business Accounting Law, Article 64: Distribution of earnings of a business, such as dividend and
bonus, shall not be recorded as expenses or losses.
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on the record format still wait to be established in the future.
In addition to year-end bonuses and employees' bonuses, Taiwanese companies also
grant warrants to CEOs and other senior executives, but seldom to directors and
lower-level non-executive employees. In Taiwan, companies grant CEOs and senior
executives warrants instead of share options. Although both warrants and share
options give the holder the right to buy a specific share at a specific price over a set
period of time, there are some differences between them. The fundamental difference
between a standard share option and a call warrant is the dilution problem. In the
case of a warrant, upon exercise, the company issues new shares, which are then
delivered to the warrant holder. In the case of a standard call option, upon exercise,
existing or new shares are delivered to the share option holder. That is, it is not
necessary for the company that grants share options to employees to issue new shares
upon exercise. The company can distribute treasury shares to employees who
exercise share options. This issuing of new shares leads to a dilution of the existing
equity and a lowering of the value of each individual share. Without the dilution
effect, the valuation of share options and warrants is almost identical. There are some
secondary differences between share options and warrants. For example, while
warrants tend to have expiration dates that can extend as far as 15 years, share
options tend to have a much shorter lifespan.
th
Companies in Taiwan could not grant warrants to their employees until 29 July,
2000. After revising Article 28-2 in the Securities and Exchange Act in 2000,
Taiwanese companies started to grant call warrants to employees147'148. Nevertheless,
147 Securities and Exchange Act, Article 28-2: In any of the following situations, a company whose
stocks are either listed on a stock exchange or traded on the over-the-counter market may, upon the
approval of a majority of the directors present at a directors meeting attended by two-thirds or more of
directors, buy back its shares from the centralized securities exchange market or over-the-counter
market or in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 43-1, without being subject to the provisions of
Paragraph 1 ofArticle 167 of the Company Act:
1. Where the buyback is for transferring shares to its employees;
2. Where the buyback is for equity conversion in coordination with the issuance of corporate bonds
with subscription right, special shares with subscription right, convertible corporate bonds, convertible
special shares or stock/subscription warrants; or
3. Where the buyback is required to maintain the company's credit and shareholders' equity and the
shares so purchased are cancelled.
(omit)
148 Please refer to Securities and Exchange Act, Article 22-2, 25, 28-2, 157, and 157-1 for more
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granting employees' bonuses is still more popular than granting call warrants in
Taiwan. Up until July, 2002, only 40 listed companies had granted call warrants to
employees. Among these 40 companies, 90% belong to the electronics industry. Most
call warrants are granted to top executives, such as the CEO and CFO. From the end
of 2000 to the beginning of 2006, 174 companies had applied to issue call warrants.
This reveals that granting call warrants is a developing phenomenon in Taiwan.
However, unlike the US, there was no formal Statement or Article to regulate the
calculation of the call warrants granted to employees until March, 2003. On 17th
March, 2003, the Accounting Research and Development Foundation (ARDF) in
Taiwan issued declaratory statutes No. 70, No. 71, and No. 72, which encourage
companies to use the fair value of the grants to reflect the compensation-based share
options in the financial statements. The Taiwanese government now intends to refer
to Statement 123(R) in the US, which regulates that the cost of all share options and
equity-based compensation should be reflected in the financial statements based on
the estimated fair value of the awards.
In addition, there is no formal Statement or Principle to regulate the disclosure of
compensation. On 30th January, 2000, the Securities and Futures Bureau in Taiwan
only issued Announcement No. 0920000457, which requires that listed companies
should disclose employees' cash bonuses, employees' share bonuses, and the
directors' compensations in their annual reports. However, this Announcement does
not regulate the mode of disclosure. Therefore, most Taiwanese listed companies
only disclose the total sum of all directors' compensation, including the chairman's
compensation. This Announcement also does not require the disclosure of individual
top executives' compensation. Therefore, Taiwanese companies seldom disclose
individual CEO compensation. In 1998, only 23 listed companies disclosed
individual CEO compensation. Other companies only disclose the total sum for all
the top executives. From 2000 to 2004, almost all Taiwanese listed companies
disclosed the sum of all top executives' compensation. The only exception is for call
warrants. When a company grants warrants to employees, it must disclose the
amount of the warrants and the employee's name. After 2005, more and more listed
detailed regulations.
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companies started to disclose the composition of top executives' compensation (e.g.,
base salary, cash bonuses, restricted shares, and warrants). Unfortunately, most
Taiwanese companies have not disclosed individual CEO compensation until now.
Therefore, in this thesis we could not obtain precise data for CEO compensation
unlike other studies, which use data from American companies. We use average top
executives' compensation to measure CEO compensation. Nevertheless, compared to
other Asian countries, which have low disclosure transparency, such as Japan and
China, in Taiwan, the data of top executives' compensation is more transparent and
precise. This gives us a good opportunity to examine the adoption of the
Anglo-Saxon compensation system in Taiwan.
8.3 Remuneration Committee
8.3.1 Literature Review concerning Remuneration Committees
Boards of directors are required, as part of their main responsibilities, to be
responsible for monitoring executives, assessing senior executives' performance and
determining appropriate compensation packages (e.g., Kesner, 1988; Daily et al.,
1998). An efficient board must align the interests of executives and shareholders. In
the UK, the Combined Code (2003) states that "the board's role is to provide
entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and
effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed" (Paragraph A.l).
According to the UK laws, the directors should act in accordance with the interests of
the company and possess skills to carry out their duties (Mallin, 2004). It is fairly
well accepted that many board functions are carried out by board sub-committees - a
nominating committee, an audit committee, and a remuneration (or compensation)
committee. The three sub-committees are recommended in Australia, Belgium,
France, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, and the US (Monks and Minow, 2004). In
the UK, the Cadbury Report (1992) recommended that an audit committee and a
remuneration committee should be adopted and stated that a nomination committee
can make the board appointments process more transparent. The Higgs Report (2003)
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also found that most listed companies have an audit and a remuneration committee.
The Combined Code (2003) recommended also having a nomination committee to
lead the board appointment process. Although the composition of these committees
changes, it is generally agreed that independent directors have a determinant role.
Among the three committees, the remuneration committee catches most academic
attention because it provides scrupulous monitoring of the level of executive
compensation and the composition of compensation in its own company. Existing
evidence indicates that the overwhelming majority of companies in the US and the
UK have established remuneration committees and that they are comprised entirely
of non-executive directors (Conyon et al., 2000).
Most literature concerning remuneration committees is based on the situations in the
US and the UK (e.g. Main and Johnston, 1993; Conyon, 1997; Conyon and Peck,
1998; Daily at al., 1998). Among these studies, the most popular topic is whether
remuneration committees reinforce the pay-performance relationship. In the UK, the
arrangement of remuneration committees became a requirement post-Cadbury (1992)
(Main, 2004). Main and Johnson (1993) examine the difference in CEO
compensation between companies with and without a remuneration committee in 220
large UK companies by using data in 1990. They find that the presence of a
remuneration committee will increase CEO compensation instead of decreasing it.
After thorough examination, they find that the high level of total compensation
packages tend to be in the form of share options, which means that the remuneration
committee strengthens the alignment between the interests of CEOs and the interests
of shareholders through changing the structure of executive compensation. Similarly,
by using panel data on large, publicly traded companies in the UK between 1991 and
1994, Conyon and Peck (1998) find that the existence of a remuneration committee
comprising a high proportion of outsiders is positively associated with CEO
compensation. These results are consistent with other studies that have sought to
measure board control and vigilance. Boyd (1994) finds that "contrary to
expectations, the ratio of insiders was negatively associated with compensation"
(1994, p.341). Some other studies also indicate this conclusion (Core et al., 1997 and
Lambert, et al., 1993). Peck and Ruigrok (2002) also reveal that remuneration
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committees are related to higher CEO compensation in a sample of 126 German
companies between 1996 and 2000.
However, Conyon (1997) finds that the presence of a remuneration committee is
associated with lower CEO compensation between 1988 (60% of his sample had a
remuneration committee) and 1993 (96% of his sample had a remuneration
committee). This contradiction casts some doubts regarding the robustness of the
empirical results and implies that the best governance reforms may lead to
unintended results (Main, 2004). Therefore, some studies start to engage in a clinical
examination of the non-consistent situation (Main, 2004) by examining the
composition of committees, the composition of compensation etc. Daily et al. (1998),
using panel data from 1991 to 1994, find that the composition of the remuneration
committee (i.e. the ratio of affiliated or independent directors, or the proportion of
CEOs serving on a remuneration committee) does not have significant influence on
the level and structure of CEO compensation. On the contrary, O'Reilly, Main, and
Crystal (1988), Main, O'Reilly, and Wade (1995), Westphal and Zajac (1995), and
Zajac and Westiphal (1996) investigate how the composition of the remuneration
committee, the relationship between directors, and the similarity of the remuneration
committee members and the CEO affect the pay determination process. According to
their empirical results, all these factors will influence the pay determination process
in ways that do not necessarily follow the agency theory perspective. Given these
varied results, we can conclude that research into this topic has yet to reach a
consensus.
The adoption of a remuneration committee has lasted for two years at most in Taiwan.
Therefore, it is pioneering to introduce the institutional background of remuneration
committee in Taiwan. It also gives us a good opportunity to examine the
establishment of a remuneration committee outside the US and the UK, which have
been investigated widely. Therefore, we will now discuss the institutional
background of remuneration committees in Taiwan.
215
8.3.2 The Institutional Background of the Remuneration Committee
in Taiwan
Remuneration committees give attention to the level and composition of
compensation in its own and peer group companies (Main, 2004). The adoption of
sub-committees on a board is still a new concept in Taiwan. From the viewpoint of
the legal system, Taiwan is similar to the US, Germany, and Japan, which are based
on civil law rather than common law (Filatotchev et al., 2005). However, from the
viewpoint of the law that regulates the adoption of the remuneration committee,
Taiwan is more similar to the UK, which utilizes a 'comply or explain' mechanism
(Mallin, 2004). Laws in Taiwan do not require the board of directors to establish a
compensation committee. Therefore, until the end of 2004, only 3 GLCs and 7
non-GLCs adopted sub-committees on their boards. In the "Corporate Governance
Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies"149, the relevant
recommendations in Article 27 and Article 28 are:
(Article 27) For the purpose of developing monitoring functions and strengthening
management mechanisms, the board of directors of a TSEC/OTC
listed company may, taking into account the basis of the size of the
board and the number of the independent directors, set up audit,
nomination, compensation or any other functional committees and
have them stipulated in the articles of incorporation. Functional
committees shall be responsible to the board and submit the proposals
to the board of directors for approval.
(Article 28) It is advisable that a TSEC/OTC listed company make it the first
priority to set up the audit committee...The audit committee shall
consist of at least one independent director and be convened by the
same. It would be advisable that independent supervisors be invited to
sit in at the meeting. At least one of the independent directors as
149 Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) is the stock exchange in Taiwan and Gre-Tai
Securities Market (GTSM) is the over-the-counter market in Taiwan. This principle was announced on
4th October, 2002 and was revised on 19th October, 2005.
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referred to in the preceding paragraph shall have professional
expertise in accounting or finance.
On 11th January, 2006, the Taiwanese government amended the Securities and
Exchange Act to reform corporate governance in Taiwan. The new Act will be
implemented on 1st January, 200715°. It establishes several new Articles concerning
the audit committees:
(Article 14-4) A company that has issued stock in accordance with this Act shall
establish either an audit committee or a supervisor...The audit
committee shall be composed of the entire number of independent
directors. It shall not be fewer than three persons in number, one of
whom shall be convener, and at least one of whom shall have
accounting or financial expertise.
According to the "Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM
Listed Companies" and the new Securities and Exchange Act, which was amended in
January, 2006, adopting a remuneration committee is not an obligation under
Taiwanese laws. It is only a recommendation principle. Therefore, Taiwanese
companies seldom have sub-committees on the board, not to mention remuneration
committees. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the
first Taiwanese company to adopt sub-committees. In line with the principle, TSMC
board of directors established an audit committee in 2002 and a remuneration
committee in 2003151. As ofMarch 2005, the remuneration committee was comprised
of five members: three independent directors serving as voting members of the
committee, and two non-voting directors. The committee meets at least four times a
year.
Before 2003, only the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) had
a remuneration committee on the board. Following TSMC, some companies started
to have an audit committee and remuneration committee. Until the end of 2004,
150 Article 183, Securities and Exchange Act (amended on 11th January, 2006).
151 Please refer to Appendix 2 for the comparison between Taiwanese and US laws.
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among the largest 200 companies whose data are available, there are 10 companies
1 S9
having a remuneration committee, 7 are non-GLCs and 3 are GLCs . Unfortunately,
since the presence of remuneration committees is a new phenomenon, there is no
requirement to disclose the composition of it. We thus cannot take the composition of
a remuneration committee into consideration in this thesis and only attempt to
examine the relationship between the average top executives' compensation and the
existence of remuneration committees in Taiwan. As far as we know, this is the first
research concerning the institutional structure of remuneration committees and their
existence in Taiwan.
Because of the sparseness of data, it is not meaningful to run regressions with 3
GLCs and 7 non-GLCs that adopt sub-committees on their boards. Hence, we use the
cross tables to examine the influence of remuneration committees on the average top
executives' compensation in Taiwan. From Table 8-3, we can observe that the change
ratio of the average top executives' compensation in GLCs that have remuneration
committees in 2004 is 47.51%, which is bigger than that in GLCs that never have
remuneration committees (10.59%). Similarly, the change ratio of the average top
executives' compensation in non-GLCs that have remuneration committees in 2004
is 73.83%, which is bigger than that in non-GLCs that never have remuneration
committees (18.71%). It indicates that a company with a remuneration committee
will have higher average top executives' compensation. This phenomenon is more
obvious in non-GLCs because the increasing rate is 47.51% in GLCs and 73.83% in
non-GLCs. The statistics are consistent with the findings of Main and Johnston
(1993), Conyon and Peck (1998), and Peck and Ruigrok (2002).
152 Seven non-GLCs are (SIC code): Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. (2881), AU Optronics Corp.
(2409), ACER Incorporated (2353), Advantech Co., Ltd. (2395), Continental Engineering Corp.
(2526), Tsann Kuen Enterprise Co., Ltd. (2430), and TSRC Co. (2103). Three GLCs are (SIC code):
TSMC (2330), Macronix International Co., Ltd (2337), and Systex Co. (2343). One GLC, United
Microelectronics Corp. (2303), started to have the remuneration committee in the beginning of2005.
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Table 8-3 The Cross-tabulation between remuneration committees and the
average top executives' compensation
GLCs
never have remuneration committee having remuneration committee in 2004
the number of observations 58 3
ATEC (2003) 5,985,309.75 18,762,038.83
ATEC (2004) 6,618,941.44 27,675,282.28
Increasing percentage (%) 10.59 47.51
Unit: Taiwanese dollars, %
non-GLCs
never have remuneration committee having remuneration committee in 2004
the number ofobservations 131 7
ATEC (2003) 6,115,334.44 6,155,822.00
ATEC (2004) 7,259,495.96 10,700,537.66
Increasing percentage (%) 18.71 73.83
Unit: Taiwanese dollars, %
Unfortunately, before 2004, Taiwanese companies only disclose the sum of top
executives' compensation. It is impossible to obtain the data of top executives'
incentive payments before 2004. Therefore, we cannot analyse the change of top
executives' incentive payments after having a remuneration committee on the board.
However, the relationship between the top executives' incentive payments and
adopting remuneration committees in Taiwan is an important topic that is worthy of
examining in the future. Moreover, with the reform on corporate governance in
Taiwan, more information is disclosed by companies, such as the composition of
sub-committees and the relationship between directors and executives. We can
thereby engage in a more clinical examination of the situation and compare it with
the situation in other countries that have adopted remuneration committees for a long
time.
8.4 Conclusion
In addition to firm performance and DOI, this thesis examines corporate governance
in Taiwan from another dimension. We try to investigate whether there is a
significant difference between top executives' compensation in GLCs and non-GLCs.
Before discussing the variables and empirical results, this chapter has provided the
necessary context for the research conducted in this thesis by introducing the
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institutional background of top executives' compensation and employees' bonuses in
Taiwan. We can conclude that the development and application of the incentive
payments in Taiwan is improving but still developing. Furthermore, compared to
other developed countries, such as the US and the UK, the alignment between the
interests of top executives and the interests of shareholders in Taiwan is
comparatively weak. We can reach this conclusion from four main aspects.
First, Taiwanese companies prefer year-end and employees' bonuses rather than
long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Section 8.2.1 indicates that the nature of the
year-end and employees' bonuses is "profit-sharing" (Cin et al., 2003). Based on the
concept of 'profit-sharing' (Cin et al., 2003), Taiwanese companies also distribute
employees' bonuses in cash or shares when the company is profitable. If the
company grant employees' bonuses in cash, we can view it as an annual bonus tied to
accounting performance (a short-term incentive payment). If the company grants
employees' bonuses in restricted shares, we can roughly view it as a long-term
incentive payment. However, the grant of restricted shares in employees' bonuses in
Taiwan is very different from LTIPs. LTIPs here are defined as grants of cash and
shares (usually shares) with performance limitations (Buck et al., 2003). Only when
executives reach a level of performance in the future, can they obtain a portion of
restricted shares according to the contract. In Taiwan, the amount of grants depends
on past performance rather than future performance. If firm performance in this year
is good, employees will be granted an amount of restricted shares at the beginning of
next year. Another difference between LTIPs and Taiwanese employees' bonuses is
that many Taiwanese companies do not restrict the time within which employees can
sell their shares (Han, 2003; Cin et al., 2003), although Company Law in Taiwan
approves such a restriction Therefore, compared to LTIPs, the employees' bonuses
in Taiwan are relatively short-term.
Second, compared to the US, in Taiwan, enforcement of the relevant laws is not
strong. Most relevant laws only recommend rather than enforce companies to adopt
some mechanisms, such as sub-committees on a board. Therefore, although the
"Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed
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Companies" recommends companies to adopt sub-committees on the board, only 10
Taiwan companies had done so up until 2005. To date, the number of companies
which have adopted a remuneration committee on the board is still small.
Third, compared to the US and the UK, in Taiwan, the disclosure of top executives'
compensation is not so transparent. This viewpoint can be proved by the data
presented in Section 9.3.3. For example, before 2004, most Taiwanese companies
only disclose the sum of top executives' compensation. After 2004, some Taiwanese
companies start to disclose individual CEO compensation. Moreover, although
Taiwanese companies grant shares and warrants to CEOs and top executives, they do
not disclose detailed information. Generally, most Taiwanese companies will disclose
the sum of top executives' cash compensation and share-based compensation. We do
not know the portion or the calculation method of share-based compensation. This
opaque disclosure of top executives' compensation in Taiwan is a serious obstacle for
future research.
Finally, in addition to the prior discussion, which indicates that the disclosure of
compensation and the enforcement of laws are not enough in Taiwan, the calculation
of compensation also requires improvement. Since the grant of warrants is still new,
unlike in the US, there is no formal Statement or principle to regulate the calculation
of call warrants which are granted to executives. Generally, Taiwanese companies
only disclose the amount rather than the value of warrants granted to executives, the
exercise price, the share-price on the grant date, and the expiration date. Additionally,
due to the 'profit-sharing' concept, the employees' bonuses in Taiwanese accounting
is recorded as the distribution of profits rather than expense, which is quite different
from that in the US, which is regulated by Statement 123 (R) issued by the Financial
Accounting Standard Board (FASB).
In conclusion, compared to other developed countries such as the US and the UK, the
establishment of laws and the level of disclosure in Taiwan are less sound and less
transparent. Fortunately, the Taiwanese government has recently improved corporate
governance. For example, in 2002, the TSEC and the GreTai Securities Market
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(GTSM, the over-the-counter market in Taiwan) jointly released the first set of
corporate governance best-practice principles for listed companies. Drawing on both
global standards and Taiwanese Company Law, the document outlines a system of
independent directors, board committees (starting with audit committee), and
independent supervisors. Additionally, more and more Taiwanese companies have
started to disclose detailed information on CEO compensation, incentive payments,
and the composition of committees. Since Taiwan is a country with relational
capitalism , the influence of adopting a remuneration committee and having
incentive payments may not be the same as in other countries with stock market
capitalism. Moreover, the legal system and the institutional background in Taiwan
are also different from western countries. Therefore, the comparison of CEO
compensation in Taiwan with other Asian and western countries by using this
newly-disclosed Taiwanese data is a critical topic for the future. In order to fill the
gap, this thesis tries to use the latest data to examine top executives' compensation in
Taiwan more precisely. In due course, with the reform of corporate governance in
Taiwan, it may be possible to use individual CEO compensation data. But it is hoped
that the results in this thesis at least point the way to the interesting insights available
regarding top executives' compensation in Taiwan. The subsequent chapter explain
the hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis. Owing to data limitations, the
calculation of top executives' compensation and incentive payments under the
constraints of data unavailability will also be explained in the subsequent chapter.
153 Please refer to Section 2.1 for relational capitalism.
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Chapter Nine
Theory and Hypotheses on Top
Executives' Compensation
9.1 Introduction
The review in Chapter 8 of the relevant literature regarding the institutional
background of top executives' compensation in Taiwan highlighted corporate
governance reform in Taiwan and the differences between Taiwan and the US/UK.
Based on the recent reform, corporate governance in Taiwan has converged toward
the Anglo-Saxon style, which adopts restricted shares, share options, and
sub-committees of the board to align the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders.
More and more Taiwanese companies have advocated employees' bonuses and share
options. Prior to 2000, apart from some subsidiaries ofUS multinational corporations
in Taiwan and a few Taiwanese firms listed on foreign stock markets, very few local
companies adopted share option plans. One of the major reasons has been the lack of
a legal framework for such plans. On 30th June, 2000, the relevant laws were
amended and several new provisions concerning the regulations of share options
were added. The new amendments allow the publicly traded companies to buy back
their own outstanding stock and to grant employees share option certificates (similar
to US stock options) as incentives after the agreement of at least one-third of the
board directors. The amendments thus provide a legal foundation for the adoption of
share options and may be expected to lead to the growth in popularity of granting
incentive payments to employees in the future (Cin et al., 2003).
Prior studies that examine the relationship between executive compensation and
board and ownership structure generally find that firms with a more effective
governance structure tend to have lower executive compensation (e.g. Coles et al.,
2001; Core and Guay, 2001; Ittner et al., 2003). In this chapter, the samples and data
sources will be introduced and, in order to understand the dynamics underlying these
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incentive payments, we build hypotheses based on previous literature (e.g., Ittner et
al., 2003; Bryan et al., 2000; Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay, 1999, 2001), to
examine whether governance structure is associated with top executives'
compensation. Based on prior research, we include several determinants, such as
ownership structure, cash constraints, past firm performance, and investment
opportunities, to observe whether these variables determine the level and the
structure of top executives' compensation. Since few Taiwanese companies disclose
individual CEO compensation, CEO compensation in this thesis is measured by the
average top executives' compensation (ATEC).
In Section 9.2.1 and Section 9.2.2, we will develop hypotheses regarding the level
and the structure of top executives' compensation. The sample and variables will be
introduced in Section 9.3.1 and Section 9.3.2. We will also define our measures of
top executives' compensation in Section 9.3.3. To test our hypotheses regarding
whether an efficient governance mechanism affects the level and the structure of top
executives' compensation, we develop empirical models in Section 9.4. We will use
several different empirical methods to fit the data, such as the fixed-effect model, the
Tobit model, and the random-effects Tobit model. The conclusions are discussed in
Section 9.5.
9.2 Hypothesis Development and Empirical Specification
9.2.1 The Determinants of Top Executives' Compensation
There are many prior studies into the determinants of CEO compensation and a
thorough review of this subject has been made in several papers (Gomez-Mejia and
Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 2003). The research results, however, are
not encouraging. Tosi et al. (2000) use a meta-analysis to examine CEO
compensation in the US. They conclude that 40% of compensation variance is
associated with firm size and only 5% can be attributed to firm performance. They
argue that the incentive alignment statements of CEO compensation are "weakly
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supported at best" (Tosi et al., 2000, p.329). Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998, p.329)
claim that "...the failure to identify a robust relationship between top management
compensation and firm performance has led scholars into a blind alley". These
arguments and findings may contradict agency theory and disconcert researchers, but
they also reveal that the causality between CEO compensation and firm performance
is far from clear. In order to clarify the causality between pay and performance,
Appendix 5 conducts panel Granger causality test. However, Garen (1994) indicates
that it is still appropriate to perform medium-size empirical analysis from the
viewpoint of agency theory.
In general, government-linked companies (GLCs) are hypothesised to be less
efficient than non-GLCs because their main objective may not be profit gaining and
therefore bad corporate governance is the result (e.g. Mascarenhas, 1989; Agrawal
and Knoeber, 2001; La Porta et al., 2002; Sun et al., 2002; Shleifer, 1998; Megginson
and Netter, 2001; Schipani and Liu, 2001). Because of different incentives, GLCs
and non-GLCs may present differences in corporate governance mechanisms and
compensation. We categorise the observations in our data into a GLC group and a
non-GLC group. There are two criteria for classification. When there are one or more
directors from the government or state-owned enterprises, or the percentage of
government shares to total outstanding shares exceeds 5%154, the company will be
classified as a GLC, otherwise the company is a non-GLC. We can compare whether
there is a significant difference in the relationship between top executives'
compensation and the corporate governance mechanism between GLCs and
non-GLCs.
There are three main research questions regarding this topic. First, is there a
relationship between top executives' compensation and other governance variables?
Second, according to prior research (e.g. Coles et al., 2001; Engel et al., 2001; Core
and Guay, 2001; Ittner et al., 2003), corporate governance mechanisms provide an
alternative to the use of incentive payments. We would like to examine whether this
kind of substitution appears in Taiwan, a country with political involvement from the
154 In Taiwanese annual reports, a blockholder is defined as a shareholder whose ownership exceeds
5% or who is the top shareholders.
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government and external governance from banks. The third question we ask is, do
non-GLCs better align the interests of top executives with the interests of
shareholders? The hypotheses for GLCs and non-GLCs are the same. If non-GLCs
are more efficient than GLCs, the substitution between corporate governance
mechanisms should be more significant (Coles et al., 2001). By clarifying the three
questions, we can first understand weather corporate governance mechanisms in
Taiwan are efficient. Furthermore, we can also test whether GLCs are less efficient
than non-GLCs on top executives' compensation.
We will now explain the hypotheses; the calculation of the variables will be
explained in Section 9.3.2 and Section 9.3.3.
Past Firm Performance
Perhaps the most complicated question raised on the subject of CEO compensation is
the relationship between firm performance and compensation. Previous studies
typically related firm performance to CEO compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
Firm performance reflects the executives' potential incentive to pursue the interests
of shareholders. Most research regarding the relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance has been firmly rooted in agency theory.
According to agency theory, executive compensation is one part of corporate
governance in general and is used to align the interests of opportunistic executives
with the interests of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In other words, agency
theory emphasises the design of executive compensation packages, which are
constructed by shareholders in order to improve the alignment between the interests
of executives and the interest of shareholders. Although many studies focus on the
pay-performance relationship, there is presently no theoretical or empirical
consensus on how share-based compensation affects firm performance (Core et al.
2003, p.34). Prior literature indicates that there may be a two-way relationship
between performance and compensation (Kole, 1996; Buck et al., 2006). On one
hand, agency theory puts emphasis on the design of executives' compensation
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packages by shareholders in order to improve the alignment of principal-agent
interests. On the other hand, the value of an executive's share-based compensation
depends upon the share price performance in that an increase in share price
automatically raises the value of share-based compensation. Therefore, share-based
compensation may guarantee a significant relationship running from performance to
pay (Buck et al., 2006).
Despite the large amount of research on compensation, the empirical results of
pay-performance are mixed. For example, Frye (2001) finds that companies that
grant more share-based compensation to employees perform better. Conyon and
Freeman (2000) examine broad-based option plans covering employees throughout
the company and reveal that the presence of option plans is associated with higher
productivity. Similarly, Sesil et al. (2002) also find a significant and positive
relationship between the presence of broad-based option plans and productivity, sales
growth, and Tobin's Q, but no association with total shareholder returns. On the other
hand, Anderson et al. (2000) estimate a simultaneous equations model linking top
executives' bonuses, share option grants, and contemporaneous share returns155. They
find a significant and positive simultaneous relationship between annual option
grants and the same period share returns, and thereby conclude that the extent of top
executives' incentive payments positively affects performance, and performance also
positively affects the extent of top executives' incentive payments. Flowever, the use
of contemporaneous share returns makes it difficult to determine whether the option
grants were rewarded for performance during the year or whether they induced
superior performance. More recently, by studying 601 Chinese companies from 2000
to 2003, Buck et al. (2006) find that there are two-way causal links between
executive pay and firm performance in the short run, which suggests that executive
pay and firm performance mutually influence each other.
155 Anderson et al. (2000) define "total current-period compensation to be the sum of cash
compensation, the Back-Scholes value of options granted, and the value of other awards and
compensation provided to the executive" (Anderson et al., 2000, p. 532). We can observe that
Anderson et al. (2000) only consider the value of share options on the grant day. They do not consider
any realised option gains from the executive share option holdings. They also do not include the
realised and unrealised gains to the option holdings of the executive in the following years. Therefore,
executive compensation they used in that research is based on the concept of flow, not the concept of a
change of value.
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According to prior studies, share-based compensation is positively related to
subsequent firm performance. Alternatively, share-based compensation may also be
granted for better performance (formulaic effects). Companies may grant more
share-based compensation to align the interests of executives with those of
shareholders. Moreover, according to the profit-sharing concept in Taiwan, which is
mentioned in Section 8.2.1, when performance is better, Taiwanese companies will
distribute more employees' bonuses, including cash and shares, to employees. Thus
we hypothesise:
Hypothesis la: Top executives' compensation is expected to be positively associated
with past firm performance.
Furthermore, according to managerial power theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002),
self-interested executives may extract rents in their own favour. Since the value of an
executive's share-based compensation depends upon the share price performance,
self-interested executives may encourage the company to grant more share-based
compensation as a substitute for cash when firm performance is good. A positive and
significant relationship between share-based compensation and past firm
performance should be observed. Based on these arguments, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis lb: The ratio of top executives' share-based compensation (i.e. restricted
shares and warrants) to top executives' compensation is expected to be positively
associated with past firm performance.
Investment Opportunity
Companies with abundant investment opportunities have many possible investment
projects for the executives to choose from. It is difficult for shareholders to solve the
information asymmetry problem without having adequate knowledge and resources
(Bryan et al., 2000). Smith and Watt (1992) indicate that for a company with more
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investment opportunities it is more difficult for shareholders or directors to determine
the appropriateness of managers' decisions because the company will operate in a
less predictable and noisier environment. In this sense, granting top executives more
incentive payments can lower monitoring costs. In addition to lowering monitoring
costs, improving the attraction to and having retention of key employees are two
other potential benefits of share-based compensation (Ittner et al., 2003). For
example, in a high technology industry that requires innovative and competitive
employees, it is important for companies to attract and retain highly qualified
personnel by offering share-based compensation.
Many researchers hypothesise and find a positive relationship between the
investment opportunities and the degree to which companies use equity incentives to
tie a manager's wealth to firm value. For example, Balkin et al. (2000) find that
long-term, equity-based CEO compensation is related to the level of innovations
(R&D spending and the number of patents) in high technology manufacturers, but
not in others. Demstez and Lehn (1985), Jensen and Meckling (1992), and Smith and
Watt (1992) find that when the company is larger and more decentralised, and has
more investment opportunities, the company will provide more equity-based
compensation to employees. In addition, Bryan et al. (2000), Gaver and Gaver
(1993), Mehran (1995), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), Core and Guay
(2001), and Ittner et al. (2003) all confirm a positive relationship between proxy
variables for investment opportunities and CEO incentive payments. Consistent with
previous studies, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 2: The ratio of top executives' share-based compensation (i.e. restricted
shares and warrants) to top executives' compensation is expected to be positively
associated with investment opportunities.
Board Composition
A company's board is the most important internal corporate governance mechanism
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that is responsible for monitoring executives and setting executive compensation.
"Boards have long been considered to play an important role in the establishment
executive pay" (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, p.248). Therefore, one of the main
focuses influencing top executives' compensation is board composition. Typically,
prior studies have evaluated the efficiency of board monitoring through the use of
proxy variables, such as the ratio of outside directors. The empirical results, however,
are not consistent. Lambert et al. (1993) find a positive relationship between CEO
compensation and the percentage of outside directors, but Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1989) find no such relationship. Mehran (1995) finds that equity-based
compensation is used more extensively in firms with more outside directors. It is not
surprising that the relationship between the ratio of outside directors and executive
compensation is neither significantly positive nor negative because outside directors
are not the main owners of the company. In Lambert et al. (1993) and Core et al.
(1999), the total outside director ownership has a median far below 1%. When
outside directors have little financial stake in the company, they are less likely to
have any influence on executive compensation.
Nevertheless, Beatty and Zajac (1994), Rediker and Seth (1995), Sundaramurthy,
Mahoney and Mahoney (1997), Coles et al. (2001), Engel et al. (2001), Core and
Guay (2001), and Ittner et al. (2003) all conclude that when the governance
mechanism is weak, the compensation package will be more performance-sensitive.
For example, companies in the electronics industry may find it useful to have a board
that has a high degree of specialized skills that can only be found in-house (i.e. inside
directors). In order to compensate for the lack of internal monitoring, the company
may choose to design a more performance-sensitive compensation package for
executives. Conversely, companies with sound internal corporate governance can
distribute fewer incentive payments to executives because the sound board of
directors can monitor the executives efficiently enough. Based on this argument, the
following hypotheses are established.
Hypothesis 3: The ratio of top executives' share-based compensation (i.e. restricted
shares and warrants) to top executives' compensation is expected to be negatively
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associated with the ratio of outside directors.
In addition to the ratio of outside directors, we also consider directors from financial
institutions, such as bank representatives on the board. As in Japan (Aoki and Patrick,
1994), it is common to have one or two bank representatives on the board in Taiwan
because of the borrowing and the cross-shareholding relationships. The function of
these bank representatives is the same as that of the outside directors. These bank
representatives can play an external monitoring role while the outside directors play
an internal monitoring role. Therefore, we also hypothesise:
Hypothesis 4: The ratio of top executives' share-based compensation (i.e. restricted
shares and warrants) to top executives' total compensation is expected to be
negatively associated with the ratio of bank representatives on the board.
The dummy variable measuring CEO duality is also considered in prior studies.
Although combining the position of CEO and chairman is currently prohibited in the
UK (Cadbury Report, 1992; Combined Code, 2003156), it is not prohibited in Taiwan.
Therefore, many Taiwanese companies combine the two positions. It is believed that
serving as the CEO and the chairman on the board at the same time will hamper
board independence (Harrison, Torresm and Kukalis, 1988; Wastphal and Zajac,
1994). From the viewpoint of agency theory, CEO duality has a negative influence
on the monitoring ability of the board and thereby requires more share-based
compensation to lower the monitoring cost (Core et ah, 1999). Thus, a positive
relationship between CEO duality and share-based compensation may exist.
However, an undiversified and risk-averse CEO will prefer cash instead of
non-tradable restricted shares or options (Hall and Murphy, 2002). The CEO will
require a high risk premium to compensate the risk. In this way, a powerful (i.e.
serves as the CEO and the chairman concurrently) but undiversified CEO will use
his/her power to decrease the ratio of share-based compensation in favour of an
155 The Combined Code, Principle A.2.1: The roles of chairman and chief executive should not be
exercised by the same individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief
executive should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board.
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increase in cash compensation. The relationship between CEO duality and the ratio
of share-based compensation to total compensation will be negative. Due to the
absence of data, we cannot evaluate the influence of risk-averse intention. This
unknown portfolio makes the relationship between CEO duality and share-based
compensation ambiguous. Regardless of whether the CEO prefers share-based
compensation or cash compensation, we expect that combining the two positions
"provides the CEO with a wider power base and focus of control" (Boyd, 1994,
p.338). CEO total compensation is higher when the CEO is more powerful (Boyd,
1994, 1996; Core et al., 1997; Main and Johnston, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1995;
Buck et al., 2003). Therefore, we arrive at the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5a: When the positions of CEO and chairman are held by the same
person, top executives' compensation (the sum of base salary, share-based
compensation, and options) is expected to be higher.
However, in Taiwan, the granting of warrants is less transparent to shareholders as
there is no detailed disclosure rule and no formal calculation method for options. A
powerful CEO may treat share-based compensation as an add-on and use share-based
compensation to boost his/her own fortune. Under this inference and agency theory,
the relationship between CEO duality and top executives' share-based compensation
may be positive. Hence, we hypothesise,
Hypothesis 5b: The relationship between CEO duality and the ratio of top executives'
share-based compensation to top executives' compensation is positive.
Ownership Structure
We now turn to the relationship between ownership structure and top executives'
compensation. In addition to board composition, ownership structure is another type
of proxy measurement to evaluate the efficiency of the governance mechanisms. The
literature regarding the link between ownership structure and executive
compensation is considerable, especially in developed countries such as the US and
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the UK, for example, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Betrand and
Mullainathan (2001), Hartzell and Starks (2003) for the US; Conyon (1997), Cragg
and Dyck (2003) for the UK; Kato and Kubo (2006), Kubo (2003, 2005) for Japan
etc.
For shareholders, financial institutions, other companies, and blockholders all play
very critical roles. Lambert et al. (1993) and Core et al. (1999) find a negative
relationship between CEO compensation and the existence of an outside blockholder
who owns at least 5% of the outstanding shares. Similar to the main bank system in
Japan (Aoki and Patrick, 1994), in Taiwan companies usually maintain a close
relationship with banks. In addition to the presence of bank representatives on the
board, it is also crucial to consider financial ownership. By using the panel data of
1,914 companies on S&P 500 index from 1992 to 1997, Hartzell and Starks (2003)
find institutional ownership concentration is positively associated with the
pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation, and negatively associated
with the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, investment
opportunities, and firm performance. These results indicate that the institutional
investors serve a monitoring role in alleviating the agency problem between
shareholders and managers. Moreover, Hartzell and Starks (2003) also find that
institutional investors can influence compensation structures according to their
preferences. In addition, we also focus on directors. With increasing proportions of
ownership, directors will have a personal wealth incentive to monitor executives in
addition to their fiduciary responsibility as members of the board of directors (Monks
and Minow, 2004).
Based on the argument that governance mechanisms substitute for each other (Beatty
and Zajac, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Sundaramurthy, Mahoney and Mahoney,
1997; Coles et al., 2001; Engel et al., 2001; Core and Guay, 2001; Ittner et al., 2003),
shareholders from banks, financial institutions, directors, and blockholders all have a
personal wealth incentive to monitor executives and thereby reduce the demand for
incentive payments. For these reasons, we hypothesise:
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Hypothesis 6: The ratio of top executives' share-based compensation (i.e. restricted
shares and warrants) to top executives' total compensation is expected to be
negatively associated with blockholder/board/cross-shareholding/financial
ownership.
Among the discussions regarding ownership structure, the literature on managerial
ownership is growing. Managerial ownership has been considered as one kind of
alignment between the interests of executives and shareholders. Core and Guay
(2002) examine the adoption of 'target ownership plans' and conclude that
companies with low managerial ownership and low share price performance will be
more likely to adopt the target ownership plan to alleviate the agency problem. Their
finding implies that the company will use managerial ownership as one governance
mechanism. Jensen and Meckling (1976) find that when CEOs hold a large fraction
of their companies' equity, the demand for more share-based compensation will
decrease. Smith and Watt (1992) support this argument by indicating that CEOs
cannot diversify the risk associated with share-based compensation because they
invest their human capital in a single position of employment. Hall and Murphy
(2002) prove this argument by employing a certainty-equivalence framework to
simulate CEO behaviour. Hall and Murphy (2002) find that an undiversified,
risk-averse CEO will evaluate the price of an option at a lower level than the
opportunity cost of issuing options to a company because these options are neither
tradable nor hedgeable.
However, similar to CEO duality, high managerial ownership may give the CEO
power to treat share-based compensation as add-on compensation. In empirical
analysis, Mehran (1995) finds a negative relationship between CEO share-based
compensation (including options and restricted shares) and managerial ownership.
Moreover, regarding restricted shares compensation, Bryan et al. (2000) document a
significantly negative relationship, whereas Kole (1997) finds no significantly
negative relationship between managerial ownership and CEO restricted shares
grants. Although some studies claim that the relationship should be negative,
managerial ownership is unrelated to option compensation in other studies, such as
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Yermack (1995), Matsunaga (1995), and Kole (1997). In this thesis, we still
hypothesise:
Hypothesis 7: The ratio of top executives' share-based compensation (i.e. restricted
shares and warrants) to top executives' total compensation is expected to be
negatively associated with managerial ownership.
Cash Constraints
Share-based bonuses and warrants require no immediate cash outflow, whereas cash
compensation will reduce cash and has unfavourable influences on the financial ratio
(Chen, 2002). Therefore, companies with cash constraints may be more willing to
distribute share-based compensation to executives as a substitute for a cash payment
(Yermack, 1995; Core et al., 2003; Chen, 2002; Core and Guay, 1999, 2001).
Yermack (1995), and Core and Guay (1999, 2001) confirm that cash-constrained
companies grant more options to the CEO and non-executive employees. Similar to
the findings of Yermack (1995) and Core and Guay (1999, 2001), we also expect that
share-based compensation is used to substitute for cash in companies with cash
constraints (Core and Guay, 2001). Therefore, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 8: Companies with cash constraints will grant more shares and warrants
to top executives as a substitute for cash.
Firm Size
Firm size plays a critical role on top executives' compensation. First, large
companies require more capable top executives (Smith and Watts, 1992). These
talented top executives will ask for higher compensation and are expected to be
wealthier (Baker and Hall, 1998). Furthermore, large companies may also have a
higher degree of diversification and more international branches, which means that
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the information-processing demands of large companies are also higher. Henderson
and Fredrickson (1996) find that CEOs are paid according to the level of information
processing that their jobs require.
Second, prior research suggests that it is more difficult for a board to monitor the top
executives with a great deal of information in a large company. According to agency
theory, top executives who are more difficult to monitor will be granted more
incentive payments to align their interests with those of shareholders. An alternative
hypothesis, however, suggests that incentive compensation, especially options, will
be used less in larger companies because these individual employees, especially
those at a lower level, cannot affect firm performance significantly (Ittner et al.,
2003).
Nevertheless, most empirical results support the hypothesis that the relationship
between incentive compensation and firm size is positive. By using the natural
logarithm of the number of employees, Ittner et al. (2003) find that larger companies
tend to grant more share-based compensation than smaller companies. Gaver and
Gaver (1993), Yermack (1995), Bryan et al. (2000), and Buck et al. (2003) all
determine a positive relationship between LTIPS/option grants and firm size. These
empirical results give rise to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 9a: Top executives' total compensation (the sum of base salary,
share-based compensation, and warrants) is expected to be positively associated with
firm size.
Hypothesis 9b: The ratio of top executives' share-based compensation (i.e. restricted
shares and warrants) to top executives' total compensation is expected to be
positively associated with firm size.
After introducing the independent variables in Section 9.3.2, Table 9-2 will match the
hypotheses with the independent variables and summarise all the hypotheses that
have been discussed above.
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Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) ask an important question: "Do executives and lower
level employees actually understand how stock options work and the implicit
incentives in these options?" (Core et al., 2003, p.43). In Taiwan, after the media
spread stories of how fortunes can be made, warrants and shares have been in fashion.
Since restricted shares and warrants are an "add-on" to existing compensation (Hall
and Murphy, 2002), executives are less likely to contemplate the implicit incentives
in adopting warrants and restricted shares. Whether the "add-on" view of share-based
compensation jeopardise the alignment of the interests of executives and
shareholders should be discussed in Taiwan currently.
9.3 Sample and Variable Measurement
9.3.1 Sample Selection and Data
We gathered our observations from companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange
Corporation (TSEC). Since granting restricted shares/warrants is a comparatively
new phenomenon in Taiwan, only companies above a certain firm size pay more
attention to the quality of corporate governance and the alignment between the
interests of executives and those of shareholders. That is, the proxy variables
concerning the granting of restricted shares/warrants would equal zero for most
companies whose size are below a certain level. Therefore, it is meaningless to
include all listed companies in TSEC in the empirical analysis.
According to the latest record supplied by TSEC at the beginning of 2006, there are
174 companies permitted to grant warrants to employees. We chose the observations
from all 678 listed companies according to their ranking by capitalisation on 1st
August, 2004 until we had a sample of 200 companies without missing data.
Unfortunately, one Taiwanese company became unlisted during our research period
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and was deleted from our sample.157. The final number of companies in the sample is,
therefore, 199. We classified these companies as either GLCs or non-GLCs. There
are two criteria for classification: when there are one or more directors from the
government or state-owned enterprises, or the percentage of government shares to
total outstanding shares exceeds 5%, the company will be classified as a GLC;
otherwise the company is a non-GLC. This results in 61 GLCs and 138 non-GLCs.
Table 9-1 shows the industry distribution of the observations.
From Table 9-1, it can be seen that most companies belong to the Electronics and
Computer industry, especially in non-GLCs. The second largest industry for GLCs is
Finance, which implies that the finance industry is one with high political
intervention in Taiwan. We collected data from two databases - the Taiwan
Economic Journal (TEJ)158 and the Market Observation Post System (MOPS)159.
The data of top executives' compensation was gathered from annual reports. The
research period is from 2001 to 2004. The following sections will describe the
calculation of dependent and independent variables.
157 First International Computer, Inc. (2319) is not listed on TSEC after 30th August, 2004. There is no
2004 compensation information for First International Computer, Inc.
158 The website of TEJ database are http://www.tei.com.tw/aboutus.html (English) and
http://www.tei.com.tw (Chinese)
159 The website ofMOPS database is http://emops.tse.com.tw/emops all.htm
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Table 9-1 The industry distribution of the observations
Industry Code Industry Classification GLCs non-GLCs Total %
11 Cement 2 1 3 1.51
12 Foods 1 1 2 1.01
13 Plastic 3 8 11 5.53
14 Textiles 1 4 5 2.51
15 Machinery 4 4 8 4.02
16 Electric Appliance and Cable 1 0 1 0.50
17 Chemicals 3 5 8 4.02
18 Glass and Ceramics 0 1 1 0.50
19 Paper 2 2 4 2.01
20 Steel and Iron 3 4 7 3.52
21 Rubber 1 4 5 2.51
22 Automobiles 0 3 3 1.51
23-24 Electronics and Computers 21 72 93 46.73
25 Construction 1 5 6 3.02
26 Transportation 3 6 9 4.52
27 Tourism 0 1 1 0.50
28 Finance 13 4 17 8.54
29 Logistics 1 3 4 2.01
98-99 Others 1 10 11 5.53
Total 61 138 199 100
9.3.2 Independent Variable Measurement
Since the study by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the problem of managerial power
and discretion has been widely analysed. Following prior research on corporate
governance, we take an agency theory view to examine the issues in this thesis. The
agency relationship has been described as "a contract under which one or more
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the
agent" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Agency theory is concerned with
insuring that a company's managers act in the interests of its shareholders. Agency
theory asserts that companies can employ various mechanisms to align the interests
of agents and principals and to monitor the behaviour of agents. Based on prior
studies and the hypotheses in Section 9.2, we include variables that may affect top
executives' compensation through the corporate governance mechanism. Hereunder
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is the calculation of the independent variables.
Firm performance: ROE; ROA; TSR.
In line with prior literature, three variables of past firm performance are included.
Similar to the work by Ittner et al. (2003), Lin (2005), and Chen (2002), return on
assets (ROA) is included as one variable to measure firm performance. In this thesis,
ROA is calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets. Return
on equity (ROE) is also included as an alternative measure of past firm performance
(Daily et al. 1998). ROE is computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's
equity. In addition to the two accounting-based variables, one market-based variable
is included. Total shareholder return (TSR) can reflect share price appreciation. TSR
is the total return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested.
Investment Opportunities: RD.
When there are more investment opportunities, it is more difficult for top executives
to avoid making decisions in his/her own interest. Thus, the share-based
compensation should be higher. Similar to the work by Gaver and Gaver (1993),
Baber et al. (1996), Finkelstein and Boyd (1998), and Ittner et al. (2003), we use
research and development expenditure to measure the company's investment
opportunities. This variable is computed as the research and development
expenditure divided by total sales (RD).
Board composition: CHAIR; OUTSIDE; BANK D.
According to prior studies, companies may make governance choices across
mechanisms, or may choose to substitute devices within mechanisms. For example,
companies in the electronics industry may find it useful to have more insiders on the
board because of their high degree of specialised skills. In order to compensate for
the lack of external monitoring, these companies may better align compensation
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packages with firm performance. Based on this argument, we include three proxy
variables concerning board composition.
CEO duality is measured by a dummy variable, CHAIR, which equals 1 when the
positions of chairman and CEO are held by the same person, otherwise equals 0
when these positions are held by different people (Chen, 2002). The ratio of outside
directors (OUTSIDE) is calculated as the number of outside (non-executive)
directors divided by the number of total directors160. In order to consider the
governance from banks, the ratio of bank representatives (BANK D) is included,
which is calculated as the number of bank representatives divided by the number of
total directors.
Ownership structure: BLOCK; BDOWN; F1NOWN; CROSS; MANOWN.
Based on the argument that companies may substitute devices within mechanisms,
we include five proxy variables to outline ownership structure. Similar to the work
by Kang and Shivdasani (1995), the percentage of ownership accounted for by the
top ten blockholders is captured in the variable BLOCK. Board ownership (BDOWN)
is measured by the directors' shares divided by the total outstanding shares. Financial
ownership (FINOWN) is measured by the shares owned by financial institutions,
such as banks and securities companies, divided by the total outstanding shares.
Cross shareholding ownership (CROSS) measures the ownership owned by other
companies and is computed as the ratio of cross-shareholding shares to total
outstanding shares. In this thesis, managerial ownership (MANOWN) is calculated




According to Taiwanese law there is no regulation to force companies to employ a fixed ratio of
independent directors. Therefore, listed companies in Taiwan seldom employ real independent
directors. If we use the strict "independent" criteria to calculate the variable OUTSIDE, most values
will equal zero. We thus use the number of non-executive directors divided by the number of total
directors to be OUTSIDE.
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Regarding the proxy variable of cash constraints, prior studies are divergent. In some
studies (e.g. Ittner et al., 2003 and Bryan et ah, 2000), the ratio of long-term debt to
total assets (i.e. the leverage level) is treated as external governance from debt
holders. Bryan et al. (2000) explain that the incentive payments align the interests of
managers and shareholders "at the expense of debtholders." Therefore, Bryan et al.
(2000) hypothesise that highly leveraged companies will decrease the intensity of
incentives provided by CEO share-based compensation and shift the structure of
CEO compensation towards cash. However, other studies (e.g. Core and Guay, 2001;
Chen, 2002) view the ratio of long-term debt to total assets as a proxy variable of
cash constraints because companies that have been unable to secure long-term debt
are expected to be "substantially constrained with respect to the debt markets" (Core
and Guay, 2001, p.259).
Following Core and Guay (2001) and Chen (2002), in this thesis we view the
leverage level as a proxy variable for cash constraints because debt holders do not
have voting rights on the board, which indicates that the monitoring ability of debt
holders is low. The variable LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt
to total assets.
Firm Size (SIZE)
There are many different variables to measure firm size, such as the natural logarithm
of sales (e.g. Chen, 2002; Core and Guay, 2001), the natural logarithm of assets (e.g.
Daily et al., 1998), the natural logarithm of employees (e.g. Ittner, 2003) and the
natural logarithm of capitalisation (e.g. Core and Larcker, 2002). Following Daily et
al. (1998), firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets in this
thesis.
Table 9-2 matches the hypotheses with the independent variables.
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Table 9-2 Summary of hypotheses on top executives' compensation
The number of hypotheses is in parentheses.
Average top executives' Top executives'
compensation incentive payment
Firm Performance ROE + (la) +ab)
ROA + (la) + (lb)
TSR + (la) + (lb)
Investment Opportunities RD ? + (2)
Board Composition OUTSIDE 9 -(3)
BANKD 9 -(4)
CHAIR + (5a) + (5b)





Cash Constraint LEVERAGE 9 + (8)
Firm Size SIZE + (9a) + (9b)
Note- „ • . The sum of all top executived compensation
Average top executives compensation - - -
The number of top executives
9.3.3 Measures of Top Executives' Compensation
The disclosure of CEO compensation is not sufficiently transparent in Taiwan as few
relevant regulations have been established. Because of the data limitations, we use
several different measures to evaluate CEO compensation, such as average top
executives' compensation. We introduce the calculation of top executives'
compensation in Part A, top executives' cash and share bonuses in Part B, and CEO
warrants in Part C.
A. Top executives' total compensation
Kato and Kubo (2006) claim that using the average compensation of all directors and
the CEO is not precise161 because it will be significantly reduced by the inclusion of
161 In addition to average top executives' compensation, Kato and Rockel (1992) estimate each CEO's
taxable income by using individual tax returns of CEOs in 599 leading Japanese companies.
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part-time directors162. In Japan, the CEO usually sits on the board. These part-time
directors are "negligible" in the decision-making process (Kato and Kubo, 2006, p.3).
• • • 163Some companies only roughly disclose the total compensation of all directors .
According to the "Survey on Executive Compensation, Reward, and Pensions", the
average compensation of part-time directors is about one quarter of the compensation
of their full-time colleagues (Romu Gyosei Kenkyu Jo, 1988, p. 14). Moreover, the
same survey reveals that more than 80% of companies with 1,000 or more employees
have part-time directors. Among these companies the average number of part-time
directors in a company is 2.5.
In Taiwan, unfortunately, companies do not disclose CEO compensation separately
from other top executives' compensation. Before 2004, Taiwanese companies only
disclosed the sum of top executives' compensation. According to the few Taiwanese
companies that disclosed CEO and top executives' compensation separately in 2004,
it can be seen that the difference between CEO compensation and that of other top
executives is not significant. Therefore, in this thesis we use the average top
executives' compensation (ATEC) for those companies that only disclose the sum of
top executives' compensation. In 2004, some Taiwanese companies started to
disclose data of individual CEO compensation. For these companies we use the
individual CEO compensation directly. The first variable is ATEC which can be
written as follows164:
ATEC, = Ln{[{base salary), + (cash bonus), +
{the number of shares), x {yearly average share price), + NUMt {BSt) +
{other compensation), ] /{the number of top executives),}
where NUM, {BS,) = the value of warrants, which is calculated by Black-Scholes on
162 Directors who are not executive officers receive fixed amounts of compensation according to their
duties and whether they are full-time or part-time directors.
163 The Japanese companies seldom disclose any compensation information. Although some
companies disclose compensation information, they disclose it in a rough way - the sum of directors'
compensation, auditors' compensation, and CEO compensation.
164 The top executives here depend on the definition of the company. Some companies only include
CEO, CFO, and COO as top executives but some companies include some other senior managers to
be top executives. No matter what the definition is, CEO is always one of the top executives. We
divide the sum of top executives' compensation by the number of top executives as disclosed by the
company in its annual report.
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the grant day165.
ATEC is a very rough estimation of CEO compensation under the data limitations.
Fortunately, although most Taiwanese companies only disclose the total value of
compensation received by all top executives, some disclosed individual CEO
compensation in 2004, which leads to the establishment of the other variable - the
adjusted CEO compensation (W_CEO_PAY). By using the individual CEO
compensation data, we compare the difference between actual CEO compensation
and the average top executives' compensation (ATEC) in 2004 and then obtain the
adjusted index of CEO compensation. The adjusted index of a company can be
calculated as:
X
The adjusted index = —-— = Wr (1)
TJN,
i: company i
X: the actual CEO compensation in company i
T: the total compensation paid to top executives in company i
N: the number of top executives whose compensation is added into the sum of
compensation in company i
When Wt is greater than one, it means that actual CEO compensation is greater than
the average top executives' compensation in company i and we would always expect
this variable to be greater than 1.0. There are 21 companies that disclosed the
individual CEO compensation in 2004. After deleting the missing data166, we finally
obtained data from 15 companies to calculate the adjusted index of CEO
compensation. Equation (2) was used to sum up the 15 adjusted indices and obtain
the average adjusted index.
165 The calculation of values of shares and warrants will be described in the following Part B.
166 Six companies do disclose individual CEO compensation but they do not disclose other top
executives' compensation. Therefore, we cannot obtain their adjusted indices of CEO compensation.
Only 15 companies disclose both individual CEO compensation and other top executives'
compensation.
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k: the total number of companies which disclose the individual CEO
compensation
The average adjusted index of CEO compensation is 1.71, the maximum is 4.66 and
the minimum is 1.03. Panel A in Table 9-3 shows the relationship between the
number of top executives and the adjusted index of CEO compensation for every
company. From Panel B in Table 9-3, we can observe that most adjusted indices of
companies are located in the range 1.2-1.3.
Figure 9-1 shows a diagram of the adjusted index for every company. Based on the
hypothesis that CEO compensation is much higher than other executives'
compensation, we anticipate a convex line. That is, when the number of top
executives increases, the average top executives' compensation (ATEC) should be
lower than actual CEO compensation. However, according to Figure 9-1 the
argument is not supported. The main reason may be the lack of observations, which
results in outliers. If we include more observations, the line in Figure 9-1 may be
more convex.
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Table 9-3 The relationship between the number of executives and the adjusted
index
Panel A Panel B
The number of executives whose „r
w,





2.00 1.68 <1 0
2.00 1.06 1-1.1 2
3.00 1.53 1.1-1.2 1
4.00 1.28 1.2-1.3 4
4.00 1.38 1.3-1.4 1
4.00 1.51 1.5-1.6 3
5.00 1.25 1.6-1.7 1
5.00 1.28 1.7-1.8 0
5.00 1.24 1.8-1.9 0
6.00 1.03 1.9-2 0











» t The actual line The hypothesised line
Figure 9-1 The relationship between the number of top executives and the
adjusted index of CEO compensation
If we classify the companies into GLC and non-GLC groups, we find that the
average adjusted index of CEO compensation is 1.26 for GLCs and 2.23 for
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non-GLCs. From the indices in Table 9-4, we observe that the adjusted indices in
non-GLCs are higher than those in GLCs, which implies that the CEO has a greater
level of compensation in non-GLCs. Obviously, we should not use the same average
adjusted index for GLCs and non-GLCs because the index for non-GLCs is much
higher than that for GLCs. Therefore, in addition to the original average adjusted
index (1.71), we have the GLCs adjusted index (1.26) and the non-GLCs adjusted
index (2.23).
Table 9-4 The adjusted indices of CEO compensation for GLCs and non-GLCs
GLCs
Company Name SIC code Wt
Chunghwa Telecom Co. Ltd 2412 1.14
ChangHwa Commerical Bank 2801 1.25
Taiwan Business Bank 2834 1.03
Taiwan Styrene Monomer Corporation 1310 1.28
Union Bank ofTaiwan 2838 1.28
The Chinese Bank 2831 1.38
Basso Industry Corp. 1527 1.68
China Steel Chemical Co. 1723 1.06
Average 1.26 «
non-GLCs
Company Name SIC code Wt
ChungHwa Picture Tubes Ltd. 2475 4.66
ZyXEL Communications Corporation 2391 2.65
Taiwan SecomCo. Ltd. 9917 1.55
Ichia Technologies Inc. 2402 1.24
Kenda Rubber Industrial Co. Ltd. 2106 1.51
Grand Pacific Petrochemical Corp. 1312 1.53
Test Rite Internaional Co. Ltd. 2908 2.46
Average 2.23 -
GLC adjusted index
■ Non-GLC adjusted index
For those companies that do not disclose individual CEO compensation, we use the
average adjusted index to adjust CEO compensation. We use the original data for
companies that do disclose individual CEO compensation. As well as using the
average adjusted index (index=1.71) to calculate the adjusted CEO compensation, we
also use the GLCs adjusted index (index=1.26) and non-GLCs adjusted index
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(index=2.23) to adjust CEO compensation. Finally, we take the natural logarithm for
the adjusted compensation as the value of the variable (W_CEO_PAY). The adjusted
CEO compensation for all companies, GLCs and non-GLCs, is computed as follows.
The adjusted CEO compensation for all companies
_lnj (The total compensation granted to top executives)k x j yJ"
1 1.71 + lx(JVt -1) X J
The adjusted CEO compensation ofGLCs for company i
_ ^ f (The total compensation granted to top executives)x j 26 i (2)
{ 1.26 + 1 x(N, -1) X J
The adjusted CEO compensation of non-GLCs for company j
(The total compensation granted to top executives)
Tnj -x2.23> (3)1
2.23 +1 x (N ■ -1) 1
where N is the number of top executives whose compensation is included in the total
compensation. For example, in Equation (1), the weight of the CEO (weight=1.71) is
different from it of other top executives (weight=1.0). The total weight is 1.71 +
lx(the number of top executives excluding CEO). Therefore, 1.71+1 x(Nk-l) is
observed in Equation (1).
B. Top executives' cash and share bonuses
It is more meaningful to examine the structure top executives' compensation rather
than the amount of top executives' compensation (Main and Johnston, 1993; Main,
2004). Therefore, in addition to the average top executives' compensation and
adjusted CEO compensation, we examine top executives' cash and share bonuses in
Part B and CEO warrants in Part C.
There are two kinds of employees' bonuses granted to the top executives - cash and
shares. Since most companies only disclose the information of top executives'
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compensation, the first measure (FVBONUS TOTAL) is the ratio of the average top
executives' cash bonuses and shares bonuses calculated by par value167 to average
top executives' compensation (ATEC). The second measure (MVBONUS TOTAL)
is the ratio of the average top executives' cash bonuses and shares bonuses calculated
by market value to the average top executives' compensation (ATEC).
FVBONUS_TOTAL, =
cash bonus, + the number of shares, x par value
ATEC calculated by par value,
MVBONUS
_ TOTAL, =
cash bonus, + the number of shares, x yearly average share pricej
ATEC calaulated by market value,
where
(ATEC)t calculated by par value
= Ln{[{base salary), + {cash bonus),
{the number of shares), x {par variable), + NUM, {BSt) +
{other compensation),]/{the number of top executives),}
{ATEC), calculated by market value
= Ln{ [{base salary), + {cash bonus),
{the number of shares), x {yearly average share price), + NUM, (BS,) +
{other compensation),]l{the number of top executives),}
where NUM, {BS,) = the value of warrants which is calculated by Black-Scholes on
the grant day.
C. CEO warrants
The most controversial topic in the area of compensation is the calculation of share
options. Most studies use the Black-Scholes Model to calculate this. Hall and
167
Par value is the nominal amount assigned to a security by the issuer. For an equity security, par
value is usually a very small amount that bears no relationship to its market price, except for preferred
stock, in which case par value is used to calculate dividend payments. The par value of a share in
Taiwan is NTD10.
168 Market value here is the yearly average share price.
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Murphy (2002) claim that "restricting the trading and hedging activities of option
recipients creates a divergence between the cost and value of executive stock
options" (Hall and Murphy, 2002, p.5). Based on this divergence, the opportunity
cost of an option to a company obviously exceeds the value of the option from the
perspective of a risk-averse, undiversified executive who can neither sell the option
nor hedge against its risk. Hall and Murphy (2002) use a certainty-equivalence
framework to analyse the cost, value, and pay-performance sensitivity of
non-tradable options, which are held by risk-averse, undiversified executives. They
find that the Black-Scholes values are much higher than the real values evaluated by
executives who are granted options.
The certainty-equivalence framework, however, assumes that the executive has a
constant relative risk aversion p and a constant specific portfolio, which is split
between company shares and safe cash. It is very difficult to know the risk aversion p
and the portfolio of CEOs. Therefore, the certainty-equivalence framework is
difficult to implement in the empirical analysis of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognise that the warrant value is higher than the real values evaluated
by executives. In this thesis we still use the Black-Scholes Model to calculate the
warrant value.
The Black and Scholes Model is:
C = SN(d])-Ke{-r,)N(d1)
sdt
d2 = dl — s4t
C: theoretical option price
S: current stock price
t: time until option expiration
K: option striking price
r: risk-free interest rate
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N: cumulative standard normal distribution
e: exponential term
In: natural logarithm
The variable WARRANT TOTAL is the ratio of the warrants value granted to the
CEO to average top executives' compensation (ATEC).
tj/ a t> t> a \ tt twt a t The value °f warrants granted to the CEO,WARRANT TOTAL, = ■
ATEC calculated by market value,
Since the number of companies which distribute warrants is small, it is meaningless
the run regressions with observations less than 30169. In order to run regressions, this
thesis combines cash, share bonuses, and warrants to create two new variables
(SHAREBASEDF and SHAREBASED_M).
SHAREBASED
_ Ft] = FVBONUS _ TOTAL, + WARRANT _ TOTALl
SHAREBASED
_ M, = MVBONUS _ TOTAL, +WARRANT _ TOTAL,
Most importantly, the period of each dependent variable is different because of data
limitations. Taiwanese companies only disclose the structure of top executives'
compensation after 2004. Table 9-5 is a typical example of the disclosure of
compensation information in the annual report in 2004. Before then it is impossible
to obtain the structure of top executives' compensation. Therefore, 2004 is the only
the period of FVBONUS TOTAL, MVBONUS_TOTAL, SHAREBASED F, and
SHAREBASED_M. Similarly, the adjusted indices are not available before 2004
because no company disclosed individual CEO total compensation before then. Thus,
the period of WCEOPAY is 2004 only. The periods of other compensation
variables are from 2001 to 2004. Table 9-7 lists the period of each dependent variable.
169 The number of left-censored data (i.e. companies which do not grant warrants) is 230 among 244
GLCs and 500 among 552 non-GLCs. That is, from 2001-2004, only 14 GLCs and 52 non-GLCs
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In this thesis, we examine some regressions with panel data. Considering the
possibility that the company and the time may influence the dependent variables
significantly, instead of using the ordinary least square (OLS), we use the
fixed-effects model and the random-effects model. In addition, not all companies
grant shares and warrants to CEOs every year (Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay, 1999;
Bryan et al., 2000). Therefore, we test some hypotheses by using a Tobit model and a
random-effects Tobit model because some dependent variables are left-censored.
One hypothesis we investigate in this thesis is, do non-GLCs align the interests of top
executives and the interests of shareholders better than GLCs? In general, non-GLCs
are found to be more efficient than GLCs (Mascarenhas, 1989; Agrawal and Knoeber,
2001; La Porta et ah, 2002; Sun et ah, 2002; Shleifer, 1998; Megginson and Netter,
2001; Schipani and Liu, 2001). In order to answer this question, we classify our
observations into two groups - GLCs and non-GLCs. As before, when there are one
or more directors from the government or state-owned enterprises or the percentage
of government shares to total outstanding shares exceeds 5%, the company will be
classified as a GLC; otherwise the company is classified as a non-GLC. Finally, there
are 61 GLCs and 138 non-GLCs. We use the Chow test to compare whether there is a
significant difference between these two groups. Table 9-6 shows the Chow test
results. It can be seen that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level for all
dependent variables. That is, the difference between GLCs and non-GLCs is
significant. Therefore, grouping the two kinds of companies into the same regression
may not be appropriate. We will run regressions and discuss the empirical results for
GLCs and non-GLCs separately in Chapter 10.
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Table 9-6 The results of the Chow test
Dependent Variable F-value F (critical value=0.01, k, n-2k) Result
ATEC 16.06 2.06 Reject
FVBONUSTOTAL 11.11 2.15 Reject
MVBONUSTOTAL 10.83 2.15 Reject
SHAREBASEF 7.02 2.15 Reject
SHAREBASEM 6.87 2.15 Reject
In the following we will introduce the methodologies we use to test our hypotheses.
The fixed-effects model used here is as follows:
=0C + flXj, + Y1W\t + 72^2 1 + 73^31 + + 7jV-l^(JV-l)t
^
+ S2Zi2 + S3Zj3 + + STZiT + sit
where
Wit = 1 for the ith individual, i=l, 2,...(N-1)
= 0 otherwise
Zit = 1 for the tlh time period, t=2, 3, 4
= 0 otherwise
_ {ESS.-ESSMN +T-l) ...
N+T-2,NT-N-T
(£SS2)/(NT ~N ~ T)
where T is number of years, which equals 3; N=61 in the GLCs group; N=138 in the
non-GLCs group.
The test involves a comparison of the error sum of squares associated with the two
estimation model. If the increase in the error sum of squares is not significant, we
conclude that the restrictions are proper and OLS can be applied. If the error sum of
squares changes substantially we opt for the fixed-effects model.
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There are some problems related to the use of the fixed-effects model. The regression
can be shifted by time or observations. Moreover, a considerable number of dummy
variables will require a substantial number of degrees of freedom. Therefore, in
addition to the fixed-effects model, we also use the more parsimonious
random-effects model. The inclusion of dummy variables represents a lack of
knowledge about the model. Therefore, we should observe this lack of knowledge
through the error term. We thus wish to choose a pooled cross-section and time-series
model in which error terms are correlated across time and observations (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1998). The random-effects model can achieve this objective, as follows:
Yit=a + pX,t+slt (5)
sit =ut +v, +wu (6)
where u: ~ N(0, a\) = cross-section error component
v; ~ N(0, crv2) = time-series error component
wit ~ vV(0, ct2 )= combined error component
The random-effects model equation is obtained by assuming that the mean effect of
the random time-series and cross-section variables is included in the intercept term.
The random deviations of the mean are equal to the error components, ut and vt,
respectively. To explain this more clearly, we can say that the error term consists of
three components and has the variance as follows:
Var(sit) = cr2 + cr2 + <x2 (7)
From Equation (7) it can be seen that if both cr2 and cr2 are equal to zero, the
error term consists of a single combined disturbance. On this occasion there is no
difference between applying the ordinary least-square regression (OLS) and the
random-effects model. In this thesis the random-effects model is estimated as a
generalised least-squares regression (GLS). The estimation weights observations
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inversely to their variances. In the estimation a two-stage process is used. In the first
stage, the whole pooled sample is estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS).
The OLS residuals are used to calculate sample estimates of the variance components.
The second stage will use these estimated variances. In this way, GLC parameter
estimates are obtained.
Statistically, the fixed-effects model can give consistent results, but it may not be the
most efficient model. The random-effects model may have more efficient estimates.
Therefore, after estimating parameters by running the fixed-effects model and the
random-effects model, we use the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to observe which
one is more efficient. We will use the fixed-effects model when the null hypothesis is
rejected. The Hausman test statistic is computed as follows:
Ho: The fixed-effects model is appropriate. The preferred estimator is least squares
with dummy variables. This is fife.
Hi; The random-effects model is appropriate. The preferred estimator is generalised
least squares (GLS) with dummy variables. This is /3re.
Additionally, for those dependent variables with censored data, the Tobit model is
used. For example, the dependent variable FVBONUS_TOTAL and
MVBONUSTOTAL, SHAREBASED F, and SHAREBASEDM are left-censored
because some top executives are not granted share-based compensation in 2004. For
those top executives who do not have share-based compensation in 2004 the value of
the observation is zero. Thus, in the Tobit model, the left limit will be set to zero.
To sum up, we will implement different regression models to fit different dependent
variables. Table 9-7 summarises the regression models used in the analysis. The
detailed regression equation will be explained with the empirical results in Chapter
(8)
Table 9-7 The summary of regression models
Dependent variable Research period Data format Regression method
ATEC 2001-2004 panel data Mxed-effects model or Random-effects mode
W CEO PAY 2004 general data OLS
FVBONUS TOTAL 2004 censored data Tobit model
MVBONUS TOTAL 2004 censored data Tobit model
SHAREBASED F 2004 censored data Tobit model
SHAREBASED M 2004 censored data Tobit model
9.5 Conclusion
Academic research on the topic of CEO compensation has a long history. The vast
majority of research in this area has been conducted in the US and the UK (Main,
2004). While the present papers extend the literature by analysing non-executive
employees' incentive payments (Core and Guay, 2001), the adoption of
sub-committees (Main and Johnson, 1993; Conyon, 1997; Conyon and Peck, 1998;
Peck and Ruigrok, 2002), and the value of options evaluated by executives (Hall and
Murphy, 2002, 2003), relevant literature in Asia is still sparse because the disclosure
of compensation information is not transparent enough. In this thesis we try to use
the latest data, disclosed under the new regulations in Taiwan, to examine whether
the alignment function of share-based compensation is also significant in Taiwan.
In this chapter, we build hypotheses based on prior literature. Corporate governance
is generally considered to be the set of complementary mechanisms that can align the
interests ofmanagers with those of shareholders. Monitoring actions by the board of
directors, debt holders, or institutional blockholders can have an important impact on
firm performance (e.g. Jensen (1989); Mehran, (1995); Core, Holthausen and Larcker,
(1999); Holderness, 2003). Another important and often debated component of the
governance structure is the compensation contract selected for providing
compensation to executives. Among the hypotheses, we not only examine the
influence of corporate governance on total compensation for top executives, but also
investigate the influence on share-based compensation for top executives. Similar to
much of the literature regarding corporate governance, research on share-based
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compensation has generated not only useful insights, but has also produced many
contradictory findings. As an organising principle of this chapter, we follow a
traditional agency-theory framework to build our hypotheses.
Additionally, we also introduce the sample, data, the calculation of dependent and
independent variables, and the methodologies. Owing to data limitations, different
methods are used to estimate top executives' (CEO) compensation. By comparing the
difference between actual CEO compensation and average top executives'
compensation, adjusted CEO compensation is created. Regarding the regressions,
different methodologies are adopted to fit different dependent variables. In this thesis
the fixed-effect model, the random-effect model, the Tobit model, and the
random-effect Tobit model are used. Furthermore, according to the Chow test results,
observations are also classified as GLCs or non-GLCs. In the following chapter,
GLCs and non-GLCs will be examined separately to observe whether these two
groups possess different characteristics on corporate governance mechanisms and




Empirical Results of Top Executives'
Compensation in Taiwan
10.1 Introduction
The review of the institutional background of top executives' compensation in
Taiwan is presented in Chapter 8. From Chapter 8, we can conclude that the relevant
laws in Taiwan, which regulate the calculation and disclosure of CEO compensation,
are not nearly as complete compared to those in the US and the UK. Fortunately, the
authorities in Taiwan have recently started to reform corporate governance. Many
laws have been established in the last few years. These new laws improve the level of
disclosure and the transparency of compensation. Based on the latest data and prior
literature, Chapter 9 builds the hypotheses that highlight the relationship between top
executives' compensation and corporate governance mechanisms. In addition,
Chapter 9 introduces the variables and describes their construction.
In this Chapter, we describe the descriptive statistics in Section 10.2.1. In Section
10.2.2, we discuss the empirical results of the analysis of top executives'
compensation in GLCs and non-GLCs and make a comparison with prior studies.
Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 10.3.
10.2 Empirical Results
10.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before discussing the regression models in Sections 10.2.2 and 10.2.3, we first
discuss the descriptive statistics for variables in GLCs and non-GLCs. Table 10-1
presents the descriptive statistics for total observations, GLCs, and non-GLCs. The
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mean of average top executives' compensation (ATEC) is 15.38 InNTD in GLCs
(Panel B, Table 10-1) and 15.30 InNTD in non-GLCs (Panel C, Table 10-1). By
comparing the three tables it can be seen that although average top executives'
compensation (ATEC) in non-GLCs is lower than that in GLCs, the ratio of top
executives' share-based compensation to top executives' compensation
(FVBONUSTOTAL, MVBONUSTOTAL, and WARRANTTOTAL) are all
higher in non-GLCs than in GLCs. Given this, we can conclude that non-GLCs in
Taiwan are more willing to grant share-based compensation to top executives and
than GLCs. The compensation structure of top executives in GLCs is based mainly
on base salary rather than share-based incentive payments. According to agency
theory, these statistics also indicate that the interests of top executives in non-GLCs
are aligned to those of shareholders more significantly than in GLCs. However, given
the phenomenon of family control in Taiwan and the higher ratio of CEO duality in
non-GLCs, increasing the ratio of share-based compensation may merely be a
method of increasing top executives' benefits (Hall and Murphy, 2002, 2003).
For other variables, the mean of the ratio of research and development expenses to
total sales (RD) is 2.38% for non-GLCs, which is higher than that in GLCs. In board
composition, the CEOs of non-GLCs are more likely to occupy the chairman position
and the boards have a lower ratio of outside directors and bank representatives,
which indicates that the CEOs in non-GLCs may be more influential and less
monitored than those in GLCs. Meanwhile, the mean of board ownership (BDOWN)
is 11.60% in non-GLCs, which is higher than that in GLCs. Furthermore, firm size of
GLCs is bigger than that of non-GLCs, and it may just be that the government is
more likely to appoint directors to large companies.
170 1 USDs 32.78 NTD; 1 GBPS 62.65
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Table 10-1 The descriptive statistics on top executives' compensation
A. All observations
N Period Min Max Mean Std.
CEO Conpensation AVECEOPAY 796 2001-2004 12.61 19.15 15.33 0.71
W_CEO_PAY 199 (note 1) 2004 13.15 18.47 15.55 0.85
FVBONUS_TOTAL 199 2004 0.00 84.14 15.16 20.62
MVBONUSTOTAL 199 2004 0.00 98.26 22.09 30.04
WARRANT_TOTAL 796 2001-2004 0.00 97.79 4.28 16.10
Performance ROE 796 2001-2004 -141.08 67.78 8.90 15.89
ROA 796 2001-2004 -54.32 50.64 6.45 8.79
TSR 796 2001-2004 -85.84 659.51 28.37 73.79
Investment Opportunities RD 796 2001-2004 0.00 44.60 2.16 4.22
Board Composition CHAIR 796 2001-2004 0.00 1.00 0.20 24.46
OUTSIDE 796 2001-2004 0.00 100.00 41.95 11.90
BANK D 796 2001-2004 0.00 81.82 5.85 0.40
Ownership Structure BLOCK 796 2001-2004 5.03 95.32 37.15 16.43
BDOWN 796 2001-2004 0.00 70.61 9.41 10.86
FINOWN 796 2001-2004 0.00 55.88 3.84 6.36
CROSS 796 2001-2004 0.01 79.92 23.99 18.72
MANOWN 796 2001-2004 0.00 8.37 0.43 1.03
Cash Constraints LEVERAGE 796 2001-2004 0.00 86.17 24.25 16.25
Firm Size SIZE 796 2001-2004 21.16 28.61 23.89 1.33
B. GLCs
N Period Min Max Mean Std.
CEO Conpensation AVECEOPAY 244 2001-2004 13.31 19.15 15.38 0.73
W CEO PAY (1.71) 61 (note 1) 2004 13.44 18.47 15.52 0.90
WCEOPAY (1.26) 61 2004 13.27 18.20 15.31 0.87
FVBONUSTOTAL 61 2004 0.00 78.01 12.60 21.16
MVBONUS_TOTAL 61 2004 0.00 98.26 17.17 29.65
WARRANTTOTAL 244 2001-2004 0.00 97.79 2.92 13.10
Performance ROE 244 2001-2004 -141.08 34.50 4.82 17.32
ROA 244 2001-2004 -54.32 24.05 3.73 8.35
TSR 244 2001-2004 -85.84 643.33 21.06 58.42
Investment Opportunities RD 244 2001-2004 0.00 32.02 1.65 3.77
Board Composition CHAIR 244 2001-2004 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34
OUTSIDE 244 2001-2004 0.00 100.00 48.89 26.31
BANK_D 244 2001-2004 0.00 81.82 10.94 16.66
Ownership Structure BLOCK 244 2001-2004 6.16 95.32 38.26 17.24
BDOWN 244 2001-2004 0.00 47.54 4.47 6.84
FINOWN 244 2001-2004 0.00 55.88 4.88 9.10
CROSS 244 2001-2004 0.01 79.81 22.50 18.11
MANOWN 244 2001-2004 0.00 8.37 0.41 1.12
Cash Constraints LEVERAGE 244 2001-2004 0.00 86.17 23.86 16.51
Firm Size SIZE 244 2001-2004 21.55 28.61 24.58 1.46
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C. Non-GLCs
N Period Min Max Mean Std.
CEO Conpensation AVECEOPAY 552 2001-2004 12.61 18.37 15.30 0.70
W_CEO_PAY (1.71) 138 (note 1) 2004 13.15 18.29 15.56 0.83
W_CEO_PAY (2.23) 138 2004 13.25 18.31 15.74 0.84
FVBONUSTOTAL 138 2004 0.00 84.14 16.30 20.36
MVBONUS_TOTAL 138 2004 0.00 95.02 24.26 30.05
WARRANT_TOTAL 552 2001-2004 0.00 92.21 4.88 17.24
Performance ROE 552 2001-2004 -90.35 67.78 10.70 14.88
ROA 552 2001-2004 -30.21 50.64 7.66 8.73
TSR 552 2001-2004 -76.37 659.51 31.60 79.48
Investment Opportunities RD 552 2001-2004 0.00 44.60 2.38 4.39
Board Composition CHAIR 552 2001-2004 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43
OUTSIDE 552 2001-2004 0.00 100.00 38.89 22.97
BANKD 552 2001-2004 0.00 60.00 3.60 8.08
Ownership Structure BLOCK 552 2001-2004 5.03 89.25 36.66 16.05
BDOWN 552 2001-2004 0.00 70.61 11.60 11.57
FINOWN 552 2001-2004 0.00 31.75 3.37 4.59
CROSS 552 2001-2004 0.53 79.92 24.66 18.96
MANOWN 552 2001-2004 0.00 7.67 0.44 0.99
Cash Constraints LEVERAGE 552 2001-2004 0.00 77.05 24.43 16.14
Firm Size SIZE 552 2001-2004 21.16 28.05 23.59 1.14
Note 1: Due to data limitations, the time period for some variables (WCEOPAY, FVBONUSTOTAL, and
MVBONUS TOTAL) is 2004 only. Hence, the number of companies for these variables is one-fourth of the number
of companies for the variable ATEC.
In addition to the statistics in Table 10-1, Figure 10-1 shows the compensation
structure of top executives and non-executive employees. In Figure 10-1 (A), from
2001 to 2003, the average value of base salary and shares for top executives'
increases from NTD 4,721,802.59 (around USD 143,258.57) to NTD 5,184,855.61
(around USD 157,307.51), whereas the value of warrants granted to CEOs increases
from NTD 466,187.98 (around USD 14,144.05) to 2,093,543.07 (around USD
63,517.69). The increasing rate of the value of CEO warrants is 36 times more than
the increasing rate of the average value of base salary and shares for top executives'.
In order to compare, the structure of the non-executive employees' compensation is
drawn in Figure 10-1 (B). Comparing Figure 10-1 (A) with Figure 10-1 (B), it can be
seen that Taiwanese companies grant a higher ratio of incentive payments to top
executives than to non-executive employees. From Table 10-1 and Figure 10-1, we
can conclude that the interests of top executives rather than those of employees are
better aligned with the interests of shareholders from the viewpoint of agency theory.
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Note: Taiwanese companies seldom disclosed top executives' base pay, cash bonuses, and share bonuses
separately before 2004. Therefore, we only obtain the value of base pay, cash bonuses, and share bonuses in
Part (A).
Figure 10-1 The structure of top executives' and non-executive employees'
compensation in Taiwan, 2001-2004: All observations
10.2.2 Empirical Results of Top Executives' Compensation
In this section, we discuss the empirical results of the relationship between top
executives' compensation and the corporate governance mechanism in GLCs and
non-GLCs. In order to explain and compare these results methodically, first, in Part A
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we examine the results of the relationship between top executives' compensation and
corporate governance mechanisms. The relationship between top executives'
incentive payments and the corporate governance mechanisms are investigated in
Part B.
A. Top executives' compensation and corporate governance mechanisms
In the area of top executives' compensation, four kinds of variables are examined:
average top executives' compensation (ATEC) and three adjusted CEO compensation
171 •
variables (WCEOPAY) with different adjusted indices . For top executives'
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compensation, the empirical model is :
(Top executives' compensation),, =a0 + a} ROEit_x +a2ROAn+a3TSRjt_x +a4RDtll +
a5CHAIR,,+ a6OUTSIDEll_x + a7BANK _ Dit_x +
aiBLOCKit_, + ccgBDOWNil_l + awFINOWNit_x +
axxCROSSit_x +anMANOWNit.A +anLEVERAGEjt_x +
®14SIZEit_x +sit
Since the variable ATEC uses panel data, both a fixed-effects model and a
random-effects model are possible. We use the Hausman test to determine which one
is more appropriate. Table 10-2 presents the Hausman test results. According to the
chi-square statistic (39.45 for GLCs and 22.44 for non-GLCs), we reject the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between a fixed-effects model and a
random-effects model at the 10% level for GLCs and non-GLCs when the dependent
variable is ATEC. Therefore, we will use the fixed-effects model in the following to
estimate parameters for the dependent variable, ATEC.
171 In Section 9.3.3, we explain that using the same adjusted index for GLCs and non-GLCs is not
appropriate because the adjusted index for non-GLCs is much higher than for GLCs. Therefore, in
empirical analysis, we use the general adjusted index (1.71), the GLCs adjusted index (1.26), and the
non-GLCs adjusted index (2.23) to run regressions.
172 ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. ROA: calculated by
dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets. TSR: the total return on shares assuming
dividends are reinvested. RD: the ratio of R&D expense to total sales. CHAIR: a dummy variable
which measures CEO duality. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BANK D: the ratio of
the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. BLOCK: the
percentage of blockholder ownership. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. FINOWN: the
ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of institutional
shares to total outstanding shares. MANOWN: the percentage of managerial ownership. LEVERAGE:
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. SIZE: the natural logarithm of total assets.
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Table 10-2 Hausman test for the dependent variable ATEC
GLCs Non-GLCs
Variable Fixed-Effects Random-Effects Difference Fixed-Effects Random-Effects Difference
ROE -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
ROA 0.008 0.017 -0.009 0.016 0.019 -0.003
TSR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RD -0.039 0.028 -0.067 -0.005 0.009 -0.014
CHAIR 0.012 0.205 -0.193 0.054 0.079 -0.025
OUTSIDE -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
BANKD -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001
BLOCK 0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006
BDOWN 0.008 0.012 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001
FINOWN 0.016 0.000 0.016 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006
CROSS -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.000
MANOWN 0.100 0.061 0.039 0.044 0.029 0.015
LEVERAGE -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
SIZE 0.196 0.108 0.088 0.255 0.176 0.080
Chi-square statistic 39.45 (0.000)*** 22.44(0.070)*
Dependent variable: ATEC
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Table 10-3 presents the empirical results for GLCs and non-GLCs for the dependent
variable ATEC. According to Hypothesis la, average top executives' compensation is
expected to be positively associated with firm performance. Surprisingly, all of the
proxy variables of firm performance are insignificant for GLCs whereas only ROA is
positive and significant at the 10% level for non-GLCs. However, in both GLCs and
nom-GLCs, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of three performance variables
(ROE, ROA, and TSR) equal zero concurrently cannot be rejected by using the F test.
Meanwhile, in line with Hypothesis 9a, average top executives' compensation is
positively associated with firm size (SIZE) in GLCs and non-GLCs. In a meta
analysis of CEO compensation studies, Tosi et al. (2000) claim that firm size
accounts for 40% compensation variance, whereas firm performance only accounts
for 5%. Using the rough variable ATEC, our result, which shows that firm size rather
than firm performance is significant in GLCs and non-GLCs, supports the work of
Tosi et al. (2000).
For board composition, OUTSIDE is negative and significant at the 5% level in
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GLCs, which means that companies pay less top executives' compensation when the
ratio of outside directors on the board is higher. However, the situation in non-GLCs
is different. There, the relationship between outside directors and average top
executives' compensation (ATEC) is not significant, whereas the relationship
between the ratio of shares owned by blockholders to total outstanding shares
(BLOCK) and ATEC is negative and significant in non-GLCs. The negative
relationship between ATEC and BLOCK indicates that the blockholders will reduce
top executives' compensation. However, the negative relationship between BLOCK
and ATEC contradicts the result in the work by Lin (2005), which finds no significant
relationship between blockholder ownership and CEO compensation.
Table 10-3 The regression results of the fixed-effects model for CEO total
compensation (ATEC)
Dependent variable: ATEC, the natural logarithm of average top executives' compensation
GLCs Non-GLCs
Variable beta t-value significance beta t-value s ignificance
constant 10.802 3.820 0.000*** 9.584 4.740 0.000***
ROE -0.002 -0.440 0.660 -0.003 -0.600 0.548
ROA 0.008 0.760 0.449 0.016 1.770 0.077*
TSR 0.000 0.230 0.821 0.000 -0.340 0.735
RD -0.039 -1.500 0.135 -0.005 -0.440 0.657
CHAIR 0.012 0.060 0.950 0.054 0.490 0.623
OUTSIDE -0.004 -1.980 0.049** 0.001 0.750 0.451
BANKD -0.005 -0.830 0.406 -0.005 -1.120 0.261
BLOCK 0.005 0.830 0.407 -0.008 -1.650 0.100*
BDOWN 0.008 0.580 0.560 -0.006 -1.180 0.239
FINOWN 0.016 1.140 0.257 -0.008 -1.130 0.257
CROSS -0.004 -0.870 0.385 -0.003 -0.870 0.383
MANOWN 0.100 0.970 0.332 0.044 1.320 0.187
LEVERAGE -0.007 -1.260 0.211 0.001 0.250 0.806

















Although the empirical results above reveal the relationship between average top
executives' total compensation (ATEC) and other variables, the dependent variable
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ATEC is less than ideal. ATEC is obtained by dividing the sum of top executives'
compensation by the number of top executives. The possibility of underestimating
CEO compensation is higher when the number of top executives is larger because it
will be diluted by other executives' compensation. After multiplying an adjusted
index on average top executives' compensation, the new variable WCEOPAY
should be closer to the actual CEO total compensation173. We first use 1.71 as the
adjusted index for both GLCs and non-GLCs. Afterwards, we use 1.26 for GLCs and
2.23 for non-GLCs as adjusted indices174.
Table 10-4 displays the empirical results. Similar to the previous results in Table 10-3,
in Table 10-4 the ratio of outside directors (OUTSIDE) in GLCs is negatively related
to adjusted CEO total compensation (adjusted indices are 1.71 and 1.26). Firm size
(SIZE) is also positively associated with adjusted CEO total compensation (adjusted
indices are 1.71 and 1.26). However, we are more concerned with addressing
dissimilarities. After multiplying the adjusted indices (1.71 and 1.26) by average top
executives' compensation (ATEC), return on assets (ROA) and CEO duality (CHAIR)
have a positive and significant influence on WCEOPAY. This finding is consistent
with Hypothesis la, which states that average top executives' compensation is
positively related to past firm performance. Furthermore, when the positions of CEO
and chairman are held by the same person, W_CEO_PAY will increase by 94.84
percentage points (adjusted index = 1.71) or 91.17 percentage points (adjusted index
= 1.26)175. This indicates that the expansion of CEO power will affect CEO
compensation significantly in GLCs.
In non-GLCs, compared with the empirical results obtained by using ATEC as the
dependent variable in Table 10-3, the empirical results in Table 10-4, which use
adjusted CEO compensation (W CEO PAY, adjusted = 1.71 or 2.23) are similar.
ROA is significant and positive for non-GLCs, which means that the alignment
173 Please refer to Section 9.3.3 for the calculation ofW CEO PAY.
174 For the calculation of adjusted indices, please refer to Section 9.3.3.
175 Given the natural logarithmic of the dependent variable, the marginal impact of CHAIR on
WCEOPAY can be obtained by taking the exponential of the coefficient 0.667 and 0.648. Hence,
we find that the combined position of CEO and chairman will increase CEO compensation 94.84
percentage points or 91.17 percentage points.
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between performance and compensation is more significant when using
W_CEO_PAY. ROE and TSR, however, are not significant in Table 10-4. In addition,
managerial ownership (MANOWN) is positively associated with WCEOPAY
(adjusted index =1.71) and W_CEO_PAY (adjusted index = 2.23). However, here we
can only conclude that the adjusted CEO total compensation in non-GLCs is
positively associated with managerial ownership. The following regressions will
examine whether the structure of top executives' compensation changes with
managerial ownership.
Table 10-4 OLS Regression results for adjusted CEO compensation
(WCEOPAY)
Dependent variable: W CEO PAY, the natural logarithm of adjusted CEO compensation. There are
two different adjusted indices for GLCs and non-GLCs. For GLCs, the two adjusted indices are 1.71
and 1.26, and for non-GLCs they are 1.71 and 2.23. For the calculation of adjusted indices, please
refer to Section 9.3.3.
GLCs Non-GLCs
WCEOPAY (1.71) WCEOPAY (1.26) W_CEO_PAY (1.71) WCEOPAY (2.23)
Variable beta (significance) beta (significance) beta (significance) beta (significance)
constant 11.609(0.000)*** 11.482(0.000)*** 5.339(0.005)*** 5.433(0.003)***
ROE -0.011 (0.472) -0.014(0.357) -0.007 (0.357) -0.007 (0.347)
ROA 0.064(0.052)* 0.068(0.033)** 0.029(0.048)** 0.028 (0.056)*
TSR -0.004(0.464) -0.004 (0.518) 0.001 (0.864) 0.001 (0.868)
RD 0.001 (0.997) 0.005 (0.923) -0.033 (0.124) -0.034 (0.107)
CHAIR 0.667(0.037)** 0.648(0.038)** -0.050 (0.731) -0.073 (0.616)
OUTSIDE -0.012(0.051)* -0.012(0.046)** -0.004 (0.187) -0.004 (0.171)
BANKD 0.001 (0.876) 0.001 (0.883) 0.008(0.341) 0.008 (0.347)
BLOCK -0.008(0.229) -0.008 (0.244) 0.002 (0.603) 0.002 (0.619)
BDOWN 0.007 (0.776) 0.007(0.766) 0.003 (0.766) 0.004 (0.706)
FINOWN -0.022(0.108) -0.022(0.106) -0.003 (0.751) -0.004(0.713)
CROSS -0.002(0.799) -0.002 (0.804) 0.001 (0.909) 0.001 (0.915)
MANOWN -0.041 (0.673) -0.040 (0.674) 0.143 (0.029)** 0.153(0.019)**
LEVERAGE -0.007 (0.253) -0.007 (0.289) -0.007(0.104) -0.008 (0.090)*
SIZE 0.183 (0.058)* 0.176(0.062)* 0.387(0.000)*** 0.391 (0.000)***
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 61 61 138 138
Adjusted R square 0.480 0.477 0.415 0.424
F test for performance 5.730(0.003)*** 5.950(0.003)*** 2.530(0.061)* 2.270 (0.085)*
F test 2.909(0.002)*** 2.884(0.002)*** 4.134(0.000)*** 4.248(0.001)***
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Prior studies reveal that there are many societal similarities between Japan, Korea,
China, and Taiwan, such as political involvement in and family control of companies
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(Claessens et al., 2000). By studying 918 Chinese companies in 1998-2002, Kato and
Long (2004) find that, "cash compensation of Chinese executives is significantly
affected by firm accounting performance as well as stock market performance" (Kato
and Long, 2004, p.23). Buck et al. (2005) and Fung et al. (2002) also report a
i nc
significant influence of performance on executive pay in China . For Japan, Kaplan
(1994) indicates that Japanese executive compensation is related to earnings, share
returns, and sales performance. Kato and Kubo (2006) also find that Japanese CEO
cash compensation is sensitive to firm performance, especially accounting measures.
Moreover, Kato, Kim, and Lee (2004) state that cash compensation of Korean
executives is positively related to share market performance. We find that CEO total
compensation in Taiwan is related to the accounting measures (ROA and ROE), but
not to the share market measure (TSR). This finding is similar to the result found by
Kato and Kubo (2006), but different from those found by Kato, Kim, and Lee (2004).
Moreover, after separating GLCs and non-GLCs, we can observe that the focus of
the monitoring mechanisms is different in GLCs and non-GLCs. In GLCs, outside
directors play the monitoring role whereas in non-GLCs, blockholders play this role.
B. Top executives' share-based compensation and corporate governance mechanisms
In this part, the relationship between top executives' share-based compensation and
corporate governance mechanisms are examined. Although the board of directors,
financial institutions, and other cross-shareholding companies are associated with the
level of CEO compensation, prior studies pay more attention to the structure of CEO
compensation (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Bryan et al., 2000). Since top executives in
Taiwan do not receive shares and warrants every year, the data of dependent
variables are left-censored. Therefore, we use the Tobit model and the random-effects
Tobit model in this part to run the regressions. The empirical model is:
176 Buck et al. (2005) also report a reverse causation running from pay to performance. This thesis,
however, does not discuss this dimension. Based on the viewpoint of agency theory, the alignment
between pay and subsequent performance is examined by many local studies in Taiwan, such as Hsu
(2003) and Yao (1997).
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(Top executives' share-basedcompensation),t =a0 + alROEil_l +a2ROAjt_l +aiTSRi!_l +
a4RD,M +asCHAIRIM+a6OUTSIDEil_1 +
a1BANK_Dl,_l +cc,BLOCKil_l + a9BDOWNu_l +
amFINOWNiJ_l+ anCROSSt,_, + auMANOWNIJlA +
anLEVERAGE]+ auSIZEt+ st,
There are four different variables used to measure top executives' shares
compensation - FVBONUSTOTAL, MVBONUS_TOTAL, SHAREBASED F, and
SHAREBASEDM. Because of data limitations, the period of these variables is 2004
only. Table 10-5 presents the empirical results of share compensation in GLCs and
non-GLCs.
Table 10-5 shows the Tobit regression results of the relationship between top
executives' shares compensation and the hypothesised determinants. The results for
GLCs shown in Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) in Table 10-5 are not very different.
According to the coefficients in columns 1 and 2, it can also be seen that ROE has a
positive influence on top executives' shares compensation. When ROE increases a
one-percentage point, FVBONUS_TOTAL will increase 1.677 percentage points,
and MVBONUS_TOTAL will increase 2.230 percentage points. Hypothesis lb is
supported.
The significant and negative relationship between BANK_D and BLOCK and the
ratio of top executives' shares compensation implies the monitoring role played by
bank representatives and blockholders, and suggests the substitution between various
corporate governance mechanisms (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995;
and Sundaramurthy, Mahoney and Mahoney, 1997; Coles et al., 2001; Engel et al.,
2001; Core and Guay, 2001; and Ittner et ah, 2003). The negative relationship
between BLOCK and the ratio of top executives' share compensation to top
executives' compensation (FVBONUS_TOTAL and MVBONUS TOTAL) is
consistent with prior studies, such as that by Ittner et al. (2003) who find a significant
coefficient of -0.510 (our coefficients are -0.406 and -0.541)177. The relationship
between OUTSIDE and FVBONUS TOTAL is also negative and significant at the
177 The dependent variable in Ittner et al. (2003) is the ratio of equity-based compensation to vice
president's total compensation rather than to CEO total compensation. If the dependent variable is the
ratio of equity-based compensation to CEO total compensation, the coefficient is not significant.
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10% level, which again demonstrates the monitoring roles of outside directors .
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 6 are supported. These results for GLCs also support the
argument in the work by Coles (2001), which demonstrates that companies may
substitute governance choices across mechanisms. For example, in order to
compensate for this lack of external monitoring, the firm may choose to design
performance-sensitive compensation packages and vice verse.
Furthermore, the significant and positive relationship between firm size (SIZE) and
the ratio of CEO shares compensation is also consistent with Hypothesis 9b and
many prior studies (e.g. Baker and Hall, 1998; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Ittner et al.,
2003). The results in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10-5 also demonstrate a
significant and negative relationship between managerial ownership (MANOWN)
and FVBONUS_TOTAL. According to the risk-aversion hypothesis in Hypothesis 7,
when top executives hold a large fraction of their companies' equity, the demand for
more share-based compensation will decrease because they cannot diversify the risk
associated with share-based compensation (Smith and Watt, 1992; Hall and Murphy,
2002, 2003). Our empirical results for GLCs support this argument.
While the results of GLCs are consistent with our hypotheses and prior studies, the
results of non-GLCs are less so. We still obtain a positive and significant relationship
between one accounting measure, ROA, and top executives' shares compensation.
When ROA increases a one-percentage point, FVBONUS TOTAL will increase
1.024 percentage points, and MVBONUS TOTAL will increase 1.539 percentage
points. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis lb. However, the relationship
between TSR and the ratio of CEO shares compensation is significant but negative,
which contradicts Hypothesis lb. This finding implies that companies are more
likely to grant shares to CEOs when the share price does not perform well.
However, the variables for governance, such as OUTSIDE and BLOCK, are not
significantly related to top executives' shares compensation in non-GLCs. This result
is consistent with the argument that governance mechanisms in non-GLCs cannot
178 The relationship between OUTSIDE and ATEC (W_CEO_PAY) in GLCs is also negative and
significant at the 5% (1%) level in Tables 10-3 and 10-4.
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substitute the monitoring mechanism that uses top executives' shares compensation
to prevent the top executives from pursuing his/her own interests. Second, this result
also supports the supposition that external and internal governance in non-GLCs may
not be efficient enough to withstand the top executives' power to gain more
compensation. If internal and external governance in non-GLCs cannot affect top
executives' shares compensation significantly, the question becomes "What can
affect top executives' shares compensation in non-GLCs?" From Table 10-5, a
significant and positive relationship between FVBONUS_TOTAL and managerial
ownership (MANOWN) can be observed. The relationship between
MVBONUS TOTAL and MANOWN is also positive. According to prior studies (e.g.
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hall and Murphy, 2003) and the risk-aversion
assumption, when CEOs hold a large fraction of their companies' equity, the demand
for more share-based compensation will decrease. Smith and Watt (1992) also
support this argument by indicating that CEOs cannot diversify the risk associated
with share-based compensation because they invest their human capital in a single
position of employment. Surprisingly, the empirical result in Taiwan contradicts this
argument.
This contradiction has several possible explanations. First, although it is common to
grant restricted shares and options to CEOs and non-executive employees in some
developed countries, such as the US and the UK, this kind of incentive payments is
still increasing and developing in Taiwan179. Murphy (1999) cites Towers Perrin's
1997 Worldwide Total Remuneration report, and indicates that LTIPs (and options)
are absent in nine of the 23 countries surveyed180, and comprise less than 5% of total
pay in 13 of these 23 countries. Since Taiwanese companies had started to grant
restricted shares and warrants in 2000, the media started to spread stories of fortunes
gained through shares and warrants. These reports suggested that restricted shares
and warrants were becoming much more popular than cash compensation in Taiwan,
179 In the past, Taiwanese companies could issue new shares to employees under only two situations:
the distribution of non-executive employees' share-based compensation and "equity offerings for
cash" (Chen, 2002, p.42). Starting from August, 2000, companies are allowed to repurchase their
outstanding shares and distribute them as non-executive employees' share-based compensation.
Regarding warrants, please see Section 8.2.2 for the discussion.
180 The nine countries are: Argentina, Belgium, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, and Venezuela.
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especially in the electronics industry. For example, in 2006, TSMC distributed 34.32
hundred million cash bonuses and 343,200 thousands shares, which is equal to
233.73 hundred million NTD calculated by market value (Economics Daily, A3, 1st
May, 2006).
Core et al. (2003, p. 43) ask the question "Do executives and lower level employees
actually understand how stock options work and the implicit incentives in these
options?" This question can apply to restricted shares as well. Benartzi (2001)
indicates that investing a large fraction of their assets in their company's shares is a
sub-optimal portfolio choice for employees because they invest large human capital
in the company concurrently. An implication of these studies is that "some
individuals do not understand the expected distribution of stock prices" (Core et al.,
2003, p. 43). According to the descriptive statistics of non-GLCs in Table 10-1, it can
be seen that the average ratio of incentive payments (including restricted shares and
options) is 29.14%181 and the maximum ratio of FVBONUS TOTAL is 84.14%.
Through the excessive popularity of restricted shares and warrants, top executives in
Taiwan may regard the acceptance of shares and warrants as a method to become
wealthy and do not understand the implicit incentives of granting them. The positive
relationship between MANOWN and top executives' shares compensation also
implies that Taiwanese companies may over-grant shares to top executives.
Third, most non-GLCs are electronics and electric machinery companies. The
electronics industry in Taiwan is the industry that is the most profitable and
international, and grants the most shares and warrants. Figure 10-2 shows that the
share prices of electronics companies have increased significantly over the past
decades. Due to the low institutional ownership and high individual ownership in the
Taiwanese share market, the share volatility is high in Taiwan, especially for the
electronics and electric machinery companies. This phenomenon reinforces the
impression that shares and warrants will bring fortunes. Therefore, the risk-aversion
argument, which states that the demand of share-based compensation will decrease
when the top executives hold more equity of his/her company, is not so convincing in
181 The average ratio of MVBONUS_TOTAL is 24.26% and the average ratio of
WARRANT_TOTOTAL is 4.88%. The sum is 24.26% plus 4.88%, which is equal to 29.14%.
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Taiwan, especially in the electronics and electric machinery industry.
Finally, compared to managerial ownership in other developed countries, managerial
• • • • 182 •
ownership in Taiwan is relatively low . By studying a sample of over 1,700
American companies in 1992-1997, Bryan et al. (2000) report that the mean
(standard deviation) of CEO ownership is 3.19% (7.18%), which is much larger than
CEO ownership in Taiwan, which is 0.41% for GLCs and 0.44% for non-GLCs.
Studying 5,955 American companies during 1984-1991, Yermack (1995) also reports
that the average CEO ownership is 2.41%. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) report that
the average management equity ownership in Japan is 2.20 % by studying 270
non-financial Japanese companies covered in the 1984 volume of Moody's
International Reports. Based on these prior studies, we can observe that managerial
ownership in Taiwan is relatively low.
On the other hand, Core and Larcker (2002) conclude that the target ownership plan
is adopted when the directors realise that the company has a governance problem.
Their results support the premise that companies with low managerial ownership will
be more likely to adopt the target ownership plan. Given low managerial ownership
and the insignificant relationship between the governance variables and the ratio of
top executives' shares compensation, it can be seen that the positive relationship
between managerial ownership (MANOWN) and the ratio of top executives' shares
compensation (measured either by FVBONUS TOTAL or MVBONUS TOTAL) is
possible because a company with weak governance arrangements may grant more
shares to substitute for cash compensation to compensate for their weak direct
oversight of the managerial function.
182
Meanwhile, because of family control, many directors in Taiwanese companies are family
members. Therefore, board ownership in Taiwan is higher than managerial ownership. Please refer to
Table 10-1 for the statistics.
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Note: The TSEC began to organise the index of electronics industry in 1995.
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSEC)
Figure 10-2 The indices of the electric machinery industry and the electronics
industry in Taiwan
In addition to restricted shares, top executives' share-based compensation also
includes warrants in Taiwan. We construct two variables (SHAREBASED F and
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SHAREBASEDM184) to measure the ratio of top executives' share-based
compensation to top executives' compensation. The Tobit model is also used for the
two variables.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 10-5 present the empirical results for GLCs and
Columns (7) and (8) in Table 10-5 for non-GLCs. Since the results are similar to
those using FVBONUS TOTAL and MVBONUSTOTAL, a brief explanation is
given. ROE is positively associated with SHAREBASEDF and SHAREBASED M
in GLCs. A one-percentage point increase in ROE will raise SHAREBASED_F by
1.900 percentage points and SHAREBASED M by 2.444 percentage points.
Similarly, ROA is positively associated with SHAREBASEDF and
SHAREBASED M in non-GLCs. A one-percentage point increase in ROA translates
roughly into a 1.164 percentage point increase in SHAREBASED F and a 1.657
percentage point increase in SHAREBASED M. Therefore, Hypothesis lb is
supported. Companies with better performance will grant more share-based
compensation to top executives. Unlike the work by Bryan et al. (2000) who find a
significant negative relationship between LEVERAGE and the granting of options,
and that of Core (2001) who finds a significant positive relationship between cash
constraints and the granting of options, the coefficient of the proxy variable for cash
constraints (LEVERAGE) is not significant for GLCs and non-GLCs. Therefore,
Hypothesis 8 is not supported.
To sum up, Hypotheses 3, 4, 6, and 7 are supported by the analysis for GLCs because
OUTSIDE, BANK_D, BLOCK, and BDOWN have negative relationships with
SHAREBASED F and SHAREBASED M. Referring to Tables 10-3, 10-4, and 10-5,
these results support the argument that external governance in GLCs is efficient once
again. Conversely, the relationship between external governance in non-GLCs and
top executives' share-based compensation is not significant, which is consistent with
184
SHAREBASED_F is calculated by par value, which is from the company's viewpoint, whereas
SHAREBASED M is measured by market value which is from the employees' viewpoint.
SHAREBASEDF, = FVBONUS _ TOTAL, + WARRANT _ TOTAL,
SHAREBASED_ M, = MVBONUS_ TOTAL, +WARRANT_ TOTAL,
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the argument that external and internal governance is not as effective and should be
improved to avoid the phenomenon of extracting rents by top executives. This
finding that the boards in GLCs are more effective differs from those in prior studies,
which often view the intervention of government as a source of inefficiency (e.g.
Shleifer, 1998; La Porta et al., 2002)185.
185 Because of the prevalence of employees' bonuses in Taiwan, we also examine the relationship
between the grant of employees' bonuses to non-executive employees and the corporate governance
mechanisms in GLCs and non-GLCs. Due to the insignificance of the year-end bonuses and the
unavailability of data, we measure non-executive employees' incentive payments by employees'
bonuses in this thesis. We find that firm performance is positively related to the grant of employees'
bonuses to non-executive employees whereas the level of cash constraints is negatively related to it,
which means that companies with more cash constraints will distribute fewer employees' bonuses to
non-executive employees. Additionally, the grant of employees' bonuses to non-executive employees
is positively related to the investment opportunities in non-GLCs. However, based on the insignificant
relationship between the grant of employees' bonuses to non-executive employees and other corporate
governance determinants in non-GLCs, we can conclude that non-GLCs may over-grant employees'
bonuses to non-executive employees. In conclusion, compared to the grant of share-based
compensation to top executives and non-executive employees in GLCs, the argument that the grant in
non-GLCs is not efficient is supported.
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10.3 Conclusion
With the latest reform of corporate governance in Taiwan, the disclosure of top
executives' compensation has become more transparent. Using the latest data and
various regressions, this chapter examines whether firm performance and corporate
governance mechanisms are related to the level and structure of top executives'
compensation. Because of data limitations, this thesis also makes use of adjustment
indices to estimate CEO compensation in Taiwan more precisely. Moreover, in order
to observe whether political intervention in Taiwan is associated with the level and
structure of top executives' compensation, we classify companies as GLCs and
non-GLCs in regressions.
Concentrating first on average top executives' compensation, the empirical results
illustrate that outside directors in GLCs play a significant monitoring role on
corporate governance in Taiwan because the ratio of outside directors on the board is
negatively associated with the average top executives' compensation and adjusted
CEO compensation (Tables 10-3 and 10-4). Conversely, outside directors in
non-GLCs are not significantly associated with average top executives'
compensation. Meanwhile, firm size plays an important role of affecting average top
executives' compensation in GLCs and non-GLCs. Whether GLCs or non-GLCs,
larger companies will grant more compensation to top executives. This finding is
consistent with that of Lin (2005), who examines CEO cash compensation in Taiwan,
and a host ofprevious studies in the area (Murphy, 1999, Tosi et al., 2000).
Owing to the reform of the transparency of disclosure, Taiwanese companies have
started to disclose top executives' compensation more clearly. Hence, in addition to
the level of top executives' compensation, this thesis also investigates its structure.
As far as we know, this thesis is the first research exercise to examine the structure of
top executives' compensation in Taiwan. According to the empirical results in Table
10-5, we find that firm performance is positively related to the grant of restricted
shares to top executives in GLCs and non-GLCs. However, internal governance (i.e.
the board of directors) and external governance (i.e. banks, other affiliated companies,
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and blockholders) are not significantly related to the grant of restricted shares to top
executives in non-GLCs, whereas they are negatively associated to it in GLCs. Given
the argument that companies may choose to substitute devices within different
mechanisms, this result implies that the substitution between internal/external
governance and top executives' incentive payments is more effective in GLCs. In
other words, the top executives' compensation package in non-GLCs may not be
effectively designed. Table 10-8 summarises these results.
In this Chapter, it can be seen that the empirical results concerning CEO
compensation in the Anglo-Saxon model are not entirely mirrored in those in Taiwan.
For example, managerial ownership is positively related to top executives'
share-based compensation in non-GLCs, which demonstrates that although the
Taiwanese authorities have started to reform corporate governance, top executives'
compensation and the granting of incentive payments to top executives are not
necessarily associated with the corporate governance mechanism, especially in
non-GLCs. Therefore, the authorities in Taiwan still need to continue their reform to
make the alignment between the interests of executives and those of shareholders and
the monitoring ability of boards of directors more effective and functional. The
reform of corporate governance has nonetheless required Taiwanese companies to
strengthen and improve corporate governance. The next chapter summarises the
findings of this thesis, identifies potential applications of this research, and maps out
directions for future research. It also includes possible policy implications arising
from the analysis and the comparison between legal systems.
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Table 10-6 Summary of results on top executives' compensation
Hypothesis Argument GLCs Non-GLCs
Hla Average top executives' compensation is expected to be
positively associated with past firm performance.
Not Significant Accept
Hlb
1 he ratio ot average top executives' share-based
compensation to average top executives' compensation is




The ratio of average top executives' share-based
compensation to average top executive compensation is
expected to be positively associated with investment
Not Significant Not Significant
H3
The ratio of average top executives' share-based
compensation to average top executives' compensation is
expected to be negatively associated with the ratio of
Accept Not Significant
H4
The ratio of average top executives' share-based
compensation to average top executives' compensation is
expected to be negatively associated with the ratio of bank
representatives on the board.
Accept Not Significant
H5a
When the positions ofCEO and chairman are held by the
same person, average top executives' compensation is
expected to be higher.
Accept (*) Not Significant
H5b
The relationship between CEO duality and the ratio of
average top executives' share-based compensation to
average too executives' compensation will be positive.
Not Significant Not Significant
H6
The ratio of average top executives' share-based
compensation to average top executives' compensation is




The ratio of average top executives' share-based
compensation to the total compensation is expected to be
negatively associated with managerial ownership.
Accept Reject
H8 Companies with cash constraints will grant more shares and
warrants to top executives as a substitute for cash.
Not Significant Not Significant
H9a Average top executives' compensation is expected to be
positively associated with firm size. Accept Accept
H9b
The ratio of average top executives' share-based
compensation to average top executives' compensation is
expected to be positively associated with firm size.
Accept Accept





The body of literature on corporate governance in Asia has grown quickly due to the
financial crisis in 1997 and numerous associated financial scandals, which resulted
from the lack of an independent corporate governance mechanism. While studies
based on samples from countries with stock market capitalism conclude that
corporate governance significantly affects firm performance, most of the literature
ignores the phenomenon that Asian governments and financial institutions intervene
in many companies. In addition, most empirical analysis focuses on the relationship
between the corporate governance mechanism and firm performance. Although some
contextual research examines internationalisation in Asia, the relationship between
the corporate governance mechanism and international expansion is seldom
examined empirically under the consideration of intervention of government and
financial institutions.
To address this gap in the literature, we use structural equation modelling to examine
corporate governance and political involvement in Japan and Taiwan. These
countries share similar board structure and extent of political involvement. First, we
have investigated the relationship between the employment of ex-bureaucrats from
the government (e.g. MoF and BoJ in Japan and MOEA in Taiwan) and financial
institutions onto the boards of private sector companies. We find that government
and financial institutions are more likely to intervene in companies with poor
performance. This finding rejects the argument that claims that amakudari186 is
predominantly used as a reward system. For example, Kaplan and Minton (1994, p.
233) indicate that amakudari "are generally considered rewards" and therefore do not
consider them as a form of intervention. However, the empirical results also suggest
that political involvement and financial intervention is not subsequently accompanied
by better firm performance. This finding is similar to that of Horiuchi and Shimizu
186 Please refer to Section 2.2.1 for the discussion of the system of amakudari.
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(2001) in that political involvement may jeopardise capital adequacy, but it
contradicts the findings of Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002), who suggest that political
involvement improves profitability in the finance industry.
Based on the different board composition in Japan and Taiwan187, we anticipate
different roles played by Japanese and Taiwanese boards. The interesting finding is
that the significant negative relationship between firm performance and the
intervention of government and financial institutions is direct in Japan, whereas it is
indirect in Taiwan. In Taiwan, the negative relationship is through the board of
directors, which indicates that it plays a mediating role and, compared to the
Japanese situation, appears to be more influential. Similarly, the relationship between
the intervention of government and financial institutions and subsequent firm
performance is also direct in Japan and indirect in Taiwan. In Taiwan, intervention
will jeopardise the monitoring ability of the board and thereby harm subsequent firm
performance. In conclusion, the results confirm the argument that troubled
companies tend to recruit retired bureaucrats (amakudari) and bank representatives
to build the business-government network and thereby gain support from the
government. However, such involvement is not positively associated with subsequent
firm performance and the subsequent monitoring ability of the board.
In addition to firm performance, this thesis also observes internationalisation in Asia,
which may be supported or regulated by the government. Based on the results, we
conclude that the relationship between the degree of internationalisation (DOI) and
subsequent political intervention in Japan is negative. In the case of Taiwan, this
direct and negative relationship is not significant, despite the fact that the total effect
from DOI on subsequent political intervention is negative. This finding supports the
argument that the role of a government will change with the internationalisation and
187 Both Japanese and Taiwanese boards are regarded as insider-oriented. Although Japan and Taiwan
share some similarities, board composition is different. First, Japanese boards are typically comprised
mostly of former employees and representatives from affiliated companies while Taiwanese boards
are mostly composed of family members. This difference implies that boards in Japan and Taiwan
may have different incentives and behaviour. Moreover, outside directors in Japan are often
executives from banks, customers, and parent companies, whereas those in Taiwan are often members
from the founding families and banks. Therefore, according to agency theory, these family members
who sit on the boards may have stronger incentive to monitor executives while representatives from
affiliated companies are sent to solidify good relationships.
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development process (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; Sim and Pandian, 2003). Since
Japan has the most developed economy in Asia, the Japanese government is less
likely to intervene in a company and regulate the strategies of internationalisation.
Moreover, the negative relationship also demonstrates that a company with a greater
DOI is more likely to fend offpolitical intervention.
Furthermore, there is a positive direct relationship between DOI and the subsequent
intervention of financial institutions in Japan and Taiwan. This result supports the
supposition that institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are
likely to be interested in investing in companies with a greater DOI because of the
positive effects on their investment (Tihanyi et al., 2003). However, after including
the indirect relationship of DOI with financial institutional intervention through the
board of directors, we find that the relationship is still positive in Japan but becomes
negative in Taiwan. Once again, the different result implies that the board of directors
in Taiwan plays an influential role. Since the intervention of government and
financial institutions is not accompanied by a greater DOI, we can support the
argument that such intervention is inefficient and jeopardises the operation of a
company from the viewpoint of performance and internationalisation. Our
conclusion also supports the supposition argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1998) which
indicates that the informal relationships and corruption raised by political
involvement will allow various governmental agencies and bureaucrats to divert
from profit maximisation to political goals.
The reform of corporate governance in Taiwan has started in the past five years and
executive compensation has become a controversial issue. Therefore, given that
political involvement may be inefficient (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), this thesis also
investigates top executives' compensation in Taiwan to observe whether there is a
difference between GLCs and non-GLCs. Such a study is not possible for Japan
owing to the inadequacy of the data. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Tosi et al.,
2000), we find that firm size is positively related to top executives' compensation in
both GLCs and non-GLCs. Additionally, the hypothesis stating that governance
mechanisms may substitute for each other is supported in GLCs and non-GLCs
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because the relationship between the grant of top executives' share-based
compensation is negatively associated with the ratio of outside directors, the ratio of
bank representatives on a board, and blockholder ownership. However, this
substitution relationship is more obvious in GLCs, which supports the argument that
corporate government mechanisms may be more efficient in GLCs. Meanwhile, both
the level and the structure of share-based compensation are not positively related to
all performance variables. The empirical results of top executives' compensation
indicate that although the Taiwanese authorities have started to reform corporate
governance in Taiwan, the grants of share-based compensation to top executives are
not always related to performance.
However, the argument which claims that the demand of share-based compensation
will decrease when the top executives already have had a greater amount of company
equity is not supported by non-GLCs in Taiwan. This result suggests two possible
explanations. First, top executives in non-GLCs prefer more share-based
compensation because they view it as a kind of 'add-on' compensation. Second,
given that the calculation and disclosure of share-based compensation is not
transparent and sufficient, companies in the electronic or electric machinery industry,
which compose 51.45% of non-GLCs, will grant more share-based compensation to
substitute cash compensation and minimise the cost.
This thesis is a pioneering piece of research that examines the relationships between
political involvement/financial intervention and performance/DOI by using SEM.
Moreover, due to the data limitations, this thesis is also the first research that
investigates the level and structure of CEO compensation in Taiwan. The discussions
concerning the institutional background and corporate governance mechanisms in the
US, the UK, Japan, and Taiwan in Chapter 2 and Chapter 8 also illustrate that
corporate governance in Japan and Taiwan still calls for further reform. Based on the
empirical results presented in this thesis, we make four recommendations regarding
policy in Japan and Taiwan.
First, according to the empirical results, the argument which claims that political and
financial intervention has negative impact on subsequent firm performance and DOI
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is supported. Since the intervention of government and financial institutions is
negatively related to subsequent firm performance and DOI, the governments and
financial institutions in Japan and Taiwan should not intervene in the operation of
companies.
Second, the empirical results in Chapter 6 support the argument that the board of
directors in Taiwan plays an intermediate role between the private and public sectors.
Furthermore, the net relationship between the board of directors and subsequent firm
performance is positive, whereas the net relationship between the board of directors
and the intervention of government and financial institutions is negative. In other
words, the monitoring ability of the board is negatively associated with such
intervention but positively related to subsequent firm performance. Thus, Taiwanese
companies should strengthen the monitoring ability of the board and try to fend off
the intervention of government and financial institutions. On the other hand, the
empirical results do not support the argument that board of directors in Japan play an
intermediate role. Therefore, Japanese companies should try to improve the quality
of the board, such as lowering the ratio of inside directors, and facilitate the board of
directors more functional.
Third, the difficulty of data collection illustrates that the disclosure of CEO
compensation is not transparent in Taiwan. The situation is even worse in Japan
where companies seldom disclose precise CEO compensation or the value of
share-based compensation. Recently, some papers have focused on executive
compensation in Japan. However, most data are confidential; for example, Kato and
Kubo (2006). Japanese companies only disclose the total amount of directors' and
executives' compensation in a very rough way, even rougher than Taiwanese
companies do. It is very difficult to know the structure of directors' and executives'
compensation in Japanese companies, which results in the difficulty of empirical
examinations on the executives' compensation in Japanese companies. Hence, both
countries should enhance the disclosure level of corporate governance issues.
Although the necessity of disclosing the information of compensation is confirmed,
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the relevant regulations and laws still await the establishment. Currently, the
Japanese and Taiwanese government only establish some guidelines which are not
enforced but self-regulatory. Therefore, the fourth and final point, which is the most
• 188
important, is that in addition to the establishment of some non-forcible Articles ,
such as introducing the committee system and utilising grants of options, Japanese
and Taiwanese governments should have a series of complementary regulations in
place to implement them. Effectively, these Articles exist in name only. For example,
outside directors are only required in companies which are listed in TSEC after 21st
Feb, 2002. The companies which are listed before 21st Feb, 2002 are only
recommended to have outside directors on the boards. Moreover, most independent
directors in Taiwan are listed in annual reports only and only truly appear when there
is a financial scandal. Therefore, Japanese and Taiwanese governments should first
consider the applicability of certain corporate governance mechanisms and then
apply them effectively after relevant Articles are established.
Fortunately, both the Japanese and Taiwanese governments have begun to realise the
importance of corporate governance and the weakness of political intervention. In
Japan, opposition lawmakers in the latest Diet session in 2006 accused bureaucrats
hoping to secure positions after retirement of leaking information to contractors
• • 18Q • •
bidding for public works . Consequently, a proposal has been included in the final
draft of the government ethics rules titled "A New Direction for Personnel
Management of Public-Sector Workers", but it is not expected to be implemented
until the next session of parliament in 2007. This draft will prohibit government
officials from searching for jobs with companies linked to their current duties.
Legislation revising the National Public Service Law to incorporate these new rules
may be presented to the Diet in 2007. Meanwhile, similar to IFRS 2190, the
188 Laws in Japan do not contain a requirement of having sub-committees on the board. Japanese
companies can choose to use the traditional auditor system or the committee system. If they choose to
use the traditional auditor system, there is no need to have a nominating/corporate governance
committee. Similarly, Laws in Taiwan do not require the board of directors to establish a
compensation committee. 'Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed
Companies' only suggests having a compensation committee. Please refer to Appendix 1 and
Appendix 2 for more information.
18
Japan Times, 12th September, 2006.
190 The new International Financial Reporting Standard 2 (IFRS 2) came into affect for the accounting
period beginning on or after 1st January 2005. This standard requires companies (including EU listed
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authorities in Taiwan have begun to regulate the calculation and the disclosure of
incentive payments. Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) Nos.34
and 36, which were implemented on 1st January, 2006, regulate the disclosure and
presentation of financial instruments, including share options granted to employees.
Furthermore, starting on 1st January, 2008, employees' incentive payments will be
recorded as expenses and deducted from profits. Given these reforms, more
important steps would be to create strong corporate governance in Japan and Taiwan
in the future.
Although this thesis uses empirical analysis to examine intervention of government
and financial institutions in Japan and Taiwan, there are some limitations on the
methodology and data. First, since many companies' Securities Reports (Yukashoken
Hokokusho) before 2001 are not available on the EDINET and the improvement in
general transparency regarding governance in Japan and Taiwan are very recent, we
have used a short time period. There is only very limited scope for teasing out
dynamics. Second, since variables in SEM must follow a normal distribution,
dummy variables will result in non-positive and fragile outcomes and the
under-identification problem. Therefore, we do not make any allowance for
firm-specific effects. Third, although compensation information in Taiwan has been
disclosed, it is not as precise as it in countries with stock market capitalism, which
inhibits us from making a long-term and detailed observation.
The final and the most important limitation focus on causality. The advantage of
SEM is also the disadvantage of it. The advantage of using SEM is that we can
combine several variables with similar underlying concept (e.g. DOI) into a latent
variable and observe the relationships among latent variables. However, unlike the
results obtained by using Granger test, the results obtained by using SEM can only be
used to provide an explanation or prediction but not to imply causality. Therefore,
our results only reflect a possible way to explain these relationships.
Given these limitations and difficulties encountered during the research period, the
companies) to determine a 'fair value' of employees' share awards and to expense the associated costs
in their financial statements.
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future research can be continued in several ways. First, some variables is worthy of
deep investigation, especially the composition and quality of outside directors. Due
to data limitations, this thesis does not consider the composition of outside director,
which may influence the monitoring ability of the boards. Therefore, the influence
resulted from the different composition of outside directors in Asia where the
implementation of adopting outside directors is comparatively weak should be
examined deeply in the future. Second, since the Japanese and Taiwanese
governments have reformed corporate governance recently, more and more
information is disclosed, such as the composition of sub-committees. The future
research can focus on the interplay between newly disclosed data and specific
phenomena in Asia, such as the relationship between the composition of
sub-committees and family control and the latest financial reforms in Japan and
Taiwan. Moreover, in addition to SEM which focuses on the underlying concept of
variables, different methodologies can be applied to examine the causality between
variables. Finally, in due course, with longer data series, it may be possible to tease
out the company-specific and year-specific effects that have been subsumed in the
analysis above.
In summary, this thesis had addressed three topics - the relationship between the
intervention of governments and financial institutions and firm performance, the
relationship between the intervention of governments and financial institutions and
DOI in Japan and Taiwan by using SEM, and top executives' compensation in
Taiwan by using regressions. The main finding is consistent with the supposition
argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1998) that the government plays as a grabbing hand
which may pursue its own political goals rather than maximising the profits of
companies. Top executives' compensation is also examined by applying a range of
quantitative methods. Due to data limitation, top executives' compensation in Taiwan
is rarely examined and discussed. Our results are consistent with the argument that
share-based compensation in Taiwan is not efficiently granted. Although there are
some limitations regarding data and methodologies, this thesis breaks new ground by
utilising SEM to examine political involvement from the viewpoint of corporate
governance, firm performance, and DOI in Japan and Taiwan. Moreover, this thesis
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is also a pioneering work which empirically examines the structure of top executives'
compensation in Taiwan. It is only owing to the very recent improvement in the level
of disclosure of governance and compensation data in Japan and Taiwan that this
analysis has been possible. It is hoped that these results at least point the way to the
interesting insights available regarding governance effects that are possible through
the use of SEM in this context.
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Appendix 1: Summary of the Institutional Framework of Corporate
Governance in Japan
The legal system in Japan is characterised by a codified style. Japan is based on civil
law rather than common law. Common law is established by judges and then
incorporated into legislature. Common law originally developed in England from
judicial decisions that were based in tradition, custom, and precedent. Civil law is a
codified system of law that establishes a comprehensive system of rules that are
applied and interpreted by judges. The civil law system is the basis of the law in
many countries, especially in continental Europe. Corporate governance practices in
Japan are governed by applicable laws, specifically the Commercial Code and the
"Law Related to Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc.
of Joint Stock Corporations". La Porta et al. (1997) find that countries with civil law
are significantly related to weaker investor protection compared with countries with
common law. Compared with the US and the UK, investor protection in Japan is
weaker (Solomon, et al., 2003). Therefore, in 2001, an amendment was made to the
Japanese Commercial Code whereby statutory auditors were given more power and
independence in their corporations. In 2002, the Diet made another amendment to the
Commercial Code whereby a committee system was introduced as an alternative to
the traditional statutory auditor system of corporate governance (Figure 2-2).
Subsequently, on June 29th, 2005, the Diet passed a new Corporation Law that was
intended to modernise Japanese corporate law and will come into effect in 2006
(Kodate, 2005).
Some Japanese companies are registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in the US. Foreign companies that have conducted a registered
public offering in the US under the Securities Act of 1933, or have registered a class
of equity securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are generally subject
to many reporting requirements of the Exchange Act as foreign private issuers (FPI).
Historically, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US exempted
FPI from many of the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act.
However, many provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are directly applicable to
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FPI191. Both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ enacted
amendments to their listing standards, which have significant influence on foreign
companies.
Following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
significantly enhanced their corporate governance rules for listed companies to
comply with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Most Japanese securities,
which are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Therefore, they are subject to those
corporate governance requirements that are applicable to NYSE listed non-US
companies. According to the NYSE listing regulations, which are codified in Section
303A192 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual, NYSE listed non-US companies
may, in general, follow their home country corporate governance practices in lieu of
most of the new NYSE corporate governance requirements. NYSE Section 303A. 11
requires that non-US companies must disclose the significant difference between
their corporate governance practices and the corporate governance practices of US
companies under NYSE listing standards. By observing these differences between
Japanese corporate governance practices and NYSE standards for listed companies,
we find that there is a big difference between Japan and the US in board structure and
the level of disclosure. In Table 2-2, we will describe the difference according to the
order of rules.
191 The SEC has used its authority to limit or modify the application of some requirements to foreign
companies.
192 303A General Application: Companies listed on the Exchange must comply with certain standards
regarding corporate governance as codified in this Section 303A. Consistent with the NYSE's
traditional approach, as well as the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, certain
provisions of Section 303A are applicable to some listed companies but not to others.
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Table Al-lThe differences between Japanese corporate governance practices
and NYSE standards for non-US listed companies
NYSE Standards for US Companies
under Listed Company Manual
Section 303A
Japanese Corporate Practices
NYSE Section 303A.01: ANYSE-listed company
must have a majority of independent directors on its
board of directors. Requiring a majority of
independent directors will increase the quality of
board oversight and lessen the possibility of
damaging conflicts of interest
Since April 2003, large Japanese companies
have been permitted to choose between the
traditional statutory auditor system and the
committee system. However, most Japanese
companies have adopted the statutory auditor
system rather than the committee system. Under
the Commercial Code, when a company adopts
the statutory auditor system, the company is not
required to have any independent director on its
board. However, according to the amendment of
the "Law Related to Special Exceptions to the
Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc. of
Joint Stock Corporations", which was applicable
from 1st May, 2005, large Japanese companies19^
are required to have at least 50% of statutory
auditors to be outside statutory auditors (§ 18)
who must meet independence requirements
under Japan's Commercial Code.
NYSE Section 303A.02 establishes general
standards to evaluate directors' independence (no
director qualifies as independent unless the board of
directors affirmatively determines that the director
has no material relationship with the listed company
directly or being a partner, shareholder or officer of
an organization that has a relationship with the listed
company).
The Commercial Code in Japan has no
independence requirement for directors because
a company using the statutory auditor system is
not required to have any independent directors
on its board under the Commercial Code.
According to the amendment of the "Law
Related to Special Exceptions to the
Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc. of
Joint Stock Corporations", which was applicable
from May 1st, 2005, the independence
requirement with respect to outside statutory
193 In Japan, large companies are defined under the Commercial Code if it has either (a) issued share
capital of¥500 millions or more, or (b) liabilities of¥20 billions or more.
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auditors has been enhanced. The outside auditor
must not have served as a director or an
employee of the company or any of its
subsidiaries (Before the amendment, the outside
auditor must not have served as a director or an
employee of the company or any of its
subsidiaries the last five years prior to the
appointment).
NYSE Section 303A.03: To empower
non-management directors to serve as a more
effective check on management, the
non-management directors of each company must
meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions
without management.
Laws in Japan do not contain such a
requirement.
NYSE Section 303A.04: Listed companies shall
have a nominating/corporate governance committee
comprised entirely of independent directors which
shall have a written charter establishing certain
minimum responsibilities as set forth in NYSE
Section 303A.04 (b) (i) and providing for an annual
evaluation of the committee's performance.
Laws in Japan do not contain such a
requirement. Japanese companies can choose to
use the traditional auditor system or the
committee system. If they choose to use the
traditional auditor system, there is no need to
have a nominating/corporate governance
committee. Some companies, such as SONY,
choose to use the committee system, which
requires companies to have three committees
composed of a majority of outside directors.
NYSE Section 303A.05 (a): Listed companies shall
have a compensation committee comprised entirely
of independent directors.
For companies that adopt the committee system,
directors', auditors' and CEO compensation will
need to be approved by the compensation
committee. For companies without committees
on the board, according to Articles of
Incorporation, directors', auditors' and CEO
compensation are proposed by directors
themselves. The total amounts of compensation
for the directors, statutory auditors, and CEO are
approved on the annual general shareholders'
meeting (AGM)194.
194 Kato and Kubo (2006) and Kubo (2003, 2005) indicate that the proposed compensation for
directors, auditors, and CEO are usually rubber-stamped by the annual general meeting of
shareholders. Therefore, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance is weak in Japan
(Kato and Kubo, 2006).
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NYSE Section 303A.06: Listed companies must
have an audit committee that satisfies the
requirements of Rule 10A-3 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). Foreign
private issuers must satisfy the requirements of Rule
10A-3 under the Exchange Act by July 31, 2005.
As discussed above, most Japanese companies
have adopted the statutory auditor system.
Under this system, the board of statutory
auditors is a legally separate and independent
body from the board of directors. The function
of the board of statutory auditors is similar to
that of the audit committee. Therefore, the laws
in Japan do not require listed companies to
establish an audit committee.
However, large Japanese companies are required
to have at least three statutory auditors195. Each
statutory auditor serves a four-year term196. An
auditor may not serve concurrently as a director
or an employee of the company or its
subsidiaries197.
NYSE Section 303A.07 (a): The audit committee
shall consist of at least three members. All of its
members shall be financially literate or must acquire
such financial knowledge within a reasonable period
and at least one of its members shall have
experience in accounting or financial administration.
NYSE Section 303A.07 (a): If a member of the
audit committee is simultaneously a member of the
audit committee ofmore than three public listed
companies, and the listed company does not limit
the number of audit committees on which its
members may serve, then, in each case the board
shall determine whether the simultaneous service
would prevent such a member from effectively
serving on the listed company's audit committee,
and shall report its decision in the annual proxy
statement of the company or in the company's
annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC.
NYSE Section 303A.07 (c): The audit committee
should have a written charter establishing the duties
and responsibilities of its members, including the
duties and responsibilities required, at a minimum,
by Section 10A-3 (b)(1) of the Exchange
Act.
The laws in Japan do not require listed
companies to establish an audit committee.
NYSE Section 303A.07(c) (iii) (B) and
(C): The two Acts establish audit committee
objectives.
The laws in Japan do not require listed
companies to establish an audit committee.
195 "Law Related to Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc. of Joint
Stock Corporations", Article 18
196 Commercial Code, Article 273
197 "Law Related to Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audits, etc. of Joint
Stock Corporations", Article 18 (4)
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NYSE Section 303A.07(c) (iii) (G): Provides that
the audit committee should establish clear policies
for hiring external auditor's employees.
The laws in Japan do not require listed
companies to establish an audit committee.
NYSE Section 303A.07 (d): Provides that each
company must have an internal audit function in
order to provide to the management and to the audit
committee permanent assessments on the
company's risk management processes and internal
control system.
The statutory auditors in Japan play the role of
internal audit.
NYSE Section 303A.08: Shareholders must be
given the opportunity to vote on all equity based
compensation plans and material revisions thereto
with certain exceptions.
Pursuant to the Commercial Code in Japan, if a
company desires to adopt an equity
compensation plan under which stock
acquisition rights are granted on specially
favourable conditions (except where such rights
are granted to all of its shareholders on a pro
rata basis), the company must approve the plan
by a special resolution of aAGM, where the
quorum is one-third of the total number of
voting rights and the approval of at least
two-thirds of the voting rights represented at the
meeting is required.
NYSE Section 303A.09: Companies must adopt
and disclose corporate governance guidelines,
including several issues for which such reporting is
mandatory, and include such information on the
company's website, which should also include the
charters of the audit committee, the nominating
committee, and the compensation committee.
Laws in Japan do not contain such a
requirement.
NYSE Section 303A.09: The board of directors
must make a self-assessment of its performance at
least once a year to determine if it or its committees
function effectively and report thereon.
Laws in Japan do not contain such a
requirement.
NYSE Section 303A.12 (a): Each listed company
CEO must certify to the NYSE each year that he or
she is not aware of any violation by the company of
NYSE corporate governance listing standards.
Laws in Japan do not contain such a
requirement.
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NYSE Section 303A.12 (b): Each listed company
CEO must promptly notify the NYSE after any
executive officer of the listed company becomes
aware of any material non-compliance with any
applicable provisions of this Section 303(A).
Laws in Japan do not contain such a
requirement.
As can be seen from Table 2-2, the difference between the current corporate
governance principles in Japan and in the US is very evident. Although since April
2003, large Japanese companies have been permitted to choose between the
traditional statutory auditor system and the committee system, most Japanese
companies have adopted the statutory auditor system rather than the committee
system. Compared to the US, relevant practices still await establishment in Japan.
Only a few Articles concerning auditors were revised in 2001 and 2002. Nevertheless,
corporate governance in Japan is an important and improving issue. More and more
practices and regulations have been established to enhance financial disclosures and
board independence.
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Appendix 2: Summary of the Institutional Framework ofCorporate
Governance in Taiwan
Like the legal system in Japan, the Taiwanese legal system is also based on civil law
rather than common law. Corporate governance practices in Taiwan are governed by
applicable laws, specifically the Company Law and Securities Exchange Law, and
the Articles of Incorporation of each company (Filatotchev et al., 2005). Compared
with the US and the UK, investor protection in Taiwan is weaker due to civil law (La
Porta et al., 1997; Solomon, et al., 2003).
Taiwan declared its first corporate governance code of practice in October, 2002.
This approach is similar to that adopted by the UK codes of practice because it is
voluntary and based on the OECD principles for good corporate governance
(Solomon et al., 2003). Compared to the regulations and laws in the US, which have
strict regulations and laws concerning the disclosure of board structure, CEO
compensation, and committees, the regulations and laws in Taiwan are not complete
enough. Recently, because of several serious financial crises and scandals resulting
from the transparency of the board198, the relevant legal institutions have started to
revise and pass laws, which can reinforce the monitoring function of boards. Most
revisions are based on the current laws in the US because both countries belong to
the civil law system rather than the common law system199 and the US is a major
trading country with Taiwan. The transition stage of laws and regulations in Taiwan
provides us with a good opportunity to compare the differences between Taiwan,
which is regarded as relational capitalism, and the US, which is regarded as stock
market capitalism.
As in Japan, some Taiwanese companies are registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US and their securities are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Therefore, they are subject to those corporate
198 For example, the scandal of China Development Financial Holding Corporation (SIC code: 2883)
in 2006 and the scandal of Procomp Informatics Ltd. (SIC code: 2398) in 2004. Procomp Informatics
Ltd. is unlisted from 8th Sep., 2004.
199
Although the US (except for the Louisianan State) uses the common law system, in order to adapt
economic development, the SEC and NYSE set up relevant regulations actively.
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governance requirements, which are applicable to NYSE listed non-US companies.
According to the NYSE listing regulations, which are codified in Section 303A200 of
the NYSE Listed Company Manual, NYSE listed non-US companies may, in general,
follow their home country corporate governance practices in lieu ofmost of the new
NYSE corporate governance requirements. In Table 2-4, we will describe the
difference according to the order of rules.
200 303A General Application: Companies listed on the Exchange must comply with certain standards
regarding corporate governance as codified in this Section 303A. Consistent with the NYSE's
traditional approach, as well as the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, certain
provisions of Section 303A are applicable to some listed companies but not to others.
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Table A2-1 The differences between Taiwanese corporate governance practices
and NYSE standards for listed non-US companies
NYSE Standards for US Companies
under Listed Company Manual
Section 303A
Taiwanese Corporate Practices
NYSE Section 303A.01: ANYSE-listed company
must have a majority of independent directors on its
board of directors. Requiring a majority of
independent directors will increase the quality of
board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging
conflicts of interest
The Company Law in Taiwan does not require
the board of directors ofpublicly traded
companies to have a majority of independent
directors. Starting on 21st Feb, 2002, the
'Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Criteria
for Review of Securities Listings' forces listed
companies to have at least two independent
directors and at least one independent
supervisor on the board but this rule only
applies to those companies which are listed
after 21st Feb, 2002201.
NYSE Section 303A.02 establishes general standards
to evaluate directors' independence (no director
qualifies as independent unless the board of directors
affirmatively determines that the director has no
material relationship with the listed company directly
or being a partner, shareholder or officer of an
organization that has a relationship with the listed
company).
The Company Law in Taiwan establishes
comparable standards to evaluate director
independence on 8th April, 2003 (revised on
23rd Sep, 2003)
NYSE Section 303A.03: To empower
non-management directors to serve as a more effective
check on management, the non-management directors
of each company must meet at regularly scheduled
executive sessions without management.
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement.
NYSE Section 303A.04: Listed companies shall have
a nominating/corporate governance committee
comprised entirely of independent directors which
shall have a written charter establishing certain
minimum responsibilities as set forth in NYSE
Section 303A.04 (b) (i) and providing for an annual
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement. Directors are nominated by the
shareholders.
201 Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Criteria for Review of Securities Listings, Article 9(10)
regulates this. However, according to Taiwan-Stock-Listing-0930032147 of the Taiwan Stock
Exchange (TSE), only the companies that are listed after 21st February, 2002 need to obey this Act.
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evaluation of the committee's performance.
NYSE Section 303A.05 (a): Listed companies shall
have a compensation committee comprised entirely of
independent directors.
Laws in Taiwan do not require the board of
directors to establish a compensation
committee. 'Corporate Governance
Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM
Listed Companies' only suggests having a
compensation committee202. In order to
comply with the corporate governance
principles established under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, some
companies, such as TSMC, currently have a
compensation committee.
NYSE Section 303A.06: Listed companies must have
an audit committee that satisfies the requirements of
Rule 10A-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the Exchange Act). Foreign private issuers must
satisfy the requirements of Rule 10A-3 under the
Exchange Act by July 31st, 2005.
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement. 'Corporate Governance
Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM
Listed Companies' only suggests having an
audit committee. But, in order to comply with
the corporate governance principles
established by NYSE, some companies, such
as TSMC, have an audit committee, which
complies with the requirements of Rule 10A-3
of the Exchange Act as a foreign private
issuer.
NYSE Section 303A.07 (a): The audit committee
shall consist of at least three members. All of its
members shall be financially literate or must acquire
such financial knowledge within a reasonable period
and at least one of its members shall have experience
in accounting or financial administration.
Laws in Taiwan only suggest the
establishment of audit committees. If there is
an audit committee, it should consist of at
least one independent director203.
202
Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies, Article 27:
For the purpose of developing monitoring functions and strengthening management mechanisms, the
board of directors of a TSEC/GTSM listed company may, taking into account the basis of the size of
the board and the number of the independent directors, set up audit, nomination, compensation or any
other functional committees and have them stipulated in the articles of incorporation. Functional
committees shall be responsible to the board and submit the proposals to the board of directors for
approval.
203
Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies, Article 28: It
is advisable that a TSEC/GTSM listed company make it the first priority to set up the audit committee.
The audit committee shall consist of at least one independent director and be convened by the same. It
would be advisable that independent supervisors be invited to sit in at the meeting. At least one of the
independent directors as referred to in the preceding paragraph shall have professional expertise in
accounting or finance.
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NYSE Section 303A.07 (a): If a member of the audit
committee is simultaneously a member of the audit
committee ofmore than three public listed companies,
and the listed company does not limit the number of
audit committees on which its members may serve,
then, in each case the board shall determine whether
the simultaneous service would prevent such a
member from effectively serving on the listed
company's audit committee, and shall report its
decision in the annual proxy statement of the company
or in the company's annual report on Form 10-K filed
with the SEC.
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement concerning the audit committee.
But, under the guideline which was
announced by the Ministry of Finance, an
independent director of any company
applying for permission to list on the Taiwan
Stock Exchange shall not be deemed to be
independent if he simultaneously serves as an
independent director or supervisor ofmore
than five companies204. The guideline also
requires public listed companies to disclose
the number of companies ofwhich their
independent directors are simultaneously an
independent director or supervisor.
NYSE Section 303A.07 (c): The audit committee
should have a written charter establishing the duties
and responsibilities of its members, including the
duties and responsibilities required, at a minimum, by
Section 10A-3 (b)(1) of the Exchange Act.
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement.
NYSE Section 303A.07(c) (iii) (B) and
(C): The two Acts establish audit committee
objectives.
Article 28 in 'Corporate Governance
Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM
Listed Companies' lists the audit committee
objectives205.
NYSE Section 303A.07(c) (iii) (G): Provides that the
audit committee should establish clear policies for
hiring external auditor's employees.
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement.
204 Announcement No. 0920003896, Ministry of Finance.
205 It is advisable that a TSEC/GTSM listed company make it the first priority to set up the audit
committee, whose functions and duties are as follows:
1 .examination of the accounting system, financial conditions, and the procedure for financial reports
of the company;
2.reviewing the procedures for major financial and business transactions such as acquisition or
disposal of assets, lending funds, and making endorsements or providing guarantees;
3.communications with the CPAs of the company;
4.examination of the internal auditors and their performance;
5.examination of the internal control of the company;
6.assessment, inspection, and monitoring of the existence and threat of risks of all kinds;
7.inspection of law compliance by the company;
8.reviewing the transactions set forth in Article 32 of the Principles where voting shall be disqualified
due to conflicts of the interest of directors, especially material related-party transactions, acquisition
or disposal of assets, lending funds, making endorsements or providing guarantees, and
establishment of an investment company for the purpose ofmaking investment; and
9.assessing the qualifications ofCPAs and nomination of qualified candidates.
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NYSE Section 303A.07 (d): Provides that each
company must have an internal audit function in order
to provide to the management and to the audit
committee permanent assessments on the company's
risk management processes and internal control
system.
The Company Law in Taiwan requires public
listed companies to establish an internal audit
department. Internal auditors are subject to
strict qualifications standards under
Taiwanese law, which require the board of
directors to approve the head of a company's
internal audit department.
NYSE Section 303A.08: Shareholders must be given
the opportunity to vote on all equity based
compensation plans and material revisions thereto
with certain exceptions.
The Company Law in Taiwan imposes a
similar requirement206. In addition to
Company Law, the Articles of Incorporation
also regulate the distribution of equity based
207
compensation .
NYSE Section 303A.09: Companies must adopt and
disclose corporate governance guidelines, including
several issues for which such reporting is mandatory,
and include such information on the company's
website, which should also include the charters of the
audit committee, the nominating committee, and the
compensation committee.
Pursuant to relevant laws in Taiwan, a listed
company must establish and disclose
corporate governance guidelines on the
company's website208.
NYSE Section 303A.09: The board ofdirectors must
make a self-assessment of its performance at least
once a year to determine if it or its committees
function effectively and report thereon.
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement.
NYSE Section 303A.12 (a): Each listed company
CEO must certify to the NYSE each year that he or
she is not aware of any violation by the company of
NYSE corporate governance listing standards.
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement. In order to comply with relevant
SEC regulations, some NYSE listed
companies' CEOs are required to certify in
the company's 20-F annual report that the
206
Company Law, Article 240. I.: A company may, by a resolution adopted by a majority of the
shareholders present who represent two-thirds or more of the total number of its outstanding shares of
the company, have the whole or a part of the surplus profit distributable as dividends and bonuses
distributed in the form of new shares to be issued by the company for such purpose. In case the
amount of balance of such distributable surplus profit is less the par value (or a fraction) of one share,
it shall be paid in cash.
207 For example, TSMC currently has in place two equity based compensation plans. First, TSMC's
employee stock option plans (ESOP) are required to be approved by the board of directors.
Shareholders' approval is not required if the number of options granted under the relevant ESOP does
not exceed the reservation made in TSMC's Articles of Incorporation. Otherwise, any change to such
reservation in the Articles of Incorporation requires shareholders' approval. Second, TSMC's
employees' profit sharing plan requires shareholders' approval.
208
Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies, Article 10
and Article 58.
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information contained therein fairly represents
in all material respects the financial condition
and results of operation of the company.
NYSE Section 303A.12 (b): Each listed company
CEO must promptly notify the NYSE after any
executive officer of the listed company becomes aware
of any material non-compliance with any applicable
provisions of this Section 303(A).
Laws in Taiwan do not contain such a
requirement.
From the table above, we can observe that the current corporate governance
principles in Taiwan and in the US are very different. In the US, relevant regulations
and rules have been established and used since the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act were passed in 1933 and 1934. With the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the US Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The
Act empowers the SEC with broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry.
This includes the power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms. It also
empowers the SEC to require periodic reporting of information by companies with
publicly traded securities. On 30th July, 2002, American President George W. Bush
signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law. The Act mandated a number of reforms to
enhance corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures and combat corporate
and accounting fraud. The Act also created the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), to oversee the activities of the auditing profession.
Compared to the US, relevant practices still remain to be established in Taiwan. A
few improved practices concerning corporate governance were established between
2001 and 2004. Before 2001, the supervisory institutions seldom paid attention to the
importance of corporate governance. Although the relevant regulations and Act were
not established until five years ago, corporate governance in Taiwan has been
improved recently. More and more practices and regulations have been established to
enhance financial disclosures and the independence of the board, and to rationalise
top executives' compensation and non-executive employees' incentive payments.
These reforms give us a good opportunity to observe corporate governance in Taiwan
and make comparisons with other countries that developed a more regulated
corporate governance mechanism a long time ago.
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Appendix 3: Structural parameters, Japan
Table A3-1 Structural parameters: Firm Performance (t) and Governance (t+1),
Japan
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BANKD: the ratio of the number
of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions
shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK:
the percentage of blockholder ownership. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates from the elite
universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of directors in the board.
GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV I: the absolute number of
government investors. GOV_APP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of
directors. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 1.00 1.00
BDOWN <- BOARD 0.01 0.20 0.07 1.82*
BD_Q<-BOARD 0.47 1.69* -0.03 -0.24
BANKD <- INST 1.00 1.00
FINOWM <- INST -4.83 -2.58*** -6.93 -3.24***
CROSS <~ INST 10.74 2.56** 11.46 3.22***
BLOCK <-INST 5.35 2.62*** 6.36 3.24***
GAKUBATSU<»GOV 1.00 1.00
GOVOWN <- GOV 0.31 3.58*** 0.23 2.83***
GOVK-GOV 0.12 2.65*** 0.04 1.97**
GOV_APP <~ GOV 0.37 5.10*** 0.62 7.18***
ROE <— PERF 1.00 1.00
TSR<- PERF 0.22 2.15** 0.05 8.39***
ROA <— PERF 0.22 3.93*** 0.14 8.54***
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.08
BOARD ~> GOV 0.07 0.20 0.23 1.62
PERF -> GOV -0.03 -1.92* -0.01 -2.69***
PERF -> INST -0.38 -2.45** -0.11 -3.69***
PERF-> BOARD -0.22 -2.63*** -0.10 -3.82***
Indirect Effect
PERF->BOARD->INST -0.002 -0.19 -0.001 -0.08
PERF—>BOARD—>GOV -0.02 -0.20 -0.02 -1.56
Total Effect
PERF -> INST -0.03 -1.94* -0.01 -2.73***






: p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A3-2 Structural parameters: Firm Performance (t) and Governance (t+1),
Japan, without GAKUBATSU
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BANKJD: the ratio of the number
of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions
shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK:
the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVOWN: the
ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity.
TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested. ROA: calculated by dividing a company's
annual earnings by its total assets.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-- BOARD 1.00 1.00
BDOWN <--BOARD 0.06 0.97 0.17 3 7]#**
BD_Q <~BOARD -0.07 -0.61 -0.10 -0.91
BANK D <~ INST 1.00 1.00
FINOWM <- INST -4.82 -2.83*** -5.20 -3.82***
CROSS <~ INST 7.60 2.82*** 10.72 3.77***
BLOCK <-INST 4.50 2.82*** 5.29 3.84***
GOV_I <- GOV 1.00 1.00
GOVOWN <-GOV 3.90 1.91* 2.91 1.81*
GOVAPP <- GOV 7.83 1.49 6.88 3.03***
ROE <— PERF 1.00 1.00
TSR <— PERF 0.06 4.76*** 0.05 8.81***
ROA <~ PERF 0.15 5.14*** 0.15 8.98***
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 0.02 0.80 -0.02 -1.35
BOARD ~> GOV 0.01 0.74 0.13 1.80*
PERF -> INST -0.02 -2.07** -0.02 -3.02***
PERF -> GOV -0.01 -1.71* -0.05 -2 97* * *
PERF ~> BOARD -0.11 -2.48** -0.14 -5.23***
Indirect Effect
PERF->BOARD-->INST -0.002 -0.73 0.003 1.30
PERF—>BOARD~>GOV -0.001 -0.78 -0.02 -1.80*
Total Effect
PERF ~> INST -0.02 -2.21** -0.02 -3 13***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** pO.Ol
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Table A3-3 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1),
Japan
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. CROSS: the ratio of institutional
shares to total outstanding shares. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares.
BANK_D: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. BLOCK:
the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares.
GOVI: the absolute number of government investors. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates from the elite
universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of executives in the highest board
positions. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares
assuming dividends are reinvested. ROA: calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 1.00 1.00
BDOWN <-BOARD 0.42 3 49*** 0.35 6.63***
BD_Q <~ BOARD 0.01 0.06 -0.18 -1.62
CROSS <- INST 1.00 1.00
FINOWM <~ INST -2.46 -4.26*** -3.87 -4.41 * * *
BANK_D <— INST 0.08 1.17 0.02 0.59
BLOCK <- INST 0.58 7.32*** 0.56 11.3***
GOVOWN <-GOV 1.00 1.00
GOVI <- GOV 0.34 32i*** 0.29 5.09***
GOV_APP <~ GOV 0.73 5.83*** 0.61 9 99***
GAKUBATSU <- GOV 1.42 3.93*** 1..57 7.63***
ROE <— PERF 1.00 1.00
TSR <— PERF 0.13 2.51** 0.11 4 4j***
ROA <~ PERF 0.19 3.45*** 0.19 5.62***
Direct Effect
INST ~> BOARD 0.31 3 39*** 0.25 5.76***
GOV->BOARD -0.08 -0.65 0.28 3.77***
INST ~> PERF -0.30 -1.73* -0.46 -3.67***
GOV ~> PERF -0.57 -1.97** -0.48 -2 93* * *
BOARD ~> PERF -0.13 -0.41 0.18 0.98
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD -> PERF -0.04 -0.41 0.05 0.99
GOV~> BOARD ~> PERF 0.01 0.34 0.05 0.94
Total Effect
INST -> PERF -0.34 -2.11** -0.41 -3.76***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A3-4 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1),
Japan, without GAKUBATSU
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BLOCK: the percentage of
blockholder ownership. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD:
the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total outstanding
shares. GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of
political-related directors to the total number of directors. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the
shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested. ROA: calculated by
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 1.00 1.00
BDOWN <- BOARD 0.22 2.20** 0.22 4.82***
BD Q<~ BOARD -0.07 -0.40 -0.27 -2.63***
BLOCK <-INST 1.00 1.00
FINOWM <- INST -6.57 -1.34 -4.62 _3 2***
BANKD <- INST 0.11 1.47 0.14 3.06***
CROSS <-- INST 5.90 1.34 4.09 3.18***
GOVOWN <~ GOV 1.00 1.00
GOVI <~ GOV 0.36 2 79* * * 0.32 4.35***
GOVAPP <-- GOV 1.21 3.67*** 0.92 7 oi** *
ROE<- PERF 1.00 1.00
TSR<- PERF 0.12 2.67*** 0.10 4 79* * *
ROA <~ PERF 0.19 3.48*** 0.18 5.69***
Direct Effect
INST ~> BOARD 0.27 3.00*** 0.23 4.35***
GOV->BOARD 0.13 0.79 0.49 4.69* * *
INST -> PERF -0.48 -2.24** -0.69 -4.20***
GOV-> PERF -0.63 -2.02** -0.57 -2.92***
BOARD -> PERF -0.27 -1.14 0.13 0.88
Indirect ETfect
INST -> BOARD ~> PERF -0.07 -1.07 0.03 0.90
GOV -> BOARD ~> PERF -0.04 -0.68 0.06 0.85
Total Effect
INST ~> PERF -0.55 -2.35** -0.66 _4 22* * *






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A3-5 Structural parameters: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Japan
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BLOCK: the percentage of
blockholder ownership. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANK_D:
the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. GOV I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the number of graduates from the elite
universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total number of directors in the board.
FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
FATA: the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. FSE: the number of foreign listed exchange.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <-BOARD 1.00 1.00
OUTSIDE<- BOARD 4.74 3 49* * * 3.03 5.00***
BD_Q <~ BOARD -0.50 -0.57 -0.78 -1.38
BLOCK <~ INST 1.00 1.00
FTNOWM <~ INST -0.95 -6.18*** -1.10 -9.98***
BANKD <- INST 0.12 2.51** 0.10 3.34***
CROSS <~ INST -3.86 -3.25*** -4.09 -5 04***
GOVI <~GOV 1.00 0.19 2.39**
GOVOWN <~ GOV 3.40 2.42*** 2.21 10.15***
GOVAPP <— GOV 4.17 2.36** 1.00
GAKUBATSU <-GOV 7.43 2.34** 2.17 7
FOROWN <~ DOI 1.00 1.00
FSTS <- DOI 2.87 10.35*** 2.90 15.38***
FATA <- DOI 1.93 10.43*** 1.85 16.09***
FSE<~ DOI 0.07 6.09*** 0.07 9 24* * *
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 1.01 2.46** 2.14 4.57***
BOARD -> GOV 0.36 1.72* 2.35 6.09***
DOI ~> INST 0.06 2.15** 0.05 1.93*
DOI -> GOV -0.05 -2.05** -0.09 -3 05 * * *
DOI ~> BOARD 0.04 2.41** 0.02 1.77*
Indirect Effect
DOI—>BOARD—>INST 0.04 1.86* 0.04 1.68*
DOI—>BOARD—>GOV 0.01 1.46 0.05 1.72*
Total Effect
DOI ~> INST 0.10 3.45*** 0.09 5.12***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A3-6 Structural parameters: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Japan
without GAKUBATSU
FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANK_D: the ratio of the number
of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to
total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of government
shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_APP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total
number of directors. GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors. BDOWN: the percentage of board
ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more
than three positions in the company. FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the
ratio of foreign sales to total sales. FATA: the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. FSE: the number of foreign
listed exchange.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient tvalue
BDOWN <-- BOARD 1.00 1.00
OUTSIDE<- BOARD 2.88 2.86*** 20.51 2.80***
BD_Q<-BOARD -0.45 -0.48 -1.75 -1.59
FINOWM <- INST 1.00 1.00
BANK_D<- INST -1.64 -0.53 -0.15 -3.63***
CROSS <~ INST 23.13 0.53 -1.73 -12.00***
BLOCK <-INST -15.49 -0.53 -0.88 -13.39***
GOVOWN <-- GOV 1.00 1.00
GOV_I <~ GOV 0.08 1.43 0.22 2 pi***
GOVAPP <~ GOV 0.33 4.37*** 1.73 5.34***
FOROWN <-DOI 1.00 1.00
FSTS <~ DOI 2.86 10.35*** 3.23 14.07***
FATA <- DOI 1.92 10.44*** 1.89 15.36***
FSE <-DOI 0.07 6.10*** 0.08 9.53***
Direct Effect
BOARD ~> INST -0.59 -0.53 -4.29 -3.41***
BOARD-> GOV 6.11 4.17*** 2.41 3.13***
DOI ~> INST 0.01 0.41 0.24 4.72***
DOI -> GOV -0.34 -2.63** -0.13 -4.04***
DOI ~> BOARD 0.04 2.37** 0.02 2 49* * *
Indirect Effect
DOI—>BOARD~>INST -0.02 -0.52 -0.09 -2.46**
DOI—>BOARD—>GOV 0.24 2.17** 0.05 2.33**
Total Effect
DOI -> INST -0.01 -0.54 0.15 4.11 * * *






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A3-7 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Japan
FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares BANKD: the ratio of the number
of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to
total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number
of political-related directors to the total number of directors. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total
outstanding shares. GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors. GAKUBATSU: the ratio of the
number of graduates from the elite universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda Hitotsubashi, and Keio) to the total
number of directors in the board. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of
outside directors. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company.
FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <-BOARD 1.00 1.00
OUTSIDE <-- BOARD 3.04 3.38*** 7.99 3.08***
BD_Q<-BOARD -0.06 -0.10 -0.49 -0.85
FINOWM <- INST 1.00 1.00
BANK D <- INST -0.06 -1.68* -0.07 -2.11**
CROSS <~ INST -0.52 -5 87* * * -1.05 -13.65***
BLOCK <-INST -0.32 _4 97* * * -0.68 -12.67***
GOVAPP <- GOV 1.00 1.00
GOVOWN <~ GOV 1.16 5.76*** 1.26 10.01***
GOVI <- GOV 0.44 3.29*** 0.28 3.76***
GAKUBATSU <-GOV 1.63 3.62*** 2.15 7.82***
FOROWN <- DOI 1.00 1.00
FSTS <-DOI 3.51 8.46*** 3.86 11.65***
FATA <~ DOI 2.20 9.08*** 2.25 13.12***
FSE <— DOI 0.08 5.61*** 0.08 g19* **
Direct Effect
INST-> BOARD -0.06 -3.35*** -0.03 -3.00***
GOV->BOARD -0.04 -0.65 0.04 2.35***
INST -> DOI -0.03 -0.66 0.01 0.49
GOV~> DOI -0.56 -3.16*** -0.38 -4.62***
BOARD ~> DOI 0.49 0.84 0.72 1.75*
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD -> DOI -0.03 -0.85 -0.02 -1.53
GOV-> BOARD-> DOI -0.02 -0.57 0.03 1.36
Total Effect
INST -> DOI -0.06 -1.74* -0.01 -0.28






p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A3-8 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Japan,
without GAKUBATSU
FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the ratio of the number
of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to
total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOV_I: the absolute number of
government investors. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_APP: the
ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. BDOWN: the percentage of
board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy
more than three positions in the company. FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS:
the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. FATA: the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. FSE: the number of foreign
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient tvalue
BDOWN <--BOARD 1.00 1.00
OUTSIDE<- BOARD 9.60 1.24 15.12 1.63
BD_Q <- BOARD -0.99 -1.06 -0.92 -1.44
FINOWM <- INST 1.00 1.00
BANKD <— INST -0.10 -1.54 -0.08 -2.32**
CROSS<-INST -1.28 -7.83*** -1.27 -13.41***
BLOCK <-INST -0.87 -7.96*** -0.75 -13.03***
GOVI <- GOV 1.00 1.00
GOVOWN <-- GOV 2.45 2.85*** 3.62 4.04* **
GOV_APP <-- GOV 3.69 2.14** 4.66 3.70***
FOROWN<-DOI 1.00 1.00
FSTS <~ DOI 3.42 8.61*** 3.72 11.97***
FATA <- DOI 2.19 9.16*** 2.24 13.28***
FSE <— DOI 0.07 5.61*** 0.08 8.17***
Direct Effect
INST ~> BOARD -0.02 -1.20 -0.02 -1.58
GOV->BOARD 0.01 0.30 0.05 1.26
INST —> DOI 0.13 1.64 0.04 1.58
GOV -> DOI -1.18 -2.31** -1.11 -3.11***
BOARD --> DOI 1.08 1.63 0.72 1.87*
Indirect Effect
INST --> BOARD -> DOI -0.02 -0.99 -0.01 -1.21
GOV~> BOARD ~> DOI 0.01 0.29 0.04 1.03
Total Effect
INST ~> DOI 0.11 1.43 0.03 1.25






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Appendix 4: Structural parameters, Taiwan
Table A4-1 Structural parameters: Firm Performance (t) and Governance (t+1),
Taiwan
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. MANOWN: the
percentage of CEO ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the
company. BANKD: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors.
FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of institutional
shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of
government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVAPP:
the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. ROE: computed as the net
income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient tvalue
OUTSIDE <-BOARD 1 1
BDOWN <-BOARD -2.67 -3.24*** -2.66 -5.50***
MANOWN <-BOARD -0.86 -3.36*** -0.94 -5.68***
BD_Q<~ BOARD 0.26 0.78 0.22 1.09
BANKD <~ INST 1 1
FINOWM <~ INST 0.29 6.26*** 0.33 9.35***
CROSS <-INST 0.62 4.45*** 0.88 8.16***
BLOCK <-INST 0.43 3 * * 0.35 3.85***
GOVOWN<-GOV 1 1
GOVI <~ GOV 0.26 6.28*** 0.12 5.75***
GOVAPP <— GOV 1.15 9.18*** 0.18 0.52
ROE <— PERF 1 1
TSR<~PERF 1.36 4.23*** 1.35 6.58***
ROA <- PERF 0.59 18.33*** 0.60 29.13***
Direct Effect
BOARD ~> INST 0.63 2.83*** 0.72 4.87***
BOARD->GOV 0.45 2.46** 0.53 4 43* * *
PERF-> INST -0.02 -1.19 -0.01 -0.70
PERF-> GOV -0.04 -0.59 0.01 0.79
PERF ~> BOARD -0.11 -2 99* * * -0.11 -5.05***
Indirect Effect
PERF ->BOARD—>INST -0.07 -3.55*** -0.08 -6.54***
PERF~>BOARD~>GOV -0.05 -2.90*** -0.06 -5.56***
Total Effect
PERF-> INST -0.09 -3.19*** -0.09 -4.77***






! p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A4-2 Structural parameters: Path Coefficients: Firm Performance (t) and
Governance (t+1), Taiwan, without MANOWN
OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BANKD: the ratio of the number
of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions
shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK:
the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares.
GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors. GOV APP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. ROE: computed as the net income divided by the shareholder's equity.
TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested. ROA: calculated by dividing a company's
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient tvalue
OUTSIDE<- BOARD 1 1
BDOWN <- BOARD -0.64 -5 23*** -0.55 -8.83***
BD_Q <- BOARD -0.08 -0.44 -0.21 -2.05**
BANKD <- INST 1 1
FINOWM <~ INST 0.27 5.52*** 0.29 7.93***
CROSS <- INST 0.30 2.35** 0.33 3.59***
BLOCK <-INST 0.36 3.11*** 0.50 5.73***
GOVOWN <~ GOV 1 1
GOVI<- GOV 0.24 4 9*** 0.13 5 47** *
GOV_APP <~ GOV 2.96 11.46*** 2.87 18.09***
ROE <— PERF 1 1
TSR<~ PERF 1.40 4.51*** 1.41 7 17***
ROA <-- PERF 0.54 15.29*** 0.50 21.02***
Direct Effect
BOARD -> INST 0.96 5.38*** 0.72 919***
BOARD -> GOV 0.83 4 3 j*** 0.82 6 9i***
PERF -> INST 0.14 2 7i*** 0.13 4.33***
PERF ~> GOV 0.14 2.34*** 0.15 4.52***
PERF -> BOARD -0.25 -4.33*** -0.22 -6.26***
Indirect Effect
PERF->BOARD—>INST -0.24 -4.33*** -0.16 -5 95* * *
PERF—>BOARD—>GOV -0.21 -3.67*** -0.18 -5.12***
Total Effect
PERF -> INST -0.10 -2.71*** -0.03 -1.76*






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A4-3 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1),
Taiwan
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the
percentage of CEO ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the
company. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the ratio of
the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional
shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of
government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVAPP:
the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. ROE: computed as the net
income divided by the shareholder's equity. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested.
ROA: calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <--BOARD 1 1
OUTSIDE <— BOARD -0.46 -3.34*** -0.33 -3 53* * *
MANOWN <-BOARD 0.35 6.79*** 0.35 8.25***
BD_Q <~ BOARD -0.25 -1.92** -0.06 -0.72
FINOWM <- INST 1 1
BANK_D <~ INST 3.90 6.18*** 3.66 10.09***
CROSS <- INST 2.21 3 33*** 1.12 3.90***
BLOCK <-INST 1.40 3.13*** 1.22 4.76***
GOVOWN <-GOV 1 1
GOV I <~ GOV 0.29 7.43*** 0.09 4.83***
GOVAPP <~ GOV 1.13 10.24*** 7.17 4.48***
ROE <— PERF 1 1
TSR <— PERF 1.19 4.01*** 0.94 6.97***
ROA <- PERF 0.59 14.05*** 0.59 22.03***
Direct Effect
INST ~> BOARD -1.62 -4.21*** -1.21 -5.55***
GOV->BOARD -0.19 -3.32*** -0.08 -1.98**
INST -> PERF -0.06 -0.25 -0.11 -0.26
GOV-> PERF -0.02 -0.16 -0.01 -0.36
BOARD -> PERF 0.36 3.83*** 0.33 4.73***
Indirect Effect
INST ~> BOARD ~> PERF -0.58 -2.90*** -0.40 -3.69***
GOV -> BOARD ~> PERF -0.07 -2.55** -0.03 -1.83*
Total Effect
INST -> PERF -0.64 -1.79* -0.51 -1.80*






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A4-4 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and Firm Performance (t+1),
Taiwan, without MANOWN
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BLOCK: the percentage of
blockholder ownership. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD:
the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. GOV I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_APP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. ROA: calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total
assets. TSR: the total return on shares assuming dividends are reinvested. ROE: computed as the net income
divided by the shareholder's equity.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <~ BOARD 1 1
OUTSIDE <-- BOARD -1.63 -5 17*** -2.00 -9.63***
BD_Q <~ BOARD -0.34 -1.31 -0.17 -1.03
BLOCK <-INST 1 1
FINOWM <~ INST 0.98 2.55** 0.62 4.95***
BANKD <- INST 3.71 2.65*** 2.19 5.45***
CROSS <- INST 0.82 1.84* 1.08 3.91***
GOV_I <~ GOV 1 0.06 1.83*
GOVOWN <-GOV 3.38 1 jj*#* 1.00
GOVAPP <— GOV 3.69 9.16*** 0.60 1.99**
ROA <— PERF 1 1
TSR <— PERF 2.46 4.75*** 1.75 7.27***
ROE <-PERF 1.97 12.04*** 1.75 20.38***
Direct Effect
INST -> BOARD -1.30 -2 37*** -0.88 -3.88***
GOV->BOARD -0.87 -4.67*** -0.14 -1.88*
INST-> PERF 1.61 0.67 1.01 1.73*
GOV-> PERF 1.11 0.72 0.15 1.42
BOARD-> PERF 1.45 0.82 1.23 2.14**
Indirect Effect
INST -> BOARD ~> PERF -1.89 -0.77 -1.08 -1.85*
GOV—> BOARD ~> PERF -1.26 -0.81 -0.17 -1.71*
Total Effect
INST ~> PERF -0.28 -1.33 -0.07 -2.03**






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A4-5 Structural parameters: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Taiwan
BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BDOWN: the
percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the percentage of
managerial ownership. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANK_D:
the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors.
GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of political-related directors to the total number of directors. FATA: the ratio
of foreign assets to total assets. FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio
of foreign sales to total sales. FSE: the number of foreign listed exchange.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN<-BOARD 1 1
OUTSIDE <~ BOARD -1.78 -5.43*** -1.95 -8.20***
MANOWN <-BOARD 0.36 6.62*** 0.34 g 72** *
BD_Q <-- BOARD 0.49 1.66* 0.63 2 92* * *
FINOWN <~ INST 1 1
BANK_D <— INST 3.66 6.12*** 3.28 10.11***
CROSS<-INST 2.00 3.11*** 2.09 5.56***
BLOCK <-INST 1.90 3.85*** 1.89 6.60***
GOVOWN <- GOV 1 1
GOVJ <-- GOV 0.42 2.56** 0.48 3.22***
GOVAPP <- GOV 5.30 4 61*** 6.71 5 \7***
FATA <- DOI 1 1
FOROWN <~ DOI 0.24 3.27*** 0.26 5.64***
FSTS <--DOI 2.67 6.55*** 2.69 10.57***
FSE <~ DOI 0.01 1.28 0.01 1.11
Direct Effect
BOARD —> INST -0.% -2.51** -1.16 -3.58***
BOARD--> GOV -2.55 -0.98 -2.18 -1.31
DOI-> INST 0.30 1.66* 0..32 2.34**
DOI ~> GOV 1.01 0.84 0.77 0.32
DOI ~> BOARD 0.45 5.72*** 0.40 8.76***
Indirect Effect
DOI~>BOARD~>INST -0.43 -2.24** -0.46 -3.25***
DOI->BOARD~>GOV -1.15 -0.94 -0.87 -1.26
Total Effect
DOI-> INST -0.13 -4.44*** -0.14 -7 39* * *






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A4-6 Structural parameters: DOI (t) and Governance (t+1), Taiwan,
without MANOWN
BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. BDOWN: the
percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. FINOWN: the ratio of financial
institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the
board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares.
BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total
outstanding shares. GOV I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of
political-related directors to the total number of directors. FATA: the ratio of foreign assets to total assets.
FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
FSE: the number of foreign listed exchange.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tsalue path coefficient t value
BD_Q<-BOARD 1 1
BDOWN <-- BOARD 1.34 2.23** 3.10 1.86*
OUTSIDE <-BOARD -2.67 -2.22** -4.57 -1.85*
FINOWM <-- INST 1 1
BANK_D <~ INST 3.63 6.03*** 3.20 10.80***
CROSS <- INST 2.14 3.22*** 1.95 5.62***
BLOCK <-INST 1.95 3.88*** 1.52 5.78***
GOVOWN <-GOV 1 1
GOV I <- GOV 0.28 6.35*** 0.47 4.34***
GOVAPP <-- GOV 5.59 4.39*** 5.02 7.73***
FATA <~ DOI 1 1
FOROWN <- DOI 0.38 3.41*** 0.33 5.76***
FSTS <- DOI 2.81 6.05*** 2.92 10.12***
FSE <— DOI 0.01 1.82* 0.01 1.03
Direct Effect
BOARD ~> INST -1.26 -1.82* -2.38 -1.75*
BOARD-> GOV -2.67 -1.12 -3.30 -1.59
DOI -> INST 0.24 1.70* 0.19 2.31**
DOI -> GOV 0.67 1.04 0.35 2.05**
DOI ~> BOARD 0.29 2.23** 0.15 1.86*
Indirect Effect
DOI—>BOARD—>INST -0.37 -2.42*** -0.36 -3 99* * *
DOI~>BOARD~>GOV -0.77 -1.20 -0.50 -2 72* * *
Total Effect
DOI-> INST -0.13 -4.46*** -0.17 -8.11***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A4-7 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Taiwan
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. MANOWN: the
percentage of managerial ownership. BD_Q: the percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in
other companies. FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. BANKD: the
ratio of the number of bank representatives on the board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN:
the ratio of government shares to total outstanding shares. GOV APP: the ratio of the number of political-related
directors to the total number of directors. GOV_I: the number of government investors. FOROWN: the ratio of
foreign shares to total outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. FATA: the ratio of foreign
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient t value path coefficient t value
BDOWN <--BOARD 1 1
OUTSIDE <-BOARD -0.48 -3.41*** -0.48 -5.43***
MANOWN <- BOARD 0.39 7.17*** 0.38 10.98***
BD_Q<-BOARD -0.15 -0.90 0.003 0.02
FINOWM <- INST 1 1
BANK_D <~ INST 4.34 5.64*** 3.94 9.22***
CROSS<-INST 1.74 3.06*** 1.27 3.83***
BLOCK <-INST 1.65 3.24*** 2.08 5.94***
GOVOWN <-GOV 1 1
GOV_APP <- GOV 5.50 4.17*** 5.47 6.17***
GOVI <-- GOV 0.51 2.74*** 0.57 4.51***
FOROWN <-DOI 1 1
FSTS <~ DOI 10.95 3.39*** 8.20 6.14***
FATA <~ DOI 3.72 3.36*** 2.64 5.92***
FSE <— DOI 0.02 1.75* 0.02 2.70***
Direct Effect
INST --> BOARD -1.50 -3.53*** -1.31 -4.64* * *
GOV->BOARD -0.11 -1.38 -0.10 -1.47
INST —> DOI -0.51 -2.64*** -0.78 -4.55***
GOV-> DOI -0.01 -0.43 0.04 1.59
BOARD-> DOI 0.10 2.83*** 0.13 4.83***
Indirect Effect
INST ~> BOARD -> DOI -0.15 -2.34** -0.17 -3.68***
GOV -> BOARD -> DOI -0.02 -1.20 -0.01 -1.36
Total Effect
INST-> DOI -0.66 -2.82*** -0.95 -4.79* * *






: p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table A4-8 Structural parameters: Governance (t) and DOI (t+1), Taiwan,
without MANOWN
BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership. OUTSIDE: the percentage of outside directors. BD_Q: the
percentage of directors who occupy more than three positions in the company. FINOWN: the ratio of financial
institutions shares to total outstanding shares BANKD: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the
board to the total number of directors. CROSS: the ratio of institutional shares to total outstanding shares.
BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. GOVOWN: the ratio of government shares to total
outstanding shares. GOV_I: the absolute number of government investors. GOVAPP: the ratio of the number of
political-related directors to the total number of directors. FOROWN: the ratio of foreign shares to total
outstanding shares. FSTS: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. FATA: the ratio of foreign assets to total assets.
2001-2003 data Normalised data
Description of path path coefficient tvalue path coefficient tvalue
BDOWN <-BOARD 1 1
OUTSIDE <-BOARD -1.78 -5.43*** -1.89 -8.78***
BD_Q<-BOARD 0.2 0.75 0.06 0.34
FINOWM <- INST 1 1
BANKD <~ INST 4.3 5.64*** 4.26 8.31***
CROSS <~ INST 1.71 3.00*** 2.76 3 Q7***
BLOCK <--INST 1.73 334*** 2.23 5.63***
GOVOWN <-GOV 1 1
GOVI <-- GOV 0.36 2.37** 0.37 2.47**
GOV APP <- GOV 4.92 5.03*** 4.92 5.01***
FOROWN <-DOI 1 1
FSTS <- DOI 9.03 3.87*** 10.38 5.83***
FATA <~ DOI 3.24 3.77*** 3.33 3 "j3***
FSE <— DOI 0.02 1.97** 0.02 2 94* * *
Direct Effect
INST -> BOARD -1.43 -3.65*** -1.75 -5.46***
GOV -> BOARD -0.17 -2.33** -0.17 -3.32***
INST ~> DOI 0.35 0.45 0.16 0.29
GOV -> DOI 0.11 1.20 0.08 1.50
BOARD -> DOI 0.80 1.49 0.61 1.91*
Indirect Effect
INST ~> BOARD ~> DOI -1.14 -1.36 -1.07 -1.77*
GOV-> BOARD-> DOI -0.14 -1.37 -0.10 -1.78*
Total Effect
INST-> DOI -0.79 -3.05*** -0.91 -4.50***






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Appendix 5: Granger causality test
Based on prior literature, the relationship between pay and performance can be a
two-way causation. For example, given the absence of long-term incentives such as
share options and the infant capital market in China, Buck et al. (2006) suggest that
the pay-performance analysis can separately focus on the performance-^pay and
pay->performance. Using a Granger causality test, Buck et al. (2006) demonstrate
that there are two-way causal links between pay and performance in the short run.
In order to test whether the relationship between pay and performance in Taiwan is
also a two-way causation, we also conduct panel Granger causality test in this thesis.
The equations are as follows.
n n




where i = 1,...., N; t = 1,..., T, n and p are lag lengths. In this case, Y and X are pay
and performance respectively, which are assumed to have a two-way relationship. In
the performance dimension (X), we include three different variables - TSR, ROE,
and ROA. Y here represents average top executives' total compensation (ATEC)209.
The sample period is relatively short term from 2001 to 2004.
Using a Wald test, the null hypothesis that 'Y does not Granger cause X' will be
rejected if the a2k are jointly significant. Similarly, the null hypothesis that 'X does
not Granger cause Y' will be rejected if the (j)lk are jointly significant. Hiltz-Eakin
et al. (1988) find that the non-stationary problem often occurs in time-series data
when the number of cross-sectional units is much larger than the number of time
periods (T). In order to obtain consistent estimators, which allow us to adopt the
standard distribution for the Wald test statistics, we use the first difference of pay and
209 Please refer to Section 9.3 for the calculation of average top executives' compensation.
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performance variables and generalised method of moments (GMM) (Buck et al.,
• 911
2006). The set of control variables as used in Chapter 10 are also included .
Table A5-1 Results of the panel Granger causality test
Causality Group Wald Test Inference
Alog(Pay)-> A(TSR) GLC 1.142 No
Non-GLCs 1.237 No
Alog(Pay)-> A(ROE) GLC 0.921 No
Non-GLCs 0.138 No
Alog(Pay)-> A(ROA) GLC 1.030 No
Non-GLCs 0.256 No
A(TSR)-> Alog(Pay) GLC 4.673** Yes
Non-GLCs 0.220 No
A(ROE)-> Alog(Pay) GLC 0.583 No
Non-GLCs 2.360* Yes
A(ROA)-> Alog(Pay) GLC 0.626 No
Non-GLCs 3.878** Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The results in Table A3-1 demonstrate that pay in Taiwan does not Granger causes
performance. However, the reverse causation running from performance to pay does
not always be supported in Table A3-1. Nevertheless, the results summarised in Table
A3-1 reveal that pay does not Granger cause performance in Taiwan. The reasons
which support that there is a two-way causal links between pay and performance in
Buck et al. (2006) are the absence of long-term incentives and the infancy of capital
market in China. However, these considerations do not hold in Taiwan because the
adoption of restricted shares and warrants in Taiwan has recently become
commonplace and the capital market is also relatively mature. Therefore, similar to
other Western executive pay studies (e.g. Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Buck et al.,
2003), we focus on performances->pay relations in this thesis.
210 The software used here is Eview.
211 These control variables are - RD: the ratio of R&D expense to total sales. OUTSIDE: the
percentage of outside directors. BANK D: the ratio of the number of bank representatives on the
board to the total number of directors. CHAIR: a dummy variable which measures CEO duality.
BLOCK: the percentage of blockholder ownership. BDOWN: the percentage of board ownership.
FINOWN: the ratio of financial institutions shares to total outstanding shares. CROSS: the ratio of
institutional shares to total outstanding shares. MANOWN: the percentage of managerial ownership.
LEVERAGE: the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. SIZE: the natural logarithm of total assets.
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